



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-5995

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

AUG 09 2007

Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Mr. John Young
CRYPTOME
251 West 89th Street
Suite 6E
New York, New York 10024

Dear Mr. Young:

References:

- a. Your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of March 29, 2001, for records pertaining to East Germany Intelligence Services MO, ZF400208W. Your request was received in this office on May 7, 2001.
- b. Our letter of April 20, 2001, informing you that we needed additional time to review the records and that we were unable to comply with the statutory 20-day time limit in processing your request.
- c. Our letter dated May 17, 2001, informing you that various records from your request of March 29, 2001 were forwarded to the National Archives and Records Administration.
- d. Our letter of March 23, 2006, re-assuring you that we are still reviewing the records you requested and will respond to you once the review has been completed.

We have completed a mandatory declassification review in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 12958, as amended. As a result of our review, information has been sanitized from the record, and 114 pages are denied in their entirety, as the information is currently and properly classified SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL according to Sections 1.2 (a)(2), 1.2(a)(3), 1.4(b), 1.4(c) and 1.4(d) of EO 12958, as amended. This information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA pursuant to Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(1). On March 9, 1999, the President exempted the files series in which these records are maintained from the automatic declassification provisions of EO 12958, as amended, Section 3.4, pertaining to classified records more than 25 years old. It is not possible to segregate meaningful portions of the withheld pages for release. A brief description of the applicable sections follows:

Section 1.2(a)(2) of EO 12958, as amended, provides that information shall be classified SECRET if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security.

Section 1.2(a)(3) of EO 12958, as amended, provides that information shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL if its unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security.

Section 1.4(b) of EO 12958, as amended, provides that information pertaining to foreign government information shall be considered for classification protection.

Section 1.4(c) of EO 12958, as amended, provides that information pertaining to intelligence activities, intelligence sources or methods, and cryptologic information shall be considered for classification protection.

Section 1.4(d) of EO 12958, as amended, provides that information pertaining foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources shall be considered for classification protection.

Information has been sanitized as the release of the information would result in an unwarranted invasion of the privacy rights of the individuals concerned, this information is exempt from the public disclosure provisions of the FOIA per Title 5 U.S. Code 552 (b)(6).

The withholding of the information described above is a partial denial of your request. This denial is made on behalf of Major General John Defreitas, III, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, who is the Initial Denial Authority for Army intelligence investigative and security records under the FOIA. You have the right to appeal this decision to the Secretary of the Army. If you wish to file an appeal, you should forward it to this office. Your appeal must be post marked no later than 60 calendar days from the date of this letter. After the 60-day period, the case may be considered closed; however, such closure does not preclude you from filing litigation in the courts.

During the processing of your request, records were disclosed that originated with other government agencies. This office has no authority to release these records; therefore, they are being referred, along with your request, for appropriate action under the FOIA, and direct reply to you.

Additionally, during the processing of your request, records and excerpts were disclosed that originated with other government agencies. This office has no authority to release these records and excerpts; therefore, we will inform you as to the releasability of the information upon completion of our coordination.

If you have any questions concerning this action, feel free to contact this office at (301) 677-4743. Please refer to case #116F-06.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Susan J. Butterfield". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, stylized "S" and "B".

Susan J. Butterfield

Director

Freedom of Information/Privacy Office
Investigative Records Repository

Enclosure

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

Mr. John Young
Cryptome
251 West 89th Street, Suite 6E
New York, NY 10024

FEB 21 2008

Reference: F-2007-01922 / Army FOIA #116F-06

Dear Mr. Young:

In the course of processing your 29 March 2001 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for records pertaining to the "East Germany Intelligence Services MO, ZF400208," the Department of the Army located CIA material and referred it to us for review and direct response to you.

We have reviewed the material and determined that it is properly classified and must be denied in its entirety on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). An explanation of exemptions is enclosed.

You have the right to appeal these determinations by addressing your appeal to the Agency Release Panel within 45 days from the date of this letter, in my care. Should you find it necessary to do so, please explain the basis of your appeal.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Scott Koch".

Scott Koch
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE
F-2007-01922
FOR REQUESTER

Explanation of Exemptions

Freedom of Information Act:

- (b)(1) applies to material which is properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of national defense or foreign policy;
- (b)(2) applies to information which pertains solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of the Agency;
- (b)(3) applies to information pertaining to the CIA Director's statutory obligations to protect from disclosure intelligence sources and methods, as well as the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency, in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947 and/or the CIA Act of 1949;
- (b)(4) applies to information such as trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person on a privileged or confidential basis;
- (b)(5) applies to inter- and intra-agency memoranda or letters which are predecisional and deliberative in nature, or consist of attorney work-product or attorney-client information;
- (b)(6) applies to information, the release of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of other individuals; and
- (b)(7) applies to investigatory records, the release of which could: (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of others, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of an individual.

Privacy Act:

- (d)(5) applies to information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action or proceeding;
- (j)(1) applies to polygraph records; documents or segregable portions of documents, the release of which would disclose intelligence sources and methods, including names of certain Agency employees and organizational components; and documents or information provided by foreign governments;
- (k)(1) applies to material properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of national defense or foreign policy;
- (k)(2) applies to investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes;
- (k)(5) applies to investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment, or access to classified information, the release of which would disclose a confidential source; and
- (k)(6) applies to testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service, the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process.

THIS MUST REMAIN TOP DOCUMENT

DOSSIER NO. ZFH00208W

Vol I 3 IV

As of 8 NOV 78 all material
(Date)

included in this file conforms with

DA policies currently in effect.

Lois E. Ward 8 NOV 78
(Signature) (Date Signed)

LOISE WARD 7
(Printed Name) (Grade)

REVIEWED FOR RETENTION CRITERIA
UP AR 381-101
REVIEWER John DATE 21 Aug 82
Sen L. Shaw (Aug 82)

THIS MUST REMAIN TOP DOCUMENT

Review on
13 Dec 88

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

3 May 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

Region XI, 66th CIC Group, APO 800, US Army

SUBJECT

East German Intelligence - MFS -
 Bezirk Chemnitz
 Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
 USUALLY RELIABLE B
 FAIRLY RELIABLE C
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
 UNRELIABLE E
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
 PROBABLY TRUE 2
 POSSIBLY TRUE 3
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
 IMPROBABLE 5
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1.

b1

SOURCE: "A-XI"

2.

b1

SOURCE: "B-XI"

(B-3)

(COMMENT:)

b1

DISTRIBUTION

2-00, 66th CIC Group
 1-Region File

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
 DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

2

WD AGO FORM 568
1 JUN 47

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b6

XI-557213/4

3 May 1956

Region XI, 66th CIC Group, APO 800, US Army

East German Intelligence - M28 -

Bezirk Chemnitz

Re: Modus Operandi

b1

~~EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE~~

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HEADQUARTERS REGION III
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 757 US ARMY

CIC
CENTRAL
FILE

Ft Holabird

1 June 1956

D-567243

SUBJECT: East German Intelligence - MFS - Bezirk CHEMNITZ (u)

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: AEUC-OCE

1. REFERENCE: Headquarters Ops Memo 4/55, revised 31 October 1955, Region XI Summary of Information, dated 14 May 1956, subject and file as above, and Headquarters teletype message F-41636.

2. FORWARDED: One (1) Summary of Information, dated 3 May 1956, subject and file as above.

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Sources: Source "A-XI" is Station D, Service Detachment (7746), APO 696. Source "B-XI" is P-50-XI.

b. Evaluation of Sources: Both Sources are evaluated B.

c. Relationship of Sources to Target: Source "A-XI" through assigned duties. Source [b1]

d. How Information Was Obtained: Source "A-XI" through normal assigned duties. Source "B-XI" through participation.

e. Date Information Was Obtained: Source "A-XI" on 21 March 1956. Source "B-XI" on 24 March 1956.

f. Date on which Information Was Reported to Agent: Source "A-XI" on 22 March 1956. Source "B-XI" on 31 March 1956.

g. Other Data Affecting Accuracy of Information: None

h. Status of Case. Coverage continues.

4. REMARKS:

4

a. Source of information contained in message K-3676 was P-50-XI.

b. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

1 Incl
SOI, dtd 3 May 56

[b6] /etw/Ofb Mil 802

~~EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION~~

[b6]

Lt Col

Inf

Commanding

AA37

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL

(Classification and Control Markings)

5230

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report. DU-1153-73

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY	8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 0565 74 (5004-03)
2. SUBJECT: b1	9. DATE OF REPORT: 23 January 1974
3. ISC NUMBER:	10. NO. OF PAGES: 6
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: March 1969	11. REFERENCES: CIR: U-GEF-G9006 DIRM: 6A2a, 6A2b, 686a, 687a, 687e, 6C, 6D1, 7A6
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: b1	12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group, APO NY 09108
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE DOC INFORMATION	13. PREPARED BY: b6
7. SOURCE: Red No: 210364 b1	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: b6 JL, MI Commanding

15. SUMMARY: (Leave Blank)

(U) Information in this report responds to paragraph 12a (1) (g) (k), (4), (5), (a) (c) (d) and (e) of cited CIR.

(c) **b1**

U 21587

RECEIVED IN DS-4C2

1 FEB 74 10 06Z

271

REPORT:

1. (c) Source

b1

201100
201710
201120
201300
202600
202800
202510
202510

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: 1-DIA 3-USAREUR The following are w/o encl 1-USEUCOM 1-V Corps 1-EUDAC 1-ACSI 1-IRCD 1-430th MI Det 1-766th MI Det	17. DOWNGRADING DATA: b1 SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY (1) DECLASSIFY ON NOTIFICATION BY ORIGINATOR 5 CONFIDENTIAL (Classification and Control Markings)	18. ENCLOSURE DATA: 1 Encl: (c) b1 1 cy, 13 pgs ENCLOSURE HAS NOT BEEN REPRODUCED REQUEST ENCL FRO? DS-4A
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DD FORM 1396 1 SEP 62

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 218 0565 74
PAGE 2 OF 6 PAGES
ORIGINATOR
66th MI Group,
APO New York 09108

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2. (c)

b1

3. (c)

b1

4. (c)

b1

6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DD FORM 1396c

REPLACE DA FORM 100-1, 1 AUG 60
AND DA FORM 606, 1 AUG 60 WHICH

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 218 0565 74
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ORIGINATOR
66th MI Group,
APO New York 09108

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5. (c)

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7
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CONTINUATION SHEET

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(Classification and Control Markings)

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APO New York 09108

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b1

6. (c)

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7. (c)

b1

8. (c)

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8

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(Classification and Control Markings)

DD FORM 1396c

REPLACE FORM 1044-1, 1 AUG 69

AND DA FORM 100, 1 AUG 60 WHICH
MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 61

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 9

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 218 0565 74

PAGE 5 OF 6 PAGES

ORIGINATOR
86th MI Group,
APO New York 09108

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9. (S)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 9

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 218 0565 74

PAGE 6 OF 6 PAGES

ORIGINATOR
66th MI Group
APO New York 09108

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10

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(Classification and Control Markings)

DD FORM 1396c

REPLACES DA FORM 1396, 1 AUG 66

AND DA FORM 100, 1 AUG 66 WHICH

MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 68

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY:	EAST GERMANY	8. REPORT NUMBER:	2.218.9009 73 (5005-01)
2. SUBJECT: (U)	State Security (MFS) Informant Activities	9. DATE OF REPORT:	11 September 1973
3. SEC NUMBER:		10. NO. OF PAGES:	5
4. DATE OF INFORMATION:	October 1972	11. REFERENCES:	CIR-U-GEF-G9006, Para 12a(5)(a) DIRM: 687
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ:	Munich, Germany 5 September 1973	12. ORIGINATOR:	66th MI Gp, APO NY 09108
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE	F INFORMATION 6	13. PREPARED BY:	b6
7. SOURCE:	XX-060-73 Red Nr: 200720	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:	
		COL, MI Commanding	

15. SUMMARY:
(C) This report discloses the methods applied by State Security (MFS) officials in NEURUPPIN and POTSDAM, to coerce Source into becoming their informant, in 1968. As a result, Source was forced to report on co-workers at two places of employment in NEURUPPIN, as well as on other individuals in which the MFS became interested. In the course of the interrogation at UIC Source admitted his MFS connection for the first time since he defected to the FRG in Jul 73.

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882

Oct 1 2 45 PM '73
RECEIVED
DS-402

REPORT:

1. (C) Source.

b1

901950 76c
202410

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:
1-LLO Nord Rhine Westphalia
for b1
1-LLO Lower Saxony
1-LLO Bavaria
1-66th MI Gp, 430th MID
1-66th MI Gp, 766th MID
1-EEIC
1-ACSI
1-IRCD
1-DIA
1-USAREUR
1-EUCOM
1-USAF
1-USASAE
1-V Corps
1-VII Corps
1-USATAU
1-CINCUSNAVEUR
1-CSI
2-PSYOPS
1-511th MIB, ATTN:BA
1-165th MIB, ATTN:BA

DD FORM 1396

17. DOWNGRADING DATA
CLASSIFIED BY DIAM 58-11
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY (2)
DECLASSIFICATION DATE CANNOT BE DETERMINED

11

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(Classification and Control Markings)

18. ENCLOSURE DATA
1 Enclosure
(C) DD Form 1396-1, 1 cy, 3 pgs.

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPORT NO. 2 218 9009 73

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

ORIGINATOR

66th MI Gp, APO NY 09108

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b1

2. (C) by Source, and his subsequent Arrest.

b1

3. (C) Recruiting Pitch.

b1

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DD FORM 1396c

(Classification and Control Markings)

CONTINUATION SHEET

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REPORT NO. 2 218 9009 73

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

ORIGINATOR
66th MI Gp, APO NY 09108

(Classification and Control Markings)

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b1

4. ~~(c)~~ Assignments for the MFS.

b1

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13

(Classification and Control Markings)

CONTINUATION SHEET

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66th MI Gp, APO NY 09108

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14

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DD FORM 1396c

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO 2 218 9009 73

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

ORIGINATOR
66th MI Gp, APO NY 09108

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Erklärung

Hiermit erkläre ich mich bereit fuer das Ministerium fuer Staatssicher-
heiten zu arbeiten. Wenn ich jemals meine hier anvertrauten geheimnisse
zu irgend jemanden preisgebe müsste ich mit schlimmen Folgen rechnen, die
fuer mein weiteres Leben mit meiner Familie von Bedeutung sind.

Decknahme

b1

Statement

I herewith agree to work for the Ministry for State Security Services.

If I should ever reveal to anyone secrets entrusted to me herewith, I
would have to expect serious consequences effecting my future life with
my family.

Cover name

b1

Figure 1. (C) Statement Agreeing to Work for the Ministry for State
Security Services

15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

DD FORM 1396c

REPLACES DA FORM 1396-1, 1 AUG 68
AND DA FORM 504, 1 AUG 68 WHICH
MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 69

GENERAL INFORMATION Encl #1, to IR 2 218 9009 73			
1. COUNTRY EAST GERMANY		2. DATE OF INFORMATION (Yr, mo, day) 1970 - Spring	3. DATE OF REPORT (Yr, mo, day) 1973 September 11
4. NAME a. FULL NAME (Give full name in Roman letters, in natural order, and with natural capitalization. Underline surname, or, if known by name(s) other than surname, underline same. Give phonetic pronunciation of name as appropriate). fmu b6			
b. NAME OR NAMES BY WHICH INDIVIDUAL PREFERS TO BE ADDRESSED (1) IN OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE: unknown (2) ORALLY AT OFFICIAL GATHERINGS: b6			
5. FULL NAME IN NATURAL ORDER (fmu) b6			
6. VARIANTS, ALIASES OR NICKNAMES b6			
7. POSITION a. PRESENT POSITION unknown; believed to be in POTSDAM As of Spring 70		b. DATE ASSUMED POSITION (Year, month, day) unknown	
c. RANK/TITLE (In English and Native language) First Lieutenant (Oberleutnant)		d. DATE OF RANK (Yr, mo, day) unknown	
8. SERVICE Ministry of Interior		9. BRANCH OF SERVICE State Security Service (MFS)	
10. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH (Town, State, Province, Country) DOB: b6 POB: b6			11. SEX Male
12. PRESENT ADDRESS (including unit location if applicable) Possibly POTSDAM (street address unknown)		13. TELEPHONE NO unknown	
14. NATIONALITY German	15. RACE Caucasian	16. PHOTO SUBMITTED <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	
17. CITIZENSHIP (Indicate dual citizenship where applicable) East German		18. RELIGION <input type="checkbox"/> PRACTICING <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NONPRACTICING	
19. TITLES AND HONORIFICS (Prince, Doctor, Pandit, etc.) None		20. MARITAL STATUS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MARRIED <input type="checkbox"/> SINGLE <input type="checkbox"/> DIVORCED <input type="checkbox"/> WIDOWED	
21. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION			
22. AGE 38-40	23. BEARD <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	24. MUSTACHE <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	25. TEETH (Natural) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO
26. PROMINENT OR UNUSUAL FEATURES (Moles, scars, birthmarks, etc.) Gold-tooth in upper jaw. Hook nose. Wavy hair. Sun tanned.			
27. COLOR EYES Blue	28. COLOR HAIR Black	29. BALD <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	30. HEIGHT 1.80 m
31. BUILD (Small, medium, large) Large	32. POSTURE Hunchback	33. WEIGHT 80 kg	
34. PHYSICAL DEFECTS unknown		35. GENERAL STATE OF HEALTH unknown	
36. HARD OF HEARING <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO		37. GLASSES <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	
38. PERSONAL BACKGROUND			
39. CIVIL EDUCATION (List schools, location(s), major course, degree(s), honors, and inclusive dates (Year, month, day). Unknown			
40. LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY (Include dialects, degree of fluency, and ability to act as translator/interpreter). German (native)			
41. TRAVEL (List countries, dates, and purpose). Unknown			

37. MILITARY SERVICE (a. List military career in chronological order. Include: Military schooling; promotions; demotions; foreign service; units served with and positions held; location of school or unit; (b. List awards and decorations together with circumstances surrounding unusual award/decoration.)

Unknown

38. EMPLOYMENT OTHER THAN MILITARY SERVICE (List employers, positions, skills, locations, and inclusive dates (Year, month, day).)

Unknown

39. MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS (Professional, social, military, others; give inclusive dates (Year, month, day).)

Communist Party (SED)

17

Unknown

41. PREFERENCES (Personal preference in food, drink, tobacco, entertainment, sports, hobbies.)

Unknown

42. PUBLISHED WORKS (Title of article or book; if article, name of publication appearing in, date published, publisher.)

Unknown

SPOUSE - FAMILY

43. FULL NAME OF SPOUSE

Unknown

44. MAIDEN NAME OF SPOUSE

Unknown

45. DATE (Year, month, day) AND PLACE OF BIRTH

DOB: 1935-1938; POB: unk

46. NATIONALITY (Indicate dual citizenship where applicable)

German

47. RACE

Caucasian

48. RELIGION

☐ PRACTICING

☒ NONPRACTICING

49. BACKGROUND (Education; languages; preference in food and drink; hobbies; preference in entertainment; special interests; professional societies.)

Unknown

50. CHILDREN (Names, sex, ages, marital status, other items of interest such as schools, health, military service.)

1 son, about 15 years old. He attended Elementary School (Rosa Luxemburg Schule) in NEURUPPIN prior to Spring 1970.

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)
NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

19-25

CONFIDENTIAL

TRANSMIT TO THE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

EGIS

VZCZCSCD022 05#8800 REUP 301904 1431344
PTTCZYUW RUFLFDA1826 1431206-CCCC--RUEADWD.
ZNY CCCCC

~~P 230915 7 MAY 73~~

FM 165TH MI BN FKFT GER
TO RUFLMMA//CDR 66TH MI GP MUNICH GER//AEUMI-TA//
RUEKJCS//DIA, WASH DC//DS-4C//
RUEADWD//ACSI, DA WASH DC//DAMI-DDO-H//
RUFTOWA//CG VII CORPS MOHRINGEN GER//AETSGB//
RUFLEVA//CDR BERLIN STA 766 TH MID BERLIN GER//AEUMI-D-M//
RUFTYGA//CDR 2ND ACR NUERNBERG GER//AETSAC//
RUFTWLA//511TH MI BN NUERNBERG GER//AEUMI-N-DBO//
RUSNAAA/EUCOM, USCINCEUR VAHIGEN GER//ECJB-A//

~~P 230900Z MAY 73~~

FM OIC FULDA BRD 165TH MI BN FULDA FRG
TO DDCS: USAREUR HEIDELBERG GER//AEAGB-PDN//AEAGB-P(CISIC)
AEAGB-C4CM, AEAGB-CI//
DIA, WASH DC//DS-4C//
CDR 66TH MI GP MUNICH GER//AEUMI-TA//
INFO RR EUCOM, USCINCEUR VAHIGEN GER//ECJB-A//
USAFE-CDR USAFE WIESBADEN GER//INCR//
ACSI, DA WASH DC//DAMI-DDO-H//
RUFLFDA/RI V CORPS FRANKFURT GER//AETVGB
RUFTOWA//CG VII CORPS MOHRINGEN GER//AETSGB//
UFTBB/CDR BERLIN STA 766TH MID BERLIN GER//AEUMI-D-M//
RUFTOWA//CDR 2ND ACR NUERNBERG GER//AETSAC//
RUFTE/511TH MI BN NUERNBERG GER//AEUMI-N-DBO//
ZEN/CDR 11TH ACR FULDA GER//AETO-S//
ZEN/CDR 165TH MI BN FRANKFURT GER//AEUMI-F-D//
ZEN/DIC KASSEL FD 165TH MI BN KASSEL GER//AEUMI-F-K//
ZEN/DIC ESCHWEGE BRD 165TH MI BN ESCHWEGE GER//AEUMI-F-E//
ZEN/DIC BAD HERSF BRD 165TH MI BN BAD HERSFELD GER//AEUMI-E--BH//
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL AEUMI-F-FU-0035-73 (810222)~~

THIS IS IR NO: 2212 2133 73

1. EAST GERMANY
2. LETTER DROP ON FRG/CDR BORDER

PAGE 3 RUFLFDA1826 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
3. N/A

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26

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ON 18 JUNE 1998
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5230.1R

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

4. 14 MAY 73
5. FULDA (NB 4800), FRG, 17 MAY 73
6. E-6

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8. 2212 2133 73 (B10222) (G)

9. 23 MAY 73

10. 4

11. 6B6A, 6B7A

12. 66TH MI GROUP

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COL, MI, COMMANDING

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230900Z May 73

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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CONFIDENTIAL

(Classification and Control Markings)

EGIS

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY
2. SUBJECT: (C) MFS Activities in West Germany
3. ISC NUMBER:
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: December 1972
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: b1
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE DOC INFORMATION
7. SOURCE: Red No: 206211
b1
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 4765 73 (5004-01)
9. DATE OF REPORT: 25 April 1973
10. NO. OF PAGES: 4
11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 6B7a, 7A5, 6C
12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group, APO New York 09108
13. PREPARED BY: b6
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: COL, MI Commanding

15. SUMMARY:

(C)

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238

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REPORT:

1. (C)

b1

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16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA
3-USAREUR
The following are w/o encl
1-EUCOM
1-USAF
1-V Corps
1-VII Corps
1-EEIC
1-IRCD
1-66th MI Gp, 430th MI Det
1-66th MI Gp, 766th MI Det
1-CINCUSNAVEUR
1-OSI
1-PSYOPS

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

b1
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY (1)
DECLASSIFICATION DATE CANNOT BE

29

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

1 Encl:
(C) b1
REQUEST ENCL FROM DS-44
ENCL HAS NOT BEEN REPRODUCED

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DD FORM 1396
1 SEP 62

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

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REPORT NO. 2 218 4765 73
PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES
ORIGINATOR
66th MI Group,
APO New York 09108

2. (c)

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3. (c)

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4. (c)

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5. (c)

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30

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CONTINUATION SHEET

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REPORT NO. 2 218 4765 73
PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES
ORIGINATOR
66th MI Group,
APO New York 09108

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6. (C)

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7. (C)

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REPORT NO. 2 218 4765 73
PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES
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66th MI Group,
APO New York 09108

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8. (C)

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EGIS

1. COUNTRY:	EAST GERMANY	8. REPORT NUMBER:	2 218 4791 73(5004-01)
2. SUBJECT:	(C) b1	9. DATE OF REPORT:	24 April 1973
3. ISC NUMBER:		10. NO. OF PAGES:	3
4. DATE OF INFORMATION:	1967	11. REFERENCES:	DIRM: 6B7, 7A6
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ:	b1	12. ORIGINATOR:	66th MI Gp, APO NY 09108
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE	DOC	13. PREPARED BY:	b6
7. SOURCE:	Red No: 205075 b1	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:	COL, MI Commanding

15. SUMMARY:	(C) b1	(Leave Blank)
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REPORT

1. (C) Source

b1

2. (C) Flight to West Germany

b1

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:	17. DOWNGRADING DATA:	18. ENCLOSURE DATA:
1-DIA 3-USAREUR -1-w/o encl 1-EUCOM- w/o encl 1-USAF- w/o encl 1-V Corps- w/o encl 1-EEIC- w/o encl 1-IRCD- w/o encl 1-66th MI Gp, 430th MID-w/o encl 1-66th MI Gp, 766th MID-w/o encl 1-USASPD- w/o encl 1-CINCUSNAVEUR- w/o encl 1-OSI- w/o encl 1-PSY OPS- w/o encl	b1 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DE-CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 1 DECLASSIFICATION DATE CAN- NOT BE DETERMINED	1 Encl: (C) b1 1 cy 6 pgs

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DD FORM 1396
1 SEP 62

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REF ID: A2 218 4791 73

PAGE 2
ORIGINATOR

PAGES 3

66th MI Gp, APO NY 09108

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3. (c)

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4. (C)

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Page(s) 36-41

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42-43

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(Classification and Control Markings)

63

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY	8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 3688 73 (5005-01)
2. SUBJECT: (U) Service with MFS in Lieu of Military Service	9. DATE OF REPORT: 19 April 1973
3. ISC NUMBER:	10. NO. OF PAGES: 2
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: July 1972	11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 6B7; 6C
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: b1	12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Gp APO NY 09108
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE F INFORMATION 6	13. PREPARED BY: b6
7. SOURCE: Red # 215053 XXM-068-72	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: COL, MI Commanding

15. SUMMARY:	(Leave Blank)
<p>(U) This report pertains to the practice of completion of East German military obligation through service with the MFS (Ministerium fuer Staats-sicherheit-Ministry for State Security). Information in this report is based on the experiences of a friend of Source. The Friend's brothers were employees of the MFS at the Time.</p>	
<p>REPORT:</p> <p>1. (C) Source</p> <p>XXM-068-72</p> <p>b1</p>	

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:	17. DOWNGRADING DATA:	18. ENCLOSURE DATA:
<p>1-DIA 5-D1</p> <p>3-USAREUR 1 b1</p> <p>1-EUCOM 3-CCFFA</p> <p>1-USAFE 1-LLO LOWER SAXONY</p> <p>1-USASAE 1-LLO Rheinl./Pfalz</p> <p>1-V Corps 1-LLO North Rhine</p> <p>1-VII Corps Westphalia</p> <p>1-EEIC</p> <p>1-ACSI</p> <p>1-IRCD</p> <p>1-66th MI Gp 430th MI Det</p> <p>1-66th MI Gp, 766th MI Det</p> <p>1-CINCUSNAVEUR</p> <p>1-OSI</p>	<p>CLASSIFIED BY DIAM 58-11</p> <p>EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652</p> <p>EXEMPTION CATEGORY (2)</p> <p>DECLASSIFICATION DATE CANNOT BE DETERMINED</p> <p>44</p> <p>CONFIDENTIAL</p>	<p>None</p>

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REPORT NO. 2 218 3688 73
PAGE 2 of 2 PAGES
ORIGINATOR 66th MI Gp
APO NY 09108

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b1

2. (U) Subject

b6

In the spring of 1972, he was approached by the East German Ministry for State Security (MfS). b6 was offered permanent staff membership in the MfS, in which case he would be released from his 18-month military service obligation. b6 accepted. He was assigned to an U/I duty station in EAST BERLIN with a beginning salary of more than 1000 DME per month. This was more than he was earning at the Academy as a scientist. Moreover, b6 b6 was living in substandard quarters in DRESDEN, while in EAST BERLIN the MfS immediately provided him with a modern 3-room apartment. b6 first names unknown, who are also staff employees of the MfS with U/I positions.

In cases where individuals join the MfS in lieu of military service, the approach is always made by the MfS. Young men of draft age in the GDR cannot avoid their military obligation by applying for employment with the MfS.

3. (U) Comment on Source

Source was a highly intelligent individual with an excellent memory and astute powers of observation. His cooperation was superb during the entire interrogation.

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522A

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EGIS

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY
2. SUBJECT: (U) MFS Recruitment of Informant in EGA BC
3. ISC NUMBER:
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: January 1973
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Munich, Germany 1 March 1973
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE F INFORMATION 6
7. SOURCE: Red # 205082
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 3277 73 (5005-01)
9. DATE OF REPORT: 28 March 1973
10. NO. OF PAGES: 3
11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 6B7
12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Gp, APO NY 09108
13. PREPARED BY: b6
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: COL, MY Commanding

15. SUMMARY:

(U) This report describes the recruiting, as informant of * EGA BC border guard (EM) by the MFS (Ministerium fuer Staatsicherheit: Ministry for State Security) and the duties he was required to perform.

Reference is made to IR 2 218 3247 73 subject (U) MFS CPT b6 and IR 2 218 3275 73, (U) MFS LT(Sr) fnu b1

REPORT

1. (U) Source

b1

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA 3-CCFFA
3-USAREUR 10 b1 (G)
1-EUCOM 1-LLO Hessen
1-USAFE 1-LLO Schleswig-Holstein
2-USASAE
1-V Corps 1-LLO Bavaria
1-VII Corps 1-LLO Lower Saxony
1-EEIC
1-IRCD
1-66th MI Gp, 430th MID
1-66th MI Gp, 766th MID
1-USASPD
1-CINCPAC
1-OSI 5 b1
1 b1

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

CLASSIFIED BY DIAM 58-11
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY (2)
DECLASSIFICATION DATE CANNOT BE DETERMINED

None

46

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DD FORM 1396
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FORM NO. 2 218 277 73
PAGE 3
ORIGINATOR
66th MI Gp, APO NY 09108

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b1

Source is of average intelligence and was cooperative during exploitation. He escaped from the GDR for political reasons.

2. (U) Recruitment of Source by the MfS (Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit: Ministry for State Security)

b1 Source b1
b1 received a message to report to the office of the Company CO. When he got there, he was informed by the Deputy CO, Capt b6 b6 (an MfS Mitarbeiter) that he should go to the postoffice in b6 to pick up a telegram.

Source went by bicycle to the postoffice and found no telegram. He was returning to the casern when he was overtaken by a blue Trabant POV (license number b6). The driver, in uniform, hailed Source by name and told him to follow his car into the nearby forest. Source obeyed.

The man in uniform introduced himself as Sgt (Emu) b6 and showed Source his ID card. b6 told Source that he b6 was the MfS officer of the b6.

During the conversation, b6 asked Source if he would like to cooperate (mitarbeiten) with the MfS. b6 then stated that Source's "troubles" in the past were known to the MfS but would be forgotten if Source chose to assist the MfS. These "troubles" consisted of Source's having been apprehended and fined for having illegally crossed the border into Poland. Source, already planning to escape as soon as the opportunity presented itself, inquired as to the nature of the cooperation with the MfS. He was told that he would be asked to observe the mood of the troops in the 4th CO and to prepare successive reports on this mood. If any of the troops revealed the desire or plan to defect, Source was to inform the Company CO immediately. Otherwise, b6 would pick up his report in about two months' time.

b6 asked Source to write out the following statement which, in English, reads as follows:

"I herewith declare that I voluntarily cooperate with the MfS and that I will not speak about this work with other members of the BGA or any other armed forces nor with any member of the civilian population unless they have given the code word.

I pledge myself to present the truth in my reports as nearly as it is possible to do so.

As code name I select b1 and a code word, b1
b1

My cooperation with the MfS is to cease when my military service ends."

22.10.72

b1

After the statement had been written out by Source, b6 mentioned that should Source ever find himself in need of any funds, b6 would be happy to let him have some, which Source need not repay. Source said that it was also well-known to him that, should he provide information about anyone planning to defect, he would be given an extra leave.

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REPORT NO. 2 218 3277 73
PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES
ORIGINATOR
66th MI Gp, APO NY 09108

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b6 did not mention this, however. Source added that he never asked for, nor received, any money from b6 during the period 22 Nov 72 - 5 Feb 73, and that he took only his regular leaves. b6 repeated that he would get in touch with Source in about mid-Dec 72 by calling him through the Company to come to BOYZENBURG. In Dec 72, Source was instructed to report to the office of the Company CO. He did so, and was sent to a nearby room where b6 was waiting for him. At this meeting, b6 asked Source to put a newly arrived EM, Uwe b6 under surveillance. b6 had been reported, from basic training, for having made remarks which were politically suspicious. Source had already had several talks with b6 and liked him. He therefore, offered to prepare a report on b6 immediately. The report was a white-wash of b6. Source did not mention this report to b6 until they had subsequently both defected and were on FRG territory. Meanwhile he cultivated b6 friendship and they decided to defect together, when the opportunity presented itself.

On 25 Jan 73, Source was instructed to report to the Company CO. When he got to Hqs, Capt b6 instructed him to go to the postoffice in b6 to pick up a telegram. He found b6 waiting outside the postoffice in his blue Trabant auto. Source got into the auto and they drove into the nearby forest. Source did not have any written report for b6, so b6 asked him about the mood and opinions of the troops. Source gave b6 some vague information about the general mood of the troops. b6 then instructed Source to begin surveillance of an EM, PFC b6 who was being considered for the position of patrol leader and had to be approved or disapproved by the MfS.

b6 asked Source during this final meeting on 26 Jan 73, if Source would not find it more convenient to turn in his reports to a man in the 4th Co who had long been a cooperator (Mitarbeiter) with the MfS and who had access by telephone to b6. Source accepted this offer. The man was b6.

About ten days later, on 5 Feb 73, at 0700 hrs, Source and b6 defected while on patrol duty together. They defected by crossing the border where they knew there were no mines.

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ON JUN 18 1996
BY CDR USA/SCUM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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HG-1103-73

EGIS

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY
2. SUBJECT: (U) LEIPZIG (5119N-1220E) (US1489) MES Surveillance Activities
3. ISC NUMBER:
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: b1
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: b1
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE DOC INFORMATION
7. SOURCE: Red No: 206220
b1
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 3676 73 (5004-01)
9. DATE OF REPORT: 27 March 1973
10. NO. OF PAGES: 1
11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 6B7a; 6A2a
12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Gp APO NY 09108
13. PREPARED BY: b6
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: COL, MI Commanding

15. SUMMARY:

(Leave Blank)

b1

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA
3-USAREUR
The following w/o encl:
1-EUCOM
1-USAFE
1-V Corps
1-VII Corps
1-EEIC
1-IRCD
1-66th MI Gp, 430th MID
1-66th MI Gp, 766th MID
1-USASPD
1-CINCUSNAVEUR
1-OSI
1-PSYOPS

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

b1
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY (1)
DECLASSIFICATION DATE
CANNOT BE DETERMINED

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

1 Encl:
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1 cy, 5 pgs.

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HG-1068-73

EGIS

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY	8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 3208 73 (5004-01)
2. SUBJECT: (U) EAST BERLIN (5231N-1323E) (UU9f19), MFS Interrogation Activities	9. DATE OF REPORT: 14 March 1973
3. ISC NUMBER:	10. NO. OF PAGES: 2
	11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 6A2a, 6c
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: b1	12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Gp APO 09108 New York
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: b1	13. PREPARED BY: b6
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE DOC INFORMATION	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: COL/MI Commanding
7. SOURCE: Red No: 206210 b1	

15. SUMMARY: (Leave Blank)

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16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:	17. DOWNGRADING DATA:	18. ENCLOSURE DATA:
1-DIA 3-USAREUR Following w/o encl: 1-EUCOM 1-USAFE 1-V Corps 1-VII Corps 1-EEIC 1-IRCD 1-66th MI Gp, 430th MI Det 1-66th MI Gp, 766th MI Det 1-CINCUSNAVEUR 1-OSI 1-PSYOPS	CLASSIFIED BY b1 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY (1) DECLASSIFICATION DATE CANNOT BE DETERMINED RECEIVED 55 CONFIDENTIAL (Classification and Control Markings)	1 Encl: (U) b1 1 cy, 6 pgs

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NO. 2 218 3208 73
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ORIGINATOR

66th MI Gp
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Page(s) 57-62

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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(Classification and Control Markings)

BO4193 (C)

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93-023-73

EGIS

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY	8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 212 0249 73
2. SUBJECT: DEBRIEFING OF MFS Agent: b1	9. DATE OF REPORT: 8 March 1973
b1 (U)	10. NO. OF PAGES: 5
3. ISC NUMBER:	11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 60, 7A6
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: January 1970-February 1973	12. ORIGINATOR: Detachment B
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: b1	13. PREPARED BY: b6
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE F INFORMATION 6	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: COL, MI Commanding
7. SOURCE: b1	

15. SUMMARY: **b1**


b1

b1

275

20130-00-006102

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: 1-DIA 1-ACSI-CIA 3-USAREUR 1-EUCOM 1-V Corps 1-IRCD 1-66th MI Gp, AEU MI-TA-IR	17. DOWNGRADING DATA: CLASSIFIED BY USAREUR REG 383-3 X FROM GDS OF EO 11652 X CATEGORY 2 DECLASSIFY ON - CANNOT BE DETERMINED 63	18. ENCLOSURE DATA: None
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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE	
CONTINUATION SHEET	CONFIDENTIAL (Classification and Control Markings)
REPORT NO.	2 OF 5 PAGES
PAGE	Detachment B
ORIGINATOR	66th MI Group
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b1	
DD FORM 1396c	
CONFIDENTIAL 64 (Classification and Control Markings)	

CONTINUATION SHEET

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 212 0241

PAGE 3 OF

ORIGINATOR Detachment
66th MI Group

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65
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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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CONTINUATION SHEET

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL 212 0249 73

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ORIGINATOR Detachment B
66th MI Group

(Classification and Control Markings)

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86

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CONTINUATION SHEET

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 212 0249 73

PAGE 5 OF 5

ORIGINATOR Detachment B
66th MI Group

b1

COMMENTS: Parkstrasse 41/42, Pankow, SSB, is the reception center for returning SZOG citizens and refugees from the FRG, and is an office of the MfS, Department I. The "service entrance" at S-Bahn Station, Friedrichstrasse, SSB, is known as a passage for informants of the MfS and is occupied by representatives of the Main Department for Pass Control and Wanted Persons. [b6] is known as a representative of District Office Berlin, Department II, Referat 1, Prenzlauer Allee 63-77, Prenzlauer Berg, SSB, which is targeted against US facilities. The telephone number 53 02 11, extension 351 is the number of the District Office, Department II, SSB. It is also known that [b6] often gives his informants cover names connected with the names of cities. The meeting places, described by Source, are known meeting places of the MfS, with the exception of the Jaegerstuben. On Invalidenstrasse 157, SSB, is a bar known as the Jaegerhof, telephone number 423 018 and at Gruenberger Strasse 1, SSB, is the Jaegerklause, telephone number 589 2250. The Jaegerklause is known as a meeting place of the MfS. Keibelstrasse 32, telephone 51777284, SSB is the investigative facility of Department II, SSB. No known cover addresses are located on Keibelstrasse and the name [b6] is not listed as residing on Keibelstrasse. [b1]

b1

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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DD FORM 1396c

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68

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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CONFIDENTIAL

543G

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EGIS

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY
2. SUBJECT: (U) SED Recruitment from the Intelligence
3. ISC NUMBER:
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: b1
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ:
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE DOC INFORMATION
7. SOURCE: Red No: 215114
b1
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 2586 73 (5004-05)
9. DATE OF REPORT: 6 March 1973
10. NO. OF PAGES: 1
11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 1C2a
12. ORIGINATOR: 68th MI Gp, APO NY 09108
13. PREPARED BY: b6
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: COL, MI Commanding

15. SUMMARY: (c) f- b1
b1

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374

103150 762
20112

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:
1 DIA
3 USAREUR
The following w/o encl:
1 EUROM
1 USAF
1 V Corps
1 VII Corps
1 EIC
1 68th MI Gp, 430th MI Det
1 68th MI Gp, 766th MI Det
1 37 Det (Abn) 2ar
1 CINCPAC
1 OSI
1 PSYOPS
17. DOWNGRADING DATA:
CLASSIFIED BY b1
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE
OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY (1)
DECLASSIFICATION DATE CANNOT
BE DETERMINED
207-SO
69
CONFIDENTIAL
18. ENCLOSURE DATA:
1 Encl:
(c) b1
1 cy, 2 pgs.

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66th MI Gp, APO NY 09108

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2. (C)

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76-82

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804180

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0595

EGIS

1. COUNTRY: DEUTSCHE DEMOKRATISCHE REPUBLIK (GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC) (DDR)	8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 212 0198 73
2. SUBJECT: (U) East German Intelligence Service (EGIS) Modus Operandi	9. DATE OF REPORT: 20 February 1973
3. ISC NUMBER:	10. NO. OF PAGES: 13
	11. REFERENCES: DIRM 6B7c, 6B6a, 6C
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: b1	12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: b1	13. PREPARED BY: b6
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE 6	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: COL, MI Commander
7. SOURCE: 22120138	

15. SUMMARY (CY 1)	(Leave Blank)
b1	
b1	

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: 1-DIA 3-USAREUR 1-USEUCOM 1-OSI 1-ACSI-CIPC 1-66th MI Gp (AEUMI-OA-IR)	17. DOWNGRADING DATA: CLASSIFIED BY: USAREUR REG 383-3 X FROM GDS OF EO 11652 X CATEGORY-1 DECLASSIFIED ON: CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED	18. ENCLOSURE DATA: NONE
CONFIDENTIAL		RECEIVED DS-402 MAR 20 3 25 PM '73

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5. (C)

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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8. (e)

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11. ~~(S)~~

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12. ~~(S)~~

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86

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16. (c)

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17. (c)

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18. (c)

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19. (c)

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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20. (c)

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89

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21. (c)

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22. (c)

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23. (c)

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90
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PAGE 9 OF 13 PAGES
ORIGINATOR 66th MI Group

24. (b) [Redacted]

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25. (c) [Redacted]

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

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(Classification and Control Markings)

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26. (e)

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27. (e)

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 212 0198 73
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28. (c)

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29. (c)

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

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(Classification and Control Markings)

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ORIGINATOR 66th MI Group

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 212 0198 73
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ORIGINATOR 66th MI Group

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COMMENT: (E)

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85

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525 G

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 III-1501-72

EGIS

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY 8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 1243 73 (5004-02)

2. SUBJECT: (U) SCHWIERIN (5338N-1125E)(FE6045) 9. DATE OF REPORT: 2 February 1973
 Interrogation by NIS

10. NO. OF PAGES: 1

3. ISC NUMBER: 11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 687

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Gp, APO NY 09109

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: 13. PREPARED BY:

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE: DDC INFORMATION: 14. APPROVING AUTH:

7. SOURCE: Red No: 140900

b1

COL, MI.
 Commanding

15. SUMMARY:

(8)

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 DS-402
 MAR 12 10 35 AM '73

20-006102
 20-001010

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

- 1-DIA
- 5-USAREUR
- The Following W/O Encl:
- 1-EUCOM
- 1-USAFE
- 1-V Corps
- 1-VII Corps
- 1-IRCD
- 1-66th MI Gp, 430th MI Det
- 1-66th MI Gp, 766th MI Det
- 1-CINCUSMAVEUR
- 1-OSI
- 1-Psy Ops
- 1-EEIC


17. DOWNGRADING DATA

CLASSIFIED BY b1
 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
 EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
 EXEMPTION CATEGORY (1)
 DECLASSIFICATION DATE CANNOT
 BE DETERMINED.

96

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

1 Enclosure
 (a) b1
 1 cy, 3/80.



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Page(s) 97-99

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Page(s) 100-103

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(Classification and Control Markings)

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KA-140-72

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY
(U)
2. SUBJECT: (S) FREITAL (5100N-1339E) (VS 0550), Recruitment of Informant (MFS)
3. ISC NUMBER:
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: October 1972
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Kassel, Germany 15 December 1972
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE F INFORMATION 6
7. SOURCE: b1 (DFOB) b1 b1
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 1297 73(5004-04)
9. DATE OF REPORT: 24 January 1973
10. NO. OF PAGES: 4
11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 6B7; 6A2a; 7A6
12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Gp, APO NX 09108
13. PREPARED BY: b6
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: COL, MI Commanding

15. SUMMARY:

(C) This report describes the recruiting of an informant for the MFS prior to the individual's induction into the East-German Border Command (BC). Duties and modus operandi of the informant during

b1

REPORT:

1. (C) Source

Source: b1

was cooperative and of average intelligence.

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA
3-USAREUR
1-EUCOM
1-USAF
2-USASAE
1-V Corps
1-VII Corps
1-EEIC
1-66th MI Gp, 430th MI Det
1-66th MI Gp, 766th MI Det
1-SF Det (Abn) Eur
1-CINCPAC
1-OSI
1-PSY OPS
1-ACSI

1-TRCD
5 b1
3-CCFEA
10 b1 (G)

17. DOWNGRADING DATA

CLASSIFIED BY DIAM 58-11
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DE-
CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE
OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2
DECLASSIFICATION DATE CAN-
NOT BE DETERMINED

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18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

NONE
RECEIVED
DS-402



Source received keys to 1LT [b6] office so he could write reports there daily on individuals. The 1LT was frequently absent from his office and sometimes appeared there in civilian clothes. Source performed his duties as an informant until he completed the [b1] [b1] During that time, he gave reports on at least 13 individuals. The subjects of his reports were primarily negative views toward East Germany and the socialistic system. Source did not observe any punishment for the individuals as a result of his reporting. Prior to his departure [b1] [b6] told Source that he would receive further instructions after arriving at his next assignment. On 17 November 1972, [b1] [b1] a man in civilian clothes approached Source in the company area and told him that he would return the following week for a conversation with him. Source assumed this individual was his new reporting contact.

b1

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(Classification and Control Markings)


REPORT NO. 2218 1297 73

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

ORIGINATOR

66th MI Gp, APO NY 09108

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ON 18 JUNE 1998
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/P0
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

(U)

FIGURE 1 (c) FREITAL (5100N-1339E)(VS0550)Memory Sketch of MFS Offices

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107

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(Classification and Control Markings)

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G-88

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528

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MZ-1520-72

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY
2. SUBJECT: (C) [REDACTED] b1
3. ISC NUMBER:
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: b1
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: b1
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE DOC INFORMATION
7. SOURCE: (DOB: b1)
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 9813 72(5004-06)
9. DATE OF REPORT: 14 December 1972
10. NO. OF PAGES: 3
11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 687.
12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Gp. APO 06108
13. PREPARED BY: b6
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: COL, MI Commanding

15. SUMMARY:

(C) [REDACTED] b1

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REPORT

1. (C) Source

b1

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145235-6C
241124-6C

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR

1-DIA
3-USAREUR
1-EUCOM-w/o encl-fol w/o encl
1-USAF
1-V Corps
1-VII Corps
1-EEIC
1-IRCD
1-66th MI Gp, 430th MI Det
1-66th MI Gp, 766th MI Det
1-SF Det (Abn) Eur
1-CINCPAC
1-OSI
1-PSY OPS

17. DOWNGRADING DATA

b1
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 1
DECLASSIFICATION DATE CANNOT BE DETERMINED

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DS-402

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111

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18. ENCLOSURE DATA

1 Encl:
(C) b1
1 cy 3 pgs

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SEP 66

CONTINUATION SHEET

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REPORT NO. 2218 9813 72
PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES
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2. (C)

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3. (C)

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4. (C)

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5. (C)

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CONTINUATION SHEET

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REPORT NO. 2218 9813 72

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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DD FORM 1396c
1 SEP 62

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☒

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

5 USC 552 (b)(1)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 114-116

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UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification and Control Markings)

This report contains unprocessed information.
Plans and/or policies should not be evaluated
or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY
2. SUBJECT: East German Intelligence Service
Modus Operandi
3. ISC NUMBER:
4. DATE OF INFORMATION:
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ:
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE _____ INFORMATION _____
7. SOURCE:
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 715 0020 72
9. DATE OF REPORT: 4 Dec 72
10. NO. OF PAGES: 1
11. REFERENCES: DETA, 766th MID MSG
DTG 061520Z Dec 72
12. ORIGINATOR: DIA/DS-4C, 26 Dec 72
13. PREPARED BY: b6
PART / REAT / /
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: b6
LT COL, USAF
CHIEF DISSEMINATION BRANCH
CENTRAL REFERENCE DIVISION

15. SUMMARY:

NOTICE OF CHANGE TO DOD INFORMATION REPORT

1. Reclassify the IR identified in item 8 above from Confidential to Secret with the following caveats NOFORN LINDIS and warning notice sensitive sources and methods involved.
2. Recipients of this notice will make lateral distribution of change as required. This IR initially originated by the 66th MIGT

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ON 18 JUNE 1998
BY CDR USAIN3CCM FC1/FO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

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X6DS - CAT TWO

117

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPLACES DA FORM 1045, 1 AUG 60.
OPNAV FORM 2620 (Rev 12-61).
AF FORM 112, JUL 61, WHICH MAY BE
USED UNTIL 1 JAN 63.

DD FORM 1396
1 SEP 62

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

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154

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

50538

THIS IR WAS TRANSMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH DIA MESSAGE DTG 182100Z OCT 72, WHICH INSTRUCTED SELECTED COLLECTORS TO SUBMIT IRS VIA MESSAGE FOR A 90 DAY TEST PERIOD. DURING THIS TEST, YOU MAY RECEIVE DUPLICATE DISTRIBUTION OF SOME INFORMATION. COMMENTS ON THE TEST PROGRAM SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO DIA ATTN-DS-4C.

SECDEF:

D

FM CDR DET A 766TH MID BHVN GER//AEUTHI-O-M//
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASH DC//DS-4C//
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GER//AEAGB-C(CH)/AEAGB-P(CISIC)/
AEAGB-CI//
INFO RUFLMMA/CDR 66TH MI GP MUNICH GER//AEUTHI-OA-IR//
RUEADWA/DA WASH DC//DAHI-CIA//
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VEIHINGEN GER//ECJB-R//
RUFTODA/C USASA OFFICE EUROPE AUGSBURG GER//AETSA//
RUFLFDA/CDR V CORPS FRANKFURT GER//G-2//
RUFTOWA/CDR VII CORPS MOEHRINGEN GER//G-2//
BT

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: EAST GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE MODUS OPERANDI (U)

THIS IS IR NO: 2 715 0020 72

PARA 1 THROUGH 14 UNCLAS

1. DEUTSCHE DEMOKRATISCHE REPUBLIK (GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC) (DDR)
2. EAST GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE MODUS OPERANDI
3. N/A
4. 15 AND 18 NOV 72
5. CELLE, FRG, 22 NOV 72
6. B-3
7. 22120013
8. 2 715 0020 72 (B14181)
9. 4 DEC 72

10. 1

11. DIRM 6B7A

12. 66TH MI GP

13. b6

14. b6

CPT, MI

COL, MI, CDR

IR

DEC 5 2 58 PM '72

2024406
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PAGE 1

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AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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50538

5. A. (C) EAST GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (EGIS) CONTINUES TO UTILIZE A FOURTH FLOOR APARTMENT, WITH NAME b6 ON DOOR NAME-PLATE, LOCATED AT b6 FOR SOURCE MEETINGS.

B. (C) EGIS TRANSPORTED A SOURCE DURING MEETINGS WITH HIM IN EAST BERLIN IN A GREY, WARTBURG SEDAN, BEARING LICENSE TM 34-55.

C. (C) EGIS CONTINUES TO FURNISH ITS SOURCE WITH AN ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS (AA) TO WHICH WRITTEN COMMUNICATIONS ARE TO BE FWD AS FOL: b6

D. (C) EGIS CONTINUES TO USE A NUMBER BY WHICH THEIR SOURCE CAN REACH THEM ON THE TEL AS FOL: b6 LOCATED IN b6

E. (C) AN EGIS SOURCE, RESIDING IN THE FRG, WAS SUPPOSED TO MEET WITH HIS EGIS CASE OFFICER (C/O) IN EAST BERLIN EARLY OCT 72. PRIOR TO DATE OF MEETING THE SOURCE WROTE THE EGIS C/O EXPLAINING THAT HE COULD NOT ATTEND THE MEET BECAUSE HE HAD SUFFERED GRAVE FINANCIAL AND BUSINESS REVERSES AND HAD TO DEVOTE ALL HIS TIME TO HIS BUSINESS. THEREAFTER, AN EGIS REPRESENTATIVE, WHO DID NOT IDENTIFY HIMSELF, TEL THE SOURCE AT HIS HOME IN THE FRG AND DIRECTED HIM TO INFORM THE EGIS C/O AS TO WHEN HE WOULD BE ABLE TO ATTEND A MEETING. THE SOURCE THEN WROTE A SECOND LTR TO EGIS IN WHICH HE STATED HE CONTINUED TO HAVE SERIOUS FINANCIAL DIFFICULTY BUT WOULD NOTIFY THE C/O IMMEDIATELY UPON FINDING A SOLUTION TO HIS PROBLEMS. IT IS A KNOWN FACT THAT THIS SOURCE HAD SUFFERED BUSINESS REVERSES AND APPEARED TO BE GOING THROUGH A PERIOD OF INSTABILITY BROUGHT ABOUT BY EXCESSIVE WORRY ABOUT FINANCIAL DIFFICULTY. HOWEVER, SHORTLY AFTER WRITING THE SECOND LTR TO EGIS, THE SOURCE DECIDED HE WOULD MEET WITH HIS EGIS C/O IN EAST BERLIN. HE THEREFORE SENT A THIRD LTR TO EGIS IN WHICH HE ANNOUNCED HE WOULD COME TO EAST BERLIN MIDDLE NOV 72. THE SOURCE DID MEET WITH THE EGIS C/O IN EAST BERLIN. HE WAS NOT GIVEN A NEW MISSION OR ANY OTHER SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS. HE WAS ASKED IF HE FELT HE COULD CONTINUE IN THE OPERATION AND GAVE AN AFFIRMATIVE ANSWER. THE EGIS C/O SAID HE WANTED TO SEE THE SOURCE AGAIN IN FEB 73 AND DESIRED MEETING TAKE PLACE SPINLER-MUEHLE (WS 4319), CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THE EGIS C/ DIRECTED THE SOURCE TO WRITE A LTR TO HIM SEVERAL WEEKS BEFORE THE DATE OF THE MEET AND INFORM EGIS AS TO WHETHER OR NOT HE COULD COME TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA. THE SOURCE WAS TOLD THAT IF THE MEETING COULD NOT TAKE PLACE CZECHOSLOVAKIA, IT WOULD AGAIN TAKE PLACE EAST BERLIN. THE SOURCE THEN RETURNED TO HIS HOME IN FRG. SEVERAL DAYS LATER, BECAUSE OF ADDED FINANCIAL AND BUSINESS WORRY, THE SOURCE DECIDED TO AGIN CONTACT EGIS AND INFORM THEM THAT HE COULD NO LONGER CARRY

PAGE 2

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50538

ON IN THE OPERATION. HE WENT FROM THE FRG TO EAST BERLIN WHERE HE

b6
b6 THE EGIS OFFICE IN b6 IN-
FORMED THE SOURCE THAT THE EGIS C/O WAS NOT AVAILABLE BUT WOULD SEE HIM IN EAST BERLIN ON THE FOL DAY. THE SOURCE LEFT EAST BERLIN AND RETURNED THE NEXT DAY. THE EGIS C/O WAS ACCOMPANIED BY A MAN NEVER BEFORE SEEN BY SOURCE. THE SOURCE EXPLAINED HIS FINANCIAL AND BUSINESS PROBLEMS IN DETAIL AND INFORMED THE TWO EGIS PERSONNEL THAT HE COULD NOT BE FOF FURTHER SERVICE TO THEM. THE EGIS C/O AGREED THAT THE SOURCE SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO WITHDRAW FROM THE OPERATION. THE OTHER EGIS PERSONALITY HANDLED THE ACTUAL DROPPING PROCEDURE BY DICTATING A STATEMENT TO SOURCE IN WHICH IT WAS DECLARED THAT THE SOURCE NO LONGER HAD AN OBLIGATION TO EGIS AND THAT HE HAD NO CLAIMS, MONETARY OR OTHERWISE, AGAINST EGIS. THE SOURCE WAS REQUIRED TO SIGN THE STATEMENT IN TRUE NAME. THE SOURCE WAS AD-
MONISHED NOT TO DISCUSS WITH ANYONE HIS ASSOCIATION WITH EGIS BUT WAS NOT THREATENED IN ANY MANNER WHATSOEVER. THEREAFTER, THE SOURCE RETURNED TO THE FRG.

F. (U) IN FIRST MEETING DESCRIBED IN PRECEDING PARA WHEREIN THE SOURCE AGREED TO CONTINUE TO WORK FOR EGIS, THE EGIS C/O GAVE HIM ONE THOUSAND D-MARKS WHICH HE EXPLAINED WAS A BONUS FOR HAVEING COMPLETED TEN YEARS SERVICE TO EGIS. HE THEN GAVE THE SOURCE AN ADDITIONAL FIVE HUNDRED D-MARKS FOR TRAVEL EXPENSES TO AND FROM EAST BERLIN. THE SOURCE WAS REQUIRED TO EXECUTE TWO RECEIPTS, ONE FOR ONE THOUSAND D-MARKS AND ONE FOR FIVE HUNDRED D-MARKS WHICH HE SIGNED IN COVER NAME. DURING THE SECOND MEET, AT WHICH THE SOURCE INFORMED EGIS HE COULD NO LONGER CONTINUE IN THE OPERATION, THE EGIS C/O GAVE HIM ANOTHER FIVE HUNDRED D. MARKS FOR TRAVEL EXPENSES. THE SOURCE WAS REQUIRED TO EXECUTE ONE RECEIPT IN COVER NAME. THE BONUS MONEY PAID TO THE SOURCE SEVERAL DAYS PREVIOUSLY AT WHICH TIME HE HAD AGREED TO CONTINUE IN THE OPERATION WAS ALLEGEDLY NOT MENTIONED TO HIM BY THE EGIS C/O. XGDS-2

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

38863

118A(10)

THIS IR WAS TRANSMITTED IN ACCORDANCE
WITH DIA MESSAGE DTG 182100Z OCT 72,
WHICH INSTRUCTED SELECTED COLLECTORS TO
SUBMIT IRS VIA MESSAGE FOR A 90 DAY
TEST PERIOD. DURING THIS TEST, YOU MAY
RECEIVE DUPLICATE DISTRIBUTION OF SOME
INFORMATION. COMMENTS ON THE TEST
PROGRAM SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO DIA ATTN-
DS-4C.

FM CDR 66TH MI GP, MUNICH GE//AEUTMI-GOP//
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASH DC//DS-4C//
RUFDAAA/DCSI USAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGB-C(CM)//
AEAGR-C(CISIC)//AEAGB-PDN//
INFO RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//EECJB-A
RUFTSWA/USAFE LINDSEY AIR STA GE//ICCR//
RUFTURA/CDR USASA OFC EUR AUGSBURG GE//IAETSA(TAREX)//
RUFLFDA/CG V CORPS FRANKFURT GE//AETVGB//
RUFTOWA/CG VII CORPS MOHRINGEN GE//AETSOB//
RUEADWD/DA WASH DC//DAMI-DOO-H//
RUFHOL/ULO BONN GE C/O US EMBASSY//IRCD//
RUDONBA/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON ENG//
RUFTWAA/CDR OSI WIESBADEN GE//
ZEN/CDR 66TH MI GP MUNICH GE//AEUTMI-TA//AEUTMI-S//
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THIS IS IR NO: 2 218 9453 72 (5005-01)

1. (U) EAST GERMANY
2. (U) MFS RECRUITMENT OF BC PERSONNEL
3. (U) N/A
4. (U) SEPTEMBER 1972
5. (U) MUNICH, GERMANY, 20 NOVEMBER 1972
6. (U) F 6
7. (U) XMX-061-72
8. (U) 2 218 9453 72 (5005-01)
9. (U) 27 NOVEMBER 1972
10. (U) 1
11. (U) DIRMI 687, 1J15
12. (U) 66TH MI GP, APO NY 09100

PAGE 1

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ON 18 JUNE 1998
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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NOV 30 8 59 AM '72

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

38863

13. (U) [b6] NEIDHART, INTG.
14. (U) [b6] COL, MI, COMMANDING
15. (S) A. SOURCE (XMX-061-72) [b6]

b1

B. (S) GENERAL

SOURCE WAS TRANSFERRED TO THE BORDER SECURITY PLATOON BECAUSE HE HAD MENTIONED TO A COMRADE [b1] THAT HE KNEW A SAFE ROUTE OF ESCAPE TO THE WEST. IRONICALLY, THE BORDER SECURITY PLATOON INTERCEPTED ILLEGAL BORDER CROSSERS AT NIGHT AND CHECKED ACCESS ROADS TO THE BORDER AREA. IT HAD A STRENGTH OF 1 NCO AND 12 EM, AND WAS KNOWN AS AN ELITE UNIT.

C. (S) RECRUITMENT

ON HIS FIRST DAY WITH THE BORDER SECURITY PLATOON [b1] [b1] SOURCE WAS QUESTIONED ON THE AFOREMENTIONED INCIDENT BY HIS BN CO, [b1] FNU [b1] CONCEIVING TO THE CHARGE, SOURCE EXPLAINED THAT HE WAS THEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND HAD ABSOLUTELY NO INTENTION OF DESERTING FROM HIS UNIT. BACK AT THE EM BARRACKS, SRLY [b6] THE BN MFS LIAISON OFFICER, TOOK SOURCE'S DETAILED PERSONAL HISTORY STATEMENT AND THEN ASKED IF HE WERE WILLING TO REPORT POLITICALLY UNRELIABLE PERSONNEL AND POTENTIAL DEFECTORS IN THE PLATOON. REALIZING THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS OWN BEHAVIOR AT THE BEER GARDER, SOURCE PROMISED TO COOPERATE AND SIGNED A CONSENT TO KEEP THE AGREEMENT SECRET.

D. (S) ACTIVITIES

[b1] SOURCE REPORTED TO THE MFS LIAISON OFFICER OR HIS ASSISTANT, [b6] ONCE PER WEEK. HE MET AT THE MFS OFFICE IN BN HQ, OR IN THE UNIT TV ROOM AFTER HOURS, AND DISCLOSED MINOR INCIDENTS, CASUAL REMARKS OR RUMORS WHICH HE THOUGHT WOULD NOT AFFECT THE PERSONS CONCERNED. SOURCE ALSO IGNORED ANYTHING RELATING TO HIS PERSONAL FRIENDS IN THE PLATOON, AND NEVER MENTIONED THAT MANY OF HIS COMRADES LISTENED TO WESTERN BROADCASTS OR WATCHED WEST GERMAN TV. [b1]

PAGE 2

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38863

b1

SOURCE FOUND

OUT THAT HIS FRIEND [b6] HAD ALSO BEEN COAXED INTO MFS
SERVICE. WHILE ON PATROL, THE TWO PVT'S HAD CONFIDED IN EACH
OTHER, AND CONCURRED TO MAKE THE BEST OF THE SITUATION WITHOUT
SERIOUSLY HURTING ANYONE. [b6]
AND CAME FROM THE [b6] AREA. SOURCE
DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THERE WERE STILL MORE MFS
INFORMERS IN HIS PLATOON.

XGDS-2.

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PAGE 3

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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1. COUNTRY: WEST GERMANY

5. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218.9450 72. (5006-01)

2. SUBJECT: (U) Attempted Recruitment of Conscientious Objectors By the EGIS

3. DATE OF REPORT: 27 November 1972

3. ISC NUMBER:

10. NO. OF PAGES: 1

11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 102

4. DATE OF INFORMATION:

12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Gp, APO NY 09108.

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ:

13. PREPARED BY:

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE DCC INFORMATION

14. APPROVING AUTH:

7. SOURCE:

COL, MI
Commanding

15. SUMMARY:

(U)

b1

REPORT:

(U)

See Enclosure 1, Document.

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA

3-USAREUR w/o Encl

RECEIVED
DS-402
03A13048

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

CLASSIFIED BY DIAM 58-11
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY (2)
DECLASSIFICATION DATE CANNOT
BE DETERMINED.

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18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

1 Enclosure:

(U) 1 of

b1

72; dtd 16 Oct 72 (U)

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201710
202110
202410
163156
GE-GC

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5 USC 552 (b)(1)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

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☐

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☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)
NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 125-130

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93-174-72

1. COUNTRY: EAST BERLIN, EAST GERMANY, WEST BERLIN and WEST GERMANY
2. SUBJECT: Various Modi Operandi of the MFS(U). DATE OF REPORT: 22 November 1972

10. NO. OF PAGES: 3

3. ISC NUMBER:

11. REFERENCES:

DIRM 6C, 6B7

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: August - November 72

12. ORIGINATOR:

Detachment B.

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: West Berlin, 15 Nov 72

13. PREPARED BY:

b6

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE F INFORMATION 6

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

COL, MI
Commanding

7. SOURCE:

b1

15. SUMMARY:

(u) This report contains information on alleged Modi Operandi of the Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit (MFS-Ministry for State Security) of the Soviet Zone of Occupied Germany (SZOG) in the SZOG, the Soviet Sector of Berlin (SSB), West Berlin (WB) and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).

(Leave Blank)

(u) Between August and November 1972, b1 has noted the usage of the following methods of operation of the MFS. The following is a summary of these methods:

(1) The MFS promised to pay the cost of moving a man's family from the SZOG to West Berlin in order to recruit the man's son, a West Berliner.

(2) Persons were sent from the SZOG under the guise of soliciting student and academic reports in West Berlin.

(3) East Berlin postal vehicles have been used as cover vehicles.

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA
3-USAREUR
1-EUCOM
1-V Corps
1-IRCD
1-66th MI Gp, AEMT-0A-IR

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

CLASSIFIED BY USAREUR REG 383-3
X FROM UDS OF EO 11652
X CATEGORY: 2
DECLASSIFY ON: CANNOT BE DETERMINED

131

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

None

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REPORT NO. 2 212 3346 72

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

ORIGINATOR Detachment B
66th MI Group

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(4) MfS spotters have been used to watch and report on US tourists in East Berlin, other SSB residents considered possible recruits as spotters, and other previously recruited MfS spotters.

(5) Parents have been sent to West Berlin to try to convince a son who had defected to return.

(6) Apartments of West Berlin residents have been broken into by MfS personnel.

(7) Recruitment attempts have been made with the aid of threats of punishment for wall pass violation (e.g. returning late) and threats of denying a fiancée an emigration visa.

(8) MfS representatives have been promised apartments in West Berlin at the expense of the MfS.

(9) Written correspondence has been brought to West Berlin to be mailed so that it received a West Berlin post mark.

(10) West German cars, such as BMW 2500's and Mercedes-Benz sedans have been identified as MfS vehicles. The cars are radio equipped and bear separately both SZOG (e.g. Magdeburg and Potsdam) and FRG (e.g. Wolfsburg) registration plates. The cars are known to patrol the Berlin-Helmstedt Autobahn.

(11) An MfS officer was known to use his daughter to entice prospective MfS employees to his apartment where they were arrested, then recruited.

(12) Dependent wives of US military personnel have been approached even though the serviceman has no access to classified information. The wives are usually German-born with relatives in the SZOG.

(13) Persons have been approached from their jobs (e.g. SSB station pilots and MfS employees) through the influence of the MfS in the employee's relatives visit family in the West.

(14) MfS spotters are tasked with the mission of making lists of good potential MfS contacts.

(15) MfS cooperators have written to citizens of both the FRG and the SZOG, none of whom they knew personally, to invite them to the SSB, and arrange meetings between them and the MfS.

(16) MfS cooperators have met Western tourists in the SSB to arrange meetings between tourists and the MfS.

(17) Persons considered to be unintelligent or "village idiots" have also been used by the MfS in the SZOG as full-time informants.

(18) MfS employees and employees of other state-controlled businesses have been fired because they have family or in-laws in the West.

(19) MfS personnel have broken into various shops in West Berlin to steal items, documents and photographs to be used as evidence in a trial against the shop owners being held in the SSB for various offenses.

(20) US Labor Service guards with alcohol habits and/or heavy debts are lured into the SSB by previously-recruited colleagues, and approached for cooperation with the aid of threats of arrest for being caught in the SSB while being employed by the Labor Service.

(21) The MfS apparently have sources at the refugee camps in the FRG

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ORIGIN

OF 3 PAGES

Detachment B
66th MI Group

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(e.g. Giessen) and West Berlin (e.g. Marienfelde Refugee Center) who inform them of successful exfiltrations.

(22) West Berlin employees with the Allied Forces with relatives or fiancées in the SZOG are promised help in obtaining visitor's permits for themselves in exchange for cooperation with the MFS at their place of work (e.g. Labor Service).

ORIGINATOR'S COMMENTS: The foregoing information was gleaned from

b1

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DD FORM 1396c
1 SEP 62

O - 608

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

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☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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NO DUPLICATION FEE
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Page(s) 134-140

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

NOT: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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543A

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report. GE-242-72

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY
2. SUBJECT: (U) GERA (5052N-1204E) (TS9440), MFS Recruitment
3. ISC NUMBER:
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: September 1972
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Giessen, Germany 2 October 1972
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE F INFORMATION 6
7. SOURCE: b1 (DFOB: b1 J-50322-B)
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 9140 72 (5004-05)
9. DATE OF REPORT: 16 November 1972
10. NO. OF PAGES: 6
11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 6B7, 6A20
12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group, APO New York 09108
13. PREPARED BY:
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: COL, MI Commanding

b6

CPT MI

15. SUMMARY:

(C) This report describes Source's recruitment by the MFS as an informer and tells of the subsequent meetings which he had weekly with an MFS officer. Source became involved with the MFS on b1 at which time he was investigated for making unfavorable comments against the East German regime. b1

b1 The enclosed MFS site had three buildings. The weekly meetings were arranged by an MFS LT, who was later known to Source by the name b1 Source's mission was to watch for anti-regime discussions, planned escapes, and any other matter which could be of interest to the MFS. Source was to call the LT at b1 on all urgent matters. On one occasion, Source was given 25.00 DME as expense money for his attendance at a beat music festival. Source had a cover name, b1 which he used to identify himself upon MFS contact. b1

b1 This report is supplemented by a location overlay and a layout sketch of the MFS City Office site.

REPORT:

1. (C) Source

b1

His reasons for defecting from East Germany were restriction of personal freedom, lack of understanding by his foster parents, and his recent contacts with the MFS. Source's MFS contacts, the subject of this

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA
3-USAREUR
1-EUCOM
1-USAFE
1-V Corps
1-VII Corps
1-EZIC
1-IRCD
1-66th MI Gp, 430th MI Det
1-66th MI Gp, 766th MI Det
1-SF Det (Abn) Eur
1-CINCPACNAV
1-OSI
1-PSYOPS
5-b1

Continued to Bloc Nr 17

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

CLASSIFIED BY DIAM 58-11
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY (2)
DECLASSIFICATION DATE CANNOT BE DETERMINED

1-b1
3-CCFFA
10-BSIU (G)

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18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

None

RECEIVED
05-402
03/19/78

1. 141
2. 141
3. 141

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ORIGINATOR
66th MI Group,
APO New York 09108

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report, began in July 1972. At first, he was being investigated for making agitating remarks at his place of work. Thereafter, he was recruited by the MfS as an informer. The information in this report is a personal account by Source of his MfS experience.

2. (u) MfS Investigation of Source

a. Investigation Cause

In early July 1972, while Source was at work, he had a discussion

b1

b1 Source's uncle, b1
resides at b1 and is a member
of the b1

b. Confrontation with Investigating Officer

b1

b1 They were going to depart from b1
by rail at 1700 hours that afternoon. Shortly before Source was ready to leave,
at b1 hours, an MfS officer arrived at his home. The MfS officer first talked
privately with Source's father for about 10 minutes. Then, Source was questioned
by the MfS officer about the agitating remarks he had made at work. Source was
also asked about his leave plans and whether he was planning to escape from
East Germany. The MfS officer then inspected Source's camping baggage.
After that, Source had to sign a handwritten statement, which had been dictated
to him by the MfS officer. The statement had the following text: "I herewith
pledge that under no circumstances will I leave the German Democratic Republic".
Source was informed that upon his return from the camping trip he was to report
to the Subject officer, at the b1 at the corner
of b1 Source was then driven to the b1
RR station in a grey, model 601, Trabant car by the MfS officer.

3. (u) Recruitment/Targeting

a. MfS City Office GERA

(1) Location and Description

On 1 Aug 72, at 1500 hours, Source went to the b1
b1 The MfS site was enclosed by a two m high wrought
iron fence. The site consisted of a square-shaped, 25-30 m to a side, grey
stuccoed, two story office building; a ground floor level wooden barrack;
and a two or three door garage. The building's ground floor office windows were
protected by metal bars. The entrance gate and the front door to the building
were electrically controlled.

(2) MfS Personnel

Upon entering the building's hallway, Source reported to an
U/I MfS official in civilian clothing at the visitors desk. After stating his
reason for being at the MfS office, he was required to leave his ID card with
the MfS official who then told Source to wait in the adjacent visitor's room.
Shortly thereafter, an U/I elderly MfS official entered the visitors room.

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b1

(Note: After Source had conveyed the official's regards, he was informed by his father that Subject official was in charge of the [b1] and held the rank of LTC). Subject official further stated that he knew the reason of Source's visit, and as he started to leave again, he informed Source that a LT would see him shortly. The LT, who then entered the room, was the investigating officer whom Source had met previously at his home.

(3) Recruitment of Source

Subject LT told Source that he was glad to see him again. He was very pleasant and made Source feel at ease. They were sitting at a table, facing each other, and talked about Source's camping trip. The LT informed Source that he was in need of his cooperation. He pushed a folded piece of paper across the table, which he asked Source to sign. Source complied without reading its contents. Thereafter, Source was asked whether he knew anything about the swastikas, which had been recently painted on the latrine walls at his place of employment. (Note: This was the first time that Source had heard of the incident. His friends, whom he later asked at work, had no knowledge about the incident either). His friends, whom he later asked at work, had no knowledge about the incident either). Source was told to be on the lookout for the painting artist at his place of work, to be watchful for any anti-regime discussions, and for planned escapes from East Germany. Subject LT then informed Source that from then on they would meet regularly on every [b1]

(Note: Source's hours of employment were from [b1] hours).

b. Contact Chronology

(1) On [b1] Source was picked up by Subject LT at the prearranged meeting place. The LT was driving the same car in which Source was driven to the RR station on [b1]. They drove to a wooded area in the vicinity of [b1] where the LT parked the car. They held a short conversation during which it was suggested by the LT that they drop the formalities, and he told Source to address him as [b1]. The LT then used a tape recorder for the subsequent debriefing to Source, which lasted 20 minutes. Source, at first, was asked some general questions about his latest social activities. Thereafter, he was asked for the news at his place of work and about the activity plans of his friends for the upcoming weekend. The LT gave Source his office telephone number, [b1] which Source was to call whenever there was an urgent matter to report. They returned to the meeting place, where Source was dropped off.

(2) On [b1] Source was again picked up by the LT as prearranged. The car, place of rendezvous, and the method of debriefing (tape recorder and questions) were the same as those of the previous meeting.

b1

Source, with his cover name, signed a money receipt for 25.00 DME and a handwritten statement, which contained the following text: "I pledge that I will not

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reveal to any person my meetings with the MFS, and that I will protect to the utmost the secrecy thereof". The LT stated to Source that he would destroy the other slip of paper, which Source had signed at the MFS office. They returned to the pickup point at 1545 hours, where Source was again dropped off.

(3) [b1] Source called the MFS office [b1] from his place of work. He identified himself on the phone as [b1] and was told to wait. After a short pause, Source talked to the LT [b1]. Source informed the LT [b1].

[b1] Source further stated that his friends had planned to depart GERA at 1700 hours by motorcycle. The LT informed Source that the mission was very important and suggested to Source [b1] which Source agreed to do.

(4) [b1] Source was again picked up at the prearranged meeting place by the LT, who was driving a [b1]. [b1] The place of rendezvous and the method of Source's debriefing were the same as those of the two previous meetings. Source gave a brief account of what he had observed at the festival, which was information of no significant value. The debriefing lasted 20 minutes. On the return trip to the pickup point, Source learned from the LT that he would soon be going on vacation and that the weekly meetings would then probably be postponed.

(5) [b1] Source again met the LT who had arrived on foot. After waiting 15 minutes at the meeting place, an U/I man drove up to the LT in a [b1] car, which he gave to the LT. The LT, accompanied by Source, drove the car to the same rendezvous place in [b1]. A tape recorder was again used by the LT for Source's debriefing. Source was asked to describe his latest social activities, to include persons with whom he associates and the topics that were discussed. Of interest to the LT were the opinions of Source's friends about the Olympic games in general. Source was informed by the LT that he was going to [b1] and that they would not meet again until [b1]. In the meantime, Source was instructed to submit a weekly report on topics which were discussed by his friends which could be of interest to the MFS, including negative reports if such was the case. The LT informed Source that he should deposit the weekly reports [b1] at the ground floor entrance hall [b1].

[b1] On the return trip to the pickup point, Source learned from the LT that upon his return [b1] the LT would give Source a new assignment, and that from then on they would hold their meetings (place of rendezvous) [b1] (Note: Source did not comply with the LT's instructions of writing a weekly report. However, on one occasion he went to the P.O. Box, for curiosity reasons, and found the same at the described location).

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CONTINUATION SHEET


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66th MI Group,
APO New York 09108

MAP REFERENCE:

Germany, 1:50,000
GERA
Sheet Nr: L5138
Series: M745
Edition: 1-AMS (USAREUR)



REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 18 June 1998
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/P0
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

Figure 1 (C) GERA (5052N-1204E) (TS9440) MFS Recruitment/Targeting, Location Over-

lay

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DD FORM 1396c

REPLACES AF FORM 1121, JUL 61 WHICH MAY BE
USED UNTIL 1 JAN 63. GPO 942629

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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
ORIGINATOR
66th MI Group,
APO New York 09108

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NOT TO SCALE:

LEGEND:

- 1-MFS Office Bldg
- 2-Wooden Barrack
- 3-Garage
- 4-Wrought iron fence
- 5-Entrance
- 6-Vehicle entrance
- 7-Garden/Park
- 8-Children Hospital



REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 18 June 1998
BY CDR USAINSCC/TJ31/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

Figure 2 (U) CERA (5052N-1204E)(TS9/40) MFS Recruitment/Targeting. Layout Sketch of

MFS City Office CERA (U)

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DD FORM 1396c

REPLACES AF FORM 1132, JUL 61 WHICH MAY BE USED UNTIL 1 JAN 63. GPO 645075

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☐

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Page(s) 147-150

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522A

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(Classification and Control Markings)

1. COUNTRY: **PAST GERMANY**
 2. SUBJECT: **MFS Informant Activities in GDR, India and FRG**
 3. ISC NUMBER:
 4. DATE OF INFORMATION: **1 September 1972**
 5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: **Munich, Germany 11 October 1972**
 6. EVALUATION: SOURCE **F** INFORMATION **6**
 7. SOURCE: **XXM-063-72**
 8. REPORT NUMBER: **2 218 8949 72(5005-01)**
 9. DATE OF REPORT: **9 November 1972**
 10. NO. OF PAGES: **8**
 11. REFERENCES: **ICR (HITS) U-GEF-G0977
DIRM: 687
Special IRCD Request TWX
Message 1679 dated 26 Oct 72**
 12. ORIGINATOR: **66th MI Group, APO 09108**
 13. PREPARED BY: **b6**
 14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: **COLONEL, MI
Commanding**

15. SUMMARY:

This report emphasizes the MFS (Ministerium Fuer Staatssicherheit) recruiting methods for informants, who originate from the East German intelligentsia class, and who were compelled to perform informants' services on managerial personnel in the domestic industry, on West German residents visiting the GDR, on East German citizens stationed in India, or on SED Party functionaries who visited the 20th Olympic Games in MUNICH, FRG. Minor missions of military intelligence nature were also assigned to reliable informants who were cleared for travels abroad. These missions included the purchasing of city plans, and the locating and recording of military installations. The results were reported to the MFS handling agents.

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REPORT:

1. **(c) Source**

b1

201120
201310
201460
201350-66-GE-1N

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA
1-EOCOM
3-USAREUR
1-USAFE
1-USASAE
1-V Corps
1-VII Corps
1-EEIC
1-ACSI
1-IRCD
1-State Dept
1-66th MI Gp, 430th MID
1-66th MI Gp, 766th MID

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

CLASSIFIED BY DIAM 58-11
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY (2)
DECLASSIFICATION DATE CANNOT BE DETERMINED

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18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

NONE

204-SD
RECEIVED

DEC 18 3 52 PM '72

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1 SEP 72

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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66TH MI GP, APO NY 09108

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16. Continued

1-SF Det (Abn) Eur

1-USASPD

1-CINCPACV

1-OSI

1-PSYOPS

5

b1

1

3-CCFFA

b1

(G)

b1

b1

2. ~~(S)~~ Location of the ~~SCHOENEBECK~~ MFS County HQ

(u)
(see Fig 1)

This HQ was located at 2, Boettcher Strasse (1, Fig 1), in an older 2-story villa. Source entered the ground floor in summer b6 after being summoned by the commanding officer, LTC fnu b6. The CO talked to Source in the reception room (2, Fig 1), a lobby located behind the doorman's booth in the W portion of the building, close to the main entrance. Source had no opportunity to become more familiar with the layout of the 2 floors, basement, or yard area. Since Source's recruitment, he dealt with his MFS handling agents in a special room of the TWS administration building.

3. ~~(S)~~ MFS Approaches

a. Indictment Against Source

Prior to Source's recruitment by the MFS County HQ of SCHOENEBECK, Source was frequently traveling to

b1

On these business trips he developed

close contacts

b1

primarily to the sales representative b6

resident of

b6

b1

b1

These tools were installed at the b1

b1

and Source invited the foreman to his home. This invitation and

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b1

b1 b6 an alleged MfS official to report Source's contacts to the local MfS County HQ. This HQ prevented Source's further business trips and even rejected his planned trip b6. Source protested against this curtailment by writing to the MfS chief of b6. In summer b6 Source was summoned to the MfS County HQ building (Fig 1), and was questioned by the commanding officer, LTC fnu b6. The b6 was present, and both wanted to know the reasons for Source's contacts to b6 of

b1 Source responded that his interest was strictly technical in nature and for the benefit b6. The MfS CO, wearing civilian clothes, disclosed doubts about the Source's statements, and labeled Source a "Sleeper" (Depot-Spion), who seemed to be engaged by Western intelligence service(s).

LTC fnu b6 could not furnish any substantiated proof, but began questioning Source's loyalty. He indicated that the temporary travel ban could be lifted, if Source would be willing to do certain things for the MfS.

b6 stated his requirements:

"We want to know the attitude of your business partners; their opinion about the GDR, and if they made attempts to bribe Source, or other TWS negotiators previously".

b6 made clear that Source's negative answers would have resulted in a complete travel stop. Source agreed to cooperate, provided that no professional espionage was involved, or missions assigned, which could cause him any personal harm. b6 accepted Source's objections, and he dismissed Source.

b. Introduction of Source's Handling Agent

About 6 weeks after the conversation in the b6 MfS County HQ building, in Sep 69, Source was taken to the b6 who then escorted Source into a secret room located behind the elevator shaft of the main administration building. The security chief, b6 introduced to Source a civilian, who identified himself as b6 LLT of the MfS County HQ of b6. The MfS officer pointed out that it was Source's patriotic duty to strengthen the economic power of the GDR, and to prevent manipulators from doing damage to the regime. He also sketched Source's future activity by instructing Source to look out for potential enemies of the GDR during future business negotiations abroad, and to state their names and motives for their hostile attitude.

b6 also requested from Source a written curriculum and a 6-page questionnaire to be returned within 4 weeks. This questionnaire contained information on Source's background, family, relatives, all sicknesses, education, professional careers, military and political experience and memberships, past travels to the West, and what contacts were established in the Western hemisphere. A photograph had to be attached to this questionnaire.

During this meeting, b6 dictated to Source a security pledge:

Date and place of writing b6 The text stated that Source volunteered to work for the MfS and would not disclose his contacts with the MfS. In case of indiscretion, the MfS would deny any ties to the Source. The main mission of the Source was to help reinforce the economic power of the GDR and help protect the government.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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Source asked [b6] to add a clause [b1]
[b1]
[b6] accepted Source's suggestion, and Source signed this pledge Sept 69.

No monetary payments were negotiated for Source's work and Source stated that he never received any money for his informant's activities. His only reward was being able to travel abroad.

4. ~~for~~ Missions Under Handling Agent [b6]

a. Domestic

The first missions from [b6] were of a very general nature. [b6]
Source would call the MFS County HQ of [b6] tel. number [b6] and [b6] would enter the room to accept Source's reports, which mainly provided information on the general attitude of the workers in the [b6]. He described their reactions to various political speeches by SED politicians, or sketched the opinions of which discussed intra-plant affairs, improvement of social welfare, job hygiene, etc. This activity lasted until end of [b6]. No specific assignments were given to the Source.

b. Foreign

In Jan 71, [b1] This was a mission to find out those individuals who were working against the GDR [b6]
[b6] In addition, Source was instructed [b6] to gather evaluations on those GDR citizens who represented the government [b6]
[b6] wanted to know if these persons were really devoted, or deviated from the SED political outlines. [b1]

[b1]

The MFS cleared Source's [b1]

[b1]

[b1]

[b1]

[b1] [b6] was assisted by the economic advisor [b6] and by the political secretary of the GDR Consulate General Frau KIRCHNER, whose wife also worked as a code specialist in the consular office of the GDR in NEW DELHI. The GDR consular office was on Naya Marg Street.

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Source soon found out that the Indian government had canceled an order of 7,000 tractors because delivery of the previous 2,000 pieces had resulted in nothing but repairs. The GDR experts were shipping air-cooled tractor engines instead of water-cooled motors, and the established GDR tractor repair stations were negligently operating, not training the Indian peasants in the proper maintenance of the tractors. This resulted in the Western competitors (Ferguson and West German Ford) to become more active on the Indian tractor market. They built up business contacts with the Indian State Trading Company and to the Indian Agro-Machines enterprise in MADRAS, HEIDERABAD, HAMEDABAD, JAIPUR, ACCRA and AMRITZA, and when Source arrived to negotiate, he found that the market was lost. Source stated that the Indian representatives of the companies were bribed by the Western partners, and that Source could not do anything about their corruptive attitude.

b1

The evaluation of about 20 GDR citizens, who worked in the central tractor stations of India, was completed by Source orally in a second session with b6 two weeks after Source's arrival. In general, this rating was good. Source blamed the Indian peasants for their inability to handle highly intricate technical machinery successfully. The majority of the engineers, tractor repairmen, and technicians had no time to train the Indian peasant.

b1

b1 The first service manager fnu b6 was rehabilitated by the Source, and b6 is now the sales director of the b6 His assistant, b6 was then transferred to Syria where he holds the post of the commercial advisor since the end of 1971. b6 was known to Source as a possible MFS staff member. b6 was also assigned to JEMEN years ago.

Regarding the military mission in India, Source was only able to purchase a city plan of NEW DELHI, but unable to make any military observations due to lack of time. In b6 introduced Source to another handling agent, Captain b6 This introduction took place in the secret room of the TWS administration building.

5. (C) Missions under the Handling Agent b6

b6 was more determined than b6 He knew of Source's past services, and b6 began to insist on more specific assignments. He wanted Source to spy on the b6 primarily on b6 b6 engineer fnu b6 wanted to know the professional capabilities of this individual, his political views and reactions to the 1968 Soviet Army occupation of the CSSR. Further, if b6 had relatives in the West, what mail or packages he was receiving, his attitude toward the West, and what vices he had. Source reminded b6 about his statements in the security pledge made in b6 but b6 replied that Source was a boss in the b6 in charge of 320 people in his technological department, and that he must be familiar with the evaluation of subordinates. b6

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treated the information on [b6] not as Source's denouncement, but as an evaluation or personnel rating procedure. Source had no other choice, and he completed a report on [b6]

After this assignment [b6] began assigning him the collection of information on Western visitors in the county of [b6]

During the Xmas season of [b6] Source was ordered to provide details on an engineer (nu), who visited his relatives in the village of [b6] 12 km off SCHOENEBECK. This engineer was working with the heavy equipment plant [b6] in HANNOVER, FRG, and Source's mission was to find out the reason for his 8-day stay in GDR. [b6] instructed Source to use several approaches; depending on the reaction of the subject.

[b6] suggested three approaches:

Firstly, to approach the subject as a member of the National Front, invite him for a drink and a nice chat. On this occasion, Source could establish an atmosphere of trust.

Secondly, to introduce himself as a student who gathers information on the youth activities in the FRG, and who studies problems of the young and older generations.

Thirdly, to introduce himself as a member of the local county administration (Rad des Kreises), who is ready to provide counsel and help in daily matters of the visitor. Such help would create an atmosphere of trust in which Source could then probe for information desired by his MfS handler. Source stated that this mission had not been fulfilled because Source went on Xmas vacation.

[b6] allegedly excused Source at that time.

Until Easter 1972, Source met [b1] secret room and delivered confidential personal reports on engineers and secretaries of the R-300 computer station. Until Whitsunday 1972, Source had to provide details on a student from FRG, who resided temporarily at the village of WOLFRAM, and whose political attitude was to be analyzed by Source. An engineer from KARLSRUHE was scheduled for the same time, but Source claimed not to have enough time to complete either mission.

In May 1972, Source was on a business trip in Poland, and when he returned, [b6] wanted Source to investigate whether the [b6] fnu [b6] had ordered a new POV, and whether the finance department had properly set up the budgets for the current business year. Source furnished the desired information, and on 30 Aug 72, [b6] and Source had their last meeting prior to Source's trip to FRG.

6. (c) MfS Missions in FRG

The Regional HQ of the [b1]

b1

[b1] Other regions were also dispatching their SED members, and according to the chief coordinator, [b6] functionary of the MAGDEBURG SED Regional HQ, a total of 2,000 SED visitors to MUNICH were present during the Olympic Games from 25 Aug 72 to 11 Sep 72. [b1]

b1

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While staying in MUNICH, [b1] Besides his function as an SED visitor, he had an MFS mission from [b6] whom he met at 1030 hrs, 30 Aug 72, in a SCHOENEBECK restaurant "Ratskeller". [b6] instructions for MUNICH were the following:

- a. Collecting any derogatory remarks made by Source's fellow-travelers.
- b. Stating names and addresses of FRG residents who sympathized with the GDR.
- c. Watching for infiltrators who would or could persuade the SED visitor(s) to defect.
- d. Watching the GDR tourists, their attitude, and contacts.
- e. Overhear conversation, and note reactions of GDR citizens listening to West German speakers.
- f. Rating of boarding house owners or managers, whether they would be suitable for espionage work, or if they worked for the West German intelligence service.
- g. Discovering persons, who would do any dirty jobs for money.
- h. Watching own tourist guides, their behavior in FRG, their remarks, comments, and their contacts.

Source stated that no military missions were assigned. [b6] instructed Source to take short notes, and upon return to report verbally all important incidents.

Source stayed in FRG from 2 Sep 72 to 7 Sep 72. He defected that day. He did not fulfill any part of the MUNICH mission, and his reason for escape

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
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LEGEND

1. MrS County HQs building in SCHOENEHECK an der Elbe, Boettcher Strasse Nr. 2. A two story villa with a basement.
2. Reception room on the ground floor.
3. Outdoor telephone distribution box.
4. Tobacco Shop
5. Drugstore "Baereneck"
6. Clothing Shop Schütze
7. Vacant Lot
8. Restaurant "Frieden"
9. Industrial-Commercial Bank

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Figure 1 (4) Location of the MrS County HQs in SCHOENEHECK

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<p>CONFIDENTIAL</p> <p>(Classification and Control Markings)</p>		
1. COUNTRY: FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (FRG)/ EAST GERMANY (EG)	8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 212 2850 72	
2. SUBJECT: (U) Modus Operandi of Hostile Intelligence	9. DATE OF REPORT: 21 September 1972	
3. ISC NUMBER:	10. NO. OF PAGES: 5	
	11. REFERENCES: DIRM : 6B7a, 6B8, 6C	
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 17/18 May 1972	12. ORIGINATOR: 66th Military Intelligence Group	
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Hannover, FRG, 7 September 1972	13. PREPARED BY:	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 10px; text-align: center;">b6</div>
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE 8 INFORMATION 2	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:	
7. SOURCE: 22120072	Colonel MI Commanding	04C
<p>(C) This report contains information on the espionage activities of a West German citizen who volunteered his services to an East German intelligence agency, believed to be the East German Army Intelligence Service, during the period from late in 1969 to b1. One of the targets assigned to him was a military installation of the US Forces in the FRG, b1</p>		
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 50px; font-size: 48px;">b1</div>		
15. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:	17. DOWNGRADING DATA:	18. ENCLOSURE DATA:
<p>1-DIA 2-USAREUR 1-EUCOM 1-USASAE 1-OSI 1-IRCD 1-V Corps 1-VII Corps 1-AGSI-CIPC 1-66th MI Gp, ABUTME-OA-IR</p>	<p>CLASSIFIED BY: USAREUR REG 363-3 X FROM GDS 11652 X CATEGORY 1 DECLASSIFIED ON : CANNOT BE PRE-DETERMINED</p> <p style="text-align: center;">160</p> <p style="text-align: center;">CONFIDENTIAL</p>	<p>NONE</p> <p style="text-align: right;">21. WJ 4T 1 DE 1972</p>

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2. (C)

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b1

Through his correspondent he established contact with an East German intelligence agency; the details of how this contact was made, are not known nor could it be determined which East German intelligence agency was concerned, but it is believed that it was a military agency rather than the Ministry for State Security (MfS). In [b1] had at least three meetings with East German intelligence representatives. He was told to keep his eyes and ears open, observe military matters and installations of both the EW and the NATO forces in the FRG, take photographs if possible, and submit reports. He was also advised to look for persons who could be recruited as agents, establish contact with them and, if feasible, try to recruit them himself. His handling agents [b1] [b1] assigned him the cover name [b1] but allegedly did not ask him to sign any written obligation. Also allegedly, [b1] did not want to be paid for his services, but asked to be reimbursed for his expenses only. What [b1] did to satisfy his handling agents, was not revealed; the only known fact in the first two months is that he took photos of a big military convoy which was lined up in a field near [b1] FRG. Not later than in the course of his third meeting with his handling agents, but possibly earlier, [b1] was issued false papers, namely a FRG passport and a FRG identity card under the name of [b1] to both of which his own photo was attached; he signed the papers with this faked name and subsequently used them frequently at airport control points and for hotel registrations in the FRG. He was also issued a container, which was a toilet kit with a secret pocket underneath the case for the shaving equipment; [b1] stored the false documents and important notes there.

3. (C)

b1

Stuttgart. He told [b1] that "the hard work was now beginning for him" and that he had to observe and photograph some military installations in the vicinity of Stuttgart because he was an East German agent. He visited Riedlingen (NU3533), Gutenstein (NU0025), Immeringen (NU2037), and Strassberg (NU0636), all located in the area of the "Schwaebische Alb". He also went to [b1] nca), an installation of the US Forces in the FRG; under special instruction of his handling agents he was looking for missile installations of the US Forces in the vicinity of Strassberg.

b1

4. (C)

In October 1970

b6

made the acquaintance of a EW NCO (Sergeant),

b6

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b1 FRG. At that time b1 who was a regular army soldier, wanted to try to leave the service early and asked b1 whom he knew to be a member of FRG/IdK, for advice. b1 promised him to do what he could, and visited the b1 frequently in their apartment. In order to be in a better position to help him, b1 asked b1 for very detailed information on his military career and his jobs in the BW. b1 who did not suspect anything at that time, told him that he was trained as a specialist in ABC defense. b1 expected that his handling agents would be interested in this, and went to East Berlin in November 1970. He informed his handling agents on his contact with b1 on b1's military knowledge and specialty, but stressed that b1's main intention was to get out of the service. The handling agents replied they wanted to talk to b1 should arrange a trip to East Berlin for b1 who were expected to "bring something with him". b1 visited the b1 after extensive drinking, b1 and went to bed. After she had left, b1 began to extoll the situation in EG where he had good friends who would be glad to arrange a free trip for b1 and himself to East Berlin, and possibly could even assist b1. The conversation lasted until about 0400 hrs the next morning. b1 suggested the visit to East Berlin for 23 December 1970. b1 who became suspicious because of b1's keen interest in his military position and because he had noticed that b1 took notes, b1 continued to maintain contact with b1. On 11 December 1970 b1 visited the b1 again who told him that they would go to East Berlin with him. A few days later he informed them that he had made three plane reservations to Berlin for b1. At random he mentioned that in the meantime he had to "go on another trip"; it was clear to the b1 that b1 intended to go to East Berlin prior to their visit. b1 was told by his handling agents in East Berlin that they were displeased with the arrangements he had made without their instruction; it were premature for b1 visit to East Berlin, they had to know more about him first and see what he could give them. b1 and told the b1 that their trip would not materialize for the time being; b1 had to do something for the "friends in East Berlin" first. In the course of this conversation b1 revealed that he was an East German agent who wanted to collect military information of the FRG. He mentioned he would have to observe the NATO maneuver WINTEX in the Fallingb. (ND4657) area in January 1971. He told b1 that he was an officer in the East German Army (EKA); he expected from b1 to give him a list of military documentary material in his company to which he had a) immediate access, b) access with major difficulties only, and c) no access at all. b1 should also get for him a copy of b1 and a list of all "atomic communication centers" in the FRG. He advised b1 to try to be admitted to the career of a "specialty officer (Fachoffizier)", so he would have easier access to classified material. He inquired whether b1 had knowledge of a "multiple missile launcher" (Mehrfachraketenwerfer). He promised b1 who is an ardent philatelist, a stamp collection of about DM 400.00. He finally asked b1 to get passport photos for himself and his wife because it were too dangerous to travel under their true name; he would obtain false passports for them. About the end of b1 a list of military documentary material and about the middle of February the desired passport photos. b1 took this to East Berlin toward the end of b1 and reported to his handling agents his observations during NATO maneuver WINTEX; he had observed a great number of signal vehicles, vehicles of the US Forces (no details) and had taken down tactical symbols. He also reported that he discovered a missile site at Lichtenmoor (ND2039), FRG, in February 1971. Upon b1's suggestion, b1 procured DV 5/1, 5/2, 5/3, 5/6, 3/50, and 132/6 all pertaining to ABC defense; all of them were classified "Nur fuer den Dienstgebrauch" (corresponding to the former US classification "Restricted"). Assisted by b1 photographed these regulations in b1 apartment every evening for about a week. He used a Revueflex camera which he had bought in February 1971. All films were developed in b1 home. On 17 March 1971, b1 took the negatives to his handling agents in East Berlin. They were pleased with the material and approved of a trip of the b1 to Berlin during the period 26/28 March 1971.

5. b1 received false passports for the b1 under the name of b1 which he gave to them upon his return from Berlin and which they signed with the

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faked names. He also gave them a stamp album which was a container in which they could hide the false papers; allegedly this album was "X-rayproof". b1 also showed the b1 his own false papers and his container. He displayed to them a stack of paper money, estimated to have been about DM 1,400 to 1,500. b1 left no doubt that he had received this money from his handling agents and said that they had opened for him a bank account with a numerical designation in Switzerland and a blocked account in EG. He also told them that he was in fact a citizen of EG. Whether any of these statements were true, could not be determined. b1 himself stated that he did not have more than about DM 650.00 with him, which he had received for his expenses and for the imminent air trip with the b1. On 26 March 1971 b1 and the b1 went to Hamburg (NB6533), FRG, in b1 car and took a plane from there to West Berlin. At Friedrichstrasse Railroad Station they were received by b1 who in the course of the conversation intimated to b1 that he was a Major General. They went sightseeing in East Berlin and had dinner together. Both "Heinz" and "Werner" said that they were satisfied with b1 job and promised him a leave wherever he wanted to go. They did not contradict b1 statement that he was a citizen of EG and that he was promoted to a higher rank (from 2nd to 1st Lt.). The next morning (27 March 1971) "Heinz" and "Werner" took the b1 without b1 to an official building of the City of East Berlin where both the housing and the garden offices of the city are located; since it was a Saturday, the building was empty. b1 told the b1 that they expected from them. b1 was questioned about his military career, ABC defense, missile sites and ammunition storage facilities and gave the b1 the information as prearranged with the military CI service of the FRG. b1 were convinced that he was genuinely willing to work for them and discussed with him how he could best try his transfer to a NATO Headquarters in Moenchengladbach (LB2075), FRG, if at all possible as a "Fachoffizier". The handling agents told him that they could assist him in this transfer. b1 was given DM 200 or 300 and had to sign an obligation. The b1 were also given a cover address

b1

a cover address which had also been given to b1. On a slip of paper they were also given a telephone number (no details) where they could reach b1 b1 in case they had any trouble in East Berlin. On 28 March 1971 the handling agents asked b1 what ABC equipment he could obtain for them. He was instructed to get as much as he could pack in a suitcase; b1 should add something classified "Confidential" to the ABC contents of the suitcase. b1 then should bring the suitcase to Berlin. He should take a night train on 24 April 1971, leaving Hannover (ND4905), FRG at 0224 hrs, should get into a certain railroad car from which East German border personnel would take the car inconspicuously. b1 should also procure samples of six combat chemicals which b1 should bring to East Berlin on a later trip in his car. Containers for the transport of these chemicals would be prepared in EG. b1 was informed by his agent handlers that he would soon be needed and employed by them in Duesseldorf (LB4574), FRG. After his return from Berlin he already put ads in some newspapers for an apartment and a job there. Because of his "good success" he was granted leave and paid for his leave expenses in advance.

6. (C) b1 spent this leave in Primosten (nca) in Yugoslavia in April 1971. He met there a German foreman-mechanic b6, employed by the Kloeckner-Humboldt-Deutz plant in the FRG and engaged in the construction of a cement factory in Yugoslavia. b1 learned from b1 that he had fled from EG to the FRG in 1955. b1 asked him if he would like to earn more money and to change his job. b6 replied in the affirmative without giving the questions too much attention. Upon b1 request b6 gave him his address, the license number of his car and the name of a restaurant near his address b1 put this slip in the secret pocket of his container. Whether or not b1 intended to recruit b6 for East German intelligence, could not be determined.

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7. (C) After his return from Yugoslavia, b1 arranged with the b1 that they

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should hand over the material pertaining to ABC defense to him at Hannover Railroad Station in the evening hours on 23 April 1971. The suitcase contained besides ABC equipment such as protective clothing, gas mask filter, dosimeter, decontamination kit etc. miscellaneous army regulations and documents and a map of the NATO firing range (scale 1 : 50,000) of Bergen-Hohne (ND6551), FRG, marked with tactical symbols. One of the documents was classified "Confidential". When b6 was about to board the night train to East Berlin with the suitcase containing a/m material, he was arrested.

8. (u) While in investigative custody in the prison of Hildesheim (NC6578), FRG, b6 gave the German text of a draft letter to a Turkish coprisoner with the request to translate it into Turkish. The letter was addressed to "1021 Vienna, Postal Box 248", an address which is known to be used by the former East German subversive radio station "Deutscher Freiheitssender 904". The letter had about the following text: " Alex H., this message is urgently to be forwarded to the MfS there. I have been in a Hildesheim hospital for six months. I am being held here. I don't know what I can say and do. Which lawyer should I take? My radio can only receive on medium wave. I am expecting instruction". The Turk translated the letter into Turkish, but it is unknown whether or not the letter was mailed. b6 destroyed the German draft text after the Turk had returned it to him.

COMMENT: (C)

b1 b6

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CONFIDENTIAL (Classification and Control Markings)		
1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY (EG)	8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 212 2812 72	
2. SUBJECT: (U) Modus Operandi of Hostile Intelligence	9. DATE OF REPORT: 21 September 1972	
3. ISC NUMBER:	10. NO. OF PAGES: 4	
	11. REFERENCES: DIRM : 6B6a 6B7a 6C	
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 28 July 1972	12. ORIGINATOR: 66th Military Intelligence Group	
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Hannover, FRG, 30 August 1972	13. PREPARED BY: [Redacted] b6	
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 2	14. APPROVING AUTH: Colonel HI Commanding	
7. SOURCE: 22120072		
<p>15. SUMMARY:</p> <p>(C) This report contains information on the recruitment of a citizen of the FRG by the East German Ministry for State Security (Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit) (MfS), a number of meetings he had with his handling agent in East Berlin, the instructions given him by the handling agent, in particular priorities on certain German military targets in which the MfS was interested.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 18 JUNE 1998 BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R</p>		(Leave Blank)
<p>1. (C) The FRG citizen [Redacted] b6 with address in [Redacted] b6 was highly interested in politics since the age of about 13/14 years and got in contact with persons who advocated radical leftist ideas, in 1965. He joined the Deutsche Friedens-Union (German Peace Union) (DFU), a pacifist organization with essentially communist tendencies, and visited cities in EAST GERMANY (EG) as a member of the DFU in 1966; in return for this visit members of the East German "National Front" visited Offenbach. [Redacted] b6 also filed an application for recognition as a conscientious objector in order to avoid to be drafted for military service in the Armed Forces of the FRG (Bundeswehr). When his mother was visited by an aunt of hers, [Redacted] b6 from [Redacted] b6 (QC0516), EG, in April</p>		2212140-60 2212140-60
16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:	17. DOWNGRADING DATA:	18. ENCLOSURE DATA:
<p>1-DIA 2-USAREUR 1-JUCCOM 1-USASAE 1-IRCD 1-V Corps 1-VII Corps 1-AOSI-CIPC 1-66th MI Gp, AEMTHI-04-IR</p>	<p>CLASSIFIED BY: USAREUR REG 383-3 X FROM GDS 11652 X CATEGORY 1 DECLASSIFIED ON: CANNOT BE PRE-DETERMINED</p>	NONE
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1967, b6 wrote a letter to the MFS with about the following text " Please get in contact with me for cooperation". He gave this letter to Frau b6 whom he knew to be a convinced communist, with the request to forward it to the addressee. (u)

2. (u) On 1 or 2 August 1967, b6 received a typed reply which was mailed in West Berlin. b6

b6 In accordance with this instruction, b6 traveled to Berlin by air, but does not remember any more whether the date was b6 when he appeared at the appointed place, he was approached by a man who introduced himself as b6 and took him to the East Berlin Airport Berlin-Schoenefeld. After they discussed b6 personal situation and background, he had to write his curriculum vitae and stated that he voluntarily offered his services to MFS without any force or pressure exerted on him. He also had to explain what motivated him to make such an offer; the reasons which led him to this step went back to the keen political interest his father had instilled in him though his father did not belong to any political party, to the suicide of his father in 1961, and to the fatal accident of one of his brothers in 1965 and the very low financial compensation which his mother received after this son's death. This sequence of events made him seek contact to leftist persons and join the DFU, as mentioned above. b6 instructed him to resign from the DFU and to break off any connections which he might have with persons in BG and to all politically left-oriented people in the FRG. He was also instructed to withdraw his application for recognition as a conscientious objector which he did in March 1968. He should lead an inconspicuous life and only maintain contact with his handling agent. The date for the next meeting was set for b6

b6 in the restaurant of the b6 his official telephone number during duty hours, 55 0305, and paid him IM 200.00.

3. (u) b6 b6 went by air from Frankfurt to Berlin and met b6 as prearranged. b6 took him to the hotel "Unter den Linden" for lunch; after lunch they went to a room on the third floor of this hotel where b6 had to write his curriculum vitae again. Then they discussed again the same matter which was discussed before. b6 gave b6 his school and trade-school report cards and a photo, all of which were given back to him at the following meeting. b6 also had to give in writing biographical sketches and characteristics of some persons who were either acquaintances of his or relatives. He was given the cover name of b6 b6 also gave him another b6 where he could be reached after office hours. The date for the next meeting was set for either b6 b6 was again given IM 200.00.

4. (u) In January 1968 received his notification that he had to report for military service on 1 April 1968. He considered this important enough for another unscheduled meeting with b6 On b6 he went again to Berlin, this time not by air, but by road with his acquaintances b6 and b6 in their car. After their arrival in West Berlin, they stayed overnight in a pension in West Berlin. Still on b6 called the b6 from the Railroad Station Friedrichstrasse and asked for b6 A female answered he should go to the place they had arranged for the next meeting, b6 would be there within one hour. After waiting at the b6 restaurant for a while, b6 succeeded in talking to b6 by telephone. b6 then came to the restaurant where b6 told him that he had received his draft notice. b6 advised him to try to get his assignment changed from the Bundeswehr to the Bundesgrenzschutz (BGS) in which the MFS at that time had a higher interest than in the Bundeswehr, and in any case to enlist for a period of three years. b6 received a payment of IM 200.00 again.

5. (u) As prearranged, the next meeting took place on 30 March 1968. b6 gave b6 the following cover address

b6

and instructed him to write a picture postcard with inconspicuous vacation greet-

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ORIGINATOR 66th MI Group

ings in case he succeeded in getting permission to serve with the BGS. In case that this permission would not be given, he should perform his service with the Bundeswehr inconspicuously, should not engage in any political discussions and neither read nor purchase any left-oriented newspapers or literature. He was told to keep his eyes and ears open, but otherwise no special mission was assigned to him. The next meeting was to be held in fall 1968; b6 should announce his visit by a letter to a/m cover address. This letter should make the impression of a letter by him to an old aunt; in the text some date should be mentioned at random exactly one month later than this date, b6 should come to the b6 b6 also told b6 that he b6 would be transferred abroad in August 1968; he introduced to b6 his successor as handling agent under the name of b6 attended the meeting for about 10 to 15 minutes. b6 was given another payment of DM 200.00.

6. On 1 April 1968, b1 b6 FRG. He inquired with his battery commander about the possibility to get permission for service with the BGS, but was told that this was absolutely impossible. b6 did not pursue this project any further. However, he applied for three years of military service; on 27 June 1968 his application was approved. Late in May 1968, two officers from the Army Air School (Heeresfliegerschule) in Bueckeburg (NCO390) came to the caserne where b6 was stationed, in an attempt to get personnel interested in that school and apply for a transfer. b6 did so and passed the qualification- and aptitude test; with effect from 1 July 1968 he was transferred to that school in Bueckeburg. Because of an eye deficiency he did not pass the air-medical test for duty as a pilot. - Since the arrangement between b6 and his handling agent provided for a meeting in case of an unforeseen event, b6 wrote to a/m cover address and announced his visit in East Berlin for b6 b6 He traveled to Berlin by air and met b6 at the b6 b6 was rather pleased with the transfer to the Heeresfliegerschule and said he hoped that b6 would later succeed in a transfer to the BGS as helicopter pilot. If he was disqualified for pilot's training, however, (NOTE: this meeting was prior to the medical examination), he should rather try to get another transfer to either a missile or radar unit in the general area of Frankfurt (MA7749) where many installations were located in which MFS was interested. b6 also informed b6 that one of his comrades in Niederlammstein had told him that he was visited several times by members of a Western intelligence agency who had approached him during a visit to EG; b6 feared that the Western intelligence agency might be interested in him. b6 did not attach particular importance to this, but promised to look into the matter. At this visit b6 also reported to b6 characteristics and functions of seven officers and NCOs with both the b6 The next meeting was arranged for November 1968; b6 should announce it again by a letter to the cover address. He was again paid DM 200.00.

7. The invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet troops in August 1969 shook b6 b6 in his political convictions and made him reconsider his activities for MFS. Without permission of his military superiors he went by air to West Berlin and reported everything to an USI agency (not further identified) at Tempelhof Airport. He was handed over to the Berlin Criminal Police to whom he repeated the information. The investigative judge of the Supreme Federal Court before whom he was arraigned on 3 September 1968, did not issue an arrest warrant and released him. He returned to his unit and performed his military duty up to 28 September 1968 on which day he defected from the Bundeswehr. In a letter to his commanding officer, dated 30 December 1968 and mailed in Paris, he stated that he did not intend to return to military duty. By administrative procedure he was discharged from the service on 24 January 1969. He was eventually apprehended in Offenbach on 18 March 1972. A criminal investigation is pending against him.

COMMENT (C) 1 b1

b1 to whom the Federal Attorney General delegated the case. Though b6 declared in the course of the investigation that his former statement, made on 2 September 1968, pertaining to the meeting on 30

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

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ORIGINATOR
66th MI Group

March 1968, was made in a state of extreme fatigue and erroneous or not true, the judicial authorities believe its contents were essentially true; at that time the statement pertained to an event in the recent past and was made twice to two different agencies, USI and the Berlin police. There is no reason to believe that [b6] [b7C] who was under the shock of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and realized that with his agent activities he had served the wrong master, did not tell the truth at that time. It is anticipated that USI will receive information on the outcome of the court trial.

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AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1-R

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PO7500 G

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2075 100/72

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY (D)

8. REPORT NUMBER:

2 212 2755 72

2. SUBJECT: (U) Modus Operandi of Hostile Intelligence

9. DATE OF REPORT:

13 September 1972

3. ISC NUMBER:

10. NO. OF PAGES:

2

11. REFERENCES:

DIRM : 6B7a
6B8
6C

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 28 July 1972

12. ORIGINATOR:

66th Military Intelligence Group

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Hannover, FRG, 18 August 1972

13. PREPARED BY:

b6

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 2

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY

Colonel
Commanding

15. SUMMARY:

(Leave Blank)

b1

32

1. (e)

b1

202300-6C

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA
2-USAREUR
1-BUCOM
1-USASAE
1-IRCD
1-V Corps
1-VII Corps
1-ACSI-CIPC
1-66th MI Gp, ABUTHI-CA-IR

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

CLASSIFIED BY: USAREUR REG 383-5
X FROM GCS 11652
X CATEGORY 1
DECLASSIFIED ON: CANNOT BE PRE-DETERMINED

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

NONE

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PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
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b1

2. (c)

b1

3. (c)

4. (c)

b1

COMMENT (c)

b1

More detailed information will possibly be received at a later date; if it contains any additions to above information, this IR will be followed up by another IR.

b1

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1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY
(U)
2. SUBJECT: (S) BERLIN (5230N-1324E)(UU9119) MFS Operations
3. ISC NUMBER:
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: May 1972
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Hamburg, Germany 19 June 1972
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE F INFORMATION 6
7. SOURCE: b1
(DFOB: b1)
J-52918-B
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 6763 72 (5004-01)
9. DATE OF REPORT: 17 August 1972
10. NO. OF PAGES: 4
11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 6B4, 6B6, 6C
12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group, APO New York 09108
13. PREPARED BY: b6
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: COL, MI Commanding

REC'D DS-4C2 07 SEP 1972

15. SUMMARY:
(U)
(S) This report furnishes the location and description of an MFS rendezvous apartment, on Gotlindestrasse in E-BERLIN, from which instructions for surveillance operations and resulting reports, on RR personnel in both parts of BERLIN, were issued and forwarded respectively. East German RR personnel connected with the MFS also had instructions to observe West German personnel at the RR border stations along the interzonal track lines. The emergency telephone number of an MFS operations office in addition to recruiting and operational methods are included.

(Leave Blank)

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REPORT: (U)

1. (S) Source

SOURCE: b1

b1

b1 Source gained information through personal observations and experience while an undercover informer for the MFS in BERLIN from the latter

201/00 GC
201300 GC

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA
3-USAREUR
1-EUCOM
1-USAFE
1-V Corps
1-VII Corps
1-EEIC
1-IBCD
1-63th MI Gp, 430th MI Det
1-66th MI Gp, 766th MI Det
1-SF Det (Abn) Eur
1-USASPD
1-CINCPAC
1-OSI
1-PSYOPS
continued to Bloc Nr 17

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

CLASSIFIED BY DIAM 5841
X FROM GDS OF EO 11652
X CATEGORY 2
DECLASSIFY ON:
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5-b1
3-GCFFA
10-BSTU (G)

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18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

None

DD FORM 1396

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66th MI Group,
APO New York 09108

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b1

2. (u) Location and Description of Rendezvous Apartment DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE 2

The rendezvous apartment, at U0982199, was located at [b6] on the S side of the E-W aligned Gotlinderstrasse and W of the approximately N-S aligned Siegfriedstrasse in the suburb of Lichtenberg in BERLIN. It was a two-room unit with kitchen and bathroom, and occupied by an elderly couple. A name plate with the name [b6] on it was fixed to the doorpost. Even though Source had been inside numerous times, the last time on 3 May 72, he described it only as clean and tidy and furnished with a table and three or four chairs.

3. (u) Recruiting Method

Sometime at the end of 1968 at the operations office for interzonal train personnel on the premises of the BERLIN East Freight Yard (Ost Güterbahnhof). Source was twice approached by an MFS agent, who introduced himself as [b6]. At the second meeting Source was asked by [b6] to observe casually the personnel of the Dining and Sleeping Car Company "Mitropa" and to meet him at the rendezvous apartment four weeks later. Source kept the appointment. At the third meeting Source had to write out a statement of obligation dictated to him by [b6] and sign it with his assigned cover name, [b6]. Subsequently Source was instructed that under no circumstance was he to come into contact with any MFS agent in uniform. The rendezvous apartment was to be visited only by prearranged appointment. Source was given the following MFS telephone number: [b6] to be contacted in cases of emergency. The first six digits comprised the switchboard number of an unidentified MFS operations office; the four digit extension the number of the responsible agent. At the end of the meeting Source was paid 50 RM (East) for which he had to write out a receipt. Source claimed that he at first refused to accept the money, but [b6] told Source that it was to be considered as a compensation for sacrificed off-duty time. Although Source had been questioned repeatedly, from various angles, he never stated clearly why he had been approached by the MFS or why he agreed to cooperate. He did mention, however, that in order to avoid trouble he pretended to cooperate but furnished negative reports in the hope of being rejected sooner or later.

b1

Source was also an SED member since 1966. Source claimed his awards had nothing to do with his recruiting by the MFS.

4. (u) Operations

a. General

The unidentified MFS unit, with which Source had been involved, seemed to be interested in RR intelligence mainly in personalities and their activities on the inter-zonal trains, the inter-BERLIN route, and at West German RR border stations and terminals. Occasionally Source had been ordered to obtain information on W troop movements. Source had been instructed by [b6] to observe the vending stand BOESE (Kiosk BOESE - named for its proprietor) on the S-Bahn platform of the W-BERLIN station "Zoo", which was allegedly involved in Black market activities as well as to observe the personnel of the E-German dining and sleeping car company "Mitropa", especially those individuals who made large purchases in W-BERLIN or West Germany. The employees of the West German Dining and Sleeping car Company (Deutsche Speise- und Schlafwagen Gesellschaft - DSG) were also to be kept under close surveillance. They were suspected of smuggling restricted items or duty-goods into E-BERLIN either for

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East German dealers or for their own illegal activities. Special attention was to be paid to a certain [b6] a resident of [b6] and W-BERLIN residents employed by "Mirrona". The following individuals had been named: [b6] (male), [b6] (male), [b6] (female), and [b6] (male), the only one of the four who lived in E-BERLIN. Source had been further instructed to obtain all available information on West German customs and pass control officials, and civilians standing nearby. At the same time Source was to observe how resettlers and expatriates were being treated by the West German authorities. He was also encouraged to ingratiate himself with West German RR employees at the HAMBURG, HELMSTEDT, and BEBRA RR facilities, especially in canteens and overnight quarters. Source reported his observations verbally to his leading agent, which he claimed were always negative. He was unable to say whether the agent made a written report. Recently, no dates were mentioned, the MFS requirements became increasingly more demanding. Although Source was repeatedly asked to be specific about increasing demands, he only mentioned that West Germans under surveillance were to be covered even more closely.

b. Rendezvous Procedures

Source met his leading agent on the average of every four weeks at [b1] depending upon his off-duty times. The meetings lasted usually one hour. At the prearranged time Source entered the building, and rang the bell of the rendezvous apartment. Usually the agent was already present and opened the door. Source was led into the living room in which the meeting progressed undisturbed alone with the agent. Now and then Source met the agent on the street but pretended not to know him. They entered the building separately, met in the hall and entered the apartment together. On these occasions an approximately 70-year old woman opened the door and remained out of sight after admitting them. Source noticed that she never had looked him straight in the face. Coffee served during the meeting was handed through the door and accepted by the agent. At the end of the meeting the agent accompanied Source to the door of the house. He opened it, looked carefully up and down the street to make certain all was clear before letting Source out. Source observed that when he met the agent on the street, he usually arrived either in a "Wartburg" or "Trabant" sedan of different color, red, white, or blue; Source did not pay any attention to the license plate number. He had strict orders not to approach the rendezvous apartment without previous arrangement.

5. Personnel

a. MFS Agents

(1) [b1] exact date not recalled. [b1] between 40 and 44 years of age, was 173 cm tall, of strong build, with a full face and dark blond hair. He usually wore a dark blue double-breasted suit, and was clean and tidy in appearance. His office supposedly was located at an unknown number on the Magdalenenstrasse. Source had met him approximately 12 times and judged him to be a reasonable individual. [b1] displayed an understanding attitude towards Source's negative reports by reasoning that RR duties left little or no time for other activities. [b1] at the rendezvous apartment at the end of 1969.

(2) [b1] was the cover name of Source's [b1] [b1] approximately 45 years old, 175 cm tall, of slim build, dark blond hair, with grayish streaks, suffered admittedly from stomach trouble, was a dapper dresser, was a rather energetic individual. During the winter months he favored wearing a blue anorak and a grayish fur cap.

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REPORT NO. 2 21F 6763 72

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66th MI Group,
APO New York 09108

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He has the habit of remarking, **b1** and yet he constantly criticized Source's activities. He often threatened Source with removal from his position as chief conductor if his activities did not improve. He pointed out to him that because of his numerous awards and SED membership, serious and effective cooperation could be expected.

b. Undercover Informers

b1 Source did not know of any other individuals being supervised by **b1** because particular caution was exercised to prevent any chance meetings. He was unable to report whether the RR employees on inter-zonal trains, of whom approximately 50 percent were SED members, were in any way committed to the MfS. Non-SED members on inter-zonal trains, were usually chosen on the basis of length of RR service, irreproachable family life and background, and possession of real estate. Periodically Source was paid for his troubles, the last time in May 1972. He claimed that at first he had refused to accept the proffered 100 DM (east) but finally accepted the money at the insistence of **b1** who called it a compensation for off-duty time spent in the service of the MfS. Source further admitted that he had received a total of approximately 500 DM (east) even though he had constantly furnished negative reports.

COMMENTS:

(W) Source displayed a friendly, cooperative, and sincere attitude. However, statements pertaining to his political and his MfS activities, in some instances, seemed to contain implications of ambiguity. Even though Source had revealed himself to West German authorities of the Lower Saxony Interior Ministry, hostile control cannot be fully precluded. His wife, who remained in E-BERLIN, was supposedly being prevailed upon by the MfS to persuade him to return with impunity.

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Page(s) 175-181

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

814181 (A)

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81-035-72 (AEUTMI-O-M)

(Classification and Control Markings)

1. COUNTRY: **SOVIET ZONE OF OCCUPIED GERMANY (SZOG)**
2. SUBJECT: **(U) East German Intelligence Service (EGIS) Modus Operandi**
3. REPORT NUMBER: **2 715 0016 72**
4. DATE OF REPORT: **31 July 1972**
5. NO. OF PAGES: **2**
6. REFERENCES: **DIRM 6B7c**

7. DATE OF INFORMATION: **28 June 1972**
8. ORIGINATOR: **66th MI Group**

9. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: **Schleswig (NY 3641), FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (FRG), 6 July 1972**
10. PREPARED BY:

11. EVALUATION: SOURCE **B** INFORMATION **3**
12. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

13. SOURCE: **22120013**

b6

COL, MI
Commanding

SUMMARY:

(C) This report contains information on East German Intelligence Service (EGIS) operational meeting facilities, operational vehicles, accommodation addresses and source payments.

EVALUATION REPORTS (DD FORM 1480) PREPARED ON THIS IR WILL BE CLASSIFIED AT LEAST CONFIDENTIAL.

1. (U) EGIS continues to utilize a fourth floor apartment, with name **b6** on door nameplate, located at **b6** (SSB), for source meetings.

2. (U) EGIS transported their source in the SSB in a grey Wartburg sedan, bearing license plates XL 06-13.

3. (U) EGIS continues to furnish its source with an accommodation address to which written communications are to be forwarded as follows: **b6**

(SZOG). **b6** **SOVIET ZONE OF OCCUPIED GERMANY**

DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA
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1-NSAINTC-ICBI
1-ACSI-CIPC
1-66th MI Gp (AEUTMI-OA-IR)
1-EUOM

DOWNGRADING DATA:

CLASSIFIED BY: **USAREUR REG 383-3**
X FROM GDS 11652
X CATEGORY-2
DECLASSIFY ON: **CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED**

ENCLOSURE DATA:

NONE

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REPORT NO. 2 715 0016 Z
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
ORIGINATOR 66th MI Group

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4. (S) EGIS paid its source 300.00 DMW to cover cost of travel expense from home in the FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (FRG) to SSB and return. The source was required to receipt for funds in his EGIS assigned cover name.

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NOT RECLASSIFIED
ON 18 JUNE 1998
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396c

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT	
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<p>1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY</p> <p>2. SUBJECT: (U) MfS Modus Operandi, and Data About MfS Personalities</p> <p>3. ISC NUMBER:</p> <p>4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 1960 to May 1972</p> <p>5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: West Berlin, 29 May 1972</p> <p>6. EVALUATION: SOURCE <u>P</u> INFORMATION <u>6</u></p> <p>7. SOURCE: <u>b1</u> DPOB: <u>b1</u></p>	<p>8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 212 2268 72</p> <p>9. DATE OF REPORT: 21 July 1972</p> <p>10. NO. OF PAGES: 3</p> <p>11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 6C, 7A6</p> <p>12. ORIGINATOR: Berlin Station, 66th MI</p> <p>13. PREPARED BY: b6</p> <p>14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: COL, MI Commanding</p>
<p>15. SUMMARY: (U) This report contains information concerning the modus operandi of the Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit (MfS - Ministry for State Security), and information concerning MfS personalities.</p>	
<p>b1</p>	
<p>16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 - DIA 3 - USAREUR 1 - ACSI-CIA 1 - EUCOM 1 - V Corps 1 - IRCD 1 - 66 MI Gp, AEUTNI-OA-IR 	<p>17. DOWNGRADING DATA</p> <p>Classified by USAREUR Reg 383-3</p> <p>X FROM XO 11652</p> <p>X CATEGORY 1</p> <p>DECLASSIFIED ON: CANNOT BE DETERMINED</p> <p>184</p> <p>CONFIDENTIAL</p> <p>(Classification and Control Markings)</p>
<p>18. ENCLOSURE DATA:</p>	

DD FORM 1396
1 SEP 62

07 AUG 1972
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202600
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202340

202460-6C
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REPORT NO. 2 212 2268 72
PAGE 2 OF 1 PAGES
ORIGINATOR Berlin Station,
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b1

2. ~~See~~ In approximately [b1] two MfS agents visited Source at his home in [b1]. They urged him to cooperate with MfS, in order to prove his loyalty to the government. Source agreed and signed an obligation. He received a cover-name, which he is now unable to recall. His mission was to gain employment with the firm [b1] in [b1] SZOG, and to spy on other juvenile co-workers. He was supposed to deliver written reports. Source remembers that one agent drove a beige colored Wartburg sedan with license number NW 40-81. Source went to [b1] but got drunk and involved in fights with other juveniles. He was picked up by MfS and taken to a cover-apartment in [b1] the location of which he is unable to remember. He was hit and urged to start working properly. Source asked for money and received DME 200, for which he had to sign a receipt. Source spent the money but still did nothing for the MfS. In [b1] Source was expelled from the MfS and signed a "quit-claim" certificate. He was alleged to not contacted further by the MfS. [b1]

b1

Source stated that during

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ORIGINATOR Berlin Station,
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his final conversation with MfS, he was restricted from future entry into the SZOG. He was also warned not to carry out any anti-SZOG acts in future, either in FRG or any other western country. He was told that if he did not comply with these obligations he would be compelled to serve all his outstanding sentences, which amount to approximately nine years imprisonment. Source stated that he was never approached by the MfS again. He also stated that he is not presently on a mission for them in the West.

3. (u) Source stated that he suspects [b6] born [b6] residing at [b6]

to be an MfS informant.

[b6] He is a member of the Sozialistische Einheits-partei Deutschland (SED - Social Unity Party Germany). Source stated that [b6] acts like a devoted communist only in order to get a good position.

4. (u) Source believes that a friend of his step-father, Hans-Joachim [b6] born approximately [b6] is a member of the MfS.

[b6] Source last saw [b6] in Gera in 1966 and has had no further contact with him.

5. (u) Source believes a former prison-mate [b6] to be an MfS informant. [b6] approximately [b6] in [b6] is a graduate economist. He is presently serving a 4 year prison sentence in Camp X Penitentiary, Hohenschoenhausen, SSB, for attempted escape.

ORIGINATOR'S COMMENTS: Source was of average intelligence. He was talkative and friendly during debriefing at MRC, Berlin-Marienfelde, WB, on [b6]

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1. COUNTRY: (u) EAST GERMANY	8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 5640 72 (5005-01)
2. SUBJECT: (u) Ministry for State Security (MfS) Operations	9. DATE OF REPORT: 3 July 1972
3. ISC NUMBER:	10. NO. OF PAGES: 19
4. DATE OF INFORMATION:	11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 687
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: b1	12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Gp, APO New York 09108
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE DOC INFORMATION	13. PREPARED BY: b6
7. SOURCE: b1	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: COL, MI Commanding

07 AUG 1972

REC'D DS-4C2

15. SUMMARY:	(Leave Blank)
REPORT: (Translation of BND Report ZLG-85569)	
(e)	
b1	

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16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:	17. DOWNGRADING DATA:	18. ENCLOSURE DATA:
1-DIA 3-USAREUR w/o 2 cy of encl 1-EUCOM w/o encl 1-USAFE w/o encl 1-USASAE w/o encl 1-V Corps w/o encl 1-VII Corps w/o encl 1-EEIC w/o encl 2-IRCD w/o encl 1-66th MI Gp, 430th MI Det w/o encl 1-66th MI Gp, 766th MI Det w/o encl 1-SF Det (Abn) Eur w/o encl 1-USASPD w/o encl	CLASSIFIED BY DIAM 58-11 X FROM CDS OF EO 11652 X CATEGORY 1 DECLASSIFY ON: CANNOT BE DETERMINED 187 CONFIDENTIAL (Classification and Control Markings)	1 Enclosure: 1. (u) b1 1 cy, 42 pgs. ENCL 1 HAS NOT BEEN REPRODUCED REQUEST ENCL FROM DS-14

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This report contains unprocessed information.
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93-075-72

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(Classification and Control Markings)

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY

8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 212 1995 72

2. subject: MFS Modus Operandi and Data
About an Alleged MFS
Personality, FNU b6 (U

9. DATE OF REPORT: 21 June 1972

2. ISC NUMBER:

10. NO. OF PAGES:

14. REFERENCES: DIRM: 60.7A6

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: May 1972

12. ORIGINATOR:

Berlin Station
66th MI Group

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: West Berlin,
Germany, 26 May 1972

13. PREPARED BY

6 EVALUATION: SOURCE F INFORMATION 6

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY

7. SOURCE: b6

DPOB:

b6

COL, MI
Commanding

18. SUMMARY:

8. SUMMARY: (S) This report contains information concerning the Modus Operandi of the Ministerium fuer Staatsicherheit (MFS - Ministry for State Security), and information concerning FNU b6 an alleged MFS Agent.

(Leave blank)

REGRADUATED 1998

ON JAN 18 1950

BY ORDER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

FORTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200

(Z) In approximately [b6] while Source was in a female prison on Barnim Strasse, Soviet Sector of Berlin (SSB), she was approached by two officials of the MFS. One of the officials was unidentified. The other official was identified as FNU [b6], born approximately 1937. [b6] told Source that if she wanted her fiancée to be released from prison soon, she would have to cooperate with the MFS by working for them in West Berlin (WB). Source agreed to cooperate. [b6] told her that on [b6], through the efforts of lawyers, she would be released from Karl Marx Stadt prison, Soviet Zone of Occupied Germany (SZOG), to Camp Giessen, Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). [b6] instructed her to meet HIM at 1400 hours, four weeks after her arrival at Camp Giessen, in front of the newspaper stand on the platform of the S-Bahnhof on Friedrich Strasse, SSB. If she was unable to meet [b6] she was to see HIM exactly one week later, at the same

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR

3-57A

15-00000

2-4081-CIA

1-BUCOM

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1-1805

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17. DOWNGRADING DATA

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

CLASSIFIED BY DIAI 58-7. EXEMPT FROM
GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. EXEMPTION
CATEGORY 2. DECLASSIFICATION DATE
CANNOT BE DETERMINED.

206

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19 JUNE 1997
by USAINSCOM FOLPA
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Q-49

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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ORIGINATOR Berlin Station,
66th MI Group

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time and place. If she was unable to meet b6 a second time, she was to go to the Friedrich Strasse checkpoint, where she could ask a border guard to contact b6. Source was told that her cooperation would be further discussed at the next meeting, and that she would get detailed instructions. Source was not required to sign anything. She did not receive a telephone number in case of emergency, or a cover name. She was told to keep the matter secret, but was not required to sign a secrecy statement. b6 remarked that she may have to sign something at their next meeting. Their entire conversation lasted 1 1/2 hours. Source was taken to Karl Marx Stadt prison, and on b6 came to the prison to remind her of their agreement. On b6 Source was released from the SZOG to the FRG, as was arranged. Source described b6 as follows:

Age: approximately 35 years
Height: approximately 5'9"
Weight: unknown
Build: stocky
Hair: dark brown, full, neatly cut, combed back
Eyes: brown
Posture: erect
Complexion: slightly tanned
Distinguishing Characteristics: none
Remarks: b6 speaks German somewhat slowly, and with a Berlin accent. HE is friendly and well mannered. HE is allegedly married, and has three children. HE was wearing a dark brown suit, white shirt, and dark colored necktie. HE also wore a gold wristwatch on HIS left wrist, and a matching bracelet. HE told Source that HE occasionally enjoys night clubs, where HE has a few drinks, and flirts with the barmaids.

ORIGINATOR'S COMMENTS: Source is a former WB prostitute. b6

b6 for exfiltration activities.

b6 She does not intend to meet with b6 or cooperate with the MFS. Source was cooperative and friendly, and provided the above information during debriefing at Marienfelde Refugee Center, Berlin-Marienfelde, WB, on b6 Berlin Station registry reflects a b6

b6

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on
18 JUN 1998
by USAINSCOM FOIPA
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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D-7

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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B08500 (G)
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or modified solely on the basis of this report.
B085-113-72

1. COUNTRY: FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

2. SUBJECT: DDR Intelligence Activity (U)

ECIS

3. ISC NUMBER:

9. REPORT NUMBER: 2 212 1920 72

10. DATE OF REPORT: 14 June 1972

11. NO. OF PAGES: 3

12. REFERENCES:

DIRM: 6B7a
IR: 2 212 1582 72

4. DATE OF INFORMATION:

b1

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ:

b1

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 2

7. SOURCE:

b1

13. ORIGINATOR:

66th MI Group

14. PREPARED BY:

b6

15. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

COL, MI
Commanding

REC'D DS-4CZ 03 JUL 1972
BW

16. SUMMARY: (U) This report discusses DDR intelligence service activity directed against the FRG police and FRG military targets. Five efforts to recruit agents with access to military targets are discussed; two involved refugees from the East, one involved an individual with relatives in the East, and one involved three Mannheim residents who received letters. In the latter instance, one of the individuals is a former US soldier and was the only one to reply to the letter, and another is a German national employed by the US forces. One attempt to black-mail and recruit a woman to supply information on FRG police is also discussed. None of the approaches was successful. This IR updates 66th MI Group IR 2 212 1582 72.

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

This report is classified CONFIDENTIAL IAW para 2-5d, AR 380-5. When separated, each item or paragraph may be handled as UNCLASSIFIED.

17. (U) During the period covered by this report, the reports on DDR intelligence service activities concentrated on firms who are under contract to the Federal Army and on military areas.

a.

b1

202410-6E-6C

18. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA
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1-OSI
1-V Corps
1-IRCD
1-66th MI Gp, AEUTMI-OA-IR

19. DOWNGRADING DATA:

GROUP I

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DD FORM 1395
1 SEP 72

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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b1

COMMENT: Reference para 1c above: the investigation concerning the letter sent to the German national employee of the US Forces is still under investigation. Upon its completion in the near future, further information will be forthcoming.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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(Classification and Control Markings)

B07400 (G)
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B07400-06L/72

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY (EG)

2. REPORT NUMBER: 2 212 1915 72

3. SUBJECT: (U) Modus Operandi of Hostile Intelligence

4. DATE OF REPORT: 8 June 1972

5. ISC NUMBER:

6. NO. OF PAGES: 3

7. REFERENCES:

DIRM : 6B7a.
6B8
6C

8. DATE OF INFORMATION: 21 February 1972

9. ORIGINATOR: 66th Military Intelligence Group

10. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Hannover, WEST GERMANY, 19 May 1972

11. PREPARED BY:

12. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 2

13. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

14. SOURCE: 22120072

Colonel
Commanding

b6

SUMMARY:

(U) This report contains information on the recruitment by East German Intelligence of an inhabitant and citizen of WEST GERMANY (WG), who unintentionally, under the influence of alcohol, crossed the West/East German border into EAST GERMANY (EG) and was apprehended by East German border guards. Included is information on the first missions assigned to him against US and British military targets and German civilian and military targets.

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

1. (C)

b1

2. (S)

b1

202-418-6C.6E
201100-6C
202460-6C
202510-6C

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

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- 1-ACSI-CIPC
- 1-66th MI Gp, AEUTMI-OA-IR

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

GROUP 3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

NONE

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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b1

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3. (C) At about 0900 hrs on [b1] he was taken by a guard to a room on the ground floor where he was interrogated by an East German First Lieutenant. He was asked about his family status and family situation and the reason why he came to EG. When he stated that he was too intoxicated to even know that he entered EG, he was threatened with a court trial for illegal entry into EG. When he refused to give any information, his interrogation was continued by a civilian who told him firmly that he could and would be treated differently in case he insisted on his keeping silent. The civilian told him "mention a few names, and you'll see that one hand washes the other".

[b1] was taken back to his cell, but was brought back to the interrogation room about 20 minutes later. The civilian asked him for details on the US military installation in Helldorfer Strasse in Helmstedt (NOTE: This is the compound of the US Military Police Detachment). Upon the interrogator's request, [b1] made a layout sketch of this installation. He was asked about the buildings and the rooms therein. He mentioned that there were a dayroom used for the showing of movies and for table tennis, and a radio room about which he could give no details because he had never entered it. When asked for the names of US military personnel stationed there, he pretended not to know any, though he frequently was in the compound and knew the names of some soldiers. When asked about the type of antennas and masts of the radio station there, he gave no information since he had never paid any attention to them. When the interrogator realized that [b1] knew very little about the Helmstedt installation, he switched his questions to the US military signal installation in the Elm woods in the vicinity of Schoeningen (PC3478), WG. Though [b1] knew the installation, he did not give any information, pretending lack of knowledge. When he was asked whether US military personnel were still billeted in the Bahnhofs-Hotel in Schoeningen, he answered in the affirmative, though he knew that this hotel burnt completely down some time ago and does not exist anymore.

4. (C) The interrogator changed subjects again and started to question [b1] on the British signal installation near Langleben (PC2386), WG, in the Elm woods. The main interest was focused on the type of antennas and the size and shape of the parabolic mirrors, questions which [b1] did not and could not answer. He was then shown a Helmstedt town map and requested to indicate the location of the British caserne on Landgrabentrift in Helmstedt which he did. The interrogator knew that the British had vacated their building near the Autobahn, but the exact location and size of the new compound seemed not to be clear to him. When asked about the size of the compound, [b1] replied it was "huge", but did not give any details.

5. (C) After this part of the interrogation, the interrogator made a short telephone call and advised the other party that he could come in now. A few minutes later an East German officer, a Captain, entered the room. He first listened in to the interrogation, but then started to asked questions, too. [b1] was asked about the location of the Bundesgrenzschutz (Federal Border Protection Forces) (BGS) installation in Helmstedt; he replied that he did not know that any BGS installation was in town at all. He was then asked for details on Helmstedt police personnel whose names were given to him. [b1] forgot all the names with the exception of Herr [b1] a plain-clothes-man, about whose assignment and duties he could not give any information. The Captain then showed him a city map of Braunschweig (PC0491), WG, on which the location of German military casernes was marked, and asked him for details on these casernes. [b1] answered that he had not served with the military, and that he was never interested in those casernes, and did not give any information.

6. (C) The civilian asked [b1] whether he owned a photo camera. [b1] answered with "No", but added that he could borrow his brother's camera. He was told to make photos of the antennas and signal masts of the US military installation in Helmstedt and near Schoeningen, and of the British caserne on Landgrabentrift in Helmstedt. He would be paid for such photos. [b1] stated that he would comply with the request.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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REPORT NO. 2 212 1915 72

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ORIGINATOR
66th MI Group

(Classification and Control Markings)

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He then was given a statement which he had to sign, that he gave all information voluntarily and without any pressure exerted on him. He was not given a cover name and/or a cover address. He also had to sign a receipt for 50 Deutschmark (DM) which were then given to him in two 20 DM bills and one 10 DM bill. He was not asked to sign any declaration or pledge that he was willing to work for the East German Ministry for State Security (Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit) (MfS). He was requested to come to EG again on the following Saturday between 1000 and 1200 hrs. If he could not keep this date, he should come on the following Saturday at the same time. If this were also impossible for him, he should return at any time on the railroad tracks along which he had walked the previous day; if apprehended by an East German border patrol, he should not give any information unless one of the three people who talked to him (civilian, 1st Lt, and Captain) were present. He should bring the photos he was requested to take, with him for the next meeting. b1 had not been told where exactly he should cross the border for the next meet. He was escorted back to the border by the civilians and the two officers in a jeep which stopped near the East/West German border in the vicinity of Magdeburger Warte (PG3987), WG. The civilian put on the uniform blouse of a 1st Lt, which was definitely not his own, since it was much too tight. b1 was also given an old East German uniform (blouse and trousers). When they approached the border on foot, the civilian observed the West German side very carefully. After he was sure that no West German customs official nor any other person (tourists etc.) were in the vicinity, b1 was sent back to WG through a minefield; a few nuts and bolts were removed from the fence before and b1 had to get out of the uniform. He was told that he should cross the border at this location next Saturday; he would be expected on the East side of the border. The time of b1 return to WG was between 1500 and 1600 hrs on b1

7. (c) b1 gave the following description of the civilian interrogator: about 28 to 30 years old, about 172 cm tall, slightly obese, black slightly wavy hair. He was dressed in a turtleneck sweater and ski trousers.

8. (c) After his return to Helmstedt, b1 first told his mother about his weekend experience. He claims that he was determined not to go to the prearranged meeting in EG. He decided to report everything to the Helmstedt police. Of the DM 50 which he received in EG, he had used about DM 30; he returned the last DM 20 bill to the Helmstedt police.

COMMENT (C) The report does not mention whether the East German officers whose rank b1 identified by their shoulder insignia, were officers of the EAST GERMAN ARMY BORDER COMMAND or another component of the East German military forces. But under the circumstances under which he met these officers, it seems to be a safe assumption that they were EGA BC officers or at least were in EGA BC uniforms. The Helmstedt police opened a criminal investigation against b1 for intelligence activities; it is anticipated on the basis of past experience, that this investigation will be discontinued by the public prosecutor.

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213

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B08500 (0)

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B085-084-72

1. COUNTRY: FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 212 1582 72

2. SUBJECT: DDR Intelligence Service Contacts of FRG Police Officials and their Wives (U)

9. DATE OF REPORT: 2 May 1972

3. INFO NUMBER:

10. NO. OF PAGES: 3

11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 6B7a

B

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: b1

12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: b1

13. PREPARED BY: b6

6. SOURCE: b1

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: b6

COL, MI
Commanding

15. SUMMARY:

(U)

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This report is classified CONFIDENTIAL IAW para 2-5d, AR 380-5. When separated, each item or paragraph may be handled as UNCLASSIFIED.

1. (U)

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2. (U)

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16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

- 1-DIA
- 2-ISAERUR
- 1-EUCOM
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17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

GROUP I

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

214

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REC'D DS-AC2 16 MAY 1972

201100 AC 202100 AC
201642 AC, AF 205000 GE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 212 1582
PAGE 2 OF 3
ORIGINATOR 66th MI Group

b1

b1

(C) During the past years, the DER intelligence service has requested some
CIA officials traveling alone in the DER to induce their husbands to

b1

b1

b1

b1

b1

9. (U) The missions given to police officials were as follows:

To determine whether the names of certain people were listed in the FRG
Wanted list (this to be reported to a cover address).

215

DD FORM 1396

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 212 ¹⁵⁸² 72
PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES
ORIGINATOR 66th MI Group

(Leave Blank)

1. To determine the ownership of passenger cars.
2. To recruit colleagues for the DDR intelligence service, especially colleagues in the security police.
3. To provide the DDR with characterizations of supervisors, including their political and party affiliation.
4. To determine the area of responsibility of the general criminal police and security police and their contacts with the Agency for the Protection of the Constitution.

216

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON JUN 18 1998
BY SP-10/10/98/SP-10/98/PO
AUTH Para 1-6.3 DOD 5200.1-R

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DD FORM 1396c

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT

b1

(Classification and Control Markings)

5430

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report. GE-1061-72

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY

8. REPORT NUMBER

2 218 4155 72 (5004-05)

2. SUBJECT: (U) SPRENNBERG (5134N-1422E)
(VT5613) MFS Questionnaire at Schwarze Pumpe Prison

9. DATE OF REPORT:

28 April 1972

3. ISC NUMBER:

10. NO. OF PAGES:

1

11. REFERENCES:

DIRM: 684

24 MAY 1972

4. DATE OF INFORMATION:

b1

12. ORIGINATOR:

66th MI Group,
APO New York 09103

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ:

b1

13. PREPARED BY:

b6

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE DOC INFORMATION

APPROVING AUTHORITY:

COL, MI
Commanding

7. SOURCE:

b1

15. SUMMARY:

1. (C) (NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT)

b1

(Leave Blank)

45

2. (U) This information was furnished USI b1 The NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT b1 marking is necessary to prevent the release of this information to a third country without the permission of the originator.

201100-6C
203300-6C
201120-6C

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-BIA
3-USAREUR, 2 w/o Incl
1-EUCOM, w/o Incl
1-USAFE, w/o Incl
1-V Corps, w/o Incl
1-VII Corps, w/o Incl
1-SEIC, w/o Incl
1-State Dept, w/o Incl
1-66th MI Gp, 430th MI Det, w/o Incl
1-66th MI Gp, 766th MI Det
1-67 Det (Abn) Eur, w/o Incl
1-BSAPD
continued to Bloc Nr 17

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

GROUP-1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

1-CINCPAC, w/o Incl
1-OSI, w/o Incl
1-PSYOPS, w/o Incl

217

CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT

b1

(Classification and Control Markings)

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

1 Encl:

(C) b1

1 cy 4 pgs

DD FORM 1 SEP 62 1396

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☒

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

5 USC 552 (b)(1)

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☐

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☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 218-221

Notice to I R

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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of national defense of the United
States within the meaning of the espionage
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BO4193 (A)

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or modified solely on the basis of this report.

93-047-72

COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY

8. REPORT NUMBER:

2 212 1515 72

SUBJECT: (U) MfS Modus Operandi, and Data
About Two MfS Personalities

9. DATE OF REPORT:

24 April 1972

10. NO. OF PAGES:

4

11. REFERENCES:

DIRM: 6C,7A6

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: March 1972

12. ORIGINATOR:

Berlin Station, 66th MI Group

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: West Berlin
7 March 1972

13. PREPARED BY:

b6

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE F INFORMATION 6

7. SOURCE:

b1

14. APPROVING AUTH:

DPOB:

b1

COL, MI
Commanding

15. SUMMARY:

This report contains information concerning the modus operandi of the
Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit (MfS - Ministry for State Security), and in-
formation concerning two MfS personalities.

(Leave Blank)

1. (C) On 21 January 1970, Source's son, [b6] DPOB: [b1]

[b1] Source
was summoned twice to the Leipzig, SZ03 MfS office, located on Friedrich
Ebertstrasse, and questioned about his son's desertion. No threats, and no
attempts for recruitment were made. In [b1] Source was
summoned again to the Leipzig MfS office, and questioned about his son's desertion.

b1

Source was allegedly turned down, since his son was a deserter.
In approximately mid [b1] Source was summoned to a meeting with the

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

- 1 - DIA
- 3 - USAREUR
- 1 - ACSI-CIA
- 1 - EUCOM
- 1 - V Corps
- 1 - IRCD
- 1 - 66th MI Gp, AEUTMI-OA-IR

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

GROUP 3
DOWNGRADED AT 10 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

222

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(Classification and Control Markings)

DD FORM 1396

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 212 1515 72

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

ORIGINATOR Berlin Station
66th MI Group

(Leave Blank)

Querschnittsbevollmächtigter (ABV - Local Representative of the People's Police), who is responsible for the area where Source lives. Source was introduced to [b6] who allegedly became Source's Case Officer. [b6] told Source that the MfS could arrange for Source to get a passport, and that he would re-contact Source, and bring a passport application. Approximately 14 days later, [b6] recontacted Source at his apartment, accompanied by his supervisor, name unknown. They discussed the desertion of Source's son. Source was asked to write to his son, and ascertain the reason for his desertion. Source told them that his son would not state why he deserted. [b6] and his supervisor left, and told Source that they would return to talk about the passport. At the end of April 1971, they both returned, and brought passport application forms, which Source completed. Source was told not to indicate his son's desertion on the forms. [b6] was to return, and inform Source as to whether the application was approved. At the end of [b6] [b6] returned, and informed Source that he would be able to travel on [b6] and that he would be recontacted on [b6]. On [b6] [b6] returned to Source's apartment, with a passport and exit visa for a 28 day visit to Worms, FRG, via the Hattenhausen border crossing point. Source was allegedly given the passport in exchange for his Deutsche Personalausweis (DPA - German Identification Card), a train ticket to Gerstunger from Leipzig, the customary 10 DM given to an annuitant traveling to FRG or WB, plus 50 DM expense money, for which he signed a receipt with his real name. While in Worms, Source was to ascertain the reason for his son's desertion. Upon his return to Leipzig, Source was to be recontacted by [b6]

b1

[b6] three or four days later. Source returned the passport, and was given his DPA. Source informed [b6] that his son's address was unknown. [b6] told him to wait until he received correspondence from his son, and that he would be recontacted at a later date. Between [b6] and [b6] Source was visited twice by [b6]. During one of these visits, Source told [b6] that he learned [b6] in [b6]. In [b6] Source was introduced to [b6] an alleged [b6] [b6] [b6] was told that [b6] would be recontacting him. At the end of [b6] Source was contacted by [b6] who told Source that he wanted [b6] to travel to WB. [b6] was told that a possibility existed for his son's repatriation if his son would cooperate with MfS, and give details about his screening in Munich, FRG, and WB. Source discussed the situation with his wife, and decided to make the trip to WB, since it would give him the chance to see his son, and the chance to defect. He had allegedly no intention of trying to recruit his son. In [b6] Source was recontacted by [b6], and told that he would travel to WB on behalf of the MfS. Stade hinted that if his son cooperated, after a couple of years he could return to SZOG without fear of punishment or arrest for his desertion. In [b6] [b6] returned to Source's apartment, and told him that he would travel to WB in [b6] again as an annuitant. On approximately [b6] Source was telephonically contacted by [b6] who told him to be ready to travel to WB in mid [b6] and that [b6] would be in Leipzig in two days to discuss the matter. During the next visit, [b6] told Source to obtain a decision from his son concerning cooperation with the MfS, and in the [b6] his son's answer was positive, to tell him that the MfS wants information concerning his whereabouts at Munich and WB. [b6] stated that it would be convenient if [b6] would accompany his son to the Friedrichstrasse train station, Soviet Sector of Berlin (SBZ). For a brief meeting with the MfS. If his son was willing to [b6], Source should have him sign a brief obligation. Source was then required to sign a statement, stating that he would never reveal any MfS connections, or his admission. [b6] allegedly signed the statement with his real name, and then asked to cover name. [b6] On [b6] [b6] returned, and gave Source the passport that he used on his trip to Worms, 10 DM as an annuitant traveling, and [b6] DM. Source surrendered his DPA to Stade. Source was then driven by [b6] to Hattenhausen, SZOG, where a room

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(Classification and Control Markings)

FORM 1396c

reserved for [b6] Source was required to pay for his room, and was told that he would be reimbursed at a later date. On [b6] at 0830 hours, [b6] drove Source to the SSB main train station. Source was told to return to the Friedrichstrasse Station at 1000 hours on [b6], where he would be met by [b6]. Source arrived in WB at approximately 1030 hours. While meeting with his son, Source allegedly said that he should get in touch with US authorities concerning the situation. On [b6] Source was met by [b6] as planned. Following a stop at Stade's alleged office, Puschkin Allee, Berlin-Treptow, SSB, [b6] and Source drove to Leipzig. In Source's apartment, a recording was made of Source's report, which stated that his son would think about [b6] offer. Source returned the passport, and received his DPA. He was then required to return any unused money, which amounted to 50 DMW. He then signed a receipt, using his cover name. He was then allegedly given 100 DMW for his services. Source told [b6] that he arranged to see his son on 29 February 1972, in order to receive the decision. [b6] allegedly agreed to this meeting. On [b6] [b6] telephoned Source, and told him that he would be busy on [b6] so he could not let Source travel to WB. The trip was postponed for eight days. Source allegedly sent a letter and telegram to his son, without [b6] knowledge, informing him of the change in plans. On [b6] Source was telephonically contacted by [b6] who told him that he would pick him up at [b6] hours, [b6] [b6] arrived on [b6] and gave Source a new passport, allegedly to preclude any suspicion from Eastern or Western border controls. Source also received the usual 10 DMW, and 150 DMW, for which he was to sign a receipt upon his return. Source again signed a statement indicating he would not talk to anyone about his WB mission. If his son agreed to cooperate, Source was to obtain details about his screenings and processing, particularly at US offices. Emphasis was allegedly supposed to be placed on his son's processing at Munich, since MfS knowledge about US offices in Munich was very poor. Source was told that he would be a permanent courier should his son cooperate. Source was instructed to return to S-Bahn Friedrichstrasse, not later than 2000 hours of the same day. The next trip would allegedly take place in [b6]. Source was required to obtain a written agreement from his son. In case of emergency, Source was given the SSB telephone number 277-034. Source then proceeded to WB, and went to his son's apartment. He and his son then contacted US Intelligence.

2. (u) Source offered a physical description of [b6] as follows:

Age:	35-40 years
Height:	6'2" to 6'4"
Weight:	205 to 215 pounds
Hair:	Black, combed straight back
Eyes:	Dark
Face:	Oval
Distinguishing Characteristics:	None
Remarks:	[b6] speaks high German, smokes cigarettes, is married, and is very polite and friendly. He appears to be well-educated. He drives a Wartburg 1000 automobile, license number unknown.

3. (C) Source offered a physical description of [b6] as follows:

Age:	45-49 years
Height:	5'7" to 5'9"
Weight:	150 to 160 pounds
Hair:	Light grey, combed straight back
Eyes:	Greyish-green
Face:	Narrow, fair complexion
Distinguishing Characteristics:	None

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REGRADER: [illegible]
ON JUN 18 1988
BY GDR [illegible]
[illegible] 1-005 000-200.15

1396c

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CONTINUATION SHEET

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 212 1515 72

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

ORIGINATOR Berlin Station
66th MI Group

Remarks:

[b6] speaks high German, above average intelligence, and is very polite and friendly. [b6] is married, with one daughter. He drives a beige Wartburg 1000 automobile, license number unknown.

(Leave Blank)

ORIG. TOR'S COMMENTS: Source is a German national. He was cooperative during debriefing at an operational facility of Berlin Station, 66th MI Group, on [b6]. Since Source desired to remain in WB, he was instructed to report to Marienfelde Refugee Center (MRC), Berlin-Marienfelde, WB.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDR [b6] [b6]
AUTH Para 1-603 EOL 5290.1R

225

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(Classification and Control Markings)

DD FORM 1396c

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☒

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☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 226-230

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EXCEPT **b1**

5476
This report contains unprocessed information.
Policy and procedures should not be evolved
or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY	8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 2806 70 (3007-01)
2. SUBJECT: (C) MES Special Personnel Files (U)	9. DATE: 10/10/70
3. ISC NUMBER:	10. TYPE OF ORIGIN: 3
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: b1	11. REFERENCE: DIRM: 23 60
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: b1	12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group, ABN New York 09128
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE F INFORMATION 6	13. PREPARED BY: b6
7. SOURCE: b1	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: b6 COL, MI Commanding

15. SUMMARY REPORT: **b1** (Leave Blank)

b1

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR: 1-DIA 3-USAREUR 1-EUCOM 1-USAF 1-USASAE 1-State Dept 1-66th MI Gp, 430th MI Det 1-66th MI Gp, 766 MI Det 1-SF Det (Abn) Eur 1-USASPD 1-CINCPACV 1-OSI 1-Psy Ops	17. DOWNGRADING DATA: Group-1 EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE 231 CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION EXCEPT b1 (Classification and Control Markings)	18. ENCLOSURE DATA: None
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DD FORM 1396
1 SEP 61

08 1072
PROD DS-102

R7

201100 7CC
90200

CONTINUATION SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION
EXCEPT ☒ b1

DD FORM 1396-62

PAGES

CLASSIFICATION

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1.

b1

2.

b1

3.

b1

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EXCEPT ☒ b1

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

DEPARTMENT OF

CONTINUATION SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DISSEMINATION SCHEDULE
EXCEPT **b1**

PAGE 72
PAGE 72
DISSEMINATION SCHEDULE
EXCEPT **b1**
DD FORM 1396c 69108

b1

233

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EXCEPT **b1**

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DD FORM 1396c
1 SEP 61

DEPARTMENT OF

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B12140 (G)

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AQ-136-72 (BA)

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY

8. REPORT NUMBER:

2 212 1294 72

2. SUBJECT: (U) LEIPZIG (5119N-1220E/US1489) 9. DATE OF REPORT: 17 April 1972

Contact with the Ministry for State Security

10. NO. OF PAGES:

1

3. ISC NUMBER:

11. REFERENCES:

DIRM: 6B7

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 16 March 1972

12. ORIGINATOR:

66th MI Group

APO New York 00100

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Hof, Germany
17 March 1972

13. PREPARED BY:

b6

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 6

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

COL, MI
Commanding

REC'D DS-4C2 25 APR 1972

RY:

(c) An unidentified legal traveler reported that while living with his fiancée and her parents in LEIPZIG he was contacted by a member of the Freie Deutsche Jugend (FDJ) (East German Communist Youth Organization). After at first refusing to do so he agreed to meet this man outside of their apartment. During this second meeting they were joined by another official, presumably a member of the Ministry for State Security. They tried to get the legal traveler to work for East Germany by making reference to his personal connections and by promising him a resident permit for East Germany. Finally they agreed to meet again in EAST BERLIN (5231N-1323E/UU9119) on b1. The traveler was then paid 200 DME for air fare to EAST BERLIN. The traveler allegedly wanted to keep this appointment because he feared that his fiancée and her parents would be otherwise subject to reprisals.

(Leave Blank)

COMMENTS (c)

b1

201100 76C
103150 76C

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA
3-USAREUR
1-ACSI
1-EUCOM
1-VII Corps
1-USASAE
1-66th MI Gp, AEUTMI-OA-IR

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

GROUP-3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

None

234

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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014151 (A)

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31-0025-72

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY (GE)

8. REPORT NUMBER:

2 718 0040 72

2. SUBJECT: (U) East German Intelligence Service (EGIS) re: Issuing of Bogus Cover Documentation

9. DATE OF REPORT:

17 April 1972

3. ISC NUMBER:

10. NO. OF PAGES: 1

11. REFERENCES:

DIRM: 6B6a

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 15 March 1972

12. ORIGINATOR:

66th MI Group

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: KAISERSLAUTERN (MV1077) Federal Republic of Germany, 15 March 1972

13. PREPARED BY:

b6

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 3

LTC, MI

7. SOURCE: 22120570 (U)

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

b6

COL, MI
Commanding

15. SUMMARY:

(U) This report concerns the issue by East German Intelligence Service (EGIS) of bogus cover documentation to one of its agents.

(Leave Blank)

DECLASSIFIED
ON JUN 18 1988
BY CDR USAF/AFMPO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

EVALUATION REPORTS (DD FORM 1480'S) PREPARED ON THIS IR WILL BE CLASSIFIED AT LEAST CONFIDENTIAL.

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION: Recently an EGIS agent was issued a Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) Passport and Personalausweis as cover documentation to be utilized by the agent only when traveling to EAST BERLIN. According to the agent's EGIS Case Officer, the documents were issued in the name of an actual person - not a fictitious name and the person actually exists and resides in the FRG. At the same time that the agent was issued the new cover documentation, EGIS retrieved from him a set of old documentation, also consisting of a passport and Personalausweis, which he had been issued previously.

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

- 1 - DIA
- 2 - USAREUR
- 1 - EUCOM
- 1 - ACSI
- 1 - USAINTC-(ICDI)
- 1 - 66th MI Gp, AEUTMI-OA-IR

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

GROUP 3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

235

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Classification and Control Markings)

DD FORM 1396
SEP 62

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☐

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FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 236-239

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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(Classification and Control Markings)

B0750C (G)
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Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.
B0750C-022/72

1. COUNTRY: WEST GERMANY (WG)/EAST GERMANY (EG) REPORT NUMBER: 2 212 1151 72

2. SUBJECT: (U) Cases of Intelligence Interest in Lower Saxony, January 1972 3. DATE OF REPORT: 23 March 1972

10. NO. OF PAGES: 2

3. ISC NUMBER: 11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 6B7a 6C

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 1 - 31 January 1972 12. ORIGINATOR: 66th Military Intelligence Group

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Hannover, WG, 1 March 1972 13. PREPARED BY: [Redacted] b6

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 2 14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: [Redacted] b6

7. SOURCE: [Redacted] b1 Colonel Commanding

15. SUMMARY (C-REF) [Redacted] b1

1. (C-REF) [Redacted] b1

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:
1-DA
2-USARMC
1-EUCOM
1-USASAC
1-OSI
1-IRCD
1-ACSI-CIPC
1-66th MI Gp, AEUPTI-OA-IR

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:
GROUP 3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

18. ENCLOSURE: NONE

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

240

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

(Classification and Control Markings)

18 APR 1972
REC'D DSAC

202410-GE-CC, 202410-GE-CC 175

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

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Page 2 of 2
212 1151 72
ORIGINATOR
65th MI Group

(Classification and Control Markings)

b1

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b1

b1

b1

b1

241

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

1396c

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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(Classification and Control Markings)

543A

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report. GE-037-72

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY (U)	8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 2261 72 (5004-05)
2. SUBJECT: (U) MAGDEBURG (5207N-1138E) (PC8078), Possible Espionage Activity	9. DATE OF REPORT: 22 March 1972
3. ISC NUMBER:	10. NO. OF PAGES: 2
	11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 6B7
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: Summer 1966	12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group, APO New York 09108
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Giessen, Germany 28 February 1972	13. PREPARED BY: <i>Jr</i>
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE F INFORMATION 6	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: <i>Pa</i>
7. SOURCE: b1 (DPOE: b1) b1	COL, MI Commanding

REC'D DE-ACZ 19 APR 1972

b6

15. SUMMARY:

(U)
(U) The following report gives an account of an incident which led Source to believe that university-aged men who were born in East Germany as the children of members of the occupying Soviet forces were being sent into West Germany by Eastern intelligence.

(Leave Blank)

REPORT:

1. (C) Source

b1

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DEA
3-USAREUR
1-EUCOM
1-VII Corps
1-PCSI
1-66th MI Gp, 430th MIBat
1-66th MI Gp, 766th MI Det
1-OST
5-b1
5-DEFA
b1 (G)

17. DOWNGRADING DATA

GROUP-3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

None

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

242

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(Classification and Control Markings)

CONTINUATION SHEET

REPORT NO. 2 510 200 72
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
ORIGINATOR
GCHQ, 11, GROUND,
PO Box 1000, 08102

(Classification and Control Markings)

(Leave Blank)

b1

2. (C) Possible Long Range Espionage Activity Against West Germany

In the 1950's, Source became acquainted with a [b6] when the letter was the [b6] in [b6] MACDEBURG (5207N-1138E) (PC8070). In [b6] was appointed as [b6] [b6] for one of the four districts of the city of HAGENBERG representing the N part of the city. Although they no longer worked in the same company, Source and [b6] remained friendly, and continued to meet each other. One Summer evening [b6] at around 20 hours, while walking together on Marxack Strasse, they passed the Magdeburg administration building of the local Soviet forces, a three story structure on the E side of Marxack Strasse between Seumestrasse and Geisslerstrasse. Source noticed about forty college aged persons (age 18 - 25) standing on the sidewalk on the other side of the street, in front of other buildings which are also occupied by the Soviet forces. The young men were standing in small groups, talking to one another and smoking. Source assumed they were taking a break from some meeting being conducted in the building in front of which they were standing. He had previously noted them at different occasions when passing on his way home from work, sometimes seeing them converse with uniformed Soviet soldiers coming from the administration building across the street. When he commented on this to [b6] his friend told him that they were the children of Soviet soldiers, that they had all been born in East Germany during the post-war occupation, and that they all spoke German with native fluency. [b6] stated in this connection that it was known that Western nations were sending agents to East Germany and that the East bloc would be foolish not to take advantage of the opportunity to send these college-age persons into West Germany. Source did not press the matter because he knew [b6] would refuse further information and because he did not want to appear inquisitive in what was apparently a confidential matter.

243

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT
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☐

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☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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NO DUPLICATION FEE
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Page(s) 244-245

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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CONFIDENTIAL

(Classification and Control Markings)

B14151 (A)

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.
51-0085-71

1. COUNTRY: **EAST GERMANY (GE)**
2. SUBJECT: **(U) East German Intelligence Service (EGIS): New Cover Documentation to be Issued to an EGIS Agent.**
3. ISC NUMBER:
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: **4 December 1971**
5. REPORT NUMBER: **2 718 0013 72**
6. DATE OF REPORT: **13 January 1972**
7. NO. OF PAGES: **2**
8. REFERENCES: **DIRM 687**
9. ORIGINATOR: **56th MI Group**
10. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: **KAISERSLAUTERN (MV1077), Federal Republic of Germany, 16 December 1971**
11. EVALUATION: SOURCE **B** INFORMATION **3**
12. SOURCE: **22120016 (U)**
13. PREPARED BY: **b6**
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: **b6**
COL, MI
Commanding

(Leave Blank)

15. SUMMARY: **(U)** This report concerns East German Intelligence Service (EGIS) intentions of issuing new cover documentation to one of its agents. The agent, who resides in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and is in possession of bogus cover documentation previously issued to him by the EGIS, was recently told to return the old documentation and that he will be issued new cover documents for the purpose of traveling to EAST BERLIN.

EVALUATION REPORTS (DD FORM 1480'S) PREPARED ON THIS IR WILL BE CLASSIFIED AT LEAST **CONFIDENTIAL**.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON **JUN 18 1998**
BY **CDR USN**
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.10

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1 - **DIA**
2 - **USARUR**
1 - **EUCOM-J-2**
1 - **ACSI-CIA**
1 - **ASIS-ICDI**
1 - **66th MI Gp, AEUTMI-OA-IR**

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

GROUP-3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

246

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1996

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B14151 (A)

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51-0082-71

2 718 0010 72

13 January 1972

8. REPORT NUMBER:

9. DATE OF REPORT:

10. NO. OF PAGES: 1

11. REFERENCES: DIRM 686a

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY (GE)

2. SUBJECT: (U) East German Intelligence Service (EGIS): Modus Operandi

3. ISC NUMBER:

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 4 December 1971

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: KAISERSLAUTERN (MV1077) Federal Republic of Germany, 16 December 1971

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 3

7. SOURCE: 22120016 (U)

12. ORIGINATOR:

66th MI Group

PREPARED BY:

LT

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

COL, MI
Commanding

15. SUMMARY:

(U) (C) This report concerns a change of East German Intelligence Service (EGIS) modus operandi regarding the mode of travel and meeting place of one of its agents. An EGIS agent, residing in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), who has made repeated trips to EAST BERLIN (UU 9220) via air and crossing at the Friedrichstrasse crossing point, was recently instructed to proceed to a small East German border town via train, where he was met by his Case Officer at the railroad station. The agent was initially contacted by an East German Army Officer, who guided him through the station and past the usual customs control. After meeting with the EGIS Case Officer, they then proceeded via car to a safe house in EAST BERLIN.

(Leave Blank)

EVALUATION REPORTS (DD FORM 1480'S) PREPARED ON THIS IR WILL BE CLASSIFIED AT LEAST CONFIDENTIAL.

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

- 1 - DIA
- 2 - USAREUR
- 1 - EUCOM, J-2
- 1 - ACSI-CIA
- 1 - DCS-ICDI
- 2 - 66th MI Gp, AEUTMI-OA-IR

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

GROUP 3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

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BY CDR CMC / HPC
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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B14151

(A)

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51-0079-71

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY (GE)

8. REPORT NUMBER:

2 718 0007 72

2. SUBJECT: (U) East German Intelligence Service (EGIS) re: Emergency Contact Procedures

9. DATE OF REPORT:

13 January 1972

3. ISC NUMBER:

10. NO. OF PAGES: 1

11. REFERENCES: DIRM 6B6a

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 30 October 1971

12. ORIGINATOR:

66th MI Group

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: KAISERSLAUTERN (MV1077) Federal Republic of Germany, 10 December 1971

PREPARED BY:

b6

117

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 3

b6

CP, MI

7. SOURCE: 221205370

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY

COL, MI
Commanding

15. SUMMARY:

(U) This report concerns East German Intelligence Service (EGIS) Emergency Contact instructions and arrangements with an EGIS agent. Due to unavoidable circumstances an EGIS agent was delayed for several hours while enroute to EAST BERLIN (UU 9220) for a previously arranged meeting with the EGIS. As a result of the delay, the agent was forced to make contact with his EGIS Case Officer via a prearranged emergency system, utilizing the telephone. Following the agent's telephone call, he proceeded to the designated safe house, where he was subsequently met by his Case Officer approximately 15 minutes after his arrival. According to the agent a little less than an hour elapsed from the time of his initial call until the arrival of the EGIS Case Officer.

(Leave Blank)

EVALUATION REPORTS (DD FORM 1480'S) PREPARED ON THIS IR WILL BE CLASSIFIED AT LEAST CONFIDENTIAL.

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

- 1 - DIA
- 2 - USAREUR
- 1 - EUCOM, J-2
- 1 - ACST-CIA
- 1 - COMUSMACV
- 1 - 66th MI Gp, AEUHMI-OA-IR

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

GROUP-3
DOWNGRADED AT 12-YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

248

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ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDR [illegible] /PC
AUTH PARA 1-6.5 DOD 5000.10

1396

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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546G
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MI-1416-71

(Classification and Control Markings)

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY
2. SUBJECT: (C) DRESDEN (VS1061) MFS Information
3. ISC NUMBER:
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: July 1971
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: b1
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE DOC INFORMATION
7. SOURCE: b1 (DOB: b1) b1
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 219 1043 71 (5004 22)
9. DATE OF REPORT: 15 December 1971
10. NO. OF PAGES: 1
11. REFERENCES: SICR: G-SCP-26711 DIRM: 6B7
12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group, APO New York 09108
13. PREPARED BY: b6
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: COL, MI Commanding

22 MAR 1972
DS-4C2

(Leave Blank)

325

201100-GC
201110-GC

1. (C) (NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT b1) Information contained in this b1 report concerns MFS vehicles and their frequent change of license plates and personalia data on MFS members of b6 Source, who worked in an automotive repairshop stated that all MFS vehicles have red vehicle registrations with 10 digit numbers. Bills for these vehicles are sent to the district administration office with the 10 digit number reflected. Most of the MFS vehicles Source had come in contact with in his shop were WARTBURGS or TRABANTS; often the same vehicles appeared in the shop with different license plates than on previous visits. Based on conversations with MFS members coming to Source's shop, Source learned that there must be a connection between the district MFS offices of b6 MFS drivers often said that they came from NIESKU or that they had to go there. Source met a b6 b6 In 1969 b6 was transferred and now handles the Inter-Gas Station in DRESDEN-ALTSTADT at VS082601, where he takes care of foreigners, mostly travellers from West Germany. It is not generally known that b6 is an MFS member, working at the gas station.

2. (C) This information was furnished USI by b1 The NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT b1 marking is necessary to prevent the release of this information to a third country without the permission of the originator.

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA
3-USABEUR, 1 w/o Incl.
1-ENCOM, w/o Incl
1-VII Corps, w/o Incl
1-ACSI, w/o Incl
1-IRCD
1-66th MI Gp, 430th MI Det, w/o Incl
1-66th MI Gp, 766th MI Det, w/o Incl
1-CINCPACAF, w/o Incl
1-OSI, w/o Incl

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

GROUP-1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

249


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b1

(Classification and Control Markings)

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

1 Encl:

(C) b1
1 cy 6 pgs



DD FORM 1396

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5 USC 552 (b)(1)

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☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 250-255

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFIED

This report is classified

Plans and/or policies

or modified solely on the basis of

17-011-71

(Classification and Control Markings)

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY

8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 717 0004 71

2. SUBJECT: (U) East German Intelligence Services (EGIS) rog Modus Operandi

9. DATE OF REPORT: 13 December 1971

10. NO. OF PAGES: 1

11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 681

3. ISC NUMBER:

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: October 1971

12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Frankfurt/Main, FRG
9 December 1971

13. PREPARED BY:

b6

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE C INFORMATION 3

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

b6

7. SOURCE: 22120338

COL, MI
Commanding

15. SUMMARY:

1. (U) EGIS instructed one of its Agents, who heretofore has been met in East Berlin, to travel to Leipzig, SZOG, for the next meeting. Agent was furnished an Erklarung (Declaration) for customs to be completed prior to his travel; an Reise - Ausreise Karte (Entrance - Exit Card) on which a name of fictitious step-brother is recorded as the person the Agent will visit in Leipzig; and Berichtungsschein (Certificate of Authorization) which is completed in the Source's EGIS cover name and authorizes him the necessary visa to visit Leipzig.

2. (U) EGIS used an olive green Wartburg, with license number LJ 5543, to meet one of its Agents.

3. (U) EGIS utilizes room 12, 30th (German) floor, Hotel Stadt Berlin, Alexanderplatz East Berlin, as a meeting facility for one of its Agents.

4. (U) EGIS directed one of its Agents to have his wife visit a US Forces Civilian Personnel Office in order to determine for what positions she is qualified and which positions she may be offered.

EVALUATION REPORTS (DD 1480's) PREPARED ON THIS REPORT MUST BE CLASSIFIED AT LEAST CONFIDENTIAL.

DECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED
ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDR USN/USMC/USN/USMC/USN/USMC
AUTH Para 1-305 DDD 5200.1R

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA
2-USAREUR
1-EUCOM J-2
1-USAINTC-IGDI
1-ACSI-CIPC
1-66th MI Group, AEUWMI-OA-IR

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

GROUP 3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

256

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1398

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DOSSIER NO. ZF400208W
Vol II 8 IV

As of 8 NOV 78 all material
(Date)

included in this file conforms with

DA policies currently in effect.

Lois E Ward 8 NOV 78
(Signature) (Date Signed)

LOISE WARD 7
(Printed Name) (Grade)

REVIEWED FOR DELETION CRITERIA
UP AN 381-10
REVIEWER Shule DATE 31 Aug 92

REVIEWED FOR DELETION CRITERIA
Jan L Shaw DATE 1 Aug 96
0258

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Review on
8 Mar 81

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE
SOURCES AND METHOD INVOLVED
(Classification and Control Markings)

B03151A
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51-0067-71

1. COUNTRY: SOVIET ZONE OF OCCUPIED GERMANY (SZOG)
2. SUBJECT: (U) East German Intelligence Service (EGIS) re: Modus Operandi
3. ISC NUMBER:
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 18 September 1971
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: KAISERSLAUTERN, Federal Republic of Germany, 22 September 1971
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE F INFORMATION 3
7. SOURCE: 22120713 (U)
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 718 0057 71
9. DATE OF REPORT: 9 December 1971
10. NO. OF PAGES: 1
11. REFERENCES: DIRM 6B6a
12. ORIGINATOR: Kal. MI Group
13. PREPARED BY: b6 LTC, M
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: b6 COL, MI Commanding

15. SUMMARY: (U) This report concerns information pertaining to the procedure used by the East German Intelligence Service (EGIS) to escort one of its Agents operating in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).

EVALUATION REPORTS (DD 1480'S) PREPARED ON THIS IR WILL BE CLASSIFIED AT LEAST ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~.

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION: (U) Recently an EGIS Agent, who operates in the FRG, was met on the train platform of the Friedrichstrasse Station in EAST BERLIN (UU 9220), Soviet Zone of Occupied Germany (SZOG), by his Case Officer (C/O) and instructed to follow the C/O at a distance of 10 to 15 feet. The Agent was led past the area where visitors to EAST BERLIN must process through the Border and Customs. Controls to a door marked "Nur Fuer Auslaender" (Only for Aliens), where the C/O instructed the Agent to remain until called. The C/O pushed a button located near the door, whereupon a member of the Volks Polizei (People's Police) opened the door and admitted the C/O. Shortly thereafter, the C/O motioned the Agent to follow. They exited the station and were on the street.

NOTE: (U) Your attention is directed to the provisions of para 3a(2) of AR 381-1.

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1 - DIA
2 - USAREUR
1 - EUCOM, J-2
1 - USAINTC-ICDI
1 - 66th MI Gp, ABUTMI-OA-IR

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
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0259

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDR USAINCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE SOURCES

REC-54C2 18 JAN 1972

262188-60
262464-60

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☐

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Page(s) 260-263

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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ASUTHI-C-M-80-70

1. COUNTRY: FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (FRG)
2. SOVIET ZONE OF OCCUPIED GERMANY (SZOG)
3. SUBJECT: (U) East German Intelligence Service (EGIS), Modus Operandi
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 30 June and 1 July 1970
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Hamburg, (SZ 6-33), FRG, 9 July 1970
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE F INFORMATION 2
7. SOURCE: 2 212 0013 (U)
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 715 0017 70 (0401-00)
9. DATE OF REPORT: 10 August 1970
10. NO. OF PAGES: 2
11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 626, 6B7a
12. ORIGINATOR: 766th MID, 66th MI Group
13. PREPARED BY: [Redacted] b6
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: [Redacted] b6
15. SUMMARY: (U) The report contains information on East German Intelligence Service (EGIS) modus operandi. Specifically the report covers information on third country meetings, payments, communications and EEL levied.
EVALUATION REPORTS (DD FORM 100-1) PREPARED ON THIS IR WILL BE CLASSIFIED AT LEAST CONFIDENTIAL

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDR USAINCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

1. (U) (C) EGIS has met agents who are based in the FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (FRG) in East Bloc countries other than the SOVIET ZONE OF OCCUPIED GERMANY (SZOG) or the Soviet Sector Berlin (SSB). The Agents themselves make hotel reservations in the meeting country. Prior to travel, they inform EGIS of the hotel in which they will be staying. The Agents travel, by air, under their true names and with use of their bonafide documentation. The initial meeting between EGIS and their Agents takes place in the hotel the Agent has selected. The Agents are then taken to another hotel in which the EGIS personnel are registered, and debriefed. EGIS takes their Agents on a sightseeing tour of the meeting city in accordance with an itinerary they themselves have planned. EGIS will not take the Agents to any places of interest which the Agents themselves suggest seeing. While in the third country, EGIS gives the Agents West German currency in relatively small amounts (several hundreds

15. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA
2-USAREUR
1-USAIRR
1-USEUCOM, J-2
1-ACSI-CIPC
1-66th MI Op-AEUTMI-CA-IR
1-USAINTC (ICDI)

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NCT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

NONE

0264

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STATEMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

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REPORT NO. 2 715 0017 70
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
ORIGINATOR 766th MID, 66th MIG

(Classification and Control Markings)

of West German Marks) and direct the Agents to change this money into local currency at the hotel registration desks. As West German, EGIS personnel would be unable to legally exchange West German currency. Following the money change, the Agents "slip" the local currency obtained to the EGIS personnel. While in the third country, EGIS allow their Agents a considerable amount of free time to go sightseeing and shopping by themselves. However, it is apparent that the Agents are surveilled during these periods. While in the third country, EGIS allows the Agents to retain accommodations in the hotels that they (the Agents) have selected. Each evening, EGIS returns the Agents to their hotel. During their free time, including evening hours, the Agents are not restricted in their movement.

2. (u) Agents carry a concealment device, usually a briefcase with a concealed compartment, into the third country with them. They transport notes, reports, films etc., which they wish to give EGIS into the third country in these concealment devices. During the course of their briefing by EGIS, Agents are given West German currency as payment for their services and film negatives bearing texts containing details of new EEI levied. The Agents then transport the money and the films out of the third country in the concealment devices.

3. (u) EGIS has requested their Agents to supply them with photographs of their residences and private vehicles. The Agents carry these photographs to the meetings in the denied areas in their concealment devices.

4. (u) Communications from the Agents to EGIS continue to be carried out in the following manner: The text of the information to be forwarded by the agent to EGIS is typed and photographed. The Agent makes a reduced film frame known as a "Macro" (larger than 2mm but less than 35mm in size) which he conceals in a food package. The package is then posted in the FRG to an EGIS Accommodation Address located in the SZOG.

5. (u) EGIS continues to levy EEI's concerning FRG residents, directing them to obtain personalia type data, i.e., verify residence, obtain information relative to employment, financial status, political ideology, private vehicle, family, social life etc..

6. (u) EGIS has asked their Agents if they have any information in regard to alleged distribution of counterfeit West German currency in the area of Frankfurt (NA 7749), FRG.

COMMENTS: (u) According to recent newspaper articles, persons in the area of Frankfurt have been apprehended and charged with distribution of counterfeit West German currency.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONFIDENTIAL

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MD-0370-70

(U) EAST GERMANY

(C) ZOSSEN (52124-13294)(UT9784)
MFS Contacts

2 218 7850-70 (5004-09)

7 August 1970

DIEM: 687

18th MI Bn, 66th MI Gp
APO New York 09108

b6

LTC, MI
Commanding

December 1969

Munich, Germany
20 July 1970

b1

(DOE: b1

(U) (C) This report contains information pertaining to the recruitment attempts of the ZOSSEN (52124-13294)(UT9784) Ministry for State Security (MFS) office toward Source, and includes methods description, description of the MFS officials known by Source, and assignment offered. Source was first contacted by the MFS in 1968 and questioned concerning a letter sent by an unknown individual from LINZ, Austria, in which Source was accused of desiring to illegally leave East Germany. Source was told that he should begin proving his loyalty to the government by assisting the MFS. Source was met several times thereafter by officials, who attempted to have him sign an agreement, which Source allegedly steadfastly refused to do. He was finally told to join a student group in BERLIN, which allegedly dealt with smuggling of East German citizens to West Germany. He was told that if he worked successfully for the MFS for 2 years, the MFS would smuggle Source into West Germany, as payment for his services. Source agreed to do the assignment, and managed to escape to West Germany before any plans were firmly set.

REPORT:

1. (C) Introduction

b1

- 1-DIA
- 3-USARUEK
- 1-USEUCOM
- 1-66th MI Gp, 760th MI Det
- 1-USASAC
- 1-CO USAIR
- 1-IBCD
- 1-66th MI Gp, 430th MI Det
- 1-V Corps
- 1-VII Corps

1-
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None

GROUP - 3
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

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2 214 7250 70

2

18th MI BN, 66th MI
APO New York 09108

2. (C) Initial Recruitment Method

b1

b1 IN b1 Source received a registered letter from the County Military Center (Wehrkreiskommando), in which Source was ordered to report for general examination of his military papers. Source had been discharged from active duty only about a month previously, and did not consider the order-to-report to be extraordinary. Upon arrival at the center, which is located in the city hall (Rathaus), Source was ushered into a room containing 4 individuals in civilian clothing. One individual, apparently the highest ranking member, showed Source a folded, multi-colored document with the rubrik "Ministerium für Staatssicherheit". The blue-olive colored document contained the picture of the holder in the middle of the inside page, and Source noted that the document was similar to a Soldier's Book, being about 4 x 6 inches and having area for promotion and clothing receipts and other markings. The individual brandishing the document, who apparently was the chief and was treated with deference by the others in the room, was never mentioned by name. The individual appeared to about 180 cm in height, 85 kg in weight and had dark hair and eyes. His date of birth is estimated to be 1930. This man renewed the questioning of Source concerning the letter of accusation, and displayed some knowledge of the whereabouts of Source's father. Source again denied having made plans to escape from East Germany. The official asked Source if he would be willing to assist the MfS by providing information, which Source knew he could not refuse without danger. Nothing concrete, however, was discussed concerning how Source would provide information nor what this information might be. Source was told he would be contacted by telephone, at which time a meeting point would be made.

3. (C) Subsequent Meetings

0267

b1 prior to the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia, Source received a phone call b1 Source met a single individual, who had been at the Military Center previously. The man told Source that his name would be known as b6 for MfS activities, and that this man would be Source's contact, known to Source as b6 mentioned during their several later visits that he was from KOTBUS (5335N-1149E) (PB1149), and had just been released from active duty in NEW-BRANDENBURG (5335N-1317E) (UV8740) in May 1968, where he had been MCC mechanic for an U/I squadron. He appeared to have a DOB of 1944, 175 cm in height, 80 kg with black hair and dark eyes. He said he was married, and lived in a new housing development near the Trade School (Berufsschule) in ZOSSEN. b6 asked Source to write out an agreement, in which Source freely offered his services to the MfS and promised secrecy. b6 told Source that he would receive many tangible benefits, including more income, an automobile and a better apartment. Source, however, said he would

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 ZLS 7850 70
PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES
ORIGINATOR 18th MI Bn, 66th MI Gp
APO New York 09108

not sign any statement, although he would be willing to help. b6 asked him several questions concerning Source's father and employer, as well as information concerning several older residents of ZOSSEN, who Source knew personally. At the end of August 1968, Source was met by b6 once again, at which time Source received his visa for Czechoslovakia. The invasion of Czechoslovakia, however, had precluded any possibilities for Source to use the visa. For the next several weeks, Source did not appear at the designated meeting points, always finding an excuse that would satisfy b6. In early December 1969, Source was met in his work shop by a man, whom Source remembered from the first meeting at the Military Center. Source remembered that someone had referred to this individual as Comrade b6 about 180 cm in height, 85 kg, with dark hair and eyes, DOB 1930, appeared to have been the second-in-charge at that time. He told Source that the Chief had something important to discuss with Source, and that Source was to report to the MfS headquarters building on Wassertrasse, near the Catholic Church in ZOSSEN. Source arrived at the small building, in which about 10 people were working, and was ushered into the private office of the man Source had earlier recognized as the higher ranking official in the Military Center.

(Leave Blank)

4. (c) Assignment

Source was told by the Chief that he had an important assignment for him. He vaguely depicted an unnamed student group active in East Berlin, which the Chief said is suspected of smuggling East German citizens into West Germany. Source was to join the group and request assistance in illegally entering West Germany, and gather names of the organization as well as all information concerning Western contacts, costs, border crossing points. The Chief told Source that after 2 years of dedicated service with the MfS, Source would be smuggled into West Germany, as well as financially rewarded. No mention was made of an assignment for Source in West Germany. Source replied that he would take the assignment on as soon as he possibly could, feigning pressing personal problems which had to be solved. Several more meetings were arranged with b6 but Source would not agree to any concrete plans. Finally, in early b6 and the Chief met with Source for the last time. The Chief was visibly irritated with Source's apparently inadequate service for the MfS, although Source claims never to have accepted even gas fare from them, let alone other remuneration. The Chief finally demanded that Source accept a distinct time-table and plan for an assignment. Source, however, categorically refused, requesting to be left alone. The Chief then threatened Source with arrest and told Source that he would be carefully watched. Should Source be caught planning an escape from East Germany or to commit any other crime against the State, Source would receive the harshest sanctions imaginable. Shortly thereafter, Source went to the State Travel Bureau and paid for a group visit to Czechoslovakia, from whence he escaped to West Germany.

COMMENTS

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(c) Source

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642A

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY 2. SUBJECT: East German Intelligence Service (EGIS): <u>Modus Operandi</u> 3. ISC NUMBER: <u>64</u> 4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 9 June 1970 5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Frankfurt/Main, FRG 19 June 1970 6. EVALUATION: SOURCE <u>C</u> INFORMATION <u>3</u> 7. SOURCE: 22120338	8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 717 0016 70 (0401-00) 9. DATE OF REPORT: 9 July 1970 10. NO. OF PAGES: 1 11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 681 <u>ZB 011227</u> 12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group 13. PREPARED BY: <u>b6</u> LTC, MI 14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: <u>b6</u> COL, MI Commanding
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15. SUMMARY:

(C) This report contains information about East German Intelligence Service (EGIS) modus operandi, specifically, ERI's, bogus identification documents, training facility, and operational vehicle.

1. (C) ERI's: EGIS has indicated an interest in a catalog listing TM's and FM's to include changes and rescissions. Any individual FM and/ or TM is of interest, and it appears that prime interest is in the FM pertaining to methods used in arial photography.

2. (C) Bogus Identification Documents: Information was obtained that EGIS utilizes bogus FRG identification documents- Reise Pass and Personal Ausweis. Bogus personalities indicated actually exist at the address indicated in the document.

3. (C) EGIS Training Facility: A training facility is located at Grabbe Allee 30, East Berlin. Facility supposedly used to train personnel prior to their assignment in the "West".

4. (C) EGIS Operational Vehicle: late model Wartburg, 4 door sedan, olive green, license number INO 1319.

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 BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
 AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

0269

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

- 1- DIA
- 2- NSA/SEC
- 1- NSACOM
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- 1- USAINFC-ICDI
- 1- USALMR
- 1- 66th MI Gp ANUTMI-CA-IR

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

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18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

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70 217 2168
(Classification and Control Markings)

<p>1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY (GC)</p> <p>2. SUBJECT: (U) East German Intelligence Service (EGIS) re: Border Crossing</p> <p>3. ISC NUMBER: _____</p> <p>4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 6 June 1970</p> <p>5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: PIRMASERS, FRG; 9 June 1970</p> <p>6. EVALUATION SOURCE: B INFORMATION: 3</p> <p>7. SOURCE: 22120016</p>	<p>8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 718 0354 70 (0401-00)</p> <p>9. DATE OF REPORT: 29 June 1970</p> <p>10. NO. OF PAGES: 1</p> <p>11. REFERENCES: DIRM 684</p> <p>12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group</p> <p>13. PREPARED BY: b6</p> <p>14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: b6 Colonel, MI Commanding</p>
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SUMMARY: (C) This report concerns border-crossing procedures at Bahnhof Friedrichstrasse in the Soviet Sector of Berlin (SSB). Recently, the border-crossing area at Bahnhof Friedrichstrasse has been relocated to the middle-level in the Bahnhof (between the U-Bahn level and the S-Bahn level rather than at the intermediate level between the middle and S-Bahn levels). This is the area where the baggage check-room is located. The baggage check-room is closed, at least temporarily, on weekends. Rather than make the mandatory exchange of 5 DM West for 5 DM East at the time one's passport is surrendered at the first booth in the border-crossing area, one recent traveler noted that the mandatory exchange was not made until the individual retrieves his passport and pays the visa fee.

COMMENT: (C) The fact that the baggage check-room is closed on weekends has been confirmed by another traveler. There have been indications that this change in procedure caught East German Intelligence Service (EGIS) by surprise and forced them to modify their practice of having agents check baggage at the check-room for later retrieval by EGIS personnel.

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(U)

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<p>DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DIA - USAREUR - EUCOM, J-2 - ACBI-CIA - USAINTC-ICDI - USATER - 66th MI Gp, ANUTM-CA-IR 	<p>17. DOWNGRADING DATA:</p> <p style="text-align: center;">GROUP-5</p> <p>Downgraded at 12 year intervals; Not automatically declassified.</p>	<p>18. ENCLOSURE DATA:</p> <p style="text-align: center; padding-top: 50px;">REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON JUN 18 1998 BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PD AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200 IF</p>
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70 208 2168

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910A

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<p>1. COUNTRY: <u>EAST GERMANY</u></p> <p>2. SUBJECT: <u>(U) East German Intelligence Service</u> <u>(EGIS): Modius Operandi</u></p> <p>3. ISC NUMBER:</p> <p>4. DATE OF INFORMATION: <u>February 1970</u></p> <p>5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: <u>Wurzburg, FRG</u> <u>28 May 1970</u></p> <p>6. EVALUATION: SOURCE <u>P</u> INFORMATION <u>6</u></p> <p>7. SOURCE: <u>66th MI Group</u></p>	<p>8. REPORT NUMBER: <u>2 212 3162 70</u> <u>(0412-00)</u></p> <p>9. NO. OF PAGES: <u>1</u></p> <p>10. REFERENCES: <u>DIRM: 6B6a</u></p> <p>11. ORIGINATOR: <u>66th MI Group</u></p> <p>12. PREPARED BY:</p> <p>13. APPROVING AUTHORITY: <u>COL, MI</u> <u>Commanding</u></p>
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ZB 011227

b6

14. SUMMARY: (U) This report concerns modius operandi of the East German Intelligence Service (EGIS). During the past year at EGIS security briefings, EGIS agents have been instructed that if they come in contact with any American intelligence organizations, one should be on guard after the initial exploitation because the Americans will ask for a polygraph examination. EGIS instructions state under no circumstances should an agent be subject to a polygraph examination. He should claim that it is his right to refuse such an examination. If this approach should fail, claim illness; become highly intoxicated and do not sleep the night before the examination.

(U) This type of anti-polygraph briefing is given every two or three months to ensure an agent does not subject himself to a polygraph examination. No other anti-polygraph training has been given to EGIS agents.

(U) COMMENTS: (C) The above reported information appears to be a change in the previously known modius operandi procedures of EGIS security briefings concerning polygraph examinations. Earlier debriefings indicated that EGIS agents were told polygraph was a psychological science and only when an agent feared detection would he be caught by the polygraph. If an agent was completely relaxed and had nothing to fear, he would not be caught. In essence, the agent must convince himself that he has nothing to worry about. If an agent was accused of deception by an examiner, just continue to deny the allegation and either the matter would be dropped or the Americans would continue with their operations. Original source of information is a temporary carded source of reporting agency.

15. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

- 1- DIA
- 2- USAREUR
- 1- EUCOM
- 1- ACSI-CIPC
- 1- USA IIR
- 1- V Corps
- 1- VII Corps
- 1- USASAE
- 1- OSI
- 1- 66th MI Gp, AEUTMI-QA-IR

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

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DD FORM 1396

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910 A
This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

<p>1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMAN</p> <p>2. SUBJECT: (U) Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit (MfS): Modius Operandi</p> <p>3. ISC NUMBER: _____</p> <p>4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 5 June 1970</p> <p>5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Frankfurt, FRG 5 June 1970</p> <p>6. EVALUATION: SOURCE <u>P</u> INFORMATION <u>6</u></p> <p>7. SOURCE: 66th MI Group</p>	<p>8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 212 3161 70 (0412-00)</p> <p>9. DATE OF REPORT: 24 June 1970</p> <p>10. NO. OF PAGES: 12</p> <p>11. REFERENCES: B016384 DIRM: 6B6a</p> <p>12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group</p> <p>13. PREPARED BY: b6</p> <p>14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: COL, MI Commanding</p>
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15. SUMMARY: (U) This report concerns modius operandi of the East German Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit (Ministry for State Security) (MfS). Information received indicates that the MfS has reserved a group of rooms at the Hotel Unter den Linden, East Berlin for their West based agents. In order to secure a room an agent tells the clerk that he is with the Central Committee (ZK).

(Leave Blank)

COMMENT: (U) Original source of information is a temporary carded source of reporting agency.

0272

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1- OSI
1- 66th MI Gp AEUTMI-CA-IR

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

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18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

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EXCEPT b1

5250

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HM-1057-70

1. COUNTRY: **EAST GERMANY**
(U)
2. SUBJECT: **(C) KALBE (5239B-1123E)(PD6237),**
MFS Recruitment Attempt
3. ISC NUMBER:
4. REPORT NUMBER: **2 218 5686 70 (5004-02)**
5. DATE OF REPORT: **16 June 1970**
6. NO. OF PAGES: **1**
7. REFERENCES: **DIRM: 6C**

8. DATE OF INFORMATION:
9. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ:
10. EVALUATION: SOURCE INFORMATION
11. SOURCE: **b1**
b1
12. ORIGINATOR: **18th MI Bn 66th MI Gp**
APC New York 00000
13. PREPARED BY: **b6**
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: **b6**
LTC, MI
Commanding

15. SUMMARY:

1. (C)(NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT

b1

b1

for the MFS and was not approached again. A memory sketch of KALBE MFS office concludes this report.

2. (U) This information was furnished USI by **b1** The **b1** marking is necessary to prevent the release of this information to a third country without the permission of the originator.

0273

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR

1-DIA
2-NSA/SECUR
1-USEUCOM w/o encl
1-66th MI Gp, 766th MI Det
w/o encl
1-CD US-IA w/o encl
1-AGSI

17. DOWNGRADING DATA

GROUP-1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

18. ENCLOSURE DATA

1 Enclosure:

(C) **b1**
1 of 1 pgs

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KA-132970

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY (U)	8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 4562 70 (5004-04)
2. SUBJECT: (C) RUMMELSBURG (5230N-1328K) (UU9617): MfS Interrogation in Prison	9. DATE OF REPORT: 8 June 1970
3. ISC NUMBER:	10. NO. OF PAGES: 4 2B50 9946
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: January - December 1967	11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 6B6a
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Kassel, Germany 21 April 1970	12. ORIGINATOR: 18th MI Bn, 66th MI Group AFM New York 09108
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE F INFORMATION 6	13. PREPARED BY: b6
7. SOURCE: b1 (DOB: b1)	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: b6 LTC, MI Commanding

15. SUMMARY: (U)

(C) This report contains information about Source's interrogation by MfS personnel upon illegal re-entry of East Germany after he had defected from the 6th BC Co G-ISA 5 months earlier. All MfS personnel involved with Source wore officers uniforms with white piping and red color tabs and shoulder boards, or civilian attire. The prison director was a MfS LTC and the interrogator assigned to Source was an MfS SrLT. Interrogation techniques included, we know all, file and dossier, neglecting in single confinement. An interrogation itinerary is also given in the report. The main subjects of the interrogation were the reason for illegal return to East Germany, West German processing system for EGA-BC defectors and military information on West Germany and US activities and installations.

0274

REPORT:

1. (C) Introduction

b1

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:	17. DOWNGRADING DATA:	18. ENCLOSURE DATA:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1- DIA 3- USAREUR 1- USEUCOM 1- 66th MI Gp, 766th MI Det 1- USASAE 1- CO USAIRF 1- VII Corps (CCIL)-H 1- ACSI 1- V. Corps 1- OSI 5- b1 3- CCFFA 10- b1 (C) 	<p>DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED DOD DIR 5200.10</p> <p style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;">CONFIDENTIAL</p>	<p>None</p>

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REPORT NO. 2 218 4562 70
PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGE
ORIGINATOR
18th MI Bn. 66th MI Group
APO New York 09108

(Leave Blank)

given in this report is based on Source's personal experience if not otherwise stated.

2. (u) Interrogation Personnel

a. Ranks

The prison director was a LTC of the Mfs. Sources interrogator was a SrLT of the Mfs. The personnel who beat him were EM, also of the Mfs.

b. Uniforms and Attire

All Mfs personnel wearing uniforms were EGA Officers uniforms with white piping, red collar tabs and shoulder boards. Worn were brown leather belts and the trousers were inserted into the boots. Source observed however, that the EM wore EM shoulder boards on their shirts. Frequently civilian clothes were worn by the Mfs officers.

c. Personalities

(1) The prison director was a LTC of the Mfs. He was approximately 50 years of age and 1.70m tall with a stocky figure of about 80 kg. His wavy hair was black with some gray in it and combed straight back. He wore glasses and had a straight posture. His face is round and big and he moves about fast. The director has a Lenin decoration. He is nervous, picks his nose and bites his fingernails while talking and plays with his desk utensils. He constantly and abruptly changes the subject. His office is room number 14.

(2) Sources interrogator was a SrLT of about 40 years. He was 1.90 cm tall and had a muscular body of about 80 kg. His full hair is black, wavy and combed back. He wore reading glasses and walked slow and slumped forward. He had brown eyes, square face and jaw and spoke with a saxonian dialect. He is married, owns a TRabant automobile and lives in EAST BERLIN. His office number is 3.

3. (u) Interrogation Techniques and Itinerary

0275

The constantly recurring question was why he came back to East Germany. Sources explanation that it was solely to visit his sick mother was never accepted. When Source denied that he had come under instructions, the SrLT interrogator applied the "We know all" techniques but to no avail. The method used next was "File and dossier." He was told his exact itinerary between his defection and his settlement in KAUFBEUREN, Bavaria. He did not deny what he had done and where he had been, and the interrogator debriefed him on HUENFELD, BGS and Police, the criminal police office in FULDA, the KASSEL JIC, Camp GIESSEN and a U/I camp in NUERNBERG and his residence, KAUFBEUREN in Bavaria. To convince Source that the Mfs knew everything already anyway, he was shown a photograph of himself crossing a street near the RR Station in GIESSEN. Then he was forgotten in his cell for 2 weeks. He received ersatz coffee twice a day. Soup for lunch and dark bread with the coffee. Washing and shaving was permitted once a week, the use of a latrine was not permitted and Source had only a bucket in his cell to defecate and urinate. The cell had now windows and the wooden bunk contained a blanket and a mattress only. After a total single confinement of 8 months, he was placed in a double cell and the other man tried to make him tell his story. Source complained constantly about the squealer and after one week he was put in a 3 man cell. He was given a form which he signed in order to allow his mother to visit him, which she did for a period of 2 hours. Prior to the visit, he was given a neat haircut and a suit, and was also allowed to smoke. After the visit, the prison director sent for Source and gave him a lecture of how he had messed up his life by defecting to West Germany. He was sent to his SrLT interrogator who told him he could have writing utensils and cigarettes if he wanted to write his confession, which he did several days later. Several days after that, he was called to the interrogator

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CONTINUATION SHEET

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ORIGINATOR
18th MI Bn, 66th MI Group
APO New York 09108

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again to sign his confession which had been typed in the meantime. Source requested several changes and signed the papers. He was again questioned on "why did you come back" and gave his standard explanation of visiting his sick mother. Soon he received his prosecution papers. Three days later he was summoned to his trial at the 1st BERLIN Court (1st Strafsenat Berlin), which lasted for 2 days. Source was convicted to serve 5 years in a penitentiary on counts of desertion, defection and espionage.

4. ~~(S)~~ Subjects of Interrogation

a. Reason for Return

One of the main interrogation subjects was why Source returned illegally to East Germany. The interrogator tried to make Source confess that he had returned to East Germany under espionage orders.

b. Military Information

Source was debriefed on observation of US and West German armed forces activity and installations. He was also questioned about West German border troops, BGS.

c. West German Processing System for EGA-BC Defectors and Personalities

(1) Point of Special interest was the KASSEL JIC. Source did not remember the address or locality and was map tracked with a photograph of a city plan. He was asked about the building of which no photograph was available. Source claims that he was unable to make a layout sketch. He was then shown sketches of alleged JIC personnel and only one sketch was slightly similar to one of the German interrogators, whose name he could not recall. Source was unaware of the presence of Partner II in the JIC. He also was shown photographs of defected EGA-BC personnel, but the only other defector who was in the JIC with Source was not among them.

(2) The Mfa was also very interested in activities and set up of Camp GIESSEN. Source claims that he was unable to state more than the site of the camp. He did not remember personalities from Camp GIESSEN.

(3) Source was unable to state any specifics about the HUENFELD Police station, the criminal police office in FULDA and the U/I camp in NUERNBERG where he had been for a period of 6 days prior to his settlement in KAUFBEUREN.

5. ~~(S)~~ Miscellaneous

0276

While Source stayed in West Germany after his initial defection his mother wrote letters that she was sick and asked him to come back to see her. Mfa Personnel had visited his mother several times, but Source was unable to find out if the Mfa initiated the "come back letters." When Source returned to East Germany illegally he took a 17 year old girl with him. The girl had been unhappy at home and wanted to come along. She was sent back to West Germany because of her age. Source was handcuffed and severely beaten by junior Mfa personnel on several occasions. He was not the only one to receive such treatment. Source felt that this was done after his ill behavior against the director and his interrogator, and was not a part of the interrogation activity.

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COMMENTS

(e) Source:

b1

0277

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70 281 2168

(Classification and Control Markings)

6798 (A121-00)

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1. COUNTRY: FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (FRG) 2. REPORT NUMBER: 2-212 2612 70
3. SOVIET ZONE OF OCCUPIED GERMANY (SZOG)

4. SUBJECT: FRG Newspaper Account of East German Intelligence Service Activity in the FRG (U) 5. DATE OF REPORT: 1 June 1970

6. ISC NUMBER:

10. NO. OF PAGES: 3

11. REFERENCES:

DIRM: 6878

7. DATE OF INFORMATION: 25 April 1970

12. ORIGINATOR:

766th MID, 66th MI Group

8. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Hamburg (NE 6533), FRG; 26 April 1970

b6

9. EVALUATION: SOURCE: C INFORMATION: 3

13. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

b6

10. SOURCE: Hamburger Abendblatt, Daily Newspaper Published in Hamburg, (NE 6533), FRG

b6

COL, MI

14. SUMMARY:

(Leave Blank)

(U) This report contains a summary translation of an article which appeared in the 25 April 1970 edition of the Hamburger Abendblatt, a moderate daily newspaper published in Hamburg (NE 6533), FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (FRG), which purports to give an account of the activity of the East German Intelligence Service (EGIS) in factories and firms located in the FRG.

(U) Although the information contained in this IR is unclassified it carries the overall classification of CONFIDENTIAL because it discloses US Army interest in the subject matter.

(U) An article appearing in the 25 April 1970 addition of the Hamburger Abendblatt, entitled "Rehabilitation of Spies - East German Technicians With Special Missions", is translated in summary as follows:

With the aid of harmless appearing mail, quises, contests, and personal correspondence, East German agent centers in the FRG are steadily on the lookout for young people that can be recruited as industrial spies. Further, East German students and technicians who have fallen into disfavor are sent to the FRG to be rehabilitated as espionage agents.

Within the more important West German industries foreign intelligence agencies maintain active espionage agents as well as sleepers. If the active agent is

15. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA
2-USAREUR
1-USAIR
1-USEUCOM
1-ACSI-CIPC
1-66th MI GP-ABUTHI-OP-IR

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

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DOD-DIR 5200.10

0278

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

NONE

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compromised, the sleeper is ready to take over the duties.

When the courts in Oldenburg (ND 4588) FRG convicted the engineer [b6] from Delmenhorst (ND 7578) FRG, his girlfriend [b6] and the Betriebsrat (Works Council) Chairman Friedrich Ebert for the betrayal of classified industrial information at the Vereinigte Flugtechnische Werke (Aircraft Factory) in Bremen (ND 8583), FRG, the Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit (Ministry for State Security) (MfS) attempted to infiltrate another agent into the target as soon as possible. In this instance MfS Case Officers selected a technician already employed at that particular industry. This young man had previously been arrested by East German border personnel for evasion of currency regulations in the amount of 15.00 East German Marks. At that time he was informed that he had a choice of either going to prison or working for the East German Intelligence Service. In order to obtain his release, he agreed to work. Thereafter, he was invited to East Berlin, the "hiring" was duly celebrated and he was presented with a copy of Karl Marx's "Das Kapital". Years passed and the young man was not further contacted. He hoped that he had been forgotten. Following the conviction of [b6], he was ordered to take over as an intelligence agent in [b6] place. The technician in this instance was intelligent enough to contact th [b1]

Another case involves a [b6] thirty years of age, from Land Saxony in the SOVIET ZONE OF OCCUPIED GERMANY (SZOG). [b6] was eventually apprehended in the FRG. Following his arrest, this agent made the following statement: "I was a member of the Volkspolizei (People's Police) and in disfavor because it did not appeal to me. In order that I might rehabilitate myself, I was trained as an intelligence agent. I was taught photography and a method of deciphering radio messages. Later I was infiltrated into the FRG as a refugee. I initially worked as a clerk and was a "sleeper" agent. Somewhat later intelligence officers with good connections secured for me a position in an electronics factory. Here, I remained a "sleeper" for six months. Eventually, I sent factory plans, production plans, sketches of the layout and information pertaining to Bundeswehr (Federal German Armed Forces) Security Officers who were stationed in the factory back to my intelligence officers. Several times they asked me if computers were being delivered to Red China. I was told my information was to be used for the exchange of technical knowledge among Communist States." Most agents, as in the case of [b6] come to the FRG in possession of forged documents. During a recent pass control operation which took place on the border, a suspicious appearing person identified himself as a member of a well known musical orchestra located in Land Lower Saxony, FRG. When the police called the man's home in an attempt to determine if the identification was bonafide, the man himself answered the telephone. In West Berlin the teacher, [b6] of Afferde (MC 0713), FRG was thought to have had a fatal accident. When the police telephoned the parents in order to inform them of the sad news, they found themselves talking with the "dead" girl. It was eventually established that the slain woman was a 28 year old intelligence agent, [b6], from Chemnitz (US 5436), SZOG. It is assumed this was the case of a murder of an agent who had become unreliable because of a love affair.

The [b1] has stated that in both of the foregoing cases the original identity papers had been photographed and thereafter forged in a manner to defy detection. The agents who were issued these false documents were obliged to learn the entire life history of the bonafide holder of the original documents.

0279

In yet another instance, a young married couple fled to the West, separately, at different times and at different places. For years thereafter the husband worked at a factory in Land Lower Saxony, FRG, while the wife worked in the Ruhr area of the FRG. Eventually they both acquired bonafide identity documents. Finally, they met "accidentally", married and had children. They then lived in the FRG for many years before they received their initial intelligence missions.

In the field of industrial espionage the hostile intelligence services utilize the services of trained, professional agents in most cases. It is known that 40 percent of the amateur agents are either apprehended or turn themselves into


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authorities the very first year they find themselves in the FRG.

A news item originating at an electronics factory in Hannover (ND 4905), FRG, caused a surprise. A firm, allegedly located in West Berlin, had ordered a number of "mini-microphones" of a type used for measuring bodily functions and for use in hearing aids. Later, this same firm ordered drills for use in installing the devices in walls, ceilings and under wallpaper. By this time, the "mini-microphones" had of course already reached their destination in the East Bloc.

It is the duty of each individual factory to defend itself against enemy intelligence agents. The Criminal Police can enter a case of industrial espionage only when it is determined that theft, disloyalty, or unethical business practices have taken place. b1 will become involved in such cases only when it is indicated that foreign intelligence agents are already at work in the factories.



0285

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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172A

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(Classification and Control Markings)

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY	6. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 0820 70 (5049-01)
2. SUBJECT: (u) (c) Poss M/S Recruit Attempt EBERSWALDE 5250N-1349E (VU 2054)	9. DATE OF REPORT: 13 May 1970 <i>LAOT 6384</i>
3. ISC NUMBER:	10. NO. OF PAGES: 2
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: April 1970	11. REFERENCES: DIRM 6C
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: BERLIN, Germany 28 April 1970	12. ORIGINATOR: JROC, BERLIN APO NY 09742
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE <u>7</u> INFORMATION <u>6</u>	13. PREPARED BY: b6 apt, USAF Operations Officer
7. SOURCE: b1 (DOB: b1)	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: b6 b6 MAJ, MI Commander

15. SUMMARY

REPORT: ☐

(c) b1

b1 In b1 1970 Source applied for a visitors permit to West BERLIN. b1 she was visited by an unidentified civilian who stated that he was a representative of the Ministry of the Interior at the EBERSWALDE District Council located in the EBERSWALDE Town Hall at 525009N-0134923E (VU 54642066). He also presented an identification card which Source did not recognize. During a discussion about Source's interest in politics he asked her to praise East German economics and industrial progress and achievements during her visit to West BERLIN. Source refused to do so. b1 she was visited by another unidentified civilian who did not introduce himself. He wanted to talk to Source and, after noticing that she had a visitor, tried to make an appointment for another day which Source refused. b1 Source's door bell rang but she did not open the door. Shortly thereafter she observed an unknown civilian leaving her house. Source stated that prior to her three previous trips to West BERLIN she had not been approached by anybody. She also stated that three years ago a friend who was a resident of FINOW 5250N-1343E (VU 1455) was also approached by a man prior to her departure to West BERLIN. This man also attempted to recruit Source's friend as a propagandist.

COMMENTS: ☐

1. (c) Source

0281

b1

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

DIA
USAREUR (3)
18th MI Bn (2)
7113th SAG
ACSI
EUCOM
766th MID
INCO
USAYR
b1 (5)
b1 (13)

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

GROUP-3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
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18. ATTACHMENT CATAL:

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REPORT NO. 2 218 0020 70
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
ORIGINATOR JROC, BERLIN

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b1

2. (U) Remarks

b6

This interrogation was conducted by
Two reports were taken from Source.

b6

Briefer was

COMMENTS OF APPROVING OFFICER:

(U) THIS IS RAW/UNEVALUATED INFORMATION.

0282

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1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY (EG)

2. REPORT NUMBER: 2 212 1877 70
(5102-00)

2. SUBJECT: (U) Description of Operational Vehicle

3. DATE OF REPORT: 27 April 1970

4. NO. OF PAGES: 2

5. REFERENCES: DIRM : b67a

3. ISC NUMBER:

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 18 March 1970

6. ORIGINATOR: 66th Military Intelligence Group

b6

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Hannover, WEST GERMANY

b6

US-12

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE: DB INFORMATION: 2

b6

7. SOURCE: (U) 221-20072

Colonel MI
Commanding

12. SUMMARY:

(C) This report contains information on an East German motor vehicle which is possibly used for covert operations or observation purposes.

(Leave Blank)

0283

1. (C) The information contained in this report was extracted from a German language report, dated 18 March 1970, Zentrale Befragungszentrale (Interrogation Center) Heilmstedt (PC3789), WEST GERMANY (WG). The original source of this German report was in East German prisons from b6 1965 to b6 1970; at which date he was released and immediately deported by train from EAST GERMANY (EG) to WG. While in the Ministry for State Security (Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit) (MfS) prison ("Haftarbeitslager" - Penal Labor Camp) in Berlin-Hohenschonenhausen (now) from July 1965 to 9 March 1970, Source who is a motor vehicle mechanic, had to check motor vehicles after they were repaired in that prison's repair shop. It was his responsibility that all necessary repairs had been properly accomplished.

2. (C) In summer 1968, the original Source of the report inspected a delivery truck

13. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-USA
2-USAREUR
1-EUCOM
1-OSI
1-USASAE
1-IRCD
1-V Corps
1-VII Corps
1-ACSI-CIPC
1-USAIR
1-66th MI Gp, AEUTMI-OP-IR

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

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18. ENCLOSURE DATA:
None

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1 SEP 63

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ORIGINATOR 66th Mil Int. Group

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EXTRACT

of the FRAMO make the outside of which showed the word "Konsum-Baeckerei" (Cooperative Bakery) in red letters on dark blue ground. On both sides of the vehicle was a one-way window which prevented persons on the outside to look into the car, but permitted a person in the vehicle to observe the outside. In the car was a round table mounted on a pillar. The inside walls of the vehicle were covered with ply-wood. There were drawers of different sizes which were secured with iron seals ("plombiert"). The door of the car could be locked from both the outside and the inside. A heating system of SOROKO make was installed in the vehicle. Source did not remember the license number of the vehicle, but stated that it was an East German police license number. Source never saw the car again, but stated that the engine of the vehicle was in rather good condition, and thought it possible that this vehicle is still being used.

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522A

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1. COUNTRY: **EAST GERMANY** 8. REPORT NUMBER: **2 2 18 3657 70 (5005-01)**
 2. SUBJECT: **(U) (S) Investigation in Conjunction with Defection of EGA Personnel** DATE OF REPORT: **22 April 1970**
 10. NO. OF PAGES: **3**
 3. ISC NUMBER: 11. REFERENCES: **DIRM: 1C2**
2A 02 02 41
 4. DATE OF INFORMATION: **January 21, 1970** 12. ORIGINATOR: **18th MI Bn, 66th MI Group**
APO New York 09108
 5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: **Munich, Germany** 13. PREPARED BY:
March 30, 1970
 6. EVALUATION: SOURCE **F** INFORMATION **6** 14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:
 7. SOURCE: **XXI-026-70** **b6**
LTC, MI
Commanding

15. SUMMARY: **(U) (S)** This report contains information on procedures in the investigation of EGA personnel who defect to the West, including information on some aspects of the investigation concerning Source's defection as relayed to him after his defection by relatives still residing in East Germany.

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0285

REPORT: ☐

1. **(S)** Introduction

b1

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

- 1- DIA
- 3- USAREUR
- 1- USFUCOM
- 1- 66th MI Gp, 766th MI Det
- 1- USASAE
- 1- CO USAIRR
- 1- 66th MI Gp, 430th MI Det
- 1- USASPD
- 1- ACSI
- 1- V Corps
- 1- VII Corps
- 3- **b1**

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

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DOD-DIR 5200.10

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

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REPORT NO. 2 218 3657 70
PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES
ORIGINATOR
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2. (u) (c) Investigative Procedures

a. Responsible Personnel for the Investigation

Source stated that the investigation of desertion or defection of EGA personnel is the responsibility of the MFS, in conjunction with the Border Security Officer for that particular area of the border, and the Political Officer of the unit from which the member defected.

b. Investigation

Source stated that the MFS Officer or Agent would be the primary investigator; however, he would be assisted by the Border Security Officer and the Political Officer. Upon learning of a defection, the MFS Officer would first visit the home of the defector to determine whether or not the defector had informed relatives of his plans. At the same time, the Border Security Officer for that area of the border would contact the Political Officer of the unit involved, and these two persons would initiate an investigation within the unit. They would soon be joined by a MFS Officer or Agent who would immediately assume control of the investigation. Every member of the unit involved and all relatives of the defector would be questioned until the desired information had been obtained or until it was determined that no one had any knowledge of the planned defection.

c. Involvement of Political Officer

Source stated that the unit Political Officer was involved in the investigation more or less to save face, since in the eyes of the MFS, if his political indoctrination had been adequate, the defection would not have taken place. Although there is no action taken against the political officer, close track is kept of his unit in the future with special attention to his political training, to insure that there will be no future incidents of defection.

3. (c) Investigation of Source's Desertion

b1

COMMENTS:

0286

(c) Source

b1

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REPORT NO. 2 218 3657 70
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Source appears to be open and completely honest. He appeared to be willing to provide information to the best of his ability, and throughout the interrogation had been very cooperative.

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644a
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1. COUNTRY: **EAST GERMANY**
2. SUBJECT: (U) **East German Intelligence Service (EGIS), re: EGIS Modus Operandi**
3. ISC NUMBER:
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: **14-15 March 1970**
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: **KAISERSLAUTERN, FRG
20 March 1970**
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE **B** INFORMATION **3**
7. SOURCE: **22120016**
8. REPORT NUMBER: **2 718 0222 70**
9. DATE OF REPORT: **17 April 1970**
10. NO. OF PAGES: **1**
11. REFERENCES: **DIRM: 686a**
12. ORIGINATOR: **66th MI Group**
13. PREPARED BY: **b6
LTC, MI**
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: **b6
COL, MI
Commanding**

15. SUMMARY: (U) This report concerns East German Intelligence Service (EGIS) Modus Operandi pertaining to bogus identification documents issued to EGIS agents operating in Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). An EGIS agent was recently told to bring his EGIS-issued false documentation to the next meeting with EGIS so that the documents could be "aged." The agent was also told to bring two concealment devices which are utilized when he travels between the FRG and the Soviet Sector of Berlin so that they could be checked.

EVALUATION REPORTS (DD 1480'S) PREPARED ON THIS IR WILL BE CLASSIFIED AT LEAST
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16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

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1-66th MI Gp, ANUTMI-OP-IR

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

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18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

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☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

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602A

(A121-00)

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081-70

1. COUNTRY: EAST BERLIN

8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 212 1533 70

2. SUBJECT: (U) MfS Modus Operandi and Description of MfS Personality

9. DATE OF REPORT: 7 April 1970

3. ISC NUMBER:

10. NO. OF PAGES: 2

11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 6B6a
6B7
6C

4. DATE OF INFORMATION:

b1

12. ORIGINATOR: Berlin Station
766th MID, 66th MI Gp

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ:

13. PREPARED:

b6

LTC, MI

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 2

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

7. SOURCE:

b1

b6

COLONEL, MI
COMMANDING

15. SUMMARY:

(U) (C) This report contains information concerning an agent and modus operandi of the Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit (MfS; Ministry for State Security).

(Leave Blank)

0291

1. (U)

b1

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA
3-USAREUR
1-ACSI-CIPC
1-USAIRR
1-EUCOM
1-V Corps
1-VII Corps
1-USASAC
1-OSI
1-66th MI Gp, AEUTMI-OP-IR
1-IRGD

17. DOWNGRADING DATA

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18. ATTACHMENT DATA

None

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PAGE 2 OF 2
ORIGINATOR Berlin Station
766th MID, 66th NY

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2. (c)

b1

3. (c)

b1

Age:
Height:
Build:
Face:
Hair:
Ears:
Nose:
Speech:
Habits:

b1

COMMENTS BY ORIGINATOR: (c)

b1

0292

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NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

BRG-KNO-C-060-0

COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY (GR)

AGENCY: (C) Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit
(Ministry for State Security)
Interrogation techniques at the request
of the source (GR0251) / EE

73016384

DATE OF INFORMATION: 18 January 1970

PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Kronach (East German Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG)) - 14 February 1970

SOURCE: 22120606

b6

(C) This report contains information concerning interrogation techniques
employed by the MfS at the request of the source.

0293

(C/REF) This report is marked NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION at the request of the
source since the information contained therein was released in violation of current
agency policies.

(C) During the last half of 1969, MfS members became more secretive and
approaching a refugee who seemed suited for intelligence activity. Formerly these
refugees were summoned over the camp loudspeaker and told to report to the first
aid station where they were met by an MfS member. This system was changed during
the second half of the year and the refugee was summoned to the cultural section
the post office, management section of the directors office where he was either
met by an MfS member or told to report to the first aid station. The MfS interro-
gation room is located in the same building as the first aid station and the
entrance to the room is protected by a security guard.

(C) The initial interrogation follows to some degree a set format, however,
the interrogators vary their methods so as to be compatible with the subject's

- 2-USAARUR
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- 1-USASAC
- 1-ACST-CIPC
- 1-V Corps
- 1-VII Corps
- 1-OSI
- 1-66th MI GP, ABUTH OF IR

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

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NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATIONREPORT NO. 2 212 1373 70
PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES
ORIGINATOR 10th AF Group

mentality. During the questioning the MFB member has the refugees' life history and results of previous questionnaires at his disposal. The questions asked during this thirty minute interview cover the following areas:

Personal data
Reason for emigration (or return), if any
Places of work in the FRG and GDR
Reason for fleeing
Way travelled during flight, to include use of tunnels, border crossings, security systems, if any.
Previous convictions
Places of residence in the FRG
Foreign places of residence
Relatives and their location
Friends and their location
Names of individuals who have left the FRG and GDR
Political affiliations and activities
Names of FRG Army members
Names of police and customs officials
Troop movements in the FRG and GDR

In this initial contact the MFB member usually tries to elicit the refugees' political attitudes in general and their views concerning GDR. The MFB member then makes an attempt to establish rapport with the refugee, stressing that GDR is an advanced socialist country and that the MFB is interested in working conditions and controlling capital flows. In all cases the MFB member in this propaganda or attempts to make changing status in the GDR. The interrogator reproaches him and insinuates that he is a spy. The MFB member then states:

"If you want to be admitted to the GDR you must first agree that you will do something to further the building up of socialism. You must also spiritually break with capitalism and tell everything that you know about FRG militarism."

questions concerning military installations then follow.

2. Detailed written interrogations were conducted in certain instances; especially in the following cases: the refugee had worked in a military office or installation; had served in the FRG Army; had a girlfriend in GDR; fled GDR after 1962; crossed the GDR/FRG border and managed to destroy security installations in the attempt. The written interrogations are usually prepared in four or five copies. During both the initial and detailed interrogation, the interrogator tries to obtain a psychological advantage over the refugee and instill a sense of guilt in him. Often several sessions are required before this occurs. All statements made by the refugee are checked as far as possible. It is believed that some GDR citizens travelling to the FRG are given assignments of checking on the refugees LPH in the FRG. Those refugees who are later expelled from GDR reported that the MFB had details about their personal life in the FRG. In order to reconcile discrepancies, refugees were often subjected to both written and oral interrogations. It was also reported that one of the GDR interrogators at Saasa, GDR, who asked obscene questions and was particularly interested in the refugee's sexual activities.

0294

3. Refugees who illegally crossed the GDR border and thereby placing themselves liable to punishment are informed that they must be taken into custody but that they may not be punished if cooperative and supply information requested. It is alleged that the refugee might be admitted to GDR as a citizen after only one year probation. Those refugees recruited by the MFB for intelligence purposes are required to write out an agreement. After the agreement is signed the refugee usually meets two to three more times with the MFB personnel. The last meeting taking place on the day of departure. At this last meeting the refugee is told how to conduct himself when questioned by the Bayerische Grenz Polizei (Bavarian

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PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

ORIGINATOR: USA MI Group

Ref: RUS-01-MA-0

Border Police) (BBP). The MFS appears to have detailed knowledge of mail counter-intelligence methods.

(U)
4. ~~(S)~~ During an unspecified length of time seventeen individuals recruited by the MFS were apprehended by the BBP in Lhasa prison (1990). 11 of the 17 persons were placed under suspicion.

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O-8

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609G (A-104-00)

This report contains unprocessed information.

Plans and/or policies should not be evolved

or modified solely on the basis of this report.

SLOM-122/70 ~~60/R/R/M~~

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY

8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 212 1212 70

2. SUBJECT: MFS Modus Operandi (c) (U)

9. DATE OF REPORT: 24 March 1970

3. ISC NUMBER:

10. NO. OF PAGES: 2

11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 6C, 6B6a, 6B7

4. DATE OF INFORMATION:

12. ORIGINATOR: 766th MID, 66th MI Group

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ:

13. PREPARED BY:

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 3

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

7. SOURCE: See Comments

(U)

15. SUMMARY:

(c) This report contains information on methods used by the MFS in recruiting informants.

(Leave Blank)

NOTE: (U) Attention is directed to the provisions of paragraph 3a(2), of AR 381-1.

0296

(c)

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17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

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18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

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REPORT NO. 2 212 1212 70
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
ORIGINATOR 766th MID, 66th MI
Group

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COMMENTS (c):

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b1

No further details available.

0297

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691C

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1. COUNTRY: WEST GERMANY; EAST GERMANY

8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 212 0930 70

(5102)

2. SUBJECT: Intelligence Recruitment Procedure

9. DATE OF REPORT: 16 March 1970, 5A

3. ISC NUMBER:

10. NO. OF PAGES: 140

11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 6B7a

2B011227

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: January 1970

12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Stuttgart, FRG
18 February 70

13. PREPARED BY: b6 LIO BW

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 2

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: b6 AC

7. SOURCE: b1

COL, MI
Commanding

15. SUMMARY:

b1

(Leave Blank)

The East German Intelligence Service is offering to West German citizens the opportunity of interesting part time work under the cover of cultural, economic and social research projects. The media used is ads in local newspapers offering this type of employment assuring a minimal effort need to be expended in exchange for acceptable remuneration. A subsequent invitation to East Berlin for personal discussion would then lead to the recruitment attempt.

0298

(U) "Although the information contained herein is UNCLASSIFIED the overall classification of this report is CONFIDENTIAL because it shows US Army interest in the subject matter."

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

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COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY
SUBJECT: (U) Data about an MfS Personality
MfS Modus Operandi
REPORT NUMBER: 2 212 0521 70
DATE OF REPORT: 13 February 1970
NO. OF PAGES: 7
REFERENCES: DIRM: 6B7, 6C
DATE OF INFORMATION: December 1969
ORIGINATOR: Berlin Station
766th MID, 66th MI Gp
PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: West Berlin
22 January 1970
PREPARED BY: b6
LTC, MI
EVALUATION: SOURCE F INFORMATION 6
SOURCE: b1
DPOB: b1
APPROVING AUTHORITY: b6
COLONEL, MI
COMMANDING

SUMMARY: (U) This report contains information concerning the modus operandi of the Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit (MfS: Ministry for State Security), and information concerning an MfS officer.

1. (C) b1 an informant for the Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit (MfS: Ministry for State Security), b1 revealed in substance the following information concerning MfS modus operandi and an MfS officer:

2. (C) In July 1963, b1 was introduced by (fnu) b1 in BERLIN-Prenzlauer Berg, Soviet Sector of BERLIN (SSB), to two unidentified men in civilian clothing at the Volkspolizei-Praesidium (People's Police Headquarters) on Keibelstrasse, BERLIN-Prenzlauer Berg. Because b1 was under investigation on suspicion of his planning to defect to the West, b1 introduced b1 to the two civilians who,

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ATTACHMENT DATA:
None

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b1 said would help b1 in his present situation. After b1 introduced b1 to the two men, he left the room. b1 and the two men discussed b1's present situation and his problems. At the end of this conversation, the younger of the two men left the room. The older man then told b1 that he could help b1. b1 was told to think the situation would agree to work for him. b1 was told to think the situation over, and to meet the unidentified man one week later in the Cafe Prag, located on Friedrichstrasse, SSB. b1 met the elderly man at the designated time and place and told the man that he would cooperate. The elderly man was pleased, but said nothing further. Nothing had been mentioned about the MfS. In July and August 1963, b1 met the elderly man nearly every week in the Cafe Prag or in the Cafe Stadt-Mitte, located at the intersection of Friedrichstrasse and Leipzigerstrasse, SSB. Around the middle of August 1963, the man, who now gave his name as b6, dictated b1 a statement of obligation and pledge of discretion. b1 wrote the pledge and signed it with his real name. At this time b1 was officially employed as a sales manager in the shop of his b6 born on b6

b6 and residing at b6

3. b1's first mission was in August 1963. He was instructed to walk in the area of the Gertraudenbruecke Spittelmarkt, where anti-Soviet Zone of Germany (SZG) leaflets had been found, and to observe any suspicious person. b1 saw no one who appeared to be suspicious.

4. b1 was to carry out missions for the MfS more easily. From the time b1 signed the pledge of discretion he realized that he was employed by the MfS, although b6 had not mentioned it. From September 1963 to fall 1964, b1 met with b6 every two weeks at either the Cafe b6 or the b6. For the year 1963, b1 received DME 500 from b6. b1 always signed receipts for the money with his real name.

5. b1 was instructed to take pictures at the official fashion show of the ladies' fashion shop b6 of the models and the customers. The show took place at the Hotel Adria, SSB. b1 was given the same mission in spring 1964 and again in fall 1964. In early 1964, several times b1 was required to observe a house at the intersection of b1. b1 was to report whether a certain car, a Wartburg with a SSB license number, was parked in front of this house. This was a continuous mission lasting until summer 1964. b1

6. By this time b1 had learned that the name of his agent handler was b6 0300

7. b1 took a four-day group tourist trip to PRAGUE, Czechoslovakia (Czech). b1 was not assigned a mission for this trip.

8. b1 with the aid of the MfS, bought his first car, a b1 paid for the car out of his own money. From this time, b1 was given the mission to drive to Checkpoint Charlie or Checkpoint Bornholmerstrasse, to wait in his car until certain cars from the West crossed into SSB, and then to follow these cars and report where they went. One of these cars was a Volkswagen with WEST BERLIN license plates (numbers unrecalled). The male driver usually went to the Mueller Printing Office on Alte Schoenhauserstrasse, SSB. Then the driver would go to various other addresses in SSB: a dental office on Wilhelm Plackstrasse, the Mellentin photo shop on Hufelandstrasse, and a garage yard and auto repair shop on Lippehnerstrasse. This same person later in

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REF ID: A66082 2 212 0521 P

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ORIGINATOR Berlin Station
766th MID 66th MI Gr

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9. (C) In 1944 or 1945, [b1] was instructed to [b6] to the Die Felle restaurant located in the small [b6] to some cemeteries in the Hunsbuecker Berg area. [b1] made [b6] of the rooms of the small restaurant, and with [b6] numbers of cars parked in the vicinity of this place. [b1] [b6] whether when a person or persons entered the restaurant, [b6] went to the rear rooms of the building. Of the very few [b6] [b1] noted one was a license number of the Federal Republic of Germany. [b6] never said why the wife was interested in this place. [b1] was of the opinion that this restaurant had something to do with or was engaged in assisting defectors.

10. (c) [redacted] b6 In the apartment located [redacted] b6 The apartment was located in the building to the left of the pond with [redacted] The apartment consisted of a kitchen, bedroom, and bathroom. [redacted] the same on the right side next to the door road. [redacted] b6 At the time in 1965, [redacted] b6 [redacted] b6 [redacted] b6 later 15-50-31. Whenever [redacted] b6 called [redacted] b6 [redacted] b6 by his name

11. (c) In 1966, b1 continued to inform Agent Sharlin and Checkpoint from headquarters. b1 b6 to determine if a checkpoint whether there was a b6 shop.

(c) [redacted] b1 [redacted] advised that [redacted] b1 [redacted] resided at [redacted] b6 [redacted]. The apartment was the middle apartment on the fourth floor in the building. From the summer of 1947, the WFS used this apartment as its office. [redacted] b1 never lived at this address because he lived at [redacted] b1 [redacted]. In January 1948, [redacted] b1 officially gave a statement to the FBI after leaving this address. He then officially gave a statement to the FBI as that of [redacted] b1 [redacted] learned from [redacted] b6 [redacted] that [redacted] continued to remain in the name of the WFS as a cover agent until he did not know who the official leader was.

13. (C) In 1968, b1 continued to drive a 1967 Ford through Checkpoint Charlie. In three instances, b1 was ordered to stop at Checkpoint Charlie to catch out for a certain car. b1 was then given the make of car and license numbers and had to decide if starting whether any person left the car before leaving the GDR. b1 can recall, do so and over left these cars.

14. (c) From [b1] 1966 to [b1] 1968, [b1] travelled on their own to PRAGUE. When he returned, [b1] was required to write a general report on the political and economic situation in the USSR. Again in spring 1968 when [b1] and [b6] went on a four-day trip to PRAGUE, he was required to write a report. In both instances

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ORIGINATOR Berlin Station

766th MID 66th MI

b6 helped b1 write the reports, and b6 was very pleased with them. On this trip to PRAGUE, b1 wanted to take along more money than was legally permitted. b1 asked b6 how this could be done. b6 gave him some helpful information, in return for DM 300. In PRAGUE, b1 could contact "our man" who came from time to time to SSB. It was later determined from a telephone directory and map of PRAGUE that "our man" b6 b1 was to go to the above address, introduce himself as "Harry," and b6 would give him 1000 Czech Korunas. When he went to PRAGUE, b1 obtained the money in the prescribed manner. When b1 was in b6 apartment, he observed that b6 was a collector of old guns. b1 also noticed that b6 had an 18-year-old daughter. b6 spoke fair German with a pronounced eastern accent, and was an engineer by profession.

15. (C) Sometime in 1968, b6 instructed b1 to observe an apartment building on Breitestrasse (number unrecalled), BERLIN-Pankow, SSB. b1 was told that a woman about 30 years of age would be released from an MFS duty car in the vicinity of the apartment building where she lived, and that she was expected to return to her apartment. b1 mission was to observe what this woman did after being released and permitted to go home. The woman appeared at the apartment building about 1700 hours, and after a few moments she came out of the building with her dog, walked her dog for a while and returned to her home. She did not come out again. At about 2000 hours, b1 left the area. While on this surveillance, b1 noticed that there were several other male civilians, including b6 who were also engaged in the surveillance.

16. (C) Since approximately 1946, b1 has been acquainted with a married couple b6 who were business partners with b1 in black market dealings. b1 had long suspected b6 of having MFS contact because b6 had no occupation. b6 knew of this couple because b6 was one of the models at the fashion show of which b1 had been required to take pictures. In 1968 b1 learned from b6 that b6 were well known to the MFS because of their black marketeering, and that the MFS had to help the b6s with the police several times. In summer 1969, b1 became acquainted through the b6 with a Danish national. b1 never knew the Danish national's real name. He knew only his nickname, b6 was born in 1934 or 1935 in Denmark, and allegedly runs a fur shop in COPENHAGEN, Denmark. Nearly twice a month b6 spends a weekend in SSB, probably to see his girl friend, who lives in SSB, a model named Barbara (lmu) born around 1944. In fall 1969, b6 flew from COPENHAGEN to HAMBURG, FRG, to BERLIN-Tempelhof. Because of bad weather conditions the plane got into some trouble while landing at HAMBURG, and several passengers were slightly injured. In summer 1969, b1 was assigned by b6 a mission to determine what b6 activities were. b6 hinted that b6 might be in contact with a western intelligence service. b6 b1 that b6 should not be investigated because the MFS did not trust them. b1 last saw Lasse in November 1969 at the Linden Hotel located at the intersection of Friedrichstrasse and Unter den Linden, SSB. b1 was never able to learn anything about b6 because, when b1 saw b6 was usually heavily under the influence of alcohol.

17. (C) b1 was issued, with the aid of the MFS, a 260-day visitor's permit for WEST BERLIN, registration Nr. b1 b1 had asked for this permit because he wanted to visit his mother. He stated that he would be willing to work for the MFS in WEST BERLIN. In all, b1 visited WEST BERLIN 67 times between 6 April 1969 and 24 December 1969.

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PAGE 5

ORIGINATOR Berlin Station

766th MID 66th MI 02

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Went to the Beton-Werk (Eternit) plant located on Kanalstrasse, BERLIN-Rudow, WEST BERLIN, and copied down license numbers, particularly FRG license numbers, of cars parked in front of the main gate. b6 hinted that there were persons who work in this plant who were affiliated with the

b1 an official West
b1 this plant twice,
took 24 pictures of cars parked in front of the main gate and copied down about ten license numbers. b1

was instructed to take pictures of the Ingenieurschule fuer Bauwesen (Engineering School for Construction) located on Leinestrasse, BERLIN-Neukoelln, WEST BERLIN. b1 went to this building four times during the period mentioned above, and took 24 pictures of the building, of cars parked in front of the building, and of students coming out of the building.

b1 took pictures of the rear of the building from a cemetery. He was required to take a close-up picture of a basement door in the rear of the building. b1 given the same mission against the Ingenieurschule fuer Bauwesen located on Kurfuerstenstrasse, BERLIN-Tiergarten, WEST BERLIN. b1 took approximately eight pictures of the building. b1 instructed to enter the

large compound, in which are assigned authorities of the FRG, located between Jebenstrasse, Hardenbergstrasse, and Fasanenstrasse, BERLIN-Charlottenburg, WEST BERLIN. b1 took 12 pictures of cars parked in front of the compound. b6 was particularly interested in building Nr. 9 which housed the Bundesbaudirektion Berlin (Federal Construction Administration Office, Berlin). b1 also took pictures of the buildings located at the intersection of Hardenbergstrasse and Fasanenstrasse.

b1 was instructed to visit the area around the Springer Printing and Publishing House located on Kochstrasse, BERLIN-Kreuzberg, WEST BERLIN, to find out whether the rumor was true that the Rolling Stones, a singing group, were going to sing over loudspeakers from the Springer Building into the SSB on 7 October 1960. b1 took 12 pictures of the area. He found out that the rumor about the Rolling Stones was false. b1 required to

investigate the following addresses to see whether the persons named were still living at the given addresses: (fnu) b6

b6 and (fnu) b6 Home for Foreigners, 11 Tempelhofer Ufer, BERLIN-Kreuzberg. b1 determined that b6 still lived at the designated address, but that b6 did not live any longer at the designated address. b1 could not learn anything about b6

b1 performed no other missions in WEST BERLIN.

19. (C) b6 revealed the following information concerning b6

Cover name:

DPOB:

Height:

Weight:

Build:

Hair:

Face:

Eyes:

Speech:

Habits:

Residence:

Home telephone Nr.:

Rank:

Assignment:

Political affiliation:

5'2"-5'4"

120-130 pounds

Medium

Brown, balding

Large, full, round

Brown

High German, slight Saxonian dialect

Smokes cigarettes, drinks alcohol moderately

b6

65 67 683

Major

MfS Headquarters, Normannenstrasse, BERLIN-Lichtenberg, SSB

Member of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland (SED: Socialist Unity Party of Germany); convinced communist and socialist

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REPLACES DA FORM 1396c
AND DA FORM 1396c
MAY BE USED

Children:

Name:	Unknown	06	(phonetic)
DPOB:	5'4"-5'6"		
Height:	110-120 pounds		
Weight:	Slender		
Build:	Dark brown, medium-length		
Hair:	Possibly brown		
Eyes:	Oval		
Face:			

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CONTINUATION SHEET

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ORIGINATOR Berlin Station
766th MID 66th MI

Habits: Smokes and drinks heavily
Speech: High German
Automobile: An old, dark reddish-brown Saab, registered in her name
Occupation: Free-lance model
Political affiliation: None
Parents: They live on Grunewaldstrasse, WEST BERLIN. Mother possesses an FRG ID Card and visits [b6] every week on Mondays in SED. In fall 1969 [b6] [b6] father, with the help of his daughter, obtained a 4-day permit of entry to SED. The permit was issued through the permit office for emergency cases on Hohenzollerndamm, BERLIN-Wilmersdorf, WEST BERLIN. [b1] knew that there was no emergency situation for the father to go to SED, so he feels that the permit was obtained through the efforts of the MFS.

COMMENTS BY ORIGINATOR: (C) [b1]

b1

0305

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(Classification and Control Markings)

DD FORM 1396c

REPLACES DA FORM 1396c, 1-64, WHICH IS OBSOLETE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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CONFIDENTIAL

(Classification and Control Markings)

172A

This report contains unprocessed information.

Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: **EAST GERMANY**
(U)
2. SUBJECT: **(C) Rumored MFS Resp for Mine Flds, LEIPZIG 5120N-1222E (US 1691)**
3. ISC NUMBER:
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: **April 1969**
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: **BERLIN, Germany 6 February 1970**
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE **F** INFORMATION **6**
7. SOURCE: **b1** (DOB: **b1**)
8. REPORT NUMBER: **2 218 0578 70 (5049-01)**
9. DATE OF REPORT: **12 February 1970**
10. NO. OF PAGES: **2**
11. REFERENCES: **DIRM 1Q4b; 6B4**
12. ORIGINATOR: **JROC, BERLIN APO NY 09742**
13. PREPARED BY: **b6**
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: **b6** Copy, USAF Operations Officer
b6 MJ, MI Commander

15. SUMMARY:

REPORT:

(C) **b1**

On his way to and from work he occasionally passed the LEIPZIG MFS district headquarters, located east of Dittrichring (street) at 512029N-0112210E (US 16899133). In early April 1969 Source observed an EGA helicopter (similar to the HUND) land in the yard of the LEIPZIG main fire department located west of Dittrichring, just across from the MFS building. Shortly thereafter, six to seven EGA personnel left the MFS building and boarded the helicopter which took off immediately. Source mentioned this incident to a fellow employee, known to be one of the MFS guards at the workshops where transistorized naval radar equipment was assembled. This man (name unknown) told Source that the group which Source had observed was part of a special department of the LEIPZIG MFS HQ. This department was the only East German agency which had in its possession diagrams depicting the exact placement of mines along the East/West German border. Source was also told that not even regimental border guard commanders knew the exact placement of mines. Therefore, no escapes, injured or killed by a mine, could be rescued before the arrival of the specialists from the LEIPZIG MFS department.

COMMENTS:

0306

1. (C) Source

b1

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

DIA
USAREUR (2)
ETC-US/REUR
USAFE
711TH SAG
ACSI
EUCOM
EEIC 18TH MI BN (2)
USASAE
V Corps
VII Corps
766TH MID
INCD
USAIHR
OSI **b1** (5)
BLN DISTR: (15)

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

GROUP 3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

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DD FORM 1396

0-00

CONTINUATION SHEET

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REPORT NO. 2 218 0578 70
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
ORIGINATOR JROC, BERLIN

(Leave Blank)

b1

2. (U) Remarks

This interrogation was conducted by **b6** Briefer was
b6 Twenty-two reports were taken from Source.

COMMENTS OF APPROVING OFFICER:

(U) THIS IS RAW/UNEVALUATED INFORMATION.

030711

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661A

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1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY

8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 718 0023 70
(0401)

2. SUBJECT: (U) East German Intelligence Service (EGIS), re: EGIS Modus Operandi

9. DATE OF REPORT: 23 January 1970

3. ISC NUMBER:

10. NO. OF PAGES: 1

11. REFERENCES: DIRM 6B6a

2B011227

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 13-14 December 1969

12. ORIGINATOR:

66th MI Group

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: MUENCHWEILER, FRG;
17 December 1969

13. PREPARED BY:

b6

LTC, MI

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 2

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

b6

Colonel, MI
Commanding

7. SOURCE: 22120016

15. SUMMARY: (U) During December 1969, an EGIS Agent Handler (AH) reviewed with one of his agents the procedures for emergency reporting of US troop movements within a specific city in the Federal Republic of Germany. The AH did not explain whether this was simply a review of the procedures or whether EGIS expected a situation to develop wherein emergency reporting might be necessary.

(Leave Blank)

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0308

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16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1 - DIA
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1 - EUCOM, J-2
1 - ACSI-CIPC
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1 - 66th MI Gp, AEUTMI-OP-IR

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

GROUP-3
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18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

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DD FORM 1396
1 SEP 62

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661A

This report contains unprocessed information.

Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY
2. SUBJECT: (U) East German Intelligence Service (EGIS), re: EGIS Modus Operandi
3. ISC NUMBER:
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 13-14 December 1969
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: MUENCHWELLER, FRG; 17 December 1969
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 3
7. SOURCE: 22120016
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 718 0022 70 (0401)
9. DATE OF REPORT: 23 January 1970
10. NO. OF PAGES: 1
11. REFERENCES: DIRM 6B6a
12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group
13. PREPARED BY: b6 LTC, MI
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: b6 Colonel, MI Commanding

15. SUMMARY: (U) An EGIS Agent Handler (AH) confronted one of his agents with information the agent had submitted to EGIS 5-6 months previously. The AH stated that he had not forwarded the information within EGIS channels and asked the agent to describe the information, which was printed in English. The AH claimed that he had not forwarded the information due to its poor quality and usefulness. The AH conceded that the information might be of value but not to the specific EGIS agency which he represented. A portion of the information submitted by the agent pertained to minutes of monthly meetings of a US Army Program Budget Advisory Committee which provided information of a statistical nature in the strategic and technical field regarding supply levels, repair time lead, etc.

(Leave Blank)

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0309

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1 - USAIRM
1 - 66th MI Gp, AEUIMI-OP-IR

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

GROUP-3
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18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

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DD FORM 1396

O-66

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661-A

This report contains unprocessed information.

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1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY
2. SUBJECT: (U) East German Intelligence Service (EGIS), re: EGIS Modus Operandi

8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 718 0016 70 (0401)
9. DATE OF REPORT: 23 January 1970
10. NO. OF PAGES: 1
11. REFERENCES: DIRM 682a

3. ISC NUMBER:

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 13-14 December 1969

12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: MUENCHWEILER, FRG; 17 December 1969

13. PREPARED BY: b6 LTC, MI

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 1

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

7. SOURCE: 22120016

b6

Colonel, MI
Commanding

15. SUMMARY: (U) An EGIS Agent Handler (AH) told one of his Sources that one of the packages containing development material which the Source had sent from the Federal Republic of Germany in late August 1969, had not arrived at the EGIS accommodation address until late November 1969. The AH did not indicate whether there had been any evidence that the package had been opened or tampered with.

(Leave Blank)

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0310

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16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1 - DIA
2 - USAREUR
1 - ENCOM, J-2
1 - ACSI-CIPC
1 - ~~SECRET~~
1 - 66th MI Gp, AEUTMI-OP-IR

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

GROUP-3
~~Downgraded at 12-year intervals;~~
Not automatically declassified.

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

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DD FORM 1396
1 SEP 62

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648A

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E-BRO-1729

COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY

8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 212 5439 69
(5103)

1. SUBJECT: MfS (Ministry for State Security) informant operations in the SZOG.

9. DATE OF REPORT: 8 January 1970

10. NO. OF PAGES: 4

3. ISC NUMBER:

11. REFERENCES:

DIRM: 6B6a, 6C
El. Msg No: E-510-U
dtd 241105Z Nov 1969

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: Apr to Nov 69

12. ORIGINATOR:

66th MI Group

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Witzzenhausen, FRG
(NB 6088) 24 Nov 69

13. PREPARED BY:

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE F INFORMATION 6

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

7. SOURCE

(u) b1

(Illegal Border Crosser)

Colonel, MI
Commanding

15. SUMMARY:

(u) (C) This report contains information concerning the procurement and handling of an informant of MfS (Ministry for State Security) in the SZOG, in addition to the functions of the buildings in which SOURCE met with MfS Agent.

(Leave Blank)

0311

1. (C) In April 1969, about 6 (six) weeks after a resident of Bornhagen (NB 6588), SZOG unsuccessfully attempted to escape to the FRG, 2 (two) civilians appeared at SOURCE's last place of employment in Arenshausen (NB 6892), SZOG and ordered him to come along with them. The men took him to the office building of the Mayor of Arenshausen which used to be the headquarters of the local East German Army Border Command Company. He was driven there in a 1968 Wartburg sedan whose color and license number subject could not remember.

2. (C) In this building he was taken into a room directly across from the Mayor's personal office. The room contained 1 (one) office

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA
2-USAREUR
1-USATIR
1-USEUCOM
1-USAFE
1-USASAE
1-ACSI-CIPC
1-66th MI Gp, AEUTMI-
OP-IR

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

GROUP-3

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18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

None

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DD FORM 1396
1 SEP 62

O-40

desk, even, a book case, 2 to 3 chairs, and a picture of **b6** (First Secretary of the East German Communist Party) on the wall. The room contained no telephone, and when a telephone was required the one in the mayor's office had to be used.

3. (C) One of the two civilians claimed to be a Criminal Police official and was described as follows:

Name: unknown
Age: 45
Sex: Male
Race: Caucasian
Build: Small
Facial: Pointed, pock-scarred face
Comment: Wore a heavy leather coat.

The other civilian, who later identified himself as an MfS official, was described by SOU RCF as follows:

Name: FNU **b6** (phonetic)
Age: 45
Sex: Male
Race: Caucasian
Build: Large
Comment: **b6** speaks through the nose with a Rheinland/Weimar dialect. He wore a wedding ring.

4. (C) The office building of the Mayor of Arenshausen, SZOG, also contains the office of the Abschnittsbevollmächtigter, (ABV, District Commissioner) as well as the reporting office for persons visiting the SZOG on interzonal passes. This office is open daily from 1400 to 1700 hours. The official commutes from Uder (NB 7591), SZOG. Interzonal passes are issued in Heiligenstadt (NB 7993), SZOG? and distributed to citizens of Arenshausen requesting them through the above office.

5. (C) SOURCE was questioned concerning his personal history, acquaintances and family, and dealings in the FRG. He claims to have mentioned only his more distant relatives in the FRG, whose addresses he did not know, and avoided mentioning his guardian-uncle, whom he knew very well. The Criminal Police official made notes during the interview in a ringed notebook. Source was able to see that the names of three of his closest friends were written in this book, but recognized nothing else that was written. The Criminal Police official hardly spoke at all, and left the room after a short while.

6. (C) **b6** continued to question SOURCE. He asked what the Source knew about other planned escapes from the SZOG. **b6** then indicated that he had not been able to speak frankly before, since it wasn't necessary for the Criminal Police to know everything. Upon SOURCE's request **b6** showed him his credentials, but allowed him to see only the front side, on which the words Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit (MfS, Ministry for State Security) appeared, and not the inside, where his name and photo could probably be found. **b6** told SOURCE to be especially alert to learn whether any of his younger acquaintances were agitating against the SED-State (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, Socialist Unity Party of East Germany), or expressed the intention to defect.

0312

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2 212 5439 69

REPORT NO.
PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES
ORIGINATOR 66th MI Group
E-BRO-1729

(Leave Blank)

7. (c) Although SOURCE stated that the MfS possessed no means with which to force him to work as an informant, he reluctantly agreed to do so, because his father had been threatened with difficulties at his job. Source was also assured special privileges connected with his prospective service in the East German Army, though the nature of these privileges was not explained to him. SOURCE was persuaded to sign a typed statement, which b6 had in his pocket. The text included the following: "Hiermit verpflichte ich mich auf freiwilliger Basis, mit dem Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit zusammenzuarbeiten. Vor allem, Kontakte zu Personen oder Sachen, die mit Republikflucht in Verbindung stehen, sofort dem MfS oder der naechsten VP-Dienststelle zu melden" (I hereby pledge, of my own free will, to cooperate with the Ministry for State Security. Above all, I shall report to the MfS or the nearest police office anything I learn in connection with defection from the SZOG)". SOURCE signed the statement with his own name, and was then told to choose a cover name. For this purpose he chose the name b1. The source was then directed to learn whether any of his young friends both male and female had intentions to defect, or were expressing anti-government sentiments. SOURCE was further ordered to report every Wednesday between 1230 and 1300 hours to b6 in his office.

8. (c) b6 accepted all oral reports from SOURCE and recorded them in block letters. SOURCE was then required to sign each page of these reports with his cover name. Among those that the source informed upon was an eighteen year-old female worker in a cigar factory, who was well known for her flirtatious behaviour with members of the 8th Border Command Company. SOURCE was paid occasionally in amounts from five to twenty East German Marks to cover his expenses. During the period in which he worked for MfS the total amount paid to him was around 80 East German Marks. This money was used to buy gasoline and to cover expenses incurred in taverns. SOURCE also borrowed a motorcycle, type Argo 350, which he repaired himself and used as transportation for training purposes. One one occasion the source was given 20 East German Marks to cover taxi fares. His cover name always appeared on the receipts. SOURCE was directed to lock the door behind him whenever he entered b6 office. One one occasion, when a large crowd had gathered on the grounds near the building, he was ordered to leave by the window. (The office was on the ground floor.)

9. (c) SOURCE told no one about his activity, except his girlfriend whom he gave only a very rough idea of what he was doing. He thought that his mother might have suspected something, since she was used to visiting him every day at work during the lunch hour, and suddenly found him missing on Wednesdays. The source says he never reported anything concerning plans to leave the SZOG, because none of the people with whom he talked had discussed this matter with him. Once, a young married couple had spoken of the SED-State in a derogatory manner, but he didn't report this incident.

10. (c) One week in September 1969 : SOURCE was given the task of observing the times at which the West German helicopter flights along the Demarcation Line took place, and to report this information. The source says that he observed these flights through an old telescope from his room in his parents' home. b6 was satisfied with the reports.

11. (c) SOURCE noticed on two occasions that his own activity was being watched over. b6

b1

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REPORT NO. 2 212 5439 69

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

ORIGINATOR 66th MI Group

E-BRC(-1729)

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b1

12. (u) SOURCE expressed the opinion that he was probably undergoing preparatory training for his MFS assignment, and said that he received no more important tasks. Since the source had obligated himself to three years of military service and was afraid he would have to continue his activities as an informant, which he already found unpleasant, he decided to defect to the FRG. SOURCE repeated several times that he had not been sent into the FRG as an agent, but he was unable to prove this statement. The source claims to know from hearsay that the MFS is housed in Heiligenstadt, in the former trade school in Heinrich Heine Park (NB 795929), though he had never been there.

COMMENT: (c)

b1

b1 information is probably reliable, and that he is not engaged in espionage activities against the FRG for MFS.

0314

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.1R**CONFIDENTIAL**

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6906

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ISA 69-12006

1. COUNTRY: WEST GERMANY

4. REPORT NUMBER: 2 212 5424 69
(5102)

2. SUBJECT: (C) Recruitment Attempts of the Ministry for State Security (MFS) in Tourist Traffic

5. DATE OF REPORT: 2 January 1970

10. NO. OF PAGES: 2

3. ISC NUMBER:

11. REFERENCES: DIRM 6B7 a

4. DATE OF INFORMATION:

12. ORIGINATOR: 766th MID; 66th MI Gp

5. PLACE AND DATE OF AC:

13. PREPARED BY:

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE

B INFORMATION 3

14. APPROVAL AUTHORITY:

7. SOURCE:

Colonel, MI
Commanding

15. SUMMARY: (C) This report concerns the attempts made by the Ministerium fuer Staatsicherheit (Ministry for State Security - MFS), a Soviet Zone of Occupied Germany (SZOG) intelligence service, to recruit a Criminal Police official from the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).

(Leave Blank)

0315

Best Copy Available

(C) TRANSLATION:

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

ENCLOSURE DATA:

- 1 - DIA
- 2 - USAREUR
- 1 - EUCOM
- 1 - ACST-CIPC
- 1 - OSI

GROUP-3
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CONTINUATION SHEET

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REPORT NO. 2 212 5424 09

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

ORIGINATOR 66th MI Group

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b1

(c) COMMENTS:

b1

0316

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Page(s) 317-320

602A (A 121)

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(Classification and Control Markings)

1. COUNTRY: **EAST GERMANY, EAST BERLIN,
WEST BERLIN**

8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 212 512 69

2. SUBJECT: **Debriefing of an MfS Agent**

9. DATE OF REPORT: 10 December 1969

10. NO. OF PAGES: 12

11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 6B7a, 6C

3. ISC NUMBER:

25016384

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 6 October 1969

12. ORIGINATOR: Berlin Station,
766th MID, 66th MI Group5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: **West Berlin
22 November 1969**13. PREPARED BY: **b6** LTC, MI6. EVALUATION: SOURCE **F** INFORMATION **6**14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: **b6**7. SOURCE: **b1**
(DPOB: **b1**
b1)**COL, MI
COMMANDING**

15. SUMMARY: (C) This report concerns the modus operandi of the Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit (MfS: Ministry for State Security) during an operation conducted in West Berlin and directed against United States Forces in West Berlin. It includes methods of recruitment, border crossing, false documents, concealment devices, secret writing material, cover stories and names and one-way voice link (OWVL) communications systems used by the MfS.

(Leave Blank)

0321

1. (C) From 1 July 1966 until 30 August 1967, **b1**

b1 was employed as a self-supporting travelling agent for the Berlin branch office of the publishing house "Heinrich Bauer Verlag," located on Potsdamer Strasse, West Berlin-Schöneberg. Owing to expenses involved in the position with the "Heinrich Bauer Verlag," **b1** owed 462.50 DMW (West German currency) to the firm and had to quit his job. **b1** had other outstanding debts totaling 12,000.00 DMW. **b1** and his wife, **b6** nee **b6** discussed these debts and came to the conclusion that they would never be able to pay them and decided to move for good to East Germany.

2. (C) In the middle of November 1967 **b1** and his wife travelled by S-Bahn to Friedrichstrasse Station, East Berlin, and asked the guards at the

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA 1-IRCD
2-USAREUR 1-66th MI Gr
1-USEUCOM AEUTMI-OP-IR
1-USAFE
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1-USASAF
1-ACSI-CIPC
1-7113 SAG
1-USAREUR ETC
1-SF Det (Abn), EUROPE
LOCAL DISTRIBUTION:
DCSI, USCOB
USABAG

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

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DOD DIR. 5200.10

18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

NONE

CONFIDENTIAL

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DD FORM 1396

CONTINUATION SHEET

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 212 5132 69

PAGE 2 OF 12 PAGES

ORIGINATOR

766th MID, 66th MI Group

control point what they would have to do if they wanted to move for good to East Germany. They were told to come back on the following morning by an unknown border guard officer. On the following day, [b1] and his wife again took the S-Bahn to the same station. In the station, [b1] was interviewed by a different border guard officer and was asked why he wanted to come to East Germany. [b1] told the officer that he was in financial trouble in West Berlin and that he wanted to start a new life in East Germany. The officer made a telephone call and a few minutes later, [b1] and his wife were taken in a small bus to an unidentified office in an old building with the word "Rueckkehrerstelle" (Returnee's Office) at the entrance.

3. (C) In the Returnee's Office, [b1] and his wife were interviewed by an elderly man who was heavily built and lame in one leg, and whose name was not revealed to [b1]. [b1] repeated his reasons for wanting to come to East Germany and was told by the elderly man that he had no reasons that the authorities would accept for entrance into East Germany. [b1] and his wife were then interviewed separately, by the same man, and again were told that the chances of their being accepted were very poor. Some time after 1400 hours of the same day, [b1] was again interviewed, this time by a fnu [b6] whom he described as follows:

DOB:	Approximately [b6]
POB:	Unknown
Height:	5'11"
Weight:	190 lbs
Build:	Medium; broad shoulders
Hair:	Dark brown, combed back, slightly wavy
Face:	Long; narrow lips; strong cheek bones
Eyes:	unknown
Speech:	Berlin Dialect, expressed himself well
Distinguishing Characteristics:	None

4. (C) During the interview with [b6] [b1] wife had to wait, and again [b1] had to tell about his debts. [b1] was again told that his reasons for wanting to live in the East were insufficient, and that he must get rid of his debts in order to live in East Germany. [b6] then stated that he could help [b1] to dissolve his debts. [b6] stated that it is an "international" method of operation to use persons who are in financial difficulty for "little services" or "missions", and that both sides, East and West, were doing this. [b6] further stated that the work would not be dangerous and that it was work to help the "German Democratic Republic" in its fight against the "capitalists". He also stated that the work would consist of observation of buildings located in West Berlin, that the work was not the work of an "agent" and that [b1] could stop it at any time. [b1] agreed to do the work and as a first payment received 50.DMW from Wuensche for which he signed a receipt in his true name. [b1] also received cigarettes, S-Bahn fare and 5.DMW as a gift, for which he signed no receipt.

5. (C) After the interview, [b1] was required to fill out several questionnaires. [b6] told him to tell his wife nothing about the arrangements, and to return in one week, taking the S-Bahn to the Friedrichstrasse station and asking the guard to send him to the Returnee's Office. At about 1500 hours, [b1] and his wife were taken by the same bus back to the Friedrichstrasse station, and the driver, a civilian, escorted them through the control point.

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6. (C) When [b1] and his wife returned to their home, [b1] immediately told his wife everything. His wife was of the opinion that [b1] could do what was asked, if "they" wanted only such unimportant information as stated by [b6]. Approximately one week later, exact date not recalled, [b1] returned for the second meeting to East Berlin by the same method, again taking the bus from the station to the Returnee's Office. [b6] was there and he immediately interviewed [b1]. [b6] stated that the work [b1] would be doing was not espionage and repeated that [b1] could stop the work at any time. [b6] then gave [b1] 50.DMW and had him sign a receipt for

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the money with the name b6 Then b6 dictated, while b1 wrote the following: "For security reasons, in the future, I will use for signatures, the name b6 then had b1 sign in his true name on the paper he had written the statement.

(Leave Blank)

7. (c) b6 then took b1 for a short "sightseeing" tour around Alexander Platz, East Berlin, in an old grey Wartburg automobile. In an unidentified restaurant on Schoenhauser Allee, they had lunch, and in a butcher shop, b6 bought b1 a large salami. Another meeting was arranged for two weeks later at 1800 hours. For that meeting, b1 was told to bring along two empty discount stamp books, or two similar picture post cards. He was told to ring the electric bell at the small door on the left side, before the controls at Friedrichstrasse Station, and that b6 would be there waiting. b6 then returned to the station. In the car, b6 wrote something on a piece of paper and then they both left the car. b6 told b1 to remain near the car while he went into the station and when he came out of the station, to go into the station without saying anything to him, and that he would be able to pass through the controls with no trouble. b1 did as he was told and was able to pass through the controls with no trouble. b1 believed that, at this meeting, he was given the mission to observe a house located next to b6 to determine if it was occupied by Americans. b1 determined that there was no house located at the address given and that the lot was occupied by a telephone exchange sub-station (unmanned). b1 reported the results to b6 at the next meeting and b6 appeared to be satisfied. b1 was also required to observe a house located at b6 b6 and to describe it to b6. b1 accomplished this mission with his wife and at the next meeting described the house to b6 b6 showed b1 a picture of the same house.

8. (c) b1 was given the following method of operation for getting through the controls at the Friedrichstrasse Station: b1 brought the two savings stamp books requested, and marked them with the number 8. b6 kept one card and gave the other to b1 was to present his card at the station controls and the controller would give b1 the other card. b1 would then turn both cards over to b6 who would keep them for the duration of the visit. b6 would then return one card to b1 with which he would be able to pass through the controls to West Berlin. b6 first turned in the other card to the controls prior to b1 passing through.

9. (c) Also at the second meeting, b6 told b1 that he should obtain employment with US Forces in West Berlin, preferably in a motor pool where he would report on "special equipment" on US vehicles, not further identified. If b1 was able to obtain such employment, he was promised better payment. At the time, b1 was employed as a mechanic and welder with a firm located in West Berlin-Lankwitz; was paid well and told b6 that he did not want to change jobs.

10. (c) At the third meeting on a Sunday b6 1967, b1 was again met by Wuensche in the station. b6 stated that he was very short of time because he had to make a "duty trip". b1 was given 50.DMW for which he did not sign a receipt and was told there would be another meeting in approximately two weeks. b6 also told b1 that he would meet him in the parking lot on the left side of the station close to the Spree river from that meeting on. b6 then took the card to the controls and left. b1 then proceeded through the controls and took the S-Bahn back to West Berlin.

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11. (c) At the fourth meeting in b6 1967 b6 met b1 in the parking lot and they drove to a restaurant (nfi) and had lunch. b6 gave b1 50.DMW and b1 signed a receipt for 100.DMW, again with the name "Ellerbeck". b1 received the mission to observe the house located at b6 stated that this house belonged

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to Americans, and that [b1] should determine, by walking past the house, if the lamps in the house were the type found in an office or a home. He also had to determine if there were bars on the windows, an antenna on the roof and if any American cars were parked in front of the house. [b6] stated that he wanted to know if the house was still occupied by Americans. The next meeting was arranged for one week later.

12. (c) At the fifth meeting, also in [b1] 1967, [b1] again met [b6] in the parking lot, and was taken to the Returnee's Center where he gave [b6] a verbal report that he had completed the mission at 66 Ihne-Strasse and had seen no American cars. After [b1] report, Wunsche showed him a photograph of the house and [b1] identified it as the one he had observed. [b6] again appeared to be satisfied with what [b1] had done. [b6] repeated his desire for [b1] to obtain employment with the US Forces in Berlin, again stating that the motor pool was preferable. [b1] was told to look for advertisements in newspapers for employment with US Forces. [b1] promised to look for an opening. [b1] was given 100. DMW and signed the receipt [b1] [b6] was not sure exactly when the name [b6] was first used, but knew that he had first started using this new cover name around Christmas 1967.

13. (c) In approximately the [b1] 1967, [b1] saw an advertisement in the "B.Z.", a daily newspaper published in West Berlin, for several openings for employment with the US Forces in Berlin. [b1] went to the German Personnel Office on the Berlin Brigade Compound near the Saargemuender Strasse entrance to the compound. [b1] did obtain employment with US Forces, but was unable to get a position in a motor pool. [b1]

14. (c) At the sixth meeting, shortly after [b1] 1967, [b1] reported that he had obtained employment with the US Forces. [b6] was displeased that he was unable to obtain employment with a motor pool. [b1] was given 100. DMW and two large sausages, for which he signed the following receipts: "Herewith confirm that I received [b1] DMW from a representative of the MfS for living expenses" and "I herewith confirm that I received [b1] DMW (value of foodstuff) from a representative of the MfS for groceries". Both of these receipts were signed with the name [b1]. All subsequent receipts signed by [b1] were of the preceding type. The next meeting was scheduled for January 1968.

15. (c) At the seventh meeting during the [b1] 1969, [b1] using the same procedure for passing through the controls, again met [b6] in the parking lot and they again proceeded to an unidentified restaurant. In the restaurant they had something to eat and [b1] had to give an oral report concerning employment procedures at the US personnel office located on Saargemuender Strasse. [b1]

wrote them down in a note pad. [b1] also had to give a brief description of [b6] and described her to [b6] as follows: A young woman with reddish blond hair wearing a mini-dress. [b6] did not take notes on the description and told [b1] that he should try to change his employment to one of the US Army motor pools. [b6] stated that the reason it was desired that [b1] obtain employment in a motor pool was that the MfS needs information on the various technical equipment installed in the US cars. [b6] also stated that many of the official US cars visit East Berlin and that that was the reason for the need for this information. [b1] was told to observe the house at [b6] and to be able to describe the house. He was also told at this time to go back to the house located on Bernadotte Strasse and to observe and be able to describe persons entering or leaving the house, and to copy down the German license numbers of cars parked in front of the house. [b6] was given 50. DMW for which he signed a receipt with the name [b1] and a new meeting was arranged for approximately four weeks later.

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16. [b1] completed the mission on Bernadotte Strasse with his wife. They did not see anyone entering or leaving the house, but they did copy down the license numbers of four German-plated cars in the area of the house.

17. (c) The eighth meeting took place in approximately the middle of [b1] 1968. Again [b1] was taken to an unidentified restaurant where he and Wuensche had something to eat. [b1] was required to give an oral report concerning his observations during the last mission and he gave [b6] the numbers he had noted. [b1] was given the mission of determining if a [b1] [b1] was still residing at [b1] [b1] received 50.DMW and signed a receipt with "Gross". A new meeting was arranged for three or four weeks later.

18. (c) [b1] travelled to Zehlendorf and ascertained from people(nfi) near the address given him by [b6] that [b6] was no longer living at the address. [b1] checked the official West Berlin telephone directory [b6] was residing at [b6]

19. (c) At the ninth meeting in early [b6] 1968, [b6] and [b6] again drove to an unidentified restaurant. [b1] gave a verbal report concerning what he had discovered about [b6] and was told by [b6] that, under the pretext of buying a dog, he should get a good look at [b6] so that he would be able to describe him. He was also to report in what circumstances [b6] was living. [b6] gave [b6] 100.DMW and had him sign a receipt with [b6]. A new meeting was arranged for early April 1968.

20. (c) If [b6] ever missed a meeting with [b6] he was to go to the Friedrichstrasse station on one of the days following the date of the missed meeting and ask for the Duty Officer to call the MfS and ask for extension 351. Whoever answered the telephone was to be told that [b6] was waiting.

21. (c) During one of the weeks following the ninth meeting, [b1] made a call to [b6]. Using the story that his mother-in-law had an old dog that she would like to have trained, [b1] was able to make an appointment to see [b6] at his house, which was also his business address. During the telephone conversation, [b1] used his true name. [b6] told [b1] that training such a dog was impossible, but that if he was interested in a young, trained dog, he should come to his house. [b1] and his wife went to see Schuhschenk together, looked at a dog and after some talk, told [b6] that he would have to think the 400.DMW price for the dog over. [b1] and his wife then left. Both [b1] and his wife thought that Schuhschenk appeared very nervous and upset, but could not say why.

22. (c) At the tenth meeting in [b1] 1968, again at an unidentified restaurant, [b1] gave [b6] a description of [b6] described his house and told Wuensche about his apparent nervousness. He also told him that he had seen a small child in the house, sex unknown, approximately five years old and also a woman. [b1] described [b6] to [b6] as follows:

Age:	Approximately 35 years of age
Height:	Approximately 5'9"
Build:	Heavy
Hair:	dark
Speech:	Low voice, expressed himself well.

23. (c) When [b1] stated that [b6] was nervous, [b6] laughed and stated that it was understandable that [b6] was nervous and upset. Wuensche showed [b1] a passport picture and [b1] identified the picture [b1] [b6] heard nothing further concerning

[b6] At the tenth meeting, [b1] received no new mission and [b6] stated that at the next meeting there would be another person. [b6] also stated that he could not continue with [b1] because that was not the kind of work that he normally did. He also stated that the man whom

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b1 was to meet would be responsible for b1 and their future cooperation. b1 received a large sausage and signed a receipt for the value of approximately 20.DME. He also received 100.DMW and signed for it with b6. The next meeting was arranged for approximately three weeks later at the end of April 1968.

24. (C) At the 11th meeting at the end of b1 1968, b1 was introduced to a new man in b6 car. This man was introduced as b6. A description of b6 is as follows:

Age:	35 to 40 years
Height:	5'10"
Weight:	187 lbs
Build:	Stout
Hair:	Dark brown; combed back and slightly wavy
Eyes:	Brown
Face:	Round
Complexion:	Tanned
Glasses:	Dark, horn-rimmed. Only worn while driving.
Clothing:	Mostly wore a medium grey shark-skin suit. In winter wore a heavy woolen grey or brown herringbone overcoat. A brown nylon summer(rain)coat.
Speech:	Spoke with a light Saxon dialect; tried to speak in a Berliner dialect.

25. (C) In addition to the above, b1 stated that b6 also drove a dark red, late-model Wartburg; that he spoke about his two children occasionally; he drinks beer; he tried to stop smoking because of stomach ulcers; and that he seemed to be of average intelligence and did not talk about his background.

26. (C) All three men drove to a restaurant(nfi) where b6 a short Resume' b1 b6 then questioned b1 about his US employment. b1

b1

b1 and that there were only German personnel working there. b1 b6 the names of all the German personnel working in his office. b1 received 100.DMW from b6 and signed a receipt for that amount with b6. b6 asked b1 if he could operate a camera, to which b1 replied that he could. The next meeting was arranged for the end of May 1968. b1 received no new mission and was told that the same method for passing through the controls would be used.

27. (C) At the 12th meeting at the end of b1 1968, b1 met b6 in the parking lot. b6 was not present, and they drove to a restaurant(nfi). b6 requested that b1 give him a list of all his debts still outstanding at the time of the meeting. b6 ordered b1 to purchase a camera, preferably secondhand, and not to exceed 100.DMW in price. b6 gave b1 100.DMW for which he again signed the usual receipt with the name b6. On the way back to the station, b6 stopped the car and seemed to be looking for something. He made b1 empty his pockets. Finally, b6 found what appeared to be a credential folder under his seat. b6 asked b1 if he would like to get a job with a firm located in West Berlin-Lichterfelde which produced insulation material. b1 told him that he did not like to change jobs and the matter was dropped by b6. Before separating at the station, a new meeting was arranged for the end of June 1968.

28. (C) b1 had the opportunity to purchase a second hand Voigtlaender camera from a co-worker for 90.DMW. He took the camera on loan in order to determine if he could operate it and take pictures with it. b1 did not give the name of the person who sold him the camera to b6.

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29. (C) At the end of b1 1968, for the 13th meeting, b1 met b6 and was driven to an unidentified restaurant. b1 reported to b6 that b6 could get a camera as specified and that he had already gotten the camera for testing. b6 directed b1 to take pictures of his wife and children and of his office rooms. b1 was told to take the pictures of his office rooms late at night when no one else was around, and that all windows should be closed and darkened. b1 was not given money to purchase the camera, but did receive 100.DMW for which he signed a receipt with b6. A new meeting was arranged for the middle of July 1968.

30. (C) Between the 13th and 14th meetings, b1 took the pictures as directed. b1 He took only one exposure of each room, but had two prints made of each exposure.

31. (C) In July 1968, at the 14th meeting, b1 turned over the developed photographs to b6 in an unidentified restaurant. b6 became very angry because he had had the photographs developed in a local shop. b6 was so angry that b1 was afraid that he would be arrested. The quality of the pictures was also very bad because b1 did not know how to use a flash bulb or high-speed film in a darkened room, and as a result, the photographs were badly underexposed. b6 kept both the pictures and the negatives. b1 was not given money at this meeting, was warned that he could be arrested at any time in the East or West and was not given a new mission. A new meeting was arranged for two weeks later.

32. (C) After the 14th meeting, b1 was afraid that he was under surveillance by the MfS. He felt that he was being followed to his job and to his home.

33. (C) At the 15th meeting in early b1 1968, b1 was taken by b6 to an apartment located on a street off of Karl-Marx Allee. The apartment was located on the fourth floor of the building. b1 did not see a nameplate, but did notice that an elderly woman was the occupant. b6 did not know the address of the building. In a small living room, b1 showed b1 enlargements of the pictures he had taken, and was again very angry. b6 pointed out that on the two pictures taken in the large dial center room, a large clock and calendar were shown. b6 stated that the lack of security in taking those photographs may cause b1 trouble. b1 received 100.DMW for which he signed a receipt with b6 and was not given a new mission and was told to return in early October 1968.

34. (C) At the 16th meeting in early b1 1968, b1 was taken, together with b6 and an unidentified man (UIA), to the same apartment he had been to at the last meeting. UIA stated that they would have to change b1 method of operation because of the mistake he had made with the photographs. UIA also said that b1 could not continue as before. He would have to wear different suits, sun-glasses and later, entry and exit methods for East Berlin would have to be changed. UIA was described by b1 as follows:

Age:	Approximately 34 years
Height:	5'6"
Weight:	154 lbs
Build:	Medium
Hair:	Medium blond; combed straight back
Eyes:	not recalled
Speech:	Heavy Saxon dialect
Outstanding Characteristics:	Non-smoker

35. (C) UIA gave b1 five telephone numbers of six and seven digits, which he said were US Military numbers in West Berlin, and told b1 to determine to whom they belonged. UIA also wanted to know if only US phones

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were monitored in [b1] office, and if he could get a position as a technician in the Dial Center. [b1] told UIA that it was possible that HE could get such a position if there was a vacancy and if he were qualified for the position. UIA hinted that [b1] would be given a container (concealment device) in which he could hide secret materials. UIA stated that the MfS would see that [b1] and gave him 200.DMW, for which SUBJECT signed the usual receipt with [b6]. A new meeting was arranged for eight days later, apparently because the mission concerning the telephone numbers was urgent.

36. (c) [b1] checked the numbers given him by UIA against the telephone number registration file kept in his office and determined that those numbers were not in the registry. [b1] was of the opinion that no monitoring at all was done.

37. (c) [b1] was again met by [b6] and UIA and was taken to the same apartment. [b1] reported that the numbers given him were not registered and that his office did no monitoring. [b1] was told to report everything that happened in his office and to determine any numbers of the US Intelligence services and the telephone number of [b6] who was said to be the American responsible for all local national employees of the US. [b1] was told to keep a small piece of hard paper and a small piece of pencil in his pocket so that he could write down numbers inside his pocket when he visited offices to service telephones. [b1] received 200.DMW and signed for it with [b6]. The next meeting was scheduled for three or four weeks later.

38. (c) [b1] obtained the number of [b6] and gave it to the MfS. From October 1968 to May 1969, [b1] delivered approximately 60 to 70 four-digit US Intelligence numbers to the MfS. [b1] was able to get these numbers [b1] where the telephone lines and circuits are identified by building number.

39. (c) At the 18th meeting in [b1] met [b6] and was again taken to the cover apartment. [b1] was given a wallet to be used as a concealment device. [b1] signed a receipt for this device which was called on the receipt a "container". He was told to use the wallet in the future for written reports. He was ordered to continue to collect the telephone numbers of US Intelligence. [b6] gave [b1] 300.DMW for which he signed a receipt with [b6].

40. (c) At the 19th meeting in December 1968, [b1] met [b6] and was driven to a restaurant with the word "Gulasch" in its name. He was told that they would not be able to use the apartment any longer for security reasons. In the restaurant, [b1] turned over more US telephone numbers. [b6] showed him a passport photograph of a female (nfi) and asked him if he had ever seen her in the BBde compound. [b1] recognized the female and told [b6] that he had seen her once in the basement coffee shop in Building 1 and once walking on the BBde compound. [b6] appeared to be satisfied with what [b1] said about the female and asked no further questions about her. [b1] left the restaurant and went to a HO Department Store located on Karl-Marx Allee, and [b6] bought winter clothing [b1] worth approximately 150.DME. [b1] signed a receipt for the clothing. [b6] put the clothing into his briefcase and carried it through the controls for [b1] received no more money and no missions at this meeting.

41. (c) The 20th meeting took place on approximately 20 December 1968. There were no business talks and [b6] gave [b1] 100.DMW and a goose for Christmas. A meeting was scheduled for 7 or 8 January 1969.

42. (c) On [b1] at the 21st meeting, [b1] met [b6] and was taken to another unidentified restaurant. [b6] stated that the MfS knew about a special communication device in [b1] office used for NATO. [b1] told him that the device referred to could be the Autovon device. [b1]

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stated that the device was still under construction and that it was a communication system to Feldberg, FRG, and then via satellite to "somewhere". b1 told b6 that he had learned that some special "whistling noise" in a speaker of the device will establish contact to London, Paris or other places in the world. He also told b6 that he had no access to the device and that b6 b6 two of his co-workers, were the only German personnel allowed to work on the device. He also told him that he may be allowed to work on the device later if he received special training. b1 was told to observe the technical development of this communication device and to report what he learned. b6 repeated that the MfS wanted to be kept informed of all that happened in his office b1 b6 that if he was interested in attending evening courses at a technical school (VfI) in order to become a "real" communication technician, the MfS was willing to pay for his lessons. b1 b6 that he would like to do so, but that he did not know if he was intelligent enough for such special training or courses. b1 said that they planned to establish a new system of communication between b1 and the MfS and that a new entry method into SSB would be discussed and established. b1 b6 that at the next meeting another man would be present to give him training on these new matters. b1 asked him if there was a telephone booth in the vicinity of his home. b1 told him that there was a booth located on the corner of Belling Strasse and Gallwitz Allee. b1 b6 that if a white, circular piece of paper the size of a 2DM coin appeared on the back side of that booth, he was to come to SSB at 1800 hours on the same day or at 1000 hours the following morning. He also said that a warning system using red and blue spots would be established later. b1 gave b1 400 DMK and had him sign a receipt b1 Another meeting was scheduled for four weeks later.

43. (c) The 22nd meeting took place in b1 1969. b1 was met in the parking lot by b6 and another unidentified man (UIB) who, b6 was a specialist and would give b1 training in a code system for future communication. b1 was driven to an apartment located on a side street off Schoenhauser Allee between the U-Bahn Station, Schoenhauser Allee and Pankow. The apartment was located in house b6 and from the front yard, was in the left wing on the first floor. The apartment had the nameplate b6 on the door. The apartment consisted of a kitchen, toilet and one living/bedroom. A description of UIB is as follows:

Age:	Approximately 50 years
Height:	5'6"
Weight:	148 lbs
Build:	Medium
Hair:	Grey, combed back
Eyes:	Unknown
Speech:	Berlin dialect
Outstanding Characteristics:	None

44. (c) At this meeting, b6 was angry b1 because, he said, b1 had not responded to the white spot on the telephone booth as directed. b1 had not known that the spot had been placed on the booth and said so. b6 stated that the spot was there because b6 had had to make a "duty" trip due to some eastern political event and wanted to b1 come to East Berlin earlier than planned. 0329

45. (c) Of the two film rolls given b1 one was for coding messages and the one with a vertical line was for decoding messages received over the radio. He was supposed to use the film roll without the line to encode messages on the Secret Writing material given him at the same meeting. He was to send these messages to a cover address which he never received.

46. (c) He also checked the back of the telephone booth, insuring that the white circle was there. There was a white piece of paper in the shape of a circle on the upper right side on the back of the booth which b1 removed.

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47. (c) The 23rd meeting took place approximately the middle of March 1969, and b1 was again taken to the b6 apartment. b1 turned over the code b6 who said he was going to give it to his colleague. b6 said that b1 would get a radio soon and that he should invent a story for his wife and friends concerning the radio. b1 was directed to determine which firm installed the "Autovon" device in his office, specifically if it was a German or American firm. b1 received 300.DMW for which he signed with b6. This b1 A new meeting was arranged b1 1969.

48. (c) b1 was able to determine that the "Autovon" had been installed by an American firm and that three American technicians had worked on it, one of whom came from Texas. All three men were civilians and b1 was not able to get their names.

49. (c) At the 24th meeting b1 1969, b1 again was taken to the b6 apartment along with UIB. b1 received more training on the code system which lasted for two hours. Again, during the training, b6 was not present. When b6 returned, b1 reported what he had learned concerning the "Autovon". b1 received 300.DMW and signed the usual receipt, received no special mission and was told to bring a list of all his debts to the next meeting which was scheduled for b1 1969.

50. (c) At one of the foregoing meetings, date unrecalled by b1 was asked by b6 if he had observed any uniforms other than British, French or American during recent maneuvers in WB. b1 told b6 that he had not seen any other uniforms. b1 does not know in what uniforms Rothe was particularly interested.

51. (c)

b1

52. (c) At the 25th meeting b1 1969, b1 was again taken to the b6 apartment. b1 reported that the "Autovon" system was still being worked on. b6 wanted to know if b1 wife knew anything about HIS cooperation with the MFS, and b1 told him she did not. b6 said that the MFS was interested in having b1 work for them too and asked b1 to bring her along to the next meeting. b1 said that he would not b1 to any of the meetings. b6 then asked b1 to bring two passport photographs b1 to the next meeting, which b1 agreed to do. b6 asked b1 what he had been doing to b1 b6

b1 then asked if he had been in Building 3, and b1 answered that he had. b6 then said that he had been seen in the building, but did not elaborate. b1 described the young man he had seen on the second floor of Building 3 as a young man with dark hair, wearing a white shirt and a black necktie. b1 told b6 that his supervisors planned to change his job classification to a position "F" (technician) and between the last meeting in b1 and the 26th meeting in b1 1969, b1 did receive the position as a technician. b1 told b6 that a

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766th MID, 66th MI Group

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technician had access to all the other US installations and [b6] told him that he should pay attention to all that he saw in the future. He was told to pay particular attention to Building 3, because intelligence offices were located there. [b1] received 300.DMW for which he signed the usual receipt and a new meeting was arranged for [b1] 1969.

53. (c) At the 26th meeting in [b1] 1969 [b1] was again taken to the [b6] apartment. [b1] gave [b6] a verbal report concerning the following installations that he had visited as part of his duties as a technician:

b1

seemed to be very happy about [b1] new duties and advised [b1] to be good in his job so that he could go on with that type of routine checks and repair jobs in the US installations. [b1] received 400.DMW and signed the usual receipt. [b6] said that he would receive more money if he was able to go on with his position as a technician. A meeting was arranged for three days later because another agent had to talk to [b1]

54. (c) [b1] made the next meeting, the [b1] days later, and was taken [b6] along with another unidentified man (UIC) to the [b6] apartment. UIC was described by [b1] only as a young, "pretty" man, wearing a wedding band and who had a slight Saxon accent. UIC had in a large briefcase a portable, battery-operated radio of Japanese manufacture (brand name unknown) and told [b1] that a radio of that type (shortwave) would be needed for the receiving of his coded messages. [b1] was told to buy a radio of the type he was shown, brand unspecified, but it had to be portable and have a large shortwave band. After listening to the broadcast, UIC left the apartment. [b6] gave [b1] 400.DMW specifically for a radio and [b1] signed the usual receipt. [b1] was told to listen to the broadcast on the following Monday. A new meeting was arranged for [b1] 1969.

55. (c) On the following Monday, [b1] listened to the broadcast on a radio he had bought. The radio was a Grundig Oceanboy, portable, which cost 556. DMW. He bought the radio at Radio-Kino-Wegert, Main Shop: Berlin Tiergarten, Potsdamer Strasse. [b1] did receive a message but was unable to get all of it.

56. (c) At the 28th meeting in [b1] 1969, [b1] again met [b6] and was taken to the [b6] apartment. [b1] gave [b6] what he had managed to get of the message and [b6] was unhappy about the results. [b1] told [b6] that he was going [b1] located at Andrews Barracks, Berlin. [b6] did not like that and told [b1] [b1] received 400.DMW and signed the usual receipt.

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57. (c) At the 29th meeting, [b1] 1969, [b1] met [b6] and was again taken to the [b6] apartment. [b6] gave [b1] a false FRG passport. The passport number was [b1] with registration number [b1] It was issued in the names of [b6]

occupation: merchant, height: 178 centimeters. [b1] height is 184 centimeters. The passport was issued on [b1] at Duesseldorf and was valid until [b1] was to enter SSB from that meeting on as an official FRG visitor, but was still to enter at the Friedrichstrasse station. If [b1] ever had any trouble with West German authorities concerning the passport, he was to tell the following story: One night, while [b1] was drunk, he was approached by a stranger who talked him into making a trip into Czechoslovakia to

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to smuggle out pistols. Because b1 was drunk, he had agreed, and the stranger gave him the passport. b6 also told b1 to build the story from that base to make it believable. b1 was to report all he could b6 located in Andrews Barracks and to get the license numbers of the military cars with the "funny pot" on top. b1 received 400 DMW and signed the usual receipt. A next meeting was arranged for b1

58. (c) b1 made a sketch of the location of b1 located in Andrews Barracks, Building 609. He copies down the license number BC-46, from one of the cars described by b6. He also copied down two unlisted telephone numbers from the telephone number registration file b1

59. (c) b1 attended the 30th meeting in b1 1969, having crossed into SSF as an official FRG visitor and was again taken to the b6 apartment. b1 had the numbers he had copied down concealed in the wallet b6 had given him and he gave these numbers and the sketch to b6 again stated that b1 should make all efforts to return to the b6. He was told to get more numbers from the military cars and also more unlisted phone numbers, to include all remarks on the registry cards. b1 told b1 to bring receipts showing he was paying his debts to the next meeting which was arranged for the b1 1969. The reason for the long delay between the 30th and 31st meeting was, as b6 he was taking a break and he also mentioned fishing. b1 received 300 DMW for which he signed the usual receipt.

60. (c) b1 attended the 31st meeting in b1 1969 and was again taken to the b6 apartment. b1 gave Rothe the name of his colleague, b6 at Andrews Barracks. b6 then took b1 secret writing material and explained its use as follows: place the prepared paper, with the lines facing up, on a normal piece of writing paper. Write the message on the lines of the prepared paper using a pointed piece of wood or metal. Remove the prepared paper and then write a normal letter on the back-side of the writing paper with a ballpoint, ink pen or pencil.

61. (c) b6 told b1 that the paper would be used later when he was given a cover address to write to. He was told to hide the secret writing material, along with the code material, somewhere in his home. b1 was given 400 DMW for which he signed the usual receipt and a new meeting was arranged for b1 b1 1969 at b1

62. (c) b1 was unable to attend the meeting arranged for b1 1969, because on 22 July 1969, b1 b1

63. (c) In b1 1969, b1 walking on two walking canes, went to the Friedrich Strasse station and had a Duty Officer there make the prearranged telephone call on extension 351 at MfS Headquarters. Approximately one-half hour later, b6 appeared and took b1 into a room at the Station where they had a short meeting. b1 reported to b6 that he had been sick and b6 told him that he should not come again on the two walking canes. During this 32nd meeting, b1 received 300 DMW and was told to return on the b1 at b1

64. (c) b1 attended the b1 and last meeting on b1 1969 and was driven around the block (nfi) by b6. In the car, b1 received 400 DMW from b6 for which he signed the usual receipt. b6 stated that he would have to bring b1 along to the next meeting and that they would have to arrange a new method of meetings and communication. He was also told to bring a sick-leave report to the next meeting which was scheduled for b6 1969.

COMMENTS: Information contained on pages 9, 10, 11 and 12 was extracted in accordance with DIAM 58-1, para 10f.

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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6480

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.
E-BRO-1579

1. COUNTRY: **EAST GERMANY** 8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 212 5066 69 (5103)
2. SUBJECT: **(C) Agent Procurement Methods of M3 (Ministry for State Security)** 9. DATE OF REPORT: 2 December 1969
3. ISC NUMBER: 10. NO. OF PAGES: 2
11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 6B6a
IR DD FM 1396 No. 2 212 2439 69
12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group
13. PREPARED BY: **b6**
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: Colonel, MI Commanding

ZB016384

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: **b1**
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: **b1**
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE **b1** INFORMATION **b1**
7. SOURCE: (C-NOFORN) **b1**

15. SUMMARY:
(C-NOFORN)

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(U)
(C-NOFORN) The NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION is added because release of this information might tend to embarrass USI agencies and the source.

1. (C-NOFORN)

b1

2. (C-NOFORN)

b1

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA
2-USAREUR
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1-USAIBR
1-66th MI Gp, AHUTHI-OP-IR

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
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0833

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

None

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ORIGINATOR 66th MI Group
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3. (C-NOFORN)

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4. (C-NOFORN)

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Comments (C-NOFORN)

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1. COUNTRY EAST GERMANY	2. REPORT NUMBER: 2 228 8095 69 (5005)
3. SUBJECT: Teltow (5223H-131CE) (UUS206), MFS Activity in Control Technique Enterprise	3. DATE OF REPORT: 12 November 1969
3. ISC NUMBER:	10. NUMBER OF PAGES: 5
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 22 August 1969	11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 657
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACO: Munich, Germany 22 September 1969	12. ORIGINATOR: 18th MI Bn, 10th MI Group APO New York 09108
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE F	13. PREPARED BY: b6
7. SOURCE: b1 (NOTE: b1)	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: b6 LTC, MI., Commanding

SIGNATURE OF PREPARED:

SIGNATURE OF APPROVING OFFICIAL:

15. SUMMARY:

(C) This report furnishes general information on the activities of the Ministry for State Security (MfS) in the State-Owned Instrument and Control Equipment Plant in Teltow (5223H-131CE) (UUS206), particularly in the ANSI Berlin Branch, where four fulltime MfS employees supervise 650 technical personnel. The report also mentions efforts to form a Plant Militia in this branch of the concern. +

0335

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

16. ATTACHMENT DATA:

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17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

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REPORT NUMBER

2-218 8095 89 OF PAGES

ORIGINATOR

18th MI Bn, 66th MI Group
APO New York 09108

REF ID:

1. (C) INTRODUCTION:

Source

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did not come under the close observation of security personnel. His information is based on the hearsay of work colleagues and also on his personnel observation.

2. (C) ORGANIZATION OF THE ENTERPRISE:

The VEB Geraete - und-Maschinenbau Teltow, located on the Oderstrasse at (UU804069), was subordinate to the Association of Nationalized Enterprises Control Technique and Optics (VVB Regelungstechnik und Optik) Berlin, which was directly subordinate to the East German Ministry for Electrotechnique and Electronics. Subordinate to the Teltow head office were the following branches:

a. East Berlin, Storkoverstrasse 101 (UU951222) for designing and development of and research on control equipment used in agriculture and industry;

b. TREUBENHUTZ (5206N 1252e) (UT5474) for construction of regulating equipment;

c. LALIG (5119N-1220e) (US1489) with a subbranch in MIFUNT (5058N-1055e) (PB4049): designing and assembly;

d. COTTEUS (5145N-1417e) (VT5334) with a subbranch in DRESEK (5103N-1344e) (VS1156): designing and assembly;

e. STRALSUND (5419N-1305e) (UA7520): construction of nautical instruments;

f. PLANK (5058N-1356e) (VS2546) with a subbranch in KARL-MARX-STADT (5335N-1308e) (UV7738): designing and assembly.

3. (C) MFS ACTIVITIES:

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The main office in Teltow, its branches and subbranches were all in some way subject to the supervision of the Ministry for State Security (Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit-MfS), either by MfS employees permanently assigned to the concern or by normal plant employees who were responsible for making reports to the local MfS offices. Source knew that none of the subbranches had any rooms set apart for the use of the MfS. Employees of the subbranches informed him that they never detected any particular persons or persons from among their colleagues who appeared to have received assignments as informers. but they were convinced from various small +

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incidents that whatever went on in the concern was reported by members of the SED (Sozialistische Einheits-Partei Deutschlands — Socialist Unity Party of Germany) or female cleaners. These women had access to all parts of the buildings and were inveterate gossips. Moreover, some of them were SED members.

Source knew that the branch in his home town TREUBERHILTZEN did not have any MFS fulltime employees installed in the plant, although it was engaged in production and had 300 personnel. It was one of the smaller branches, and its production was not of strategic importance. Members of the firm thought that as the MFS office in the neighboring county town JUELICH (5200N-1305E) (UT6862) did not have much to do, since incidents were not frequent in the area, the MFS duties were taken over by the County Office in JUELICH, which had its S&I informers among the employees of the branch. The other branches in LEIPZIG, COTTBUS, PIRNA and STRALSUND, so far as Source could recall from hearsay in his own branch, all had a permanent MFS section.

His own branch in EAST BERLIN shared a building with the above mentioned VEB Hegelungstechnik und Optik and with a subordinate Institute for Control Technique EAST BERLIN (Institut fuer Hegelungstechnik BERLIN). According to Source, the Institute worked to a great extent on orders for the East German Army, details of which were secret. The EAST BERLIN branch of the TALTOV enterprise had 250 employees, the V&B 200, and its subordinate Institute 200 also. For the whole building there was a room occupied by four full-time MFS employees, names unknown. Their duties were to supervise the work, guard against sabotage, and espionage and to ensure the security of all documents. More particularly in the case of the Institute employees, they investigated the private lives of the personnel and monitored telephone calls in the office. They did not wear uniforms, were very discreet and reserved in their manner, and when they spoke to workers inside the office they did so without producing a pass. There was no production carried on in the EAST BERLIN building, but Source was informed that when new instruments were being produced in other branches or in TALTOV, alleged production workers arrived on some pretext and mingled with the regular employees. It was obvious from their manner and the clean state of their overalls that they were not workers in any other branch or factory, but were there to prevent sabotage.

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The technicians of the EAST BERLIN branch, institute and V&B worked in small rooms and were not supervised directly by the MFS during the day. After work, the MFS visited the rooms on a spot check basis. A particular room was not visited every day. Source considered that a thorough check on each room was carried out once or twice a month. When performing overtime, he observed the MFS employees making their rounds two at a time. They saw that documents and smaller instruments were put away in sealed safes. Larger instruments were left out in a sealed room. It was sometimes noticed that safes had been opened and resealed between the close of work and the following morning.

If a member of the branch or V&B was out of favor, his family, friends, free-time activities and mail were investigated, also his phone calls, +

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AFO New York 09108

certainly in the office, perhaps also at home. As a rule, however, only the employees of the Institute, which was concerned with military orders, were subject to close screening. Employees informed Source that they observed that they were being shadowed. Their families related that strangers had visited them and entered into conversations, sometimes without disclosing their identity, but by showing an MFS pass when the questions were of a searching nature. The conversations of most occupants of the building were in the opinion of Source monitored only in exceptional cases for a particular reason. There was a central exchange for the three agencies working in the building, and Source was informed by a telephone technician that conversations of Institute employees were regularly intercepted in the MFS room.

Source heard from colleagues that in 1967, before he joined the enterprise, The EAST BERLIN branch designed an air-conditioning system, which was constructed in TELTO. It was destined for the Foreign Ministry, Marx-Engels-Platz. The persons working on the project were not particularly supervised by the MFS, but when the equipment was being installed at the Ministry, the workers were subject to constant MFS vigilance, exactly by whom Source did not know. Just before the proposed inauguration of the system, a fire broke out and caused great damage to the equipment. All the workers and engineers concerned were cross-examined and for some time afterwards closely watched during their daily activities, not by the MFS employees of the enterprise, but by MFS specially sent by the Ministry of the Interior. So far as the colleagues of Source knew, the cause of the fire was never ascertained.

4. (C) MISCELLANEOUS

The VEB Geraste - und Reglerwerk TELTO and all its branches outside of EAST BERLIN had a Plant Militia (Kampfgruppe) at DOI. According to colleagues of Source, the groups were in existence several years before he joined the enterprise in 1968. Only the EAST BERLIN branch held out successfully against proposals to form a militia. The branch was in this respect considered the black sheep of the enterprise. The Institute and the VEB in the same building had their militia, who were observed setting out in their uniforms for training at unknown locations, yet the branch in EAST BERLIN did nothing! Source did not know the strength of these militia groups, and could only say that they wore the usual gray uniforms and were armed with unknown carbines and submachine guns. Their equipment was stored unguarded in a sealed room in the basement of the building. Details of training and instructors were unknown.

One of the reasons why the EAST BERLIN branch had no militia was an almost complete lack of interest. The technical development section where Source worked had only four SED members out of 24 total personnel. The branch as a whole had about 45 members out of 250 office employees. Moreover, the part time SED Secretary, [b6] fnu, aged about 40, did nothing to organize a group in a branch where he knew that he could not expect much cooperation. Source heard that he was ordered by the head office in TELTO to form a militia by the end of 1967. This was discussed at the SED meetings in the branch, but SED members told Source that it was always postponed in favor of allegedly more urgent tasks. The MFS took no interest in the matter, and it was not discussed at labor Union meetings. No attempts were made by SED members to recruit Source. Shortly before he departed in August 1969 a new SED Secretary, nu, was elected, an ambitious young man, who it is thought will certainly succeed +

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18th MI Bn, 66th MI Group
APO New York 09168

in forain, a group. The attitude of the VEB is supported by the SED Local Management in Teltow. The Local Management announced at the beginning of 1969 that all plants subordinate to the VEB in Teltow must have a militia. This would include the subbranches in BAPUR, BRESCH and KARL-MARX-STADT, concerning whose militia activities, if any, Source could not give any information. The instruction from the SED Management in Teltow was issued to the new secretary, and to the manager of the branch, an SED member. Although the order was classed as urgent, nothing had been organized by August. However, all are agreed that there is no escape this time. Most believe that the group will be functioning by about October 1969, while Source personally thinks that nothing concrete will be achieved before 1970.

COMMENTS:

Source:

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1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY
2. SUBJECT: (U) East German Intelligence Service (EGIS) re: Modus Operandi
3. ISC NUMBER:
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: September 1969
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: KALSERSLAUTERN, FRG; 1 October 1969
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 3
7. SOURCE: 22120016
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 718 0322 69 (0401)
9. DATE OF REPORT: 31 October 1969
10. NO. OF PAGES: 1
11. REFERENCES: DIRM 6B6a
12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group
13. PREPARED BY: LTC, MI
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: Colonel, MI

15. SUMMARY: (U) This report contains information concerning the Modus Operandi of the East German Intelligence Service (EGIS). Case officers of the EGIS are sometimes dressed as baggage clerks, and perform duties of those personnel at the Friedrichstrasse Border Crossing Point, for persons processing from the American Sector of Berlin (ASB) into the Soviet Sector of Berlin, and return to the ASB.

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17. DOWNGRADING DATA

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Not automatically declassified.

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

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(CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROL MARKINGS)

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY	8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 018 9010 69 (5004)
2. SUBJECT: (U) (C) BERLIN (5231N-1323N)(UUG119) Attempted Recruitment by the KGB	9. DATE OF REPORT: 31 October 1969
3. ISC NUMBER:	10. NUMBER OF PAGES: 3
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 12 September 1969	11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 687a ZB016384
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Glessen, Germany 14 October 1969	12. ORIGINATOR: 18th MI Bn, 66th MI Group APO New York 09108
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE INFORMATION 1 6	13. PREPARED BY: c b6
7. SOURCE: b6 (DOB: b6)	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: b6 LTC, MI., Commanding
b6	b6

15. SUMMARY:

(U) (C) This report contains information on contacts which Source had with KGB officials. It gives information on the mission which the officials considered assigning to Source such as accompanying English city and district councilmen, US and English businessmen to bars and hotelrooms. To have relations with them and to find out their political opinion of East Germany, and other matters which she would be assigned. Source slapped the official in the face and claims that she refused to carry out the mission. +

0341

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

2 DIA; 3 USARRM; 1 66th MI Op, 766th MI
Det; 1 MASAK; 1 CO UNAXER; 1 INCD; 1
ACSI; 1 W CORPS; 1 VII CORPS; 1 OSI;
5 b1 1 b1 3 CCFPA; 10 b1 0)

17. ATTACHMENT DATA:

None

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

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ORIGINATOR

18th MI Bn, 66th MI Group
APO New York 09108

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REPORT:

1. (c) First Contact with MfS Officials

In [b1] 1969, Source was contacted for the first time by two officials (nu) (one male and one female). [b1]

b1

[b1] The officials introduced themselves (Source did not recall the names), and told her they are from the Ministry for Peoples Education (Ministerium fuer Volksbildung). Only the male official asked Source questions, such as about her diploma work on languages, what kind of progress she is making in her study and how she is getting along with the teachers. Source told him that she was progressing well, is sure that she will graduate and is getting along well with the teachers. The official asked Source if she would be interested to work in a ministry in BERLIN. Source answered that she is not a party member and that she would not be accepted to a position in a ministry. The official told Source that she should not worry, and that he would take care of this matter.

2. (c) Second Contact with the MfS Official

On [b1] 69, only the male official visited Source in her private apartment in [b1]

b1

[b1] The official asked Source again if she would be interested to work for the ministry. Source told him straight to his face that he meant the Ministry of State Security (Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit-MfS), and the official admitted that she was right. He asked Source if she is acquainted with photography, and she answered that she did some photography in her spare time.

3. (u) Mission from the MfS

The official started to explain to Source about the real job that she was needed for. The MfS official told Source that she has very good assets because she speaks fluent English and French, and that such type of girls are needed for the MfS. He told Source that she would earn in the beginning 1,500 DEM per month until she is familiar with her job. The official told Source she would have to accompany city and district councilmen and other officials, US and English businessmen who are visiting East Germany. She has to encourage the officials and businessmen during dinner and while visiting bars to consume alcoholic drinks, and try to have sexual relations with the officials in their hotel rooms. She would be issued a portable tape recorder or other means in the hotel rooms and to conduct political conversations with them and to make the officials express their opinion about East Germany and other political matters to which she will be advised. The official continued that he has prepared a doctors prescription for pills (Source stated that he meant birth control pills). When Source heard this, she was furious and nervous, and she slapped the official in the face. He told her that she will be sorry and if she talks to anyone about the conversation "It will be damned bad for her." Source was certain that she did not have to sign any statement or agreement with the MfS official. +

0342

CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROL MARKINGS

CONFIDENTIAL

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IN SHADED AREAS.

REPORT NUMBER
22 2

CONTINUATION SHEET

REPORT NUMBER
7 74

REPORT NUMBER		
2 218 9210 69		
PAGE	OF	PAGES
3	3	
ORIGINATOR		
18th MI Bn, 66th MI Group		
ABO New York 09108		

IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL MARKINGS

4. (C) A Present from the MRS Official

On b1 69, Source received a bouquet of 15 roses with a card with the following: Cordial greetings and wishes, signed Peter. About a week later someone called at her private apartment, but she could not be reached because she was working in the Intertext.

5. (C) MRS Personality Description

LMI, Peter: 30 to 35 years old; height: 180 cm; weight: 80 kg; grey eyes; spoke German without any dialect; dark brown wavy hair combed backward; wide bony face; red hands; wore a SED badge; he did not make an impression on Source as an intelligent person; and she believed that he is of farmers descent.

COMMENTS

(C) Source

b1

0343

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(Classification and Control Markings)

661A 0401

This report contains unprocessed information.

Plans and/or policies should not be created or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY

8. REPORT NUMBER:

2 718 0272 69
(0401)

2. SUBJECT: (U) Ministry for State Security (MfS), re: Modus Operandi

9. DATE OF REPORT:

8 October 1969

3. ISC NUMBER:

10. NO. OF PAGES:

1

11. REFERENCES:

DIRM 6B6a

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: May 1969

12. ORIGINATOR:

66th MI Group

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: KAIERSLAUTERN, FRG;
May 1969

13. PREPARED BY:

b6
LTC, MI

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE C INFORMATION 3

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

b6

7. SOURCE: 22120020

Colonel, MI
Commanding

15. SUMMARY:

(U) This report contains information concerning Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit (Ministry for State Security - MfS) training requirements in instructions concerning codes. An MfS Agent Handler (AH) advised an agent of the MfS residing in the Federal Republic of Germany, that when he receives instructions in code and other related communications matters from the MfS Radio Technician, that no one else including the MfS AH will be permitted to be present during this period of instruction. No reason was given to the agent for the exclusion of the AH from such instructional periods.

(Leave Blank)

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0344

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ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDR USARPACOM P01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

- 1 - DIA
- 3 - USAREUR
- 1 - USEUCOM, J-2
- 1 - ACSI-CLPC
- 1 - USAEUR
- 1 - 66th MI Op, AEUONI-OP-IR

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

GROUP-3
Downgraded at 12 year intervals.
Not automatically declassified.

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

DD FORM 1396

(Classification and Control Markings)

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

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661A 0401

This report contains unprocessed information. Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

(Classification and Control Markings)

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY
 2. SUBJECT: (U) Ministry for State Security (MfS), re: Training Modus Operandi
 3. ISC NUMBER: 2B016 384
 4. DATE OF INFORMATION: May 1969
 5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: KAISERSLAUTERN, FRG; May 1969
 6. EVALUATION: SOURCE C INFORMATION 3
 7. SOURCE: 22120020
 8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 718 0270 69 (0401)
 9. DATE OF REPORT: 8 October 1969
 10. NO. OF PAGES: 2
 11. REFERENCES: DIRM 6B6a
 12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group
 13. PREPARED BY: b6 LTC, MI
 14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: b6 Colonel, MI Commanding

15. SUMMARY: (U) This report concerns instructions given by the Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit (Ministry for State Security - MfS) to one of its agents residing in the Federal Republic of Germany.

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 ON JUN 18 1998
 BY CDR USAF/COM F01/PO
 AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

0345

EVALUATION REPORTS (DD 1480'S) PREPARED ON THIS IR WILL BE CLASSIFIED AT LEAST CONFIDENTIAL.

(C) The MfS gave the following instructions to one of its agents:

a. Increase efforts to establish contact with US soldiers (MfS Agent Handler indicated that this could possibly be accomplished by the agent asking some US soldier in the office in which he works to purchase for Source cigarettes or other PX items, and use this as a beginning to gradually work up to the point of obtaining information from the soldier).

b. Report all material collected for passage to East German Intelligence Service (EGIS) to that agency by secret writing letter, prior to sending it or bringing it to the Soviet Sector of Berlin (SSB). EGIS will then advise the agent by short-wave radio messages whether to bring the material to the SSB or not.

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR

1 - DIA
 3 - USAREUR
 1 - USEUCOM, J-2
 1 - ACSI-CIPC
 1 - USAIBR
 1 - 66th MI Gp, AEUTMI-OP-IR

17. DOWNLOADED DATA

18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

CONTINUATION SHEET

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 718 0270 69
PAGE 2 OF 2
ORIGINATOR 66th MI Group

If material is obsolete or already in the possession of that agency, much time and effort can be saved by this method of operation.

(Leave Blank)

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AUTH Para 7-6.3 DOD 5200.1R

0346

DD FORM 1396c
1 SEP 64

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPLACES AF FORM 118a, JUL 61 WHICH MAY
USED UNTIL 1 JAN 62. GPO 640020

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY
2. SUBJECT: (U) Ministry for State Security (MfS), re: Modus Operandi
3. ISC NUMBER: ZB016354
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: May 1969
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: KALERSLAUTERN, FRG; May 1969
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE C INFORMATION 3
7. SOURCE: 22120020
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 718 0265 69 (0401)
9. DATE OF REPORT: 8 October 1969
10. NO. OF PAGES: 1
11. REFERENCES: DIRM 6B6a
12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group
13. PREPARED BY: b6 LTC, MI
14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: b6 Colonel, MI Commanding

15. SUMMARY: (U) This report contains information concerning travel modus operandi for agents of the Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit (Ministry for State Security - MfS) traveling from the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to the Soviet Sector of Berlin.

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BY CDR USN/USMC F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

EVALUATION REPORTS (DD 1480'S) PREPARED ON THIS IR WILL BE CLASSIFIED AT LEAST CONFIDENTIAL.

16. SUMMARY OF INFORMATION: The MfS directed two of its agents operating in the FRG to travel together from the FRG to the Allied Sector of Berlin, and then to proceed separately to the meeting site with the MfS Agent Handlers.

0347

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:
1 - DIA
3 - USAREUR
1 - USEUCOM, J-2
1 - ACSI-CIPC
1 - USAIRM
1 - 66th MI Gp, ABUTMI-OP-IR

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:
GROUP-3
Downgraded at 12 year intervals;
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18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

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(Classification and Control Markings)

6896

This report contains unprocessed information.

Plans and/or policies should not be evolved or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: WEST GERMANY (FRG)

8. REPORT NUMBER: 3 212 1365 69

(6100)

2. SUBJECT: (U) East Block Intelligence Approach

9. DATE OF REPORT: 7 October 1969

3. ISC NUMBER:

10. NO. OF PAGES: 2

11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 487a

4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 17 September 1969

12. ORIGINATOR: 66th MI Group

5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Munich, FRG
19 September 1969

13. PREPARED BY:

b6

DAC

6. EVALUATION: SOURCE C INFORMATION 3

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

b6

7. SOURCE: 22120028

15. SUMMARY: (a) The following is b1 concerning an "approach method" used by East Block Countries in an effort to gain intelligence.

(Leave Blank)

0348

(c) In the course of the past weeks instances have occurred again where business-men of the Federal Republic of Germany who showed interest in contacts with State Trade Organizations in Communist countries were approached by agents of Eastern Intelligence Services.

There are intelligence agents working in every State Trade Organization in communist ruled countries. These agents report on the at times at business connections made by West-German companies and individuals to the Intelligence Services and an investigation on the business-partner is started.

During negotiations the business-men are promised favorable business-contacts. It is intimated at the same time, that the necessary authorization from other offices will be more readily available if the West-German business-man will agree to do

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

1-DIA
2-USAREUR
1-USEUCOM
1-USAFB
1-ACSL-CIPC
1-USAIRB
1-66th MI Group, AEUML-OP-IR

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:

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18. ENCLOSURE DATA:

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DD FORM 1396

CONTINUATION SHEET

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 2 212 4065 69
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
ORIGINATOR 766th MI Det, 66th
MI Group

"certain favours". At the outset these appear to be harmless. Generally they are the beginning of an involvement in intelligence work. This method is used by Communist Intelligence Services especially where the business-man shows strong interest in doing business with Eastern partners, because of financial difficulties or for other reasons.

COMMENT: Original source of information unknown.

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ON JUN 18 1998
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8226

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0501-69-P810

COUNTRY: East Berlin and West Berlin

8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 212 3862 69

(5102)

SUBJECT: (U) Attempted Recruitment of West Berlin Resident by the MFS.

9. DATE OF REPORT: 17 September 1969

10. NO. OF PAGES: 2

11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 6B6a, 6C

70 117 184

2 B016 384

12. DATE OF INFORMATION: June and July 1969

12. ORIGINATOR: 766th MI Det, 66th MI Gp

13. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: West Berlin
2 September 1969

13. PREPARED BY

b6

CW4, USA

14. EVALUATION: SOURCE B INFORMATION 2

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY

b6

Colonel, MI
Commanding

15. SUMMARY: (C)

b1

0350

(C)

b1

b1

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR

- 1-DIA
- 2-USAREUR
- 1-USAIR
- 1-USEUCOM
- 1-USAF
- 1-USASAC
- 1-ACSI-CIPC
- 1-7113 SAC
- 1-66th MI Gp

17. DOWNGRADING DATA

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18. ATTACHMENT DATA

None

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CONTINUATION SHEET

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REPORT NO. 3-212 3062 69

PAGE 2 OF 2

ORIGINATOR 766th MI Det
66th MI Group

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0311

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 513TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP
APO 09757

AEUMS-ASO-77-68

SUBJECT: "Jung-Invaliden-Rentnern" (Young-Invalids-Pensioners) (U) (C)

Commanding Officer
66th Military Intelligence Group
ATTN: AETCIO-SO(OC)
APO 09154

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

1. (U) (C) Forwarded herewith as a matter of possible interest to your organization is an unevaluated report concerning alleged MfS exploitation of East German invalids who visit West Germany. The information was obtained by a coded asset of this Group.
2. (U) A check of the files of this Group failed to reveal any additional information concerning Subject. No further action contemplated by this Group.

b6

1 Incl
as

Colonel, MI
Deputy Commander

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0352

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NR 587

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5 USC 552 (b)(1)

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☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

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Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 353-360

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1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY 022
2. SUBJECT: (C) SEEHAUSEN (5257N-1145E), MFS Attempt to Recruit Source
3. ISC NUMBER:
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: April 1965
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Oberursel, Germany 23 September 1966
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE R INFORMATION 5
7. SOURCE: b1 pg 3.
(DOB: b1)
8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 6210 66
9. DATE OF REPORT: 16 NOV 1966
10. NO. OF PAGES: 3
11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 687

12. ORIGINATOR: C&T Bn 2 513th MI Gp

13. PREPARED BY:

b6

14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:

DAC, GS-12
Ass't Opns Officer

15. SUMMARY:

(U) (C) This report describes the methods the MFS in SEEHAUSEN employed in its attempt to recruit Source as an informer at his future military unit. The proposition, which was initially accepted and then rejected by Source, was by a MFS Official (name can not be recalled), who was introduced to Source by the Director of the Motor Trades Station (MFS) Source was employed with.

0361

REPORT (U)

1. (C) Location of the MFS Office

The MFS Office that attempted to recruit Source as an informer was located, until June 1966, in SEEHAUSEN, Goethe Strasse (no. unknown). Source believes that during the summer of 1966, this office was probably moved to OSTENBURG (5247N-1144E). This assumption is based on the fact that during the summer of 1966, OSTENBURG has replaced SEEHAUSEN as County Capital, and that the office building in SEEHAUSEN appeared to be vacant since then. The new location of the office has never been observed by Source.

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:

3-USAHEUR, DCSI
2-USHECOM, J2
3-USA/BPD
2-10th SF Op (Abn)
1-AF InO w/CBI Bn
1-C&T 513th MI Op
4-D/BC, 513th MI Op
1-D/BC, 513th MI Op
ATTN: OREN
3-IRCD
1-E Affs Sec, USHER

b1

17. DOWNGRADING DATA

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18. ATTACHMENT DATA

None

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CONTINUATION SHEET

REPORT NO. 2 218 6210 66

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGE:

ORIGINATOR C&I Bn, 513th
MI Gp

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2. (C) Circumstances of Contact

Sometime in April 1965, Source was called to the office of his MFS Supervisor and asked whether he had any objections to talk to an unidentified man, who was also present in the office. Having given his consent, Source and the unidentified man were left alone in the office. The man then asked Source whether he had some time after work to meet him at his office. Source gave a positive reply and was told to come to the MFS Building in SEEHAUSEN, Goethe Strasse.

3. (C) First Meeting in the MFS Office

At about 1700 hrs of the same day, Source arrived at the MFS Building. He rang the door bell and was admitted by the same unidentified man, who led him to a room on the first floor. There, the man introduced himself for the first time by showing an Identification Card and stating, that he is an associate of the MFS (name can not be recalled). He continued by telling Source in an obscure manner, that he had learned that Source was due to be inducted into the EGA, and that he wanted to find out whether Source would be willing to forward to the MFS information on the mood of the troops, general discrepancies within the unit, and also make suggestions on how to correct these deficiencies.

In the middle of the 30 minute meeting, Source was asked to sign a Secrecy Pledge (Schweigepflicht). The text of this statement which was hand written on ordinary paper was dictated to Source as follows:

"I herby obligate myself not to disclose to my relatives and friends any of the themes discussed in this office. I am aware that violation of this pledge can be punished under the E German laws."

Source was required to sign this statement and soon afterwards the MFS official began conversing with him in a more outspoken manner. Source was told to report to the MFS all anti-government statements by soldiers using a cover name and submitting his reports only through the mail. Source was again warned not to reveal to anybody the subjects discussed or his visit to the MFS office. He was told to prepare a Personal History Resume and a separate list of all relatives residing in E and W Germany, and to bring both to the MFS office the following evening.

Source returned home, considered the MFS offer, and decided not to accept. The next evening he informed the MFS official that he did not intend to betray his future friends and therefore was not willing to accept the proposed role.

The official reacted furiously. He first tried to persuade Source to reconsider by pointing out the simplicity and harmlessness of the informer role and the fact, that the entire affair would be handled in a discrete manner. He then began questioning Source about the reasons for his refusal and wanting to know why he did not refuse from the very beginning. The MFS official seemed to be disturbed over the reasons that led Source to decline, and about the fact that Source had gained a foretaste of MFS activities in the EGA. He ended the conversation by saying that he could not compell Source to work for the MFS and again impressing him never to disclose any of the information known to him.

4. (C) Descriptions of the MFS Official and the MFS Director

a. MFS Official

Name: unk
Apparent Age: 32
Height: 176 cm
Weight: 75 kg

0362

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

CONTINUATION SHEET

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REPORT NO. 2 218 6210 66
PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGE:
ORIGINATOR CAI Bn, 513th
MI Op

(Leave Blank)

Hair: Dark blond
Eyes: Light color
Built: Medium
Posture: Erect
Marital Status: Married
Characteristics: Fairly intelligent and cordial

b. MTS Director

Name: b6
Apparent Age: 44
Residence: b6 (No unk)
Height: 176 cm
Weight: 75 kg
Hair: Dark
Eyes: Brown
Marital Status: Married, two children
Political Attitude: Fully supports SED party line.

COMMENTS(c) Source**b1**

Source is of average intelligence and was cooperative.

0363

COMMENTS OF THE APPROVING OFFICER

(U) THIS IS RAW UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

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116

East Germany 044

2 212 2951 66

(u) MFS Activity Directed
Against the GFR

28 Aug 66

Six

DIRECT: 6B7a

CARMEN

b1

b1

CARDED
CARDED

b6

OC Branch
Operations Officer

(u)
(s) This report contains information concerning attempts by two MFS members to establish an agent in the GFR, to include recruiting techniques used, meeting places on the GFR/SWOC Zonal Border, arrangements for maintaining communication, and arrangements for agent to make initial contact with a middleman in the GFR. Names and descriptions of the two MFS members are included.

0364

1. (c) Background:

b1

1-DIA (DIAA1-3), W/atch
2-USENCOM, 32
2-Special Publications Det
2-10th Spec Forces Gp (W/ach)
2-USENREAR, DCSI
4-513th INTC Gp
1-OC Div, 66th INTC Gp
1-Seventh Army

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NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOW BY 5200 10

(u)
Subj: ~~(s)~~ MFS Activity
Directed Against the GFR,
w/3 atch:

1. (c) [redacted]

b1

2. (c) [redacted]

3. (c) [redacted]

b1

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CONFIDENTIAL

FD-116

6542 INFO GP

b1

ARDED
AND
CARDEN

2. (S) First Recruitment Attempt: [REDACTED]

b1

[REDACTED] 0365

3. (S) Second Recruitment Attempt: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] b1

CONFIDENTIAL

b1

0366

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2-212-2951-66

66th INFO. OP.

HL-116

b1

4. (S) Attempt to establish [redacted] as an Agent in the GPH [redacted]

b1

5. (C) [redacted]

b1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1-12-51 60

60th ANN BR

71-116

b1

CONFIDENTIAL

b1

0368

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2 212 2951 66

6 3 6

66th INTC CP

PT-116

Appendix I
(c) Personalities

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. 

b1

REL. AREA:



b1

2.




b1

0369

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This document contains information
relating to the national defense of the United
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laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sec. 793 and 794.
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or modified solely on the basis of this report.

1. COUNTRY: EAST GERMANY C22 8. REPORT NUMBER: 2 218 2459 66
(u) 2. SUBJECT: (u) MFS Recruiting Attempt in E 9. DATE OF REPORT: 27 May 1966
BERLIN 10. NO. OF PAGES: 6
3. ISC NUMBER: 11. REFERENCES: DIRM: 6B7c
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: December 1965 12. ORIGINATOR: C&I Bn. 513th INTC Gp
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: Oberursel, Germany 13. PREPARED BY: b6
25 April 1966 14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: b6
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE F INFORMATION 6
7. SOURCE: b1
(DOB: b1)

Capt, AIS
Operations Officer

15. SUMMARY: (u) This report contains information on an approach method used by the MFS to recruit informers; it also lists personalities and a sketch of an MFS office location.

REPORT

0370

1. (u) Initial Contact

During the month of b1 1963, Source was contacted at his place of work, an electrical projects plant b1 in BERLIN, by his section chief and directed to report to the personnel office of the company. Upon arrival there he was instructed to wait for a short while and was ushered into a waiting room in the personnel office. After approximately 20 minutes he was asked by a female employee of the personnel section to step into a small conference room. This was not the MFS office; it was merely a meeting room for not more than six or eight people. He was greeted by an MFS official who showed his credentials and also identified himself as an official of the MFS. After initial small talk about weather and girls, to

16. DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR:
3-USAREUR, DCSI
2-USEUCOM, J2
3-USA/SPD
2-10th SF Gp (Abn)
1-AF LNO w/C&I Bn
1-C/R, 513th INTC Gp
4-Op Br, 513th INTC Gp
1-Op Br, 513th INTC Gp
ATTN: ORBN
3-IRCD
1-CI Branch, 513th INTC Gp

b1

17. DOWNGRADING DATA:
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18. ATTACHMENT DATA:

None

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(Classification and Control Markings)

ORIGINATOR: OSI En, 513th
INFC Op

(Leave Blank)

out Source at ease, he proceeded to confront him with his personal and family difficulties. [b1]

[b1]

[b1] The MFS official requested that Source give his side of the matter and apparently was satisfied with the explanations given by Source. Source denied everything and pointed out that he had many chances for escape before, while working for his company in foreign (East Bloc) countries, but never made use of it. At this time there was no direct attempt to recruit Source to work for the MFS; the official merely stated that he had to talk to him again on this matter and that he would call him. At this time he stated that his name was [b1] and that he would introduce himself as such when calling. There apparently was no file on Source, at least it was not shown. Source was not required to sign anything nor was he told to remain silent about the meeting. The meeting lasted approximately one hour.

2

(S) Additional Meetings

Next contact was approximately one week later. Source received a telephone call and the MFS official introduced himself [b1]. It was arranged that they would meet in a restaurant between Source's place of work and his home. At the time Source was working on an installation project some distance from the plant proper and the place was chosen because it was convenient for both parties. Time of meeting was 1600 hrs on a Tuesday of the following week. They met as arranged and again after some conversation, the official came back to the subject of the first conversation, his family problems. A few new items of interest and concern to Source were presented, all in the general trend of the accusations as in the first meeting. (Source had the definite feeling that the official always kept some items of valuable information back, to have a reason to contact him again at a later time.) Source proceeded to clear himself of the accusation by energetically denying everything and had the feeling that the official believed him. After a while the conversation was directed to the plant and their projects and Source's opinion was requested on two individuals employed in his section. Source was very vague when talking about the two; he always stated that he worked a lot outside the plant on projects and that he was not too knowledgeable on the individuals. Although this was true, both individuals discussed were well known throughout the plant and Source could have supplied much more of the information requested by the MFS official. Source had the feeling that the turn of the conversation was to test his willingness to supply information and to exploit the possibility of him becoming an informer. He was particularly aware of this when the MFS official stated that Source worked in the research and development part of the firm and that the "enemy" most likely will try to infiltrate there first, and that it behoves each and every good citizen to report anything of value to the MFS. Both had dinner at this time and the MFS official offered to pay for the meal. This was not accepted by Source. The meeting lasted approximately two hours. A new meeting was arranged about four or five weeks later, but was subject to confirmation by the MFS official per telephone. Source was contacted again by telephone about two or three days prior to the next meeting, which was between [b1] 1963. It was arranged that they meet in the same restaurant as last time. When Source arrived the MFS official waited for him outside the place and suggested they go to a different restaurant, just across the street. The change was made for no apparent reason. After small talk, again the family problems were discussed and later the general trend of the conversation circled around the need of competent help for the state, although a direct approach to recruit Source for the MFS was never made. Again it was in general terms discussed that the "enemy" is most likely to strike in the research and development section of any plant, and that reliable personnel is needed to prevent infiltration and sabotage. The meeting lasted approximately two hours. There were two more meetings, one around the middle of [b1] and the other around the end of [b1] 1964. Both meetings were conducted in different restaurants and followed the general pattern of discussion as indicated above. Source continued to go to the meetings because the real reason for them was never openly discussed and he did not know how much and how far the denunciations by his wife's family had gone. On two occasions he managed to get out of a requested

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REPORT NO. 2 218 2459 66
PAGE 3 OF 6 PAGES
ORIGINATOR CBI Bn, 513th
INOC Gp

(Leave Blank)

meeting by asking for a duty trip to a project outside of BERLIN, thus allowing him to be absent at a certain date. His former section chief was always sympathetic to his problem and Source kept him informed about all meetings, whenever possible he arranged the absence of Source at the requested time. This man is not employed at the plant anymore and Source has lost contact with him. The meetings that Source attended lasted approximately 1 1/2 to 2 hours. There was never pressure applied to recruit Source and he was not requested to sign anything. He was not offered money for services. In April 1964, Source went to Poland to work on a project there and upon his return to BERLIN was not contacted again by the MFS.

3. ~~(C)~~ Last Meeting in [b1] 1965

Source received a telephone call shortly before [b1] 1965 at his place of work and the caller identified himself [b1]. He requested a meeting because of Source's planned vacation trip to Cuba. The trip was scheduled for the first part of [b1] 1966. Source was instructed to come to a certain office (See Figure 1) in the main plant building, during the week [b1]. Source did not expect anything drastic at this meeting because it was common practice by the MFS to talk to employees before they went to foreign countries. After the initial small talk, the MFS official immediately asked Source whether he would be willing to watch a specific individual (see paragraph 4) aboard the ship and during their stay in Cuba. Source refused because he was too nervous for a job of this nature and that he wanted to take a vacation and would not want to be hampered in his attempt to relax. At this time it occurred to Source that the MFS official could very well bar him from the trip based on his prior contacts with him, and he turned the conversation to point out that he certainly would report anything directed against the well being of the passengers aboard ship to the ships officers. The MFS official was not totally satisfied with the development of the conversation and he gave Source a description of the individual to be watched. He stated that the man was working for some unidentified secret service, but that the MFS was only suspecting him at this time and that they needed more information on him, to determine his real status. Photographs of the man entering Consulates and Missions in Cuba were specifically asked for. Source did not agree to produce anything and also made it a point to state that he would not consider himself to be responsible for the conduct of the man during the trip. He was not asked to sign a statement of silence and he was not instructed to remain silent on this matter. The meeting lasted approximately 30 to 45 minutes and was conducted in private. Source met the man casually aboard during the trip and did not observe the man to behave in any way different than expected from a tourist. He did not go into any great extent of watching, merely took notice of him whenever the man was around. Upon his return from the vacation trip Source was not contacted by the MFS again. He was never requested to render a report on his observations, nor did he.

4. ~~(C)~~ Personalities

[b6] MFS official employed in an electrical projects plant (VEB Elektroprojekt Berlin) in BERLIN. Born about [b6] 168 cm, slender build, blond wavy hair, married. Has graduated from the school for heavy machinery and electrical techniques (Ingenieurschule fuer Schwermaschinenbau und Elektrotechnik BERLIN-Lichterfelde) as an electrical engineer. Speaks with a heavy saxonian dialect.

[b6] Suspected secret service agent working for unknown country. Born [b6] 168 cm, medium build, black hair, single. Has a prominent nose and bushy eyebrows. Speaks with slavic accent mixed with saxonian dialect.

COMMENTS

~~(C)~~ Source

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b1

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CONTINUATION SHEET

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(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO2 218 2459 66
PAGE 4 OF 6
ORIGINATOR C&I Bn, 513th
INTC Co

PAGES

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b1


COMMENTS OF THE APPROVING OFFICER

(U) THIS IS RAW UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

0373

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1R

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LEGEND:

- = Outside Wall
- = Inside Wall (Wood and Glass)
- = Inside Wall (Brick)
- = Doors
- = Windows
- = Closed Dooropening (Sound-proof)




Figure 1 (u) Office Layout Sketch (o)

CONTINUATION SHEET

(Classification and Control Markings)

REPORT NO. 218/255/46
PAGE 16 OF 6
ORIGINATOR CATALOG 5311
WFO-0p

MAP REF.
TOWN PLAN OF BERLIN
GERMANY
SHEET 4-A
SCALE 1:10,000

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AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R




Figure 2 (U) Location Sketch (U)

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HEADQUARTERS
515TH INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
APO US FORCES 09757

20500240

AEUMC-CES 65/3

11 January 1965

SUBJECT: False West German Personal Identity Documents currently being utilized by Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheits Agents (M)

TO: See Distribution

~~WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED~~

1. (C) In recent analysis of suspect documents of Subject type, SPD has noted the following methods of spot-checking for a spurious Bundespersonalausweis (BdPA):

a. Examine the paper and if it is quite bright with no brown or blotches of yellow, then it probably is not safety paper. The bona fide originals use a safety paper which changes color (darkens) with age. Generally, the over-all appearance of false BdPA's is lighter than known originals. This is attributed by SPD to a difference in the paper stock used.

b. Examine the printing on the front cover under a four to six power glass. If the edges of the letters are jagged and at times run over the side, then the cover was printed and not stamped as are most BdPA's. When the bona fide BdPA's first appeared, the West Germans also printed the covers, but later changed to stamped foil.

c. Examine the document under U-V light or make a Xerox copy of it. If a definite chain pattern is evident running (horizontally) across the pages, then the document is probably false. See Inclosure 1 for an example of the results obtained by running a spot-check using a Xerox copy. Although the inclosed is a Xerox copy of the Xerox copy forwarded to this Headquarters by SPD, the difference between the false document in the center of inclosure, and those genuine BdPA's that flank it, is noticeable.

2. (C) In addition to the above, SPD has determined that all BdPA's whose numbering begins with the digit zero (viz., all below one million) will have pages with a pink undertint with no exceptions. This Group recently forwarded black-and-white photographs of a suspect document to SPD for analysis. Apparently MfS reproduction of false BdPA's is now so refined that it was not possible to detect irregularities merely on the

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AEUMC-CES 65/3

11 January 1965

SUBJECT: False West German Personal Identity Documents currently being utilized by Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheits Agents (C)(U)

basis of photographs forwarded. At SPD suggestion the field was queried to determine the colortint of the document in question. Although the document was no longer in USI hands, it was recalled that the colortint was green. Since the document began with the digit zero, the green colortint constituted prima-facie evidence that the document was a MfS reproduction.

3. (C) The above spot-checks are recommended when an element has possession of the suspect BdPA only for a few hours. In such a case, Group elements should forward the following information for subsequent passage to SPD: results of analysis per 1a and 1b above, designation of the colortint of the document, black-and-white photographs, and whenever possible — Xerox copies per 1c above. Field elements are reminded, however, that the SPD interest in obtaining the original documents is continuing, and that the actual documents should be forwarded for analysis whenever feasible.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

b6

1 Incl
as

for Lt Colonel, AIS
S3

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Nr.B 5392923

Periodebericht

Amliche Vermerke

Observations officielles / Official remarks

Nr.B 4335950

Periodebericht

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False Document

0378

Amliche Vermerke

Observations officielles / Official remarks

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HEADQUARTERS
COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION BATTALION
513TH INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
APO 757 US FORCES

SD 12418

ZC 500589

18 April 1963

AEUMF (SP)
(MI-666-63)

SUBJECT: Explanation of the E German Wanted Persons List of E Germany VP-10

IMPERSONAL SUBJECTS CARDING INIT. 448 JUL 1963

THRU: Commanding Officer
513th Intelligence Corps Group
ATTN: Operations Officer
APO 757, US Forces

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
ATTN: CI-IP
APO 403, US Forces

1. (U) Reference

Reference is made to D-8a(5)(b)(CI) and Spec Request by INCD.

2. (U) Source

Date of Information: December 1962

Evaluation: F-6

b1

3. (U) General

0379

Subject Fahndungsbuch is the official wanted list published periodically to aid in the search for and apprehension of criminals, missing persons, escapees from penal institutions, individuals for whom a warrant of arrest has been issued, and those known to have defected from E Germany or to be deserters from the armed forces. Although not completely familiar with the search process, Source asserted that there are two categories of searches, each with three phases of action. The first is the Sonderfahndung (Special search) which is a superimposed search operation conducted by the police within time or location limits; secondly, a more thorough search during

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AEUMF (SP)
(MI-666-63)

14 April 1953

SUBJECT: Explanation of the E German wanted Persons List of E Germany VP (u)

which road blocks are set up and vehicles searched, while the third phase in which raids on suspicious or disreputable installations are made, occasionally with the aid of dogs. The second category of Fahndung is known as "die Dauerfahndung" (continuous search); it is carried on indefinitely. Wanted persons are published in the Fahndungsbuch only when authorized by the Attorney General and according to the gravity of the crime or the importance of the individual.

2. (u) Omission of Names

It should not be assumed that the names of all wanted individuals are to be found in every copy of the Fahndungsbuch because some editions will be noted to make no reference to individuals known to have defected, deserted or otherwise to have been wanted. Source asserted that there are two main reasons for the omission of names, as follows:

a. Older Editions

The law which made it a crime to defect or attempt to defect from E Germany was enacted in 1959 (?) while the law defining treason and desertion from the armed forces was enacted earlier, 1958 (?). Many omissions of the names of wanted persons may be due to the fact that the individual defected prior to the enactment of these laws.

b. Other Possibilities

The omission of names of defectors from an up-to-date Fahndungsbuch can be explained in only one or two ways, as follows:

(1) An individual may have been on leave or vacation, following which he may have been sick, and unable to report back to his job or duty station. Through carelessness his absence may not have been properly explained. Since only the Attorney General's office can authorize an action resulting in the inclusion of the individual's name, a preliminary search may have been underway at the time the book was printed, the results of which were at that time inconclusive to warrant including the individual's name as a definite defector.

(2) The name may have been omitted through a printer's error.

(3) The individual may have been assigned to a covert mission in the West; in which event his name would not appear in the Fahndungsbuch at all.

Other than such possibilities, however, there is no reason which would explain the omission of any names from the book, since defection has been made a crime in E Germany.

3. (u) Key to The Reason for Listing

A simple key indicating the crime committed by the wanted individual or the reason he is wanted is printed on one of the first few pages of the Fahndungsbuch (usually on Page 4). Source stated that the explanation of this key which is given in the book is correct; he was certain that there was no secret code in the book or elsewhere, by which the symbols used in the key could be interpreted in any other way than explained. He stated that the book is printed in thousands of copies and furnished the units of the VP down to the lowest police stations and to every Abschnittsbevoll-machtigten (a police officer having charge of a small district within the

AEUMF (SP)
(MI-666-63)

18 April 1963

SUBJECT: Explanation of the E German Wanted Persons List of E Germany VP (C)

area of responsibility of a regular police station, or of a district in a rural area where no police station exists). It is also distributed to all ZBK or Zug-Begleit-Kommandos (railroad inspection groups), to all units on duty at border control points, including customs units, units patrolling the Autobahn (Autobahn Kommandos), boat units covering waterways, the staffs of all border troops and those of the Transportpolizei. It is utilized by police personnel as low as Oberwachmeister (corporal) or squad leader. Source believed it inconceivable that a book given such wide distribution and accessibility could possibly contain a secret code, since there would be too great a possibility that wanted persons might escape through lack of knowledge of the proper interpretation, and any such secret key could not be kept secret with such a wide distribution.

4. (C) Special Fahndungs Actions

Other than the Sachfahndungsbuch (list of stolen or lost items), there are no other books of this type. There are special searches for individuals which are initiated to make an immediate search for a missing person but the names of such individuals are not printed in any list but given by telephone or telegraphic means. A notice that an individual is wanted initiates action by interested authorities in a designated Kreis, Bezirk or even country-wide, but it is broken off after 48 hours or sooner if it is determined that the wanted person has successfully escaped. This is the so-called Sonderfahndung referred to in Par 3 of this report. Only in exceptional cases is such a special search continued beyond a 48 hour period; such cases are governed by the importance of the individual and/or absolute proof has been established that the individual has successfully defected.

The case of Lt Col b6 is a good example of this procedure; Source knew that the Sonderfahndung continued in his case for several days, since his escape route was not discovered, and it could not be definitely determined that an actual defection had taken place. On the other hand, Source knew that the Sonderfahndung in his own case had been broken off after a period of only eight hours because the news of his arrival in the West had been announced within that time.

7. (C) Omission of MfS Defectors

There may be occasions when the names of MfS defectors are omitted from the Fahndungsbuch; Source gave the following opinion as to the reason for any such omissions:

a. Covert Assignment

There is a possibility that an MfS agent has been dispatched to the West on a covert mission. In such an event, the individual's name would be deliberately omitted.

b. Genuine Defector

0381

The name of a genuine defector may be omitted from the wanted list intentionally, in order to cast doubt upon his bona fides and any statements he may make to western intelligence agencies, in the event that a copy of the Fahndungsbuch should fall into the hands of these agencies at a later date.

ABUMR (SP)
(MI-666-63)

18 April 1963 (u)

SUBJECT: Explanation of the E German Wanted Persons List of E Germany VP (u)

8. (u) Miscellaneous

It must be added that the MfS may maintain other wanted lists in which the names of those individuals not listed in the Fahndungsbuch are carried. Such books undoubtedly contain the names of individuals who have attempted to defect and have been turned back, but were not prosecuted for one reason or another. The Fahndungsbuch is, however, the only official wanted list known to Source.

Source also knew, through his activities as Chief of Abteilung PS of the MfS up to 1955, that the MfS maintains a personality file on all persons about whom a doubt exists concerning their political reliability. Whenever an official state banquet is given (or public gathering attended by VIP's of the Government), the complete list of all guests attending the affair, as well as service personnel must be submitted to the MfS for checking against this file prior to the event. This "black list" is maintained on persons belonging to sects, doubtful organizations and on individuals about whom something suspicious may exist but against whom no proof exists sufficient to cause an arrest.

The loss of the Fahndungsbuch automatically initiates an investigation of the incident by the Attorney General's office. If the investigation reveals negligence or deliberate intent of the individual to dispose of the book illegally, an arrest and trial follows.

b6

no M/S

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2-Scty Bn, 513th INTC
1-C/R, 513th INTC Gp
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1-Mag Ctr, C&D Bn

Lt Col, AIS
Commanding

"Telephone Obl Mil 829"

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HEADQUARTERS, SEVENTH ARMY
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
APO 46 8 Jan 62 US Forces

REPORT No. NURN/LR-36-52

MAR 12 1962

COUNTRY: East Germany
IMPERSONAL SOURCES CARED INT. 4108
Subject: Soviet attempts to recruit espionage
agents (S) (U)

DATE: 12 January 1962

REFERENCE: 8 a(2)

DATE OF INFORMATION: 11 January 1962

SOURCE: **b1**

PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: EEP HQF, 11 Jan 62

PREPARED BY: **b6**

EVALUATION: F-3

INFORMATION: (S) (U)

1. **SUMMARY:** This report contains information of how SOURCE was approached to do espionage work for the Soviet Zone of Germany. This information is based on personal experience of the SOURCE.

2. **INFORMATION:**

b1

SOURCE was taken into custody on the grounds that he was an illegal border crosser and was sent to SASSA (NCA). While in SASSA SOURCE was questioned by Soviet Zone Secret Service Personnel on personal matters. On 9 January 1962 SOURCE was given a statement of return to the West Zone. On 10 January 1962 when SOURCE got to JUCHHOEN (QAO389) he noticed a Soviet automobile with a man in civilian clothes sitting in it. When SOURCE went to clear through JUCHHOEN, the East German Check Point, the man that had been sitting in the car was sitting in the corner of the room. An East German Official mentioned to the SOURCE a previous charge of drunken driving. Then the East German Official left the room for some unknown reason. At this the man in the corner got up and approached the SOURCE and said "You must help me." SOURCE stated that he was not a "Waterland Verräter". At this the man said that was fine but if you don't help me you will go to jail for three (3) months on this drunken driving charge. SOURCE wanted to come back to the West Zone and not go to jail so he said, "Alright, what do you want me to do." Then the man gave the SOURCE the following mission:

0383

Card and File:

EE 567250/L

1775-334404319

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REPORT No. NURN/LE-36-62

allied forces in the ANSBACH (GFR) area.

- b. Determine the types of units and their weapons.
- c. Note all bumper numbers of military vehicles and their direction of travel.
- d. Take special note of what type of weapons on trucks or towed by trucks.

This information, when gathered, was to be delivered at the Spring Fair in LEIPZIG (US1394) to the same man. A date, time and place was set where this information was to be delivered and DM 50-- was given to the SOURCE to defray expenses for traveling to LEIPZIG which SOURCE had to sign for on a receipt.

5. ~~(S)~~ SOURCE DATA: Name:

b1

COMMENTS: (u) SOURCE was a pushout from East Germany on the charge that he was an illegal border crosser. SOURCE stated that at no time had he intended to carry out any mission that he might be given, but only agreed to the proposal so that he could get back into West Germany. After his release and upon entering West Germany SOURCE immediately reported to the BBP TOEPEN (GFR) and told story and presented the money that was given to him. After an investigation the SOURCE was released. The City District Attorney in ANSBACH was notified and was asked to watch SOURCE for a while.

NOTE: The person that approached and gave the SOURCE the mission is believed by the SOURCE to be a Russian because of his inability to speak fluent German.

b6

DISTRIBUTION: Special

1-CO, 66th MI Gp

3-CO, Coll & CE Br, 513th MI Gp

3-CO, 10th Spec Forces Gp

3-CO, USA Spec Pub Det

1-Ln Off, 513th MI Gp

1-CO, Det "O"

1-CO, Flt Sta VI, 66th MI Gp (passed locally)

1-CO, Flt Sta XI, 66th MI Gp

1-Ln Off, Co "C", 532d MI Bn, (passed locally)

1-Sec III, Nur JIC (passed locally)

2-Hqs, 7000th Support Wing, ATTN: FOSA, APO 57

Colonel, GS,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G2

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AEUAT-EM (321/42)
HG-3470-61

21 November 1961

SUBJECT: MFS Methode in House Search and Property Seizure in ROSTOCK (u)

Card-File

TO: Commanding Officer
C & D Battalion
513th INTC Group
APO 757, US Forces
ATTN: SP Section

Ref *EE567 254/L*
Subj *EGIS-Book-Rostock*

This Document Has Been
Carded by SP Section
Date DEC 15 1961 Init 516

1. References (U)

Reference is made to D-3a(1)(c)(CI): DAIRER I-9

2. Source (c)

Date of Information: January/February 1961

Evaluation: M-6
CARDED

b1

- 1 -
0385

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AMTFF-HM (321/42)
HC-3470-61

SUBJECT: MFS Methods in House Search and Property Seizure in ROSTOCK

b1

Although Sources apparently succeeded in convincing the MFS they were not transmitting espionage information, there still remained the charge of attempting to flee East Germany and it was only due to the fact that East Germany is woefully short of experienced rail-road personnel that Sources were not sentenced to three years of prison. Both Sources were of average intelligence and highly cooperative.

3. Report (c)

a) Report of Preparations and Occurrences

b1

Some

smaller items they left with friends to be mailed later.

b1

On

arriving in BERLIN that evening, he was to have sent a telegram addressed to [] at their home address with some innocuous message. This telegram was to have indicated that they had arrived safely []

b1

As the train carrying [] and his son pulled into the NEUSIEBELTZ train station to pick up more passengers, it was boarded by two TRAPPO (Transportation Police) who came straight to the compart-

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ATTN: RR (321/42)
RG-3470-61

SUBJECT: MFS Methods in Home Search and Property Seizure in ROSHOK (u)

ment [b1] The TRAPPO asked to see his identification papers, hardly glanced at them and ordered him and his son to accompany them to the local TRAPPO headquarters. An MFS vehicle and three MFS personnel picked them up several hours later and drove them to SCHWABIN where Source was interrogated for 18 hours on the charge of transmitting espionage information from ROSHOK to SERBIN.

b) MFS Methods of Physical Search

[b1] who had been expecting the telegram [b1] during the evening of 30 January 1961 and was still waiting through 31 January 1961, was relieved to hear a door bell at about 1:00 hours and supposed that it was the telegraph service. She opened the apartment door and discovered the bell to be full of men and a woman presented her with a warrant for her arrest and a search warrant which she was ordered to sign. In her confusion and astonishment she hesitated and was told that her signature did not mean much anyway; it would be gotten later. Five men streamed past her through the doorway and, obeying orders from the son with the warrants, began setting up a press camera, photographing the walls' every angle from the centers, moving the furniture away from the wall, photographing the rear of it and going through every possible hiding place.

Starting with the living room, photographs were made as indicated above. The large living room Schrank (buffet) in which table linen, bed linen and most of the china and glasses were kept, was gone through item by item.

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0387

~~SECRET~~
AEURF-HM (321/42)
RG-3470-51

SUBJECT: MFS Methods in Home Search and Property Seizure in ROSTOCK (u)

Each glass was looked at individually, from top to bottom, but hurriedly. The first four or five pieces of linen were unfolded, held up to the light, refolded and stacked on a table. The rest of the linen, of which there was a great deal, was simply taken out by the two men working the Schrank and stacked on a table along with many other items. The table itself, a large fold-out affair, was usually very full of inspected items and no one got around to inspecting or photographing it as was done with all other pieces. All books, except for the first few, were held by the bindings and shaken. The first few books were inspected as thoroughly as the first few pieces of bed and table linen. Each chair, either stuffed or hard, was up-ended and thumped. Each picture was taken down from the wall and looked at but not taken out of the frame although this could easily have been done. The couch cushions were taken out and thumped but the couch itself was too heavy to easily turn over, as wished, so it was merely photographed from the rear with no inspection made of the springs. The curtains and the curtain rods were favored with a close scrutiny. The man with the warrants was disappointed and seemed sure that they would house an antenna.

Shortly after the five MFS agents had begun their search, another man arrived with a gadget which rather resembled a carpet sweeper with two small metal runners instead of wheels. The body was approximately 15" to 20" wide, approximately 8" to 10" long and encased in stainless steel or something

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~~SECRET~~
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ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDR USAF/COM F01/P0
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1-R

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AECHP-HH (321/42)
HG-3470-61

SUBJECT: MTS Methods in House Search and Property Seizure in ROSTOCK (u)

similar. The agent who had brought the thing proudly plugged the cord into the wall and began to run it over the rug with apparently negative results. Mumbling that it should make a noise, he opened the cover and began looking at the insides. Other agents joined him and the search was temporarily forgotten. [b1] used the chance to put three unnoticed West German romance magazines, forbidden literature, into the coal heating stove. After about 30 minutes one of the agents asked [b1] what sort of current the building had and learned that since the building was pre-war, the current was DC. The man in charge of the machine left and returned some 20 to 30 minutes later with a small box, presumably a transformer/rectifier, into which he plugged the gadget. The rectifier was then plugged into the wall socket and the gadget began to issue a loud hum. Every square inch of the oak rug was then covered with the gadget several times, apparently with negative results. From overhearing conversation, Source guessed that the gadget was sent to the men and that it was supposed to have detected something but Source did not know what.

Becoming more and more impatient, the man with the warrants ordered the other agents to move on into the other rooms. At no time did anyone think of inspecting the many flower pots of which there were at least a dozen, in the living room. As the agents split up into several teams and went into the other rooms, the agent-in-charge, the man with the warrants, informed Source that she and her husband were guilty of transmitting espionage information to West BERLIN

- 5 -

CONFIDENTIAL 0389

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AEUHP-BEM (321/42)
EG-3470-61

STELJEC: MFS Methods in House Search and Property Seizure in ROSTOCK (u)

and that her husband, already under detention, had admitted to the charge and would be leniently treated because he had confessed. If she would do the same, she would also receive good treatment. [b1] was astounded since she had assumed that the entire matter was connected with her and her husband's attempted flight. She had, therefore, wondered why the MFS would go to such trouble to search the apartment. Source replied in the negative and completely denied that either she or her husband had anything to do with espionage. She and her husband had simply wanted to flee East Germany. She was struck in the face and told to think the matter over.

The search continued as before but growing more and more perfunctory. Each item of clothing was taken out of the bedroom cabinets and looked at but no pockets were looked into. No potted plants were disturbed. The beds were not further disturbed after having their quilts pulled. No one even bothered to look under the beds. One agent did have the initiative to check the two girls' school book bags and looked through their composition books. The children, wide awake from all the excitement, were not further disturbed in their beds. All dirty linen was dumped out of the hamper and piled over. The bed tables were looked into and there one agent discovered the DM(E) 3,000.00. At this, the agent-in-charge became very excited and demanded to know, if the Sources were not engaged in espionage where so much money came from. [b1] pointed to the withdrawal column in the bank book which he held in his other hand.

In the kitchen into which Source was brought to sign an

0390

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ABURMP-EM (321/4A)
HC-3470-61

SUBJECT: MFS Methods in Home Search and Property Seizure in ROSTOCK (C) (S)

acknowledgement concerning the confiscation of the money, an agent had set up a typewriter on the kitchen table and was writing a report concerning the search although it was not yet finished. The kitchen cabinets were then gone through in much the same manner. The crockery was superficially looked at and the kitchen linen was taken out and put back without being unfolded or felt. The gas stove also came in for some attention; each burner was taken out and the oven was thoroughly scrubbed out. No one took notice of the fact that the stove was not hooked up to the gas line although it was plainly visible. Two days before, Source had given her new stove to a neighbor downstairs and had received the neighbor's old stove in exchange. The pipe connections did not fit and thus were left that way since Sources were leaving anyway. The coal heating stove, on which Source had cooked the last two days, had its ashes checked but not the fire compartment into which Source had thrown the magazines. The full coal scuttle, standing next to the stove, was not disturbed. The MFS agents were then finishing up the search but as a last attempt to find something, piled chairs on tables or on other chairs and in each row looked into and photographed the interior of every overhead light fixture.

During the entire search, b1 was largely unhindered and went from room to room straightening and generally neatening up the stacks of things the agents had taken out of the many cabinet or re-arranging the things they had replaced. No one seemed particularly to mind this except the agent-in-charge who kept trying to get her to admit to espionage. After a while, even he

0391

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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT
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Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☒

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)
NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 393-394

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RV-1359-61

In Apr 61, Source patrolled with the regular BSP Pvt, [b6] (fmu), at the "BOYE BRUCKE", North of STEINSTUECKEN, and both made their first apprehension of a would-be defector, who originated from FLAUBER/Saxony. The VOPO Kreiskommando picked up this 22 year old defector and escorted him to the HQ at POTSDAM. The fate of this defector is unknown to Source.

On 1 July 61, "Day of the VOPO", Source received a premium of 50.00 DM for good service and alertness. This was the only financial compensation Source ever received by the BSP. He received free meals when on BSP duty, during his spare time. Cigarettes or other provisions were never issued to Source and his fellow BSP helpers.

On 12 August 61, Source and [b6] patrolled the ER station, GRIENITZKE in civilian clothes. They did not wear any badges or brassards and they acted like plain clothes detectives. At about 1615 hrs, they checked three young men at this ER station and apprehended this group, composed of one 18 year old male from WITSTOCK, and two 19 year old males from the MERSEBURG area. The group intended to defect to West BERLIN, but Source's alertness ended this action. All three apprehended men were picked up by a BSP Sgt and Pvt of the 16th BSP Company, stationed at POTSDAM/Babelsberg, Karl-Marx Strasse. The fate of these men is unknown to Source. During these patrols in civilian clothes, Source wore a 0.9 mm MAKAROV pistol in a concealed shoulder holster.

Since 13 August 61, Source patrolled almost every day around the US Enclave of STEINSTUECKEN. While on guard duty, he was relieved from the work with the locomotive plant, which paid Source's wages in spite of his absence. After the 13 Aug 61, Source acted as bait in civilian clothes, luring would-be defectors, who tried to defect to West BERLIN or STEINSTUECKEN. Source was armed with the MAKAROV pistol in a concealed shoulder holster, and generally patrolled as a single sentry from 1700 to 2000 hrs or 2200 hrs, almost daily, from 13 Aug 61 to the time of his defection, 18 Oct 61. Night patrols were conducted by the regular BSP troops. Source was sometimes relieved by his fellow worker, [b6]. The other male helper, [b6], quit patrolling after 13 Aug 61, because of schooling.

The girls of the BSP helper squad, were engaged in checking local inns, pubs, and restaurants of POTSDAM and POTSDAM/Babelsberg. They wore civilian attire and had order to search for provocateurs, for critics, and after 13 Aug 61, for those patrons who would ridicule the regime in public.

During Source's patrol duties from 14 to 16 Oct 61, he observed two civilian photographers from MYS HQ, POTSDAM, who photographed US Army helicopters landing at STEINSTUECKEN; the pilots and other US personnel; they also made pictures of all movements within the STEINSTUECKEN Enclave during these two days. They photographed from the ER shack # 11, (see Incl 1), or from various positions at the fenced boundary which encloses the Enclave. The regular BSP guards told Source that these two civilian photographers were from MYS HQ, POTSDAM.

During Source's patrols, the BSP unit used passwords like "WERNIGERODE - WALLBUSS", or like "COMEL - GOSSLAR"; the recognition was as follows: If a person approached a BSP sentry, the sentry called: "PAROLE"; the approaching person had to say the first password, and the sentry the second. Within the 15th BSP Company, the passwords were changed almost daily.

Since 13 Aug 61, a total of 14 men, seven posts of two sentries each, patrolled the boundaries of STEINSTUECKEN. Each pair of sentries were armed with one submachine gun SHPAGINA, 1941; one SIS, SIMONOV semi-automatic carbine; and one flare pistol. The sentry armed with the SPG, had 120 rounds of ammunition; the sentry armed with the SIS, 60 rounds; for the flare pistol, six flare cartridges.

0395

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RV-1359-61

One cartridge contained a red and green cluster (two red stars and three green stars) meaning "ALERT - OFFICER REQUESTED TO THE BOUNDARY". The second cartridge was a white illumination flare, for illuminating the area at night, if desired so. The third cartridge contained one red star, meaning a defector was spotted and he is trying to enter Western territory. The fourth cartridge had a red cluster of two stars, meaning "OFFICER to the BOUNDARY". The fifth cartridge had a yellow cluster, but the meaning is unknown to Source. The sixth cartridge is unknown to Source. For area sketch of the BSP Steinstuecken sentries, see Incl # 1.

Effective 15 Sep 61, the 15th BSP Company, DREWITZ, Steinstrasse, came under the VOFO Command. The next higher headquarters is unknown to Source. The regular BSP troops were unhappy about this change of commands, because the BSP troops lost their independence, and are going to wear VOFO uniforms in the future. This info is based on hearsay from several low-ranking personnel of the 15th BSP Company, which recently changed its unit designation. Source heard that this company is now the 12th VOFO-BSP Company, still located at DREWITZ, Steinstrasse.

COMMENTS:

1. (e) Source: [REDACTED]

b1

2. (e) Remarks: This interrogation was conducted by [REDACTED]

b6

COMMENTS BY APPROVING OFFICER:

THIS IS RAW/UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

To avoid false confirmation, it is requested that agencies reprinting a part or the whole of this report, include the C&D Bn CONTROL NUMBER OF THIS REPORT, the DATE OF THIS REPORT, and MENTION OF THE SOURCE IN THE EXACT TERMS AS GIVEN IN THIS REPORT. Doing so will also make it possible for C&D Bn to answer inquiries based on material reprinted by other agencies from C&D Bn reports.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

APPROVED:

b6

Major, AI(MPC)
Operations Officer

0396

MAI/cal/mv

DCSI, USAREUR COMMENT: Report gives good insight into methods used by Communist border guards to catch refugees.

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RV-1359-61

C & D BN,
513TH INTC GP


DUTIES OF BSP-HELPERS

INCL. NR. 1

BSP-PATROL AREA ALONG THE STEINSTÜCKEN ENCLAVE

0 250 500 750 1,000 METERS

SCALE: 1:25,000



LEGEND: + ≈ DOUBLE PATROL OF THE 15th BSP COMPANY, DREWITZ.
(7 DOUBLE PATROLS)

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ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

0397

DISPOSITION FORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (If any)

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FILE NO.

ACSI-CO 6.21

SUBJECT

Request for Reprint by East German Scientist (U)

TO Chief, CI Br

FROM Chief, Ops Br

DATE NOV 29 1961

COMMENT NO. 1

(C)

Cap b6 Ops/Cell Div/56159/dg

1. (U) Reference DF from CCIA to OACSI, Attention ACSI-C, dated 22 Jun 61, which forwarded the original post card from one b6 requesting a scientific reprint "Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfare" by b6 (US Army Chemical Center).

2. (U) Our Comment #3 to reference DF, dated 8 Sep 61, furnished information received from DCSI USAREUR in response to your Comment #2, dated 6 Jul 61.

3. (U) Returned herewith is the postcard from b6 to b6 which was returned by DCSI USAREUR in letter of 18 Nov 61. USAREUR reports that efforts to locate b6 or to identify him have been unsuccessful.

b6

1 Incl

Postcard (U)

Colonel, GS

Chief, Operations Branch

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ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDR USAINCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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
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0399

Encl 1

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ON JUN 18 1998

BY 60211 M EOI/RO

DISPOSITION FORM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~DISSENT~~

FILE NO. [REDACTED] REQUEST FOR REPLY BY East German Scientist (U)
TO: OAESD FROM: USA 221A DATE: 29 JUN 1961 COMMENT NO.
ATTN: JACSIC b6

(U) Attached as included in the original report card from
b6 requesting a scientific reprint on "The Medical Aspects of
Chemical Warfare" by [REDACTED] (US Army Medical Center).

(S) Although the requested scientific paper is unclassified
and releasable, it is conspicuous that a medical doctor from a small
town in East Germany is interested in any aspects of chemical warfare.

The request becomes even more conspicuous in view of
b6 interest in research on incapacitating and lethal agents.

(S) It is known that East Germany's policy is primarily
defensive, but possible change in this policy is indicated by recent
CW agent development and production.

b6 It is reported by the chief coordinator
of the CW program of the East German People's Army (NVA) that some of his
publications on defensive chemical warfare are based on unclassified
information from leading US and other free world scientists.

(U) It is also known that the 5th Chemical Co. (Hq. 4th Army
Unit 0) is located in East Germany.

(U) In view of the above, it is entirely possible that
b6 is being used as a cut-out for another civilian and/or
military individual having a specific interest in receiving information
on chemical warfare, especially on incapacitating and/or lethal agents.

(S) Recommend that the above be brought to the attention
of the Division Officer, US Army Intelligence Center (Room 21453) for
any necessary action. (U) Determine if b6 is in contact with
b6 and/or key military personnel of the NVA.

Further recommend that this Agency be informed of the
results of any investigation which may be conducted.

FOR THE COMMANDER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~DISSENT~~

b6

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ON 06/18/2000

DD FORM 96

Control No. 237701

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACSI-SC

SUBJECT: Request for Reprint by East German Scientist (U)

142504

TO: CO, USACCIA

FROM: ACSI

DATE: SEP 19 1961 COMMENT NO. 2 (S)

Major b6 6074/11u

1. (u) (S) USAREUR's reply to ACSI Letter regarding Subject is quoted as follows:

a. "In the recent past the EGIS have been known to attempt to exploit Western sources of technical information through professional contacts. An operation targeted against marine torpedo specialists of the former German navy, and a plan to approach an engineer employed at Cape Canaveral, Florida, are examples. Although known targets of this type thus far have been few, the steady improvement of all facets of EGIS modus operandi may be expected to include an increase in such activity.

b. "In the specific field of CW, there has been no apparent indication of an NVA offensive capability. b6 is thought to be more of an administrator than a scientist. On the basis of very limited information, it appears that the effort described in the referenced letter was probably designed to serve the twofold purpose of supporting East German CW defensive planning and fulfilling Soviet Intelligence requirements."

2. (u) (S) USAREUR will forward any additional results obtained which may indicate that b6 is in contact with b6 and/or key military personnel of the NVA. Upon receipt of such information it will be disseminated to you,

3. (u) (S) It is requested that this office be advised of any further correspondence received by b6 from b6 or other personnel in East Germany.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

b6

Colonel, GS
Chief, Security Division

0401

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BY CDR/USMC CM F01/PO
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CCLIA
Control No. 2371-61-5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CMLIT-C-676-61

SUBJECT: Request for Reprint by East German Scientist (U)

01 Br
C-344
29
142504

TO OACSI
Attn: ACSI-SC

FROM CO, USA CCIA

DATE 29 SEP 1961 COMMENT NO. 3
Major b6 /ms/2347

(U) Reference is made to basic correspondence which recommended investigative action. The information contained in Comment No. 2 above is very informative and the combined OACSI/DCSI USAREUR effort is appreciated. This Agency will comply with the request contained in paragraph 3 above.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

b6

Major CmlC
Adjutant

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0402

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DOD DIR 5200.10

CCIA

Control No.

2371-64-S

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C/R

AGENT REPORT
(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF

b1

b1

CARDED

2. DATE SUBMITTED

21 August 1961

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

DFOB:

b1

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS ~~WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED~~

On 2 August 1961, b1, born b1, an East German refugee who fled to the West on b1 1961, was interviewed at Camp King, Oberursel, West Germany, and furnished substantially the following information: IMPERSONAL SUBJECTS LARGED INT. 4/68

From 1957 until defection, SUBJECT was employed

b1

This plant manufactures electronic control and regulation devices for machine automation equipment which are sold primarily in Eastern Bloc countries, but also used by some manufacturers in the West. To the best of his knowledge, SUBJECT made the following trips outside East Germany, as an installation and service representative of this firm during the period 1959 to 1961.

1959-1960 (almost 1 year)

Oct 1960 (5 days)
Nov 1960 (5 days)
Jun 1961 (6 days)

June 1961 (1 week)

June 1961

b1

CARDED

During Spring 1960, SUBJECT visited the Leipzig Fair, Leipzig, while on a day off from his firm. There at the exhibition stand

b1

0403
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DOWNGRADED AT 42 YEAR INTERVALS

NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR 5230.10

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

, 513th IC Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE

12-76730

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT

(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF

b1

CN

b1

DPOB:

b1

2. DATE SUBMITTED

21 August 1961

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

~~WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED~~

b1

SUBJECT continued his tour of the Fair and finally returned to the exhibition of his own firm where he was confronted by the SED Partei-Sekretar (SED Party Secretary) of INTRON, Pnu b6 commented to SUBJECT in the presence of approximately six other persons to the effect that SUBJECT had been seen talking b6 SUBJECT commented in turn, "Why, is there something the matter with that?" and therewith proceeded with his visit of the INTRON exhibit.

The following day SUBJECT was working in Zerbst UT-0061, East Germany. During the noon hour the INTRON plant manager, name not given, arrived by car, hurriedly came to SUBJECT and told HIM to get in the car because they were going places, places not specified. SUBJECT was driven to the Leipzig "Clubhaus" in the vicinity of the Leipzig Fair. Here he was dropped off and instructed to go to Room 027 on the first floor where someone would be waiting to see him. In Room 027, he was received by a previously unknown male who introduced himself as b6 and produced an identification card (not a folding credential) which identified b6 as an authorized representative of the MfS.

b1

SUBJECT refused on the grounds that he had already given a verbal account of the matter and that, in his opinion should suffice. b6 became belligerent and informed SUBJECT that b6 the BBC men were suspected of being mutually engaged in the recruitment of persons to flee to the West, and that it was strongly suspected that SUBJECT was planning to flee to the West. SUBJECT persisted with his refusal to sign a written statement. Thereupon b6 produced a pistol and holster from his jacket pocket and slammed them on the table. He said "If you don't write and sign this statement right now, I will arrest you, bring you someplace, and you will be forced under severe circumstances to write and sign the required statement." SUBJECT relented and wrote a truthful account of what had transpired b6 he signed by his true name. SUBJECT could write only a truthful account because it was obvious to him b6 had been reported to the MfS by a person or persons unknown. Later that evening SUBJECT was driven to his home, and upon being dropped off, SUBJECT was told that he would hear from b6 again.

2

0404

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

513th IC Group

6. SIGNATURE OF 5

DA FORM 341

1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGL (1) 18-60-8024-78720

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AGENT REPORT
(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

b1

DFOB

b1

2. DATE SUBMITTED

21 August 1961

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

~~WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED~~

Several days later SUBJECT received a telephone call from b6 who gave SUBJECT instructions for a meeting that evening at the Clubhaus previously mentioned. During this meeting b6 told SUBJECT that he could be of aid to the MfS. He was to develop a closer acquaintance with b6 and report on her activities, personal character traits, and associates, b6

b6 reiterated that b6 was suspected of being connected with illegal activities having to do with the incitement of people for "republikflucht" (flight to the West). SUBJECT was to render his reports in writing and to sign them with his true name. Several meetings and several reports later b6 told SUBJECT that his status with MfS required administrative finalization in the form of a "harmless" statement SUBJECT would be required to write. SUBJECT wrote what b6 dictated worded substantially as follows: "I obligate myself to work for the Staatssicherheitsdienst (SSD-STASI) and to report everything and anything which is against the East German state, and to report specifically concerning all persons who intend to flee." SUBJECT was instructed to sign this statement with the name b6 b6 told SUBJECT that henceforth his reports would be signed with this cover name. SUBJECT had many meetings with b6 until about December 1960. During this period SUBJECT was given the following missions to report on:

1. b6
2. Why an excessive number of people were fleeing to the West from INTRON.
3. Character reports concerning the SED Party Secretary at INTRON and other INTRON plant managers.

In December 1960 b6 introduced SUBJECT to b6 (Comrade b6 his second MfS A/H. b6 as SUBJECT's A/H until 31 July 1961. SUBJECT contacted b6 as he had b6 through the Leipzig SSD telephone number which is listed in the Leipzig telephone book, and which is the switchboard of Leipzig MfS. Having been connected with the switchboard he would ask to be connected with extension 283. Having been connected with extension 283, he would ask for b6 (SUBJECT instructed to ask for b6 his cover name, for telephone contact with his MfS A/H). Under b6 SUBJECT carried out the basic mission which he had had under b6 SUBJECT was required to advise his A/H whenever he left Leipzig, however SUBJECT did not always comply with these instructions.

3

0405

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

513th INTC Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341

1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

CONFIDENTIAL

AGL (1) 10-60-803M-70730

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT
(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

b1

DFOB: b1

2. DATE SUBMITTED

21 August 1961

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS - WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

In June 1960 prior to SUBJECT's trip b6 contacted SUBJECT by telephone at INTRON and advised SUBJECT that he had become aware that SUBJECT b6 Meeting arrangements were made for that night. During the meeting SUBJECT was admonished for not having apprised his A/H of the impending trip. b6 told SUBJECT that on this trip he was to note demonstrations and activities in West Germany with respect to the West German holiday "Tag der Deutschen Freiheit" on 17 June (commemorating the Berlin uprising in 1953). He was to note the number of individuals observed wearing lapel insignia commemorating this event. SUBJECT objected to the mission stating that he would be too occupied with his work. b6 insisted that SUBJECT carry out this mission. b6 SUBJECT was required to contact his MfS A/H immediately. He failed to do so. Several days later, on or about 28 June, after being contacted b6 he did render his report. He reported that he had resided b6 which is in the West and had had no opportunity to note anything unusual with respect to 17 June. Nevertheless, SUBJECT had to write a report concerning this. During this meeting SUBJECT received the EEI of reporting character, personality, and attitude data concerning Fnu b6 the research

b1

On 25 July 1961 SUBJECT was advised b6 had been a telephone call for him, and that the caller had left the message that SUBJECT should call the person whom he knew to call. SUBJECT did not call b6 SUBJECT began his leave at this time, on b1 1961 he married, and on b1 while on vacation, SUBJECT and his wife fled to the West under the circumstances already reported the Refugee Authorities in Berlin.

SUBJECT added b6 born approximately b6 a resident of Dresden and employee of "VEB Mikromat Maschinenbau" Dresden was his co-worker on installation trips to West Germany. SUBJECT described b6 as a staunch communist and believes that he reported everything concerning SUBJECT's activities in the West to higher East German authorities. SUBJECT found it difficult to disassociate himself from b6 while on these trips. Wherever SUBJECT went, b6 also went.

SUBJECT claimed that everything he ever reported to the MfS in no way was derogatory or resulted in harm to the person reported on. He reported to MfS only because of pressure by them. b1

4 0406

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

513th INTC Group

6. SIGNATURE OF:

DA FORM 341

1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAY BE USED.

AGL (1) 10-60-6024-78720

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT
(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

b1

DFOB:

b1

2. DATE SUBMITTED

21 August 1961

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

~~WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED~~

b1

Source also conceded that his activities as a "spitzel" (informant) at INTRON were probably known to the factory workers.

SUBJECT provided the following description of his A/H:

Name:

b6

Age:

Born circa b6

Height:

5' 3"

Weight:

170 lbs

Build:

Fat

Hair:

Black, full

Name:

b6

Age:

Born circa b6

Height:

5' 7"

Weight:

145 lbs

Build:

Thin

Hair:

Light blond

Face:

Long

Peculiarities:

Dead-pan

CARDED

CARDED

AGENT'S NOTES: SUBJECT, an obviously intelligent young man, appeared to have some unusual lapses in memory concerning names. Throughout the interview he failed to remember the first names of persons he regularly reported on to MfS, b6

b6

SUBJECT became flustered and rather vague concerning his mission in West Germany. Although he claimed having been in Munich, PU 9135, b6

b6

Information received from Camp King and emanating from Berlin revealed the following: "May 1961 - to Munich for MfS mission."

In the opinion of the undersigned the fact that SUBJECT was obligated to MfS by making several trips to the West during 1960 and 1961 but claims his first MfS mission to have taken place during June 1961 is unusual. Why no West Germany missions before? When asked where he would like to resettle SUBJECT showed apparent unconcern which is in variance with his status of a newly arrived refugee. Although SUBJECT denies being under MfS control at present, its possibility cannot be discounted. Even if the above account is truthful the probability exists that MfS will make a later attempt to contact SUBJECT in the West.

5 0407

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

513th INTC Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 341

1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGL (I) 10-40-5074-75720

CONFIDENTIAL

(WHEN FILLED IN)

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Card-File

USAREUR INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Ref FE 006233

Subj Activities of Eastern
Intell Section
Federal Republic of Germany FM-A/I

TO: DCI, DEPT. OF DEFENSE
ATTN: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

BRANCH:

SECTION:

UNIT	REPORT NUMBER	REFERENCE	PROJECT NUMBER	SOURCE NR. & EVAL	DATE OF INFO	DATE OF REPORT	COUNTRY
	AE 116-1	BAKER 1-9 b6(2) (C) b6(1)		See para 11	150001	150001	RG

9. SUBJECT: East German Intelligence Service (RGZ), Ref: Eastern Germany

10. FORWARDED BY: Lt Col b6

11. TELEPHONE: Box 0112

12. INCLOSURES:

Activities of Eastern Intel Service - 1 Rep
PERSONAL SUBJECTS CARED FOR
1/68 JAN 12 1968

13. REPORT: (C) (G) LIMITED EDITION - INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

b1

b1

Further, Agents in East Germany have been informed that they may continue to use the railroad but that they should anticipate the possibility for reporting to air travel (East Germany to West Berlin) in order to make the trip into the West.

14. The above information has been passed to SAC, Frankfurt, by this unit.

0408

DECLASSIFIED FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION
AND HER 2003-10 DODS ARE APPLICABLE (WHEN FILLED IN)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 10 JUN 1998
BY USARP COM FOU/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

AGL (1) 4-6-122M 88012

FORM 1
AE 20 NOV 55 3197

REPLACES AE FORMS 1, 1053, 2262 AND 2263 AND 2263-1, WHICH ARE OBSOLETE

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FL.
CONFIDENTIAL

AEUMQ-CPCE

b1

(u)

OO, Berlin Sta, 519th MI
APO 742, US Forces
ATTN: Gold

On, Coll & CE By
519th MI Group
APO 757, US Forces
(GADO Gold)

8 Mar 61

b6 eh/7052

OO, Bremerhaven Station
519th MI Group
APO 69, US Forces
ATTN: Gold

1. (C)

b1

He is presently being debriefed at Camp King.

2. (u) Subject was questioned about a recruitment letter which Berlin Station had attempted to send him, but he denied receiving any such letter.

3. (u) Subject disclosed that he had received one letter mailed from West BERLIN. The same letter was received by other MFS Staff officers or former Staff officers. Although he cannot remember the exact wording of the letter, it was something as follows:

"Uns ist bekannt dass Sie und Ihre Vater mit dem jetzigen System in der Zone nicht einverstanden sind, und wir moechten persoenlich mit Ihnen in Kontakt treten. Teilen Sie uns, bitte, mit die Adresse Ihrer Verwandten und Bekannten in West Berlin. Setzen Sie nicht Ihre Freunde von der Staatssicherheitsdienst, Schnabe, Klabunde, Rick und Pix, in Kenntnis von diesem Schreiben."

A Postschliessfach address in BIR/Steglitz was given as the sender. From his friend b1 learned that several colleagues received similar letters, among them: b1 Dept K&S; b1 Dept II; b1, a GM for the SIS; b6 Dept unknown, and (Fm) b6 Dept V. b1 advised b1 the letter was undoubtedly MFS provocation; b1 also was inclined towards this opinion since he did feel that the Americans would write a letter of this type. b1 gave the letter to b6 the Potsdam MFS district chief. b6 feigned surprise, but b1 reiterated his belief that it was provocation. b6 answer was non-committal. b6 was apparently caught by this letter, and was subsequently dismissed from the MFS. When asked why he thought these particular individuals had been chosen for an MFS operation of this type, b1 stated that he believed there were two primary reasons:

0409

- (1) They had relatives in the West (b1 had a brother in West BIR).
- (2) They were suspected of anti-regime contacts or feelings.

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals
Not automatically declassified

CONFIDENTIAL

76

AEUHO-OPGE

SUBJECT:

b1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b1

cells that the operation was conducted either by Dept II or Dept RK.

4. (D) Subject is being debriefed re censorship policy of MFS and the Operative
Blenstalle of the VoPa. This information will be forwarded as soon as the reports are
processed by Camp King.

b6

14 Col PG
Chief, Coll & OS Br

409A

176

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)
NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 410

THIS MUST REMAIN TOP DOCUMENT

DOSSIER NO. ZF 40208W
Vol III of IV

As of 8 NOV 78 all material
(Date)

included in this file conforms with

DA policies currently in effect.

Lois E. Ward 8 NOV 78
(Signature) (Date Signed)

LOIS E. WARD 7
(Printed Name) (Grade)

REVIEWER [Signature] DATE 31 Aug 78

[Signature] 1 Aug 78

0411

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22 Mar 85

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20501307 MM

FILE NO.

SUBJECT

East German Intercept Methods and Techniques

FROM

3 Sep Distribution

FROM

Ch, Coll & GE Br
513th MI Group
APO 757, US Forces

DATE

16 Nov 1960

COMMENT NO. 1

b6

dep/8347

(c) The following information concerning East German mail intercept methods and techniques, extracted from a 513th MI Group agent report, dated 24 Sep 1960, is submitted as material of interest to all agent handlers:

b1

Subject stated that Department "12" is responsible for mail censorship in Wismar and consists of a female supervisor and nine employees. Subject gave the breakdown as follows: Four "sorters," who sort out letters; three "readers"; and two individuals who are assigned to the "Technik" (technical) section. The duties of the "sorters," Subject explained, were to sort the letters according to a certain key. To do this, a large panel was placed on the wall, showing all streets and house numbers in Wismar in which the MFS were interested. Subject gave this example: a notation was placed on the panel reading Stalin Strasse, 102. In this respect, all mail addressed to this address was sorted out, packages as well, and sent to the supervisor of Department "12" who, in turn, forwarded the letters and/or packages to the MFS KD or BV. In cases where mail was being sent to the address from outside Wismar, the name of that town is also added to the name of the street on the board. According to Subject, a separate board was maintained for Berlin. All mail to and from Berlin was checked. Furthermore, all mail sent from "Schwerpunkten" (priority areas) was also censored. Subject explained that "Schwerpunkte" are the areas in which major military or industrial installations are located.

All mail which has been sorted is given to the "readers". The "readers" are instructed to look for the following: letters containing information on military installations, or mentioning troop movements, or concentrations; letters in which the writer mentions the fact that he is employed in an industrial plant; and letters in which the writer mentions strikes in West Germany. In such cases the "readers" are required to write excerpts from these types of letters.

Subject explained that a card system was employed, using two colored cards, to file the excerpts which were extracted from the letters: a red card was employed for East Germany and yellow for the FRG. Entries were made on the cards as to negative or positive political remarks made by the writers. The entries consisted only of a line or two and did not contain any other data, such as names of the writer, or to whom the letter had been addressed, or the town from which the letter had been mailed. According to Subject, this card system was used for statistical purposes only.

GROUP - 3

DD FORM 96

(Stencil) REPLACES NKE FORM 50, 1 OCT 45, WHICH MAY BE USED

Downgraded at 12-year intervals
Not automatically declassified**CONFIDENTIAL**

SECRET-02

SUBJECT: East German Intercept Methods and Techniques (S) (U)

Confidential

"Subject claimed that she was assigned as a member of the "Technik" section. Her duty was to open the letters that had been sorted and to reseal the letters after being read by the "readers." In order to open the letters, Subject explained the following process: copper boilers with a water capacity of approximately ten liters were used. The water was brought to a boiling point by means of an electrical stove or heater. A perforated plate was placed on top of the boilers, the plate of which was covered with a linen cloth. The letters to be opened were then placed on the cloth. After the glue of the envelopes had dissolved the letters were then opened by means of a letter opener. Subject stated that in some instances, persons had used albumen to seal the letter, or any other special glue, or if additional seals were used to seal the letters, the letters then could not be opened. In such cases, the letters were smoothed or pressed out and forwarded to their respective addresses.

"Subject stated that whenever a letter arrived from a foreign country the names of the sender and addressee were registered. If such mail contained currency of any sort, or religious pamphlets, the currency and pamphlets would be confiscated. Small parcels were opened in order to ascertain if they contained any literature which had been banned in East Germany.

"After the mail had been censored the letters were returned to the "Technik" section for resealing. Subject stated that glue was applied to the envelope in the exact place where the old glue had been. The glue was applied with a brush, cleaned with a sponge, placed back on the steam plate and smoothed out by a press."

b6

DISTRIBUTION

London Station	- 30
Bremenhaven Station	- 10
Paris Station	- 1
Co "C", 532nd MIB	- 10
MIC, Munich Ele, 513th MIG	- 2
Frankfurt Security Team	- 1
Frankfurt Red Team	- 3
Frankfurt Yellow Team	- 3
Frankfurt White Team	- 3
Frankfurt Gold Team	- 3
Frankfurt Rotg Team	- 2
COMA II Group	- 20
DOSE, USAREUR	- 6
All GADGs	- 6
Security Br, 513th MIG	- 8

Lt Colonel, TC
Chief

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDR USARMCOW F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

0413

Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL CORR FILE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (If any)

DISPOSITION FORM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FILE NO.

SUBJECT

New MRS MO for Enticing US Military Personnel to East Berlin (u)

TO: See Distribution

FROM: Chief, Coll & CE Branch

DATE: 2 Sep 1960

COMMENT NO. 1

b6

dep/8547

513th MI Group
APO 757, US Forces

1. Forwarded herewith for your information and dissemination to Agent Handlers is an excerpt from a Berlin Station report, dated 27 Aug 60, which indicates an apparently new MRS MO for enticing US military personnel to East Berlin. The report is based upon a routine debriefing of Source 0062, a Berlin Station DAO.

"The East German handling agent then asked Subject if he had any US soldier friends. Subject replied that he did not. The agent said that Subject might have some US soldier friends in the future and that he could help the East Germans by offering to procure antiques for the soldiers. Subject inquired what sort of antiques. The East German answered all sorts. Subject could bring the antiques to West Berlin at first and then at a later date, attempt to draw the soldiers over to East Berlin for reasons of enabling them to inspect the antiques first hand. The East German added that perhaps the soldiers could come in uniform. Subject said that this was dangerous for the Americans and that he doubted if they would come over in uniform, if at all. The East German stated that he believed they would, as US soldiers come into East Berlin every day in uniform."

b6

Major, Inf
Chief, Collection and CE Branch

DISTRIBUTION:

- Berlin Station - 30
- Bremenhaven Station - 10
- Paris Station - 1
- Os "C", 532nd MIB - 10
- CEC, Munich Element - 2
- Frankfurt Security Team - 1
- Frankfurt Red Team - 3
- Frankfurt Yellow Team - 3
- Frankfurt White Team - 3
- Frankfurt Gold Team - 3
- Frankfurt Rotg Team - 2
- 66th MI Group - 20
- 111 GADOCs - 6

0414

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AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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DISPOSITION FORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (If any)

CONFIDENTIAL

Confidential

REF ID:

SUBJECT

MIS Surveillances in West Berlin (u)

TO

FROM

DATE

COMMENT NO. 1

See Distribution

Ch, Coll & CE Br
513th MI Group
APO 757, US Forces

127 JUNE 1960

b6

Rep/8347

1. Forwarded herewith are copies of a mimeographed series of excerpts taken from a Berlin Station report entitled **b1** dated 10 June 1960.

2. These excerpts are forwarded because they illustrate the use made by the MIS of surveillance in counter USI investigations and because they indicate the importance of counter surveillance by agent handlers during meetings with their sources. Very likely some of the individuals under surveillance by **b1** were sources of this unit.

3. It is requested that these excerpts be given wide distribution among agent handlers.

b6

1 Encl
Excerpts

Chief, Operations Section

for, Inf

DISTRIBUTION

Berlin Station	- 30
Bremervhaven Station	- 10
Paris Station	- 1
Ch #04, 532nd MIB	- 10
Ch #04, 513 MIG	- 2
Frankfurt Security Team	- 1
Frankfurt Red Team	- 3
Frankfurt Yellow Team	- 3
Frankfurt White Team	- 3
Frankfurt Gold Team	- 3
ALL GADOS	- 6
Security Branch, 513 MIG	- 8

GROUP - 3

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0415

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MfS Surveillances in West Berlin

(Excerpts taken from AR23702, Subject: b1 dated
10 June 1968, written by A/H b6

b1

"During Subject's period of MfS cooperation, he denied receiving any training regarding performing surveillances and making West Berlin address checks. He further refuted ever receiving any special documentation from the MfS. Subject was never given the name of the person placed under surveillance; he was normally shown a picture of the individual by the handling agent or else the person was pointed out to Subject at a certain location. Prior to conducting a surveillance, the MfS handling agent would inform Subject if a person was under surveillance for the first time or if the person had been previously followed by another MfS source. If an initial surveillance was being conducted, it meant that Subject was to stay close to the individual in order not to lose the individual on busy streets and during train transfers. Subject was always told to keep as close to the individual as possible without arousing any suspicion. The MfS did not fix a distance between Subject and the individual under surveillance. The handling agent pointed out that persons who knew they were under surveillance might attempt to lose Subject by boarding transportation media at the last moment, charter taxi cabs, and cross intersections when the traffic light is amber or even red. Subject was instructed rather to drop the surveillance than to violate traffic regulations and become involved in an investigation with the West Berlin Police. Subject was further prohibited from boarding a bus, streetcar, elevated or underground subway in West Berlin with the intention of following a person. As soon as a person utilized the aforementioned transportation media, Subject was to discontinue the surveillance and report back to his handling agent. If the person entered a department store, governmental office, or apartment house in West Berlin, Subject was instructed to observe the entrances for approximately one hour and if the person did not leave the building within an hour, Subject was to discontinue the surveillance. According to the MfS, if Subject remained in a particular area for more than one hour he might arouse suspicion and be arrested by the police. The MfS had given Subject 5 DM West for emergency purposes. Subject had been told to utilize the aforementioned sum of money to charter a taxi to get out of a certain area rapidly in case Subject had been compromised and his arrest by the police was imminent. In order to make Subject less

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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conspicuous, the MFS provided Subject with a hat, a grey cap, two scarfs with different colors and a pair of wire-rimmed glasses, which Subject carried in his brief case during each West Berlin surveillance mission. Subject was told to utilize the aforementioned items optionally depending upon the situation. In case Subject was ever apprehended by an East German policeman or customs official while on a surveillance mission, Subject was instructed to ask to be placed in contact with the chief of the arresting agency. After being placed in contact with the chief, Subject was to tell the arresting authority to call the Cottbus MFS by telephoning Cottbus 4261, and inform the MFS that Subject had been arrested. The MFS would promptly gain Subject's release by informing the arresting authority that Subject was performing official duties. Subject was warned never to give any details regarding his MFS missions to the arresting authority. If Subject were arrested by the West Berlin Police, he was instructed to emphatically deny having any hostile intelligence contact. If the police found written notes containing West Berlin address checks, Subject was to tell the police that he was attempting to locate a relative of some friend in East Germany for whom Subject was doing a favor because the friend was unable to travel to West Berlin. During a meeting with [b6] in approximately March 1960, Subject was told that the MFS planned to provide Subject with the utmost security in West Berlin by giving Subject the telephone number of a resident of West Berlin. Subject upon being arrested by the police, would indicate to the police that the West Berlin resident was Subject's uncle whom Subject had visited or planned to visit when he was arrested. According to the MFS, the respective West Berlin resident would be briefed and would confirm Subject's story if the police effected Subject's arrest and made an inquiry. The MFS handling agent had bought a West Berlin city map for Subject. Whenever a West Berlin mission was assigned, Subject and the handling agent would ascertain the location of the West Berlin address where the surveillance or address check was to take place. Prior to undertaking the trip, Subject was oriented as to the layout of the streets in the target area. Subject usually took the early express train which left Cottbus at approximately 0715 hours for Berlin. The handling agent indicated that early departure would give Subject more time to carry out his West Berlin missions and furthermore the border controls were not so stringent during the morning hours when the laborers were traveling to work. Although the MFS discouraged Subject from making written notes in West Berlin, Subject occasionally was forced to write down the names of all tenants residing at a certain West Berlin address. Subject would record the names on small slips of paper which Subject hid in his gloves when he crossed the border into East Berlin. If Subject was unable to complete his assigned MFS mission in one day and Subject was forced to stay in an East Berlin hotel, no particular hotels specified by the MFS, for one night, Subject was ordered to hide any written notes in the soap container. After returning to the operational apartment in Cottbus, Subject referred to his written notes while preparing a written report concerning a West Berlin surveillance or address check. It was prohibited for Subject to burn or destroy his own notes. The address check report reflected information pertaining to description of the target building and adjoining buildings, number and type of tenants, if possible, residing in the target building, type and identity of streets near the

[REDACTED]

target area, and type of district (whether residential or business). Furthermore, Subject had to include in his report the exact route he traveled to the target area, identity of the transportation media utilized, and the length of stay in the target area. Regarding surveillance reports, Subject had to record the exact times when the person entered a particular building in West Berlin, description of persons met in West Berlin, and identity of locations where the individuals met. Prior to undertaking a West Berlin trip, Subject was paid approximately 40 to 50 DM East in advance by the handling agent. The money was utilized for expenses incurred during the trip, including train fare, and Subject signed a receipt for the money with his cover name. After completing a mission, Subject had to submit his handling agents with receipts covering hotel and food bills, and train tickets. If Subject did not spend the entire amount of money advanced during the trip, the handling agent permitted Subject to keep the amount that was not spent.

"During October 1959, [b6] assigned Subject the mission to travel from Cottbus to East Berlin, go to the parking lot located in front of the Friedrich Strasse railroad station, and record the license numbers of Cottbus vehicles that frequently were parked in the lot. Furthermore, Subject was instructed to follow the car occupants to West Berlin and determine the places visited. Subject remembered frequently observing a light brown, Wolga sedan, bearing license number, 2M 12-11, parked near the Friedrich Strasse railroad station. The driver of the vehicle, an alleged unidentified Cuban, East Germany, resident, often went to the coffee shop of the Hilton Hotel in West Berlin. Subject did not follow the male into the coffee shop and Subject was unable to state if this male met other individuals in the shop. The Cuban resident was also observed by Subject entering the theater ticket agency located in Berlin-Charlottenburg (British Sector), Kurfuerstendamm 220.

"In early October 1959, [b6] drove Subject to the Cottbus railroad station waiting room. Here, a second unidentified MFS agent was sitting at a table with a male civilian. [b6] informed Subject that the male was an MFS source whom the MFS did not trust, and Subject was assigned the mission to follow the male to West Berlin to determine if the male actually flew from the Berlin-Tempelhof (US Sector) airport to Frankfurt/Main M1775L, FRG. The male departed from Cottbus by train at approximately 0904 hours, on either 12 or 19 October 1959, detrained at Koenigs Wusterhausen, East Germany, boarded the S-Bahn (elevated train) and traveled to Friedrichstrasse in East Berlin. After arriving at the Berlin-Tempelhof S-Bahn Station, the male detrained and walked to the airport where he boarded a plane bound for Frankfurt/Main, at approximately 1400 hours. After the male had departed for Frankfurt/Main, Subject returned to Cottbus and reported to the MFS accordingly. Subject claimed to have seen the male on Cottbus streets after the flight on approximately 16 or 17 March 1960. According to [b6] the male performs unidentified MFS missions in the FRG.

"In late October 1959, [b6] drove Subject in an official MFS vehicle to the Cuban railroad station after mid-night. Subject was instructed to

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ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDR USA/DCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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unit at the railroad station where a male, an alleged MFS source, would arrive shortly and travel to West Berlin. [b6] told Subject to follow the male, 40 years old, 5'7" tall, medium build, oval face, big nose, thin brown hair, wore an old felt hat and a light brown trench coat, carried a leather brief case, to West Berlin. The male made the trip by train from Cottbus via Frankfurt/Oder VT6999, East Germany, to the Ostbahnhof in East Berlin. From the Ostbahnhof, Subject followed the male by S-Bahn to the Lehnert S-Bahn station in Berlin-Tiergarten (British Sector). The male detrained at the Lehnert station, walked to an unidentified post office near the aforementioned station, and made a telephone call. After waiting at the post office for approximately thirty minutes, the male was met by a female and they engaged in conversation near the post office. At this time, Subject discontinued the surveillance.

"On 27 February 1960, Subject followed the male to West Berlin a second time. The male traveled by train from Guben to Erkner VU1509, East Germany, where the male detrained and boarded the S-Bahn to West Berlin. After detraining at the Berlin-Neukölln (US Sector) S-Bahn Station, Subject followed the male to an apartment house located in [b6] [b6]. As soon as the male entered the aforementioned apartment house, Subject discontinued the surveillance and returned to Cottbus.

"On approximately 10 November 1959, [b6] after showing Subject the photograph of a male who allegedly worked as a source for the MFS DV Cottbus, indicated that the male was making a trip by train to West Berlin the following day. [b6] instructed Subject to travel to West Berlin alone and start the surveillance in Berlin-Schoeneberg (US Sector), at the intersection of Hauptstrasse and Dominicus Strasse. Here, the male allegedly was going to make a meeting at approximately 1300 hours, on 11 November 1959. Subject made the trip to West Berlin and began the surveillance at the planned meeting site at 1245 hours. At approximately 1300 hours, the Cottbus male arrived on the scene, where he was awaited by a second unidentified male. According to MFS instructions, Subject followed the two males to the Kleine Rats Stuben Restaurant which was located near the Schoeneberg city hall on Steinstrasse. Both males entered the restaurant and after one hour they were joined by a third unidentified male at a table located in a segregated corner of the restaurant. After three hours had passed, the third individual left the Kleine Rats Stuben alone and Subject followed this person to another unidentified restaurant located nearby. After the third male had entered the new restaurant, Subject returned to the Kleine Rats Stuben in time to observe the Cottbus resident and his partner leave the stuben for Hauptstrasse. Subject lost the two individuals on Hauptstrasse because of heavy foot traffic and he discontinued the surveillance.

"In early December 1959, [b6] instructed Subject to travel by S-Bahn to the border crossing point located at Klein Machnow UJ3006, East Germany, and Duerpel in West Berlin. Subject was told to remain on the East side of the border for two days in succession between 0500 hours and 1100 hours, and watch for a Cottbus vehicle bearing license number ZM 33-22 or ZM 22-33. If the driver and the car occupants parked the vehicle and proceeded on foot or by S-Bahn to West Berlin, Subject was supposed to follow the occupants and ascertain where they went and whom they met in West Berlin. The vehicle never appeared at the aforementioned border crossing point.

0419

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON
BY CDR JUN 18 1998
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"On 23 December 1959, at approximately 1429 hours, an unidentified Cottbus married couple boarded a Berlin bound train. The couple made the trip via Koenigs Wusterhausen and after arriving at Berlin-Groeschau (Soviet Sector), they took the S-Bahn to the Papestrasse station. Here, the couple transferred to another S-Bahn bound for the Berlin-Mariefelde (US Sector) station, where they detrained and walked to a two family villa located at [b6] (US Sector), [b6]. After the couple entered the main entrance to the villa, Subject discontinued the surveillance and returned to Cottbus.

"In addition to conducting the aforementioned surveillance, Subject made address checks for the MFS DV Cottbus in [b6] (British Sector), [b6]

[b6]
[b6]
[b6]
[b6]

"Subject's last mission was assigned by [b6] on [b6]. He was asked to take photographs of bars, cafes, and restaurants located in the vicinity of the Zoo, Lehnert, Gesundbrunnen, Savignyplatz, Charlottenburg, and Tempelhof S-Bahn stations. Subject remained in West Berlin from [b6] to [b6] to complete the aforementioned mission. He used his personal camera, an Altix 5 East German model, and exposed six rolls of thirty five millimeter film. Subject maintained that he never saw the processed film after giving it to his handling agent. Subject received \$5.00 East for carrying out the photographic mission.

* * *

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 18 June 1998
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

0420

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT
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Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

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Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

5 USC 552 (b)(1)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

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Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s)

421

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

File
EE 395979

b6

TOR 16/1220 Z

ACTION ROUTINE		MSG (Check)	ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
INFO	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE	DA	CONFIDENTIAL
			X		

FROM:

CO 66th CIC GROUP BAD CANNSTATT, GERMANY

TO:

b1

CONFIDENTIAL / - 38/c Opr for AEUC-LB from AEUC-OPCE. (EGIS)

Ref: Ur Bv-59-2547.

- (U)
1. ~~(S)~~ SUBJ: Training for MFS mbrs.
 2. ~~(S)~~ Fol may be rel to **b1** Rel Nr. 15784.

"This orgn has no info which would tend to verify the existence of course of two yrs at which MFS informants are trained for operations in W GER after unification of Germany is accomplished."

MR: RHC/wb 14 Jul 59, Adv fwds neg reply to Bonn for passing to **b1** Query involved MFS school for training agts for activity in W GER after unification. Info allegedly came from **b1** **b1** but is not borne out in either Gp's debriefing or DAD debriefing.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION-PRINCIPALLY RE-MOVE ALL INTERNAL SECURITY INFORMATION FROM GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE DATE TIME GROUP IS QUOTED.

EXCLUDED FROM CENTRAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

0422

DATE	TIME
11	1930Z
MONTH	YEAR
July	59

WRITER	SYMBOL		SIGNATURE	
	AEUC-OPCE (EGIS) 274/46		b6	
	TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature if required)		MAJ AI (INF) ASST OPO CI	
	b6 CAPT AI (INF)		CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL BY b6 CAPT	
	AI (MPC) CHIEF EGIS SEC CE BR			
PHONE 8472		PAGE NR.	NR. OF PAGES	
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION				
CONFIDENTIAL				

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FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 423-426

~~SECRET~~

OACofS, G2, Hq, USAFEUR, APO 403
Attn: CI Branch

31 March 1958

b6 G2 USAFEUR Liaison Office, OCA
American Embassy, Box 105, APO 80, US Army
MIS Sabotage Training

1. Reference is made to telephone conversation of 31 Jan 1958 with
b6 of your office and to our OM of 3 Feb 1958, file b1
SUBJECT as above.

2.

b1

a.

b.

c.

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e.

f.

g.

b1

0427

b1

b1

~~SECRET~~

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL

DECLASSIFIED

REF ID: A6658-2257

28

~~SECRET~~

b1

7.

0428

a/c: 1)
2)
3)

b1

Copy to:
CO, Hq, 66th OIC Group, Attn: S-3 Section, CE Div
(for incls see page 3)

~~SECRET~~

EXCLUDED FROM GDS/BAC
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

27

~~SECRET~~

w/4 incls:

1)
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4)

b1

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0429

1710

SECRET

EXCISE
DECLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

b1

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT
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☒

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5 USC 552 (b)(1)

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NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 430-442

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~(Not Classified In-
less Date Entered)~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

(SR 380-320-10)

26 FEB 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

Region VIII, 66th CIC Group, CE Division, EE-567253/d

b6

b6 / bb

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk - Potsdam,
RE: Modus Operandi (C) (u)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN FINFORMATION:
CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
CANNOT BE JUDGED 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Recruitment of Source by MfS in

b1

He was imprisoned and interrogated by the Volkspolizei (People's Police) and was told that it would be advisable for him to work for the MfS if he wanted to be released from prison. Source agreed to work for them and signed a statement of obligation that he had copied from a stenciled text that was given to him. He was given the cover name of [] to be used for all future reports.

b1

2. Missions assigned to Source by the MfS:

a. About two weeks after his release from prison, Source met with his handling agent, Fnu [b6] a Junior Lieutenant, MfS office, ZOSSEN, as previously instructed. The meeting took place in a forest in MAHLOW UU9103, GDR, a suburb of BERLIN. Source received the mission to go to a certain address in BERLIN-Charlottenburg (British Sector) to verify a name on the door of an apartment building there. In case of an emergency, Source was given an MfS telephone number to call, which he cannot recall. Source accomplished this mission but cannot recall the exact address or the name that he found there. Source reported to his handling agent two weeks later in MAHLOW and was instructed to submit a written report including a detailed description of the apartment building. The subsequent missions assigned to Source from July 1955 to early 1956 were of a general nature, such as, reports on the general political attitude of his fellow employees and general public reaction to the various laws and actions taken by the GDR government. Source, on two or three occasions went to certain BERLIN (Soviet Sector) restaurants to report on the general conversation of the patrons. The meetings with his handling agent were usually in the forest at MAHLOW, taking place approximately every eight weeks by mutual agreement. Source's handling agent also contacted him at Source's residence in BERLIN (Soviet Sector) and a few times he sent telegrams arranging for special meetings.

b. In early 1956 the missions became more specific and the meeting place was switched to a room on the second floor of a one family dwelling.

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REGRADING DATA

CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED

0443

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

DA

FORM

568 (Formerly Replaces WD AGO Form 568, 1 Jun 47,
1 Dec 1951 DA AGO) which may be used(Not Classified Un-
less Date Entered)~~CONFIDENTIAL~~~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGL (7) 3-57-25M-57236

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CE Division; EE-567253/d

SUBJECT: EGIS - MfS - Bezirk - Potsdam, Re: Modus Operandi (c)

(u) 26 FEB 1968

b6 /bb

This house was located in BLANKENFELDE UU9131, GDR, near MAHLOW, the last stop before MAHLOW on the railroad. Source could not recall the exact location of the building. At one of these meetings in the early part of 1956, Source met a superior of his handling agent, a Fnu [b6] had previously taken part in the recruiting of Source at the prison in ZOSSEN. At this same meeting, Source was given a special mission to take a roll of 35 millimeter AGFA film to a letter drop located at BERLIN-Kreuzberg (US Sector), in a small park near the Prinzenstrasse U-Bahn station. The film was sealed in a small aluminum cylinder wrapped with friction tape. Source had to sign a form with the heading AUFTRAG (Mission) which contained all the details pertaining to the mission including the exact location of the letter drop, a certain time for delivery, and a statement to the effect that Source would not tamper with the contents of the cylinder and that he would make a written report after the mission had been accomplished. Source deposited the container in a hole in the footing of a wooden bench at approximately 2300 hours date unknown, and later submitted a written report as previously directed. Source became ill after this last assignment and his next contact with the MfS was not until June 1956 when he was summoned to the MfS office in ZOSSEN, Wasserstrasse, number unknown. Source was told to go to BERLIN-Schoeneberg, (US Sector), Rudolf Wilder Platz, to attend the demonstrations in front of the Rathaus (City Hall) on the occasion of the anniversary of the 17 June 1953 riots. Source was to submit a report on the speeches made by the FRG politicians, the number of people there and any other facts concerning the demonstration that might be of interest to the MfS. Source went to the demonstration on 17 June 1956, but arrived late and missed the main speeches. Source extracted the details of the demonstration the following day from the West BERLIN newspapers and prepared a false report from this information. Approximately one week later Source met his handling agent at the house in BLANKENFELDE and presented the false report. The meetings from this time until the early fall between Source and his handling agent were very infrequent due to the excuses Source made concerning business and the fact that Source was injured on one of his construction jobs. The missions assigned to Source during this period were of a very general nature.

c. In the fall of 1956, Source, while convalescing from his accident, was contacted at home by his handling agent. They went to a restaurant and there Source was told to watch for any GDR residents who might have DE West in their possession. Source also received instructions to try to be recruited by any FRG intelligence agencies, Allied agencies, Agency B-VIII or Agency C-VIII. Source promised to do this but claims he never took any action to fulfill this promise. In late 1956 Source met his handling agent in MAHLOW and was given another film to be delivered to a letter drop located at the footing of a bridge that crosses the TETLOW Canal near the BERLIN-Lichterfelde (US Sector) railroad station. Source could not recall the exact location of the bridge but pointed out on a map of BERLIN a bridge that connects with Krahmerstrasse near Lichterfelde Schlosspark. Source accomplished this mission and later submitted a written report. Approximately one week after this trip to BERLIN (US Sector) Source was sent to the Lichterfelde

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ON
BY CDR USN J. S. 1998 F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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CE Division; EE-567253/d

SUBJECT: EGIS - MfS - Bezirk - Potsdam, Re: Modus Operandi

(u)
(c)

26 FEB 1958

b6 /bb

(US Sector) S-Bahn station to observe a man who was supposed to receive a letter or some papers from a female. Source was given a description of the man but was not given his name. Source went to the station but did not see any meeting between a woman and a man. Source reported this to his handling agent and was told that it was alright as the man had arrived safely in BERLIN (Soviet Sector). Source could not recall the description of the man. In February 1957 Source was given another film container to deliver to West BERLIN. Source became ill and never made an attempt to deliver the container. About three weeks later Source was contacted by his handling agent through the mail, arranging another meeting. At this meeting Source explained to his handling agent that he had not delivered the film container because on his attempt to do so he felt he was being observed and that it was best not to try to deposit it in the letter drop. Source then told how he had fallen ill soon after this attempt and for that reason he still had the container in his possession. Source's handling agent told Source that he had done the right thing except that Source should have notified him that he was unable to perform his mission. The handling agent urged Source to find some excuse to report to a Western intelligence agency so that he could be recruited. Source explained that he could think of no reason to contact a Western agency and that he feared they would arrest him. His handling agent told him to work on a good story and to give it a try as soon as possible.

d. In March 1957 Source received another mission for the MfS. He had to go to a certain house located at BERLIN-Neukoelln (US Sector), Heidelberger Strasse and write down the names of any firms that were located there. The building had five stories and two or three side wings with factory and office space as well as apartments. Source does not recall the number of the house but remembers that one of the occupants there was the Domicus Klar, liquor firm. Source reported this information to his handling agent and was given a list of ten West BERLIN names and addresses to verify by the name plates on the door. Source did not want to carry out this mission because he felt he would be endangering West BERLIN residents. Source made no attempt to fulfil this mission and missed a scheduled meeting with his handling agent approximately three weeks later. Source continued to avoid contact with his handling agent by ignoring the letters and calls that were made by his handling agent. Source used his new job as a truckdriver with the VEB Englehardt Brewery which kept him away from home until late in the evenings and sometimes two or three nights when on long trips in the GDR.

e. In early June 1957 Source was ordered to attend a meeting with his handling agent at the MfS office in ZOSSEN. b6 was at this meeting and Source was severely reprimanded for avoiding contact with his handling agent and after being warned against any future negligence to duty, Source was given a new mission. Source was to go to a small hill near the border located in BERLIN-Lichterfelde (US Sector) in the afternoon on 17 June 1957. Source was to remain at this place from 1900 hours until 2000 hours to learn what he could about the plans of a crowd, that, according to the MfS, was

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ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDn... F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CE Division; EE-567253/d

SUBJECT: EGIS - MfS - Bezirk - Potsdam, Re: Modus Operandi (C)

(u) 26 Feb 1958

b6 bb

going to form there to demonstrate and march enmasse across the border. Source arrived at the site and found the area practically deserted. Source could see that a crowd was not going to form so at 1945 hours he crossed the border at this point into the GDR. Source was arrested immediately by a KVP (Kasernierte Volkspolizei - Garrisoned People's Police) officer who took him to a barracks in OSDORF UU8607, GDR, where he met his handling agent. Source's handling agent told him that he had disobeyed strict orders by not remaining at the assigned location until 2000 hours. Source was then taken to the MfS office in ZOSSEN. After a few hours he was released and told to report back in b6

3. Payments made to Source by the MfS KD in ZOSSEN: Source claims to have received approximately 400 DM East while working for the MfS. The payments were usually in the amounts of five or ten DM East to cover travel and other incidental expenses. Source received larger payments of 40 to 50 DM East when he made the letter drops deliveries to West BERLIN. Source claims that his payments were small because of his lack of cooperation with the MfS agents.

4.

5.

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(S-6)

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

65A-380-920-103

21 Jan 58

PREPARING OFFICE

Region VIII, 66th CIC Group, CE Division D-567252/d

LAL/ft

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Neubrandenburg, Re: Modus Operandi (cst)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE

USUALLY RELIABLE

CAIRLY RELIABLE

NOT USUALLY RELIABLE

UNRELIABLE 8

RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

७७. ॥ १५ ॥ ७७०५ - ७७०५

1948 FEB 24 14 0000

PROPERTY 1934

906194A: 4UE..

RESPECTFULLY YOURS

ENGINE OFF. 4.....

1. 1. The first part of the document is a list of the names of the persons who have been named in the document.

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. MFS liaison with the GDR Army:

b 1

2. Source, in his capacity as a political instructor, had an opportunity to observe MfS liaison with the GDR Army. Source stated that the MfS is responsible for all security affairs pertaining to any GDR army unit. For this purpose the MfS maintains a special branch known as Department I. As far as Source knows, the MfS has a branch office located in the compound of every military division or unit of comparable size. Furthermore, there is usually one liaison officer assigned to each regiment or corresponding unit. The MfS has no officers in units smaller than a regiment with the exception of specialized units such as engineer battalions.

3. Previously these liaison officers worked under cover. They wore the uniforms of their respective units and were seen very seldom in the compounds. In fall 1956 the entire system was changed. The MfS had discovered that the soldiers mistrusted and feared the MfS officers and were afraid to report to them voluntarily. Beginning in the fall of 1956 the liaison officers were introduced publicly and all soldiers were told to report to their respective MfS liaison officer should they find any Western propaganda material in the compound or observe any sabotage or Western propaganda activities. The new system appears to be very successful. At the present time many soldiers voluntarily report to their respective MfS liaison officers.

4. Every military officer is responsible for reporting immediately to his superiors any Western political activities in his unit. The commanding officers of all military units have instructions to report to their respective MfS liaison officer at once if they hear of or observe, any activities or incidents that might involve a security risk for their units. For this

~~0447~~

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DA

2010 Fall, Sec 1, Pg. 6

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CE Division D-567252/d

21 Jan 58

SUBJECT: EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Neubrandenburg, Re: Modus Operandi (C/A b6) /rt

purpose, every MfS officer has one internal telephone number where he or his assistants can be reached at any time day or night. It was rumored that the MfS has many informants, including officers as well as enlisted men, working for them in the units. Since the MfS liaison officers do business with so many people, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine who the informants are. Officers in charge of personnel files and employment contracts are in almost daily contact with the MfS liaison officer handling cases concerned with their unit. Source observed that the MfS cooperates closely with all officers in charge of military units down to company level. The MfS officers appear to have much influence in the GDR concerning military training and personnel affairs.

5. Source knows that the 6th GDR Division stationed at PASEWALK VV3229, GDR, and PRENZLAU VV2508, GDR, has a large MfS liaison office in its compound at PRENZLAU. The MfS Chief Liaison Officer, a major, has several other officers under his command. Among them are a Pnu b6 a captain, who is responsible for security affairs pertaining to the 6th Panzer Regiment, and a Pnu b6 a first lieutenant, who is responsible for security affairs pertaining to the 6th Artillery Regiment and 13th Armored Infantry Regiment. b6 allegedly told Source that he is also responsible for the AAA unit stationed at UECKERMUENDE VV3755, GDR.

6. Although not expressly stated in directives and regulations, the MfS liaison officers have considerable power in the military units. The liaison officers have their own office rooms within the military compounds. They also have their own Communist Party cells and political lectures. The liaison officers wear the uniform of their respective units, but occasionally wear civilian clothes.

7. Before fall 1956 there was rivalry among the military commanders, the party secretaries of the units, and the MfS officers, but since that time this rivalry apparently has ended by orders from higher authorities. At the present time party functionaries, military commanders, and MfS officers seem to be cooperating with one another on rather friendly terms.

8. According to Source, the MfS employs civilians to conduct surveillances of military personnel during off-duty hours. According to the new system, MfS officers also attempt to establish personal relations with military officers and their dependents in order to keep them under better control.

9. Source further added that until May 1957 every military unit of the GDR Army had one Soviet advisor who was more or less superior to all other military officers. These advisors were abandoned in May 1957 with the exception of the tank regiment of the 6th GDR Division stationed at PASEWALK.

0448

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ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDR USN/COM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CE Division D-567252/d

SUBJECT: EGIS-MfS-Bezirk Neubrandenburg, Re: Modus Operandi (U) 21 Jan 58 (S) b6 ft

Furthermore, there are two Soviet advisors, a Colonel and a Major, in the 6th Division compound at PASEWALK. There are also several Soviet officers of lesser rank who are stationed in the PASEWALK compound. Source stated that the Soviets supply the staff of every GDR division with advisors for nearly every military subject. These advisors are more or less superior even to the respective GDR Division Commanders. The Soviets never directly interfere in the military affairs of the GDR Army, but will discuss problems with German commanders from time to time. All orders and directives, although originated by the German commanding officers, have to be approved by the respective Soviet advisors before they can become effective.

10. Source stated that he was responsible for professional training and schooling, and occasionally had to make speeches on political subjects. Source's main lectures concerned tactics, the part of the masses and the individual in modern warfare, and similar subjects. The directives for Source's work came from the Propaganda Office of the GDR Army which is located in BERLIN (Soviet Sector). All professional schooling was coordinated with the plans of the SED during meetings with the SED Central Committee in BERLIN (Soviet Sector). In addition to the lectures given by Source, the members of the GDR Army had to attend lectures by Communist Party functionaries and FDJ (Freie Deutsche Jugend - Free German Youth) representatives. Source also had the further responsibility to influence members of the GDR Army to remain in the service when their term of enlistment expired.

11. Source claims that he had plans for defection for a long time because he believed himself under surveillance. His superiors did not trust him because his mother and two sisters live in West BERLIN. On 3 August 1957 Source had political argument with two sergeants of his unit. Due to his inebriated state, Source made deprecating remarks against the GDR regime, which were reported later by the sergeants. One of the sergeants informed Source's wife that Source had been reported, and she in turn warned Source, who fled to West BERLIN on 5 August 1957.

(P-6)

Region VIII File Examination: A check of Registry and R&A Files revealed that information has been previously reported on a Fnu b6 possibly identical to the Fnu b6 mentioned in this report.

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ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

0449

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REGRADED DATA
CANNOT BE REDETERMINED

CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

25 October 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

Region XII, 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Group, APO 227, US Army

SUBJECT

MFS Schools

Re: Modus Operandi
(Communications)

D-395979/d

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1.

b1

- a. His interest and education in the field of communications.
- b. His being a member of the Volkspolizei (People's Police) in Jaben, East Germany.
- c. The recommendation of his superior.

b1

2. Enroute to Potsdam, on 1 October 1956, Source was taken to Angermuend/Frankfurt on Oder, East Germany, where he was given an employment interview and a physical examination. The interview consisted of a very few questions among which Source was asked if he had relatives in the West Zone of Germany, and how long he had studied telephone and telegraphy through home study courses.

3. Upon his arrival in Potsdam, Source was driven directly to Potsdam-Eiche where the Third Battalion and the [b6] Source was informed that he had been assigned to work as a [b6] and was given approximately two hours of instruction in the [b6] by [b6] Commander of the MFS Regimental Headquarters, identified by the cover name [b6] and located at Berlin 2, East Germany.

4. The [b1]

ing into the [b1] Of the lines com-
(Source was unable to clarify the term "OB"). A person calling in on an [b6]

b6

identification number.

Prior to making the connection the operator would check a roster of code numbers and names, check with the person to whom the call was being made, or ask the Officer of the Day if the connection should be made.

ENCLOSURE - CENTRAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

#450

Original in 66-010-1

DISTRIBUTION

WD AGO FORM 568
1 JUN 47

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SL. ARY OF INFORMATION

(SR 380-320-10)

DATE

21 Oct 57

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Division D-567246/d

b6

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Erfurt
RE: Modus Operandi (u)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIDENTIAL ASSISTANT 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Recruitment by MfS KD in EISENACH NB9249:

b1

In October 1956, Source was visited by a MfS agent [b6] who was assigned to the above plant. Source was informed that he had to give information to the MfS. Source was not obligated because being a high SED functionary he was forced to give the MfS all the information it wanted. His mission was to report on the production, individual output and any difficulties at the plant. He also received the mission of observing the employees and reporting on their political attitude. Source allegedly refused to report on the employees and only submitted reports concerning technical matters. Source was frequently visited by the agent in his office. He never met the agent outside his office because, as he told [b6] Source was well known through his SED activities and did not want his MfS connection to become known. On 5 February 1957, Source reported sick with a nervous breakdown and had no further contact with the MfS until 10 July 1957. On that day he was visited by an MfS agent who asked him when he would resume work again. Source agreed to return to work but would first take his annual leave. He defected on 22 July 1957 to West BERLIN to avoid any further contact with the MfS.

(F-6)

2. Region VIII examination: Negative.

0451

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DA FORM 568 (Formerly Replaces WD AGO Form 568 1 Jun 47, Dec 1951 DA AGO) which may be used

(Not Classified Unless Data Entered)

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AGL (I) 3-57-25M-57236

SECRET

CIC CENTRAL FILE

AEUC-SCCE: EE-567241/d

17 June 1957

SUBJECT: MFS Modus Operandi - New Trends (C)

18 JUN 1957

TO: Commanding Officer
Region VIII, 66th CIC Group
APO 742, US Army
ATTN: AEUC-SCCE

1. (SECRET)

b1

a.

b1

(1)

b1

(2)

b1

b1

b1

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Classified SECRET by authority of Colonel
b6 Inf Hq. 66th CIC Group

0452

Page 1 of 2 Pages
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SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM CENTRAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

HQ
LOG NR 40650

~~SECRET~~
AMUC-SCOE: KE-567241/d
SUBJECT: MFS Modus Operandi - New Trends (u) (S)

2. (UNCLASSIFIED) Request that this Headquarters be advised on a continuing basis of any information developed concerning the above mentioned trends. If information is currently available to your Region, request that it be submitted.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

b6

Captain, MI (Armor)
Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt Mil 8371
DER/RLM/mr

M/R: Above advises Rgn VIII of new MFS trends and requests info avail to them.

0453

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ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDR USN F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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AEUC-SCCE: EW-567245/c/d

16 May 1957

SUBJECT: EGIS - MFS Bezirk DRESDEN
Re: EEI and Targets and Modus Operandi (c)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, US Army
ATTN: AEAGB-C(OA)

1. Reference is made to ICM CI-CE-1-55, subject: SFS (State Sec-
retariat for State Security) (GDR/East German Intelligence), dated 18
February 1955.

2. Forwarded herewith are the following Region VIII, 66th CIC
Group, reports:

a. In sextuplet, Summary of Information, subject: EGIS -
MFS Bezirk DRESDEN, Re: EEI and Targets, file EE-567245/c, dated 11
March 1957.

b. In triplicate, Summary of Information, subject: EGIS -
MFS Bezirk DRESDEN, Re: Modus Operandi, file EE-567245/d, dated 11
March 1957.

3. Source of the attached report is [redacted]

b1

4. Examination of Central Registry files revealed the following:

a. A CPI card dated 7 April 1954 contains information on one
[redacted] b6 born [redacted] b6 in [redacted] b6 Since
16 Mar 48, [redacted] b6 was employed as an interpreter and telephone operator
in the railroad office of HIRKA/Wiesky. [redacted] b6 was a member of the SED,
ROTHAMBURG from 1947-53. He fled to West BERLIN on 29 March 1954.

0454
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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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CIC CENTRAL FILE

HD
LOG NR

36721

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AMUC-SCCE: KE-567245/a/4

SUBJECT: EGIS - MFS Berlin BRENNER

Re: KKI and Targets and Modus Operandi (C)

b. A GPI card dated 22 Nov 54 revealed the following information pertaining to [b6] born [b6] in [b6]

[b6] previous address was [b6]

[b6] The present address is [b6]
[b6] was a member of the FDGB from 1 Dec 1952 to 15 Nov 1953 and a member of the DPD from 1 Dec 52 to 1 Mar 54. The 3rd and 6th of May 1954, she was interrogated by MFS and obligated to discover different offices of the BERLIN Screening Center. [b6] was suspected of maintaining connections with MFS ROTTERDAM. [b6] defected to West BERLIN on 7 May 1954.

c. [b6] German national born [b6] claimed to have worked for an intelligence agency in BERLIN which has ceased to function. Files failed to substantiate his claim.

d. No record of [b1] or [b6] Pmu.

5. Information contained in the attached report may be released to other US and Allied Intelligence Agencies; no other dissemination has been made by this Group.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incls:

1. SOI, dtd 11 Mar 57 (sextuple)
2. SOI, dtd 11 Mar 57 (trip)

[b6]

Captain, MI (Armor)
Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt Mil 8371

[b6]/mr

M/R: Above finds G2 a report concerning the recruitment of one [b1] [b1] by the MFS, and assigning SUBJECT the mission of travelling to the Federal Republic of Germany to locate one [b6] and an [b6] [b6] [b6] allegedly took [b6] to a US Agency, located in West BERLIN, where [b6] was told to persuade SUBJECT to continue to send information to the West.

0455

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2

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

10 May 1957

PREPARING OFFICE

Region III, 66th CIC Group

D-395979/d

SUBJECT

East German Intelligence-MfS
MfS Schools
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE
USUALLY RELIABLE
FAIRLY RELIABLE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
UNRELIABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
PROBABLY TRUE
POSSIBLY TRUE
DOUBTFULLY TRUE
IMPROBABLE
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

On 24 April 1957, Source B-III was interrogated by Agency A-III and furnished the following information concerning the Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit (Ministry for State Security) (MfS) Bezirk Suhl school's modus operandi:

Modus Operandi:

Security of Personnel: During the length of time required for completion of a course of instruction at the MfS school in Sonneberg, the personnel in attendance are not permitted to leave the confines of the installation containing the school.

Course of Instruction: The normal course of instruction at the MfS school in Sonneberg, PA5581, East Germany runs for approximately four months. Normal attendance for these courses is between 15 and 30 students.

(F-6)

0456

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b1

FE 015996

1 - CO Hqs 66th

1 - Region III

WD AGO FORM 1 JUN 47 568

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386

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☒

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)
NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 457-458

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☒

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

5 USC 552 (b)(1)

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☐

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

459-468

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HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154 US ARMY

JUN 14 1956

13 June 1956

CIC CENTRAL FILE

AEUC-OCE; D-567243/4

SUBJECT: BGIS - MFS Bezirk CHEMNITZ
Re: Modus Operandi (C) (u)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, US Army
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch, G2CICE

1. Reference is made to ICM CI-CE-1-55, subject: SFS (State Secretariat for State Security) (GDR/East German Intelligence), dated 18 February 1955.

2. Forwarded herewith in triplicate is a Region VIII, 66th CIC Group, Summary of Information, subject and file as above, dated 28 May 1956.

3. Examination of Central Registry files of this Group revealed no information identifying any personalities mentioned in the attached report except for the following:

a. The telephone number KARL MARX STADT 33 & 58 is confirmed.

b. b6 born b6 in b6 was KVP
"Hauptwachtmeister" Artillery in LOEBAS. FFW in WISMAR since 7 July 1946. Fled to BERLIN on 4 October 1955.

(Date of Information: 5 Oct 55) (F-6)

4. Source of the attached report b1

b1

5. Agency "A" is the Office of Special Investigations, BERLIN.

6. Information contained in the attached report may be released to other US and Allied Intelligence Agencies in its present form. No other distribution of the attached report has been made by this Group.

0469

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AA41

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AFUC-OCB; D-567243/4

SUBJECT: EGIS - MFS Bezirk CHEMNITZ
Re: Modus Operandi (G) (u)

7. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl:

SOI dt4 28 May 56 (trip)

Telephone: Stgt Mil 8371

b6

bg

b6

Capt, Armor
Adjutant

M/R: Above fws to G2 info rec from Rgn VIII concerning MFS Bezirk
CHEMNITZ Re: Modus Operandi, contributed by b1

b6

bg

b6

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

0470

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
28 May 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team.

D-567243/a

RSE/awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MFS - Bezirk Chemnitz
Re: Modus OperandiCODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE
USUALLY RELIABLE
FAIRLY RELIABLE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
UNRELIABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

OF INFORMATION

ASST
CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCE
PROBABLY TRUE
POSSIBLY TRUE
DOUBTFUL
IMPROBABLE
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Recruitment by MFS installation in KARL MARX STADT (US5433). In March 1956, Source was recruited as a potential penetration type informant while serving a four (4) month prison sentence in KARL MARX STADT for failing to notify the police upon changing his place of residence (Maldegenstr.). Source was obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the MFS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source was instructed, upon his release from prison, to call KARL MARX STADT phone number 33 4 58 and ask for Frau b6 male, who was primarily responsible for Source's recruitment and later Source's principal handling agent. Source met b6 three (3) times at the staircase of the post office in AUE (US3706) and was assigned the mission of reporting as a refugee to BERLIN-Marienfelde (US Sector) Refugee Center and was to attempt to obtain a position with a US or Western agency. Source was instructed to write a letter addressed to b6 CHEMNITZ, Schule an der Annerstrasse, number unknown, after he arrived in West BERLIN. If Source was successful in establishing contact with a US or Western agency, the letter would contain the following message: "I arrived, I'm feeling fine and very soon I will have a job." If Source was not successful, the message would read: "I'm in a bad situation, no money, no job, but I hope this will change very soon." During Source's third meeting with b6 Source's story, documents, and instructions were "checked out" and Source was obliged to sign another statement agreeing to work for the MFS and was assigned the cover name "Manfred TROEGER." Source was transported from AUE to KARL MARX STADT to BERLIN-Crunau (Soviet Sector) by a chauffeured MFS passenger vehicle. Source was instructed to keep an appointment with b6 at 11 hours, 3 May 1956, at the S-Bahnhof BERLIN-Treptow (Soviet Sector). If b6 could not keep this appointment, Source was to be met by another MFS agent, who would greet Source with a sentence containing "Karthause von Parma" and Source would answer with a phrase containing the word "Babylon." This meeting place was later changed from S-Bahnhof BERLIN-Treptow to S-Bahnhof BERLIN-Stalin Allee (Soviet Sector). Source received 50 DM from b6 during their first meeting on 27 March 1956 and 15 DM at BERLIN-Crunau shortly before his departure for West BERLIN. Source was required to sign a receipt for the 15 DM. Source came to West BERLIN on 16 April 1956 and immediately reported to Agency "A" and told them of his recruitment by MFS. Agency "A" referred Source to this Region on 17 April 1956.

(P-6)

2. Region VIII files revealed no information regarding the personality mentioned in this report.

3. The telephone number KARL MARX STADT 33 4 58 is recorded as of 12 Jan 56 as the number of Major b6 Chief of MFS Bezirk Chemnitz. (P-6)

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ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDR USA/COM EAS

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HEADQUARTERS REGION VIII
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 742 US ARMY

CICE
FT/Hlo/brach

D-567248/e,d

5 June 1956

SUBJECT: RGIS - MFS - Desist Gers, Re: KRI and Targets,
Modus Operandi

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group, USAREUR
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: CE Division

1. FORWARDED: SOI's dated 1 June 1956, Subject and file
as above.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source: b1 / - 122210/191414C
b1 born b1 in
a refugee, residing at time of interview at the Marienfelde
Refugee Center.

b. Evaluation of Source: F

c. How information was obtained by Source: Source was
recruited by the MFS as an informant.

d. Date Source obtained information: b1

e. Date Agent received information: 27 February 1956

3. REMARKS:

a. Source was not susceptible to exploitation by the Pro-
duction Section, Counter Espionage Team, this Region, and was returned
to the refugee stream for normal processing.

b. Information regarding an attempt made by the SIS to
recruit Source as an informant is being forwarded in SOI dated 1
June 1956, file D-567132, Subject: SIS - Stadthaus Halle.

2 Incls:
SOI's dtd 1 June 56

0472

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b6

Major, Armor
Commanding

Berlin 42323/ b6 /WJM/ops/ep

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AC15

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE																
PREPARING OFFICE 66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567248/d		b6 / fs																
SUBJECT EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Gera Re: Modus Operandi	<table border="1"><thead><tr><th colspan="2">CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION</th></tr><tr><th>OF SOURCE:</th><th>OF INFORMATION:</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>COMPLETELY RELIABLE A</td><td>CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1</td></tr><tr><td>USUALLY RELIABLE B</td><td>PROBABLY TRUE 2</td></tr><tr><td>FAIRLY RELIABLE C</td><td>POSSIBLY TRUE 3</td></tr><tr><td>NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D</td><td>DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4</td></tr><tr><td>UNRELIABLE E</td><td>IMPROBABLE 5</td></tr><tr><td>RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F</td><td>TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6</td></tr></tbody></table>		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION		OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:	COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1	USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2	FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4	UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5	RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6
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UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5																	
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6																	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION																		
<p>Recruitment by an MfS installation in Kreis Gera: In June or July 1955, Source was summoned to the Volkspolizei (People's police) office located at RONNEBURG (US0239), Marktplatz, and was interrogated by an MfS agent. Source was recruited as a part-time MfS informant and was required to sign a confidential informant obligation. He was given the cover name b6 and was assigned the mission of observing his fellow workers. He met his handling agent about every two (2) weeks at the above-mentioned Volkspolizei office. Source continued his work as an MfS informant until early October 1955, when he moved away from RONNEBURG. Source was not contacted again by the MfS, and he had received no financial compensation from the MfS.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(P-6)</p>																		
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<p>0473</p>																		
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1 JUN 47

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

23 May 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIG Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567241/2

b6

awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - SFS - Headquarters
Re: Modus OperandiCODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

eight-tenths (1.9) seconds for a revolution, this factor is negligible.

d. Exhibit " III " illustrates the metal frame on which the plates are mounted and through which the axle which rotates the device is inserted. The frame is made of four (4) iron U-shaped bands which are held in place by aluminum plates. The license plates are inserted into the iron bands and are then fastened in place by small tin overlaps which are also attached to the aluminum plates.

e. Exhibit " E " illustrates the axle which rotates the device and which serves at the same time as a holder for the light bulbs which illuminate the device from within. The lighting system is connected to the other lights of the vehicle and is independent of the rotation of the device.

f. Exhibit " K " illustrates the transmission of the device which transmits the power from the motor to the axle.

g. Exhibit " L " illustrates the various parts of the transmission in a side view.

h. The device is set in motion when a button, located on the dashboard of the vehicle and connected to the battery of the vehicle and to the motor of the device, is pushed. (Attached are Exhibits " " and " " in which the parts referenced in the following description are illustrated.) As the motor goes into motion, wheel "A" begins its rotation. Since the connecting pin "a" on wheel "A" fits into socket "c" on wheel "B", wheel "B" is set in motion. The connecting pin "b" then engages in one (1) of the four (4) slots on wheel "C". Wheel "C" is attached to the axle and thus the device goes into rotation. At the same time that the connecting pin "b" engages in one (1) of the four (4) slots on wheel "C", the teeth on wheel "F" engage with the teeth on wheel "E" establishing an electrical circuit, since wheel "E" is connected to the battery. At the same time that wheel "B" completes a quarter turn and connecting pin "b" is disengaged from wheel "C", wheel "F" completes a quarter turn and is disengaged from wheel "E", breaking the electrical circuit and shutting off the motor.

(F-6)

2. Region VIII file examination: Information regarding the MFC Prison at BERLIN-Hohenschonhausen has been previously reported in an SGI dated 12 October 1955, reference D-567241, Subject: SFS Headquarters.

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ON

JUN 18 1998

BY CDR USARMCOM F01/PO

AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

23 May 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-557241/a

b6

/awt

SUBJECT

SGIS - KFS - Headquarters
Re: Organization

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. The KFS Prison at BERLIN-Hohenschoenhausen (Soviet Sector) is organized in four (4) separate compounds, or Objects, which are as follows:

- a. Object I, which is the largest of the Objects
- b. Object "U-BOOT," which houses pre-trial prisoners
- c. Object "KEIKE," which is a supply depot for automobile parts
- d. Object "X," where prisoners work under the supervision of

Main Department S of the KFS, and which is organized into workshops as follows:

(1) Chemical workshop, where two (2) prisoners are employed at chemical research under the supervision of a Junior Lieutenant. These prisoners are segregated from other prisoners at all times.

(2) Galvanic workshop, where two (2) prisoners are employed at repairing chrome or nickel on automobiles and cameras under the supervision of a Lieutenant.

(3) Carpenters workshop, where eight (8) prisoners are employed at manufacturing and repairing furniture and manufacturing wooden boxes under the supervision of a Lieutenant.

(4) Mechanics and opticians workshop, where 40 prisoners are employed at manufacturing parts for automobiles, cameras, watches, and optical equipment under the supervision of a Captain, a Senior Lieutenant, two (2) Lieutenants, and two (2) Junior Lieutenants.

(5) Printing workshop, where 10 prisoners are allegedly employed at printing various types of credentials under the supervision of a Lieutenant and a Junior Lieutenant. These prisoners are segregated from other prisoners at all times.

(6) High Frequency workshop, where 20 prisoners are employed at manufacturing parts for and repairing radios, tape recorders, microphones, and aerials under the supervision of a Major, a Senior Lieutenant, and three

(3) Lieutenants. These prisoners were segregated from the other prisoners at all times.

(7) Supply room, where two (2) prisoners are employed at the maintenance of tools for the various workshops under the supervision of a Sergeant.

0475

2. The Command Staff at the KFS Prison located at BERLIN-Hohenschoenhausen is organized as follows:

a. Commander, a Lieutenant Colonel, responsible for the overall supervision of the Prison and its activities.

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ON JUN 18 1998
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1 JUN 47

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

23 May 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th SIG Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567241/d

b6

/awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MFS - Headquarters
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE
USUALLY RELIABLE
FAIRLY RELIABLE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
UNRELIABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
PROBABLY TRUE
POSSIBLY TRUE
DOUBTFULLY TRUE
IMPROBABLE
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. a. The MFS utilizes an electrically operated device which enables the driver of a vehicle to change both the rear and front license plates while the vehicle is in motion. The device was designed by Rudi JAHNKE (see paragraph , Re: Personalities), who was a prisoner at the MFS Prison at BERLIN-Hohenschoenhausen (Soviet Sector) from 1948 until February 1955. Up until 23 April 1955, 21 of these devices had been manufactured at BERLIN-Hohenschoenhausen, one (1) of which was allegedly turned over to Soviet engineers, while the other 20 were installed into 10 vehicles, one (1) device for front and rear of each vehicle. The devices were manufactured almost entirely by hand, and thus the manufacture of one (1) device took from six (6) to eight (8) weeks, including installation. All of the devices were installed in MFS vehicles which were all black, four (4) door sedans of BMW (Eisenach Motoren Werke - Eisenach Motor Works) make. The reason for the use of BMW's is that this make automobile has a metal plate attaching the bumpers to the body of the vehicle, thus concealing the device which is installed under the metal plate and behind the bumper. Each device was equipped with a total of four (4) different license plates, two (2) of which were "KB" plates (West BERLIN civilian plates), and two (2) of which were "GB" plates (formerly East BERLIN civilian plates). Thus a vehicle equipped with a device in the front and rear would have four (4) different sets of license plates, two (2) West BERLIN, and two (2) East BERLIN. Two (2) sets of control lamps, one (1) set each for the front and rear, are located on the dashboard of each vehicle (see Exhibit " "). The lamps are in four (4) different colors, each color corresponding to one (1) set of plates. These control lamps act as a safety check against either the front or rear device failing to operate properly once set in motion. If the two (2) lit lamps on the dashboard are not the same color, then the operator of the vehicle knows that the license plate in the front is not identical to the plate in the rear and remedial action must be taken. The devices are powered by "Bosch" windshield wiper motors which allegedly are purchased in West BERLIN. The license plates used are made of plexiglass and all of the devices contain an interior lighting system which illuminates the plates from inside.

b. Exhibit " I " illustrates how the device is inserted behind the bumper and under the metal plate connecting the bumper to the body of the vehicle. It also illustrates the control lamps which are located on the dashboard of the vehicle.

c. Exhibit " I " illustrates again how the device is inserted behind the bumper and under the metal plate connecting the bumper to the body of the vehicle. The window in the bumper is merely a space, coinciding with the size of the device, which is cut out of the bumper. While the device is revolving it protrudes through the window, but since it takes only one and

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BY CDR USAF

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WD AGO FORM 1 JUN 47 568


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2.



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EXHIBIT "II"

SOI REGION VIII

FILE: D-567241

SUBJECT: EGIS - MFS - Headquarters

DATE: 23 May 1956

478
0076

EVALUATION: P-6


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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE


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3.

Construction of frame,
carrying license plates



Head plates of
2.5 mm thick aluminium



3mm
made of 27mm thick
iron

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BY CDR/CDR/CDR/CDR F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

499

EXHIBIT "A"

SOI REGION VIII

FILE: D-567241

SUBJECT: EGIS - MFS - Headquarters

DATE: 25 May 1956

EVALUATION: P-6

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4.

Construction of axle
(for revolving frame)

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AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R







EXHIBIT "IV"

SOI REGION VIII

FILE: D-567241

SUBJECT: ECIS - MFS - Headquarters

DATE: 23 May 1956


EVALUATION: P-6

480

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5.



Transmission gear
for operation of the gadget

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AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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EXHIBIT "E"

SOI REGION VIII

FILE: D-567241

SUBJECT: EGIS - MFS - Headquarters

DATE: 23 May 1956

EVALUATION: P-6


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EXCERPTED FROM
DISSEMINATION STATEMENT


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6.



Transmission gear
(compare to page 5.)



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AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

EXHIBIT "□"

SOI REGION VIII

FILE: D-567241

SUBJECT: EGIS - MFS - Headquarters

DATE: 23 May 1956

482

EVALUATION: F-6

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SUMM. RY OF INFORMATION		DATE 17 May 1956																					
PREPARING OFFICE	REGION III 66TH CIC GROUP																						
		D-567245/d																					
SUBJECT East German Intelligence - MfS - Bezirk DRESDEN Re: Modus Operandi	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION <table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 60%;">OF SOURCE:</td> <td style="width: 10%;"></td> <td style="width: 30%;">OF INFORMATION:</td> </tr> <tr> <td>COMPLETELY RELIABLE</td> <td>A</td> <td>CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES</td> </tr> <tr> <td>USUALLY RELIABLE</td> <td>B</td> <td>PROBABLY TRUE</td> </tr> <tr> <td>FAIRLY RELIABLE</td> <td>C</td> <td>POSSIBLY TRUE</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NOT USUALLY RELIABLE</td> <td>D</td> <td>DOUBTFULLY TRUE</td> </tr> <tr> <td>UNRELIABLE</td> <td>E</td> <td>IMPROBABLE</td> </tr> <tr> <td>RELIABILITY UNKNOWN</td> <td>F</td> <td>TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED</td> </tr> </table>		OF SOURCE:		OF INFORMATION:	COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED
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RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED																					
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION <p>On 15 March 1956, SOURCE was interrogated at Field Office Giessen and gave the following information concerning KOENIGSTEIN VS3541, Bezirk DRESDEN MfS, Modus Operandi:</p> <p>INFORMANTS:</p> <p>(1) <u>Selection Standards:</u> SOURCE was apparently selected because of his background in radio communication and because of his desire to return to West Germany.</p> <p>(2) <u>Recruiting:</u> SOURCE was recruited involuntarily to work for the MfS. SOURCE, who had been captured in VIET MINH and taken by rail to KOENIGSTEIN, East Germany, was imprisoned in a JULIUS FUCIK (House of Youth) for four (4) weeks until he was approached by the MfS. SOURCE was led to believe that, unless he worked for the MfS in West Germany, he would not be allowed to return to that country. He, therefore, signed a pledge that he would work for the MfS.</p> <p>(3) <u>Pledge:</u> The pledge, to the best of SOURCE's recollection is as follows: "I (name) pledge to cooperate voluntarily with the MfS as a fellow worker. I will keep silent concerning my activities and accomplish all missions assigned to me. It is known to me that if I break this pledge I can be sentenced to ten years in the penitentiary".</p> <p>(4) <u>Training:</u> SOURCE'S original mission to West Germany was to be a test mission. If, after an undetermined length of time, the reports in letter form which were to have been sent to SOURCE's handling agent, were satisfactory, SOURCE would then be given additional missions.</p> <p>(5) <u>Contacting of Informants:</u> SOURCE was to have been contacted by the MfS only after his letters of information had proved satisfactory. If, upon the basis of the letters sent to his handling agent, SOURCE was judged to possess the necessary attributes for a successful agent, he was to have been contacted by an MfS agent in West Germany who would then give him further missions. There was to be no other contact during the trial period.</p> <p>(6) No information concerning security factors, payment, transfer, informant nets, or administrative control of informants was given to SOURCE.</p>																							
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: flex-end;"> <div style="text-align: left;"> <p>REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON JUN 18 1998 BY CDR USAF/PO AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R</p> </div> <div style="text-align: center;"> <p>0483</p> <p>EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE</p> </div> <div style="text-align: right;"> <p>(Cont'd)</p> </div> </div>																							
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
17 May 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

REGION III 66TH CIC GROUP

D-567245/a

SUBJECT

East German Intelligence - MfS -
Berirk DRESDEN
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

OPERATIONAL LIAISON:

(1) Operational Liaison was to have been maintained by the use of letters between SOURCE and his handling agent. The letters of a seemingly personal nature were to have been sent to the handling agent under the agent's cover name. No other liaison was mentioned to SOURCE.

COVER:

(1) SOURCE was to establish residence in West Germany and seek a respectable job while carrying out his mission.

REPORTS:

(1) Reports were to have been submitted in the form of personal letters between SOURCE and the MfS handling agent. These letters were not to have contained any information of great importance, but merely general events. Any information deemed too important to send in this manner was to have been given the MfS contact agent when he approached SOURCE with additional information about future missions at the termination of SOURCE's probation period.

INTERROGATIONS:

(1) SOURCE was interrogated one time for two hours on 28 February 1956. During part of this two-hour period, the MfS interrogator extolled the virtues of the East German regime. After explaining to SOURCE his mission in West Germany, the MfS agent spent about one-half hour discussing SOURCE's background in radio operations and indicated that if SOURCE successfully passed his test period, some use could be made of SOURCE's knowledge of radio. No specific examples of just how SOURCE's radio background would be utilized were mentioned by the interrogator.

COMMUNICATIONS:

(1) The only communication between SOURCE and the MfS during SOURCE's trial period was to be an occasional letter of a personal nature between SOURCE and the MfS agent under the agent's cover name. After the termination of the trial period, SOURCE would be contacted by another MfS agent.

BORDER CROSSINGS:

(1) SOURCE was to be a legal border crosser.

REFERENCE: Letter, dated 17 May 1956, subject and file as above.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
16 May 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567255/d

b6

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Schwerin
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Recruitment by an MfS installation in SCHWERIN (PE6045): In March 1955, after returning from a trip to West BERLIN, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the MfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. A few days earlier, Source had received a letter from [b6] residing at [b6] (US Sector), [b6] in which she invited Source to travel to West BERLIN and obtain an easy job which would pay well. Source had subsequently traveled to West BERLIN and had been introduced by [b6] to Fnu LNU, male, a German national "from MUNICH" (PU9135), who asked Source to deliver some money for him in the GDR. The MfS apparently intercepted Source's letter from [b6] as they summoned him for interrogation shortly thereafter and recruited him as an informant. Source was instructed by the MfS to meet Fnu LNU at BERLIN-Dahlem (US Sector), Breitenbachplatz, on the street, as had been arranged between Source and Fnu LNU at their previous meeting. Source met Fnu LNU, but he informed him of his MfS recruitment. Fnu LNU advised Source to return to SCHWERIN and tell the MfS that his employment by Fnu LNU had been postponed temporarily as Fnu LNU had returned to MUNICH, and that he would send Source a postcard when he came back to BERLIN. The MfS seemed to believe Source's story, and they pestered him for some time as to whether the postcard had arrived. It never did, and Source has not seen Fnu LNU again. Source received a total of 175 DM East from the MfS for his mission against Fnu LNU. (P-6)

2. Region VIII file examination: No information regarding the personality mentioned in paragraph 1 was revealed.

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HEADQUARTERS REGION XI
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 800 US ARMY

CIC
FT. Holabird

FILE: XI-567243/a/c/d/f/g

MAY 15 1956

SUBJECT: East German Intelligence - MFS -
Bezirk Chemnitz

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: CE Division - Offensive

1. REFERENCE: Headquarters Operational Memorandum 4/55, revised 31 October 1955, Subject: Counter Espionage Reporting Procedures; Headquarters Operational Memorandum 15/55, 14 November 1955, Subject: East German Intelligence Collection Plan (C) (Offensive).

2. FORWARDED: Five (5) Summaries of Information and one (1) Agent Report, dated 20 April 1956 and 11 May 1956, Subject and file as above.

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Sources: Source "A-XI" is b1 born b1 in b1 *already carded*

b. Evaluation of Source: Source "A-XI" is evaluated "P".

c. Relationship of Source to Target: Source "A-XI" was an MFS informant from b1 to b1

d. How Information Was Obtained: Through participation.

e. Date Information Was Obtained: b1 to b1

f. Date on Which Information Was Reported to Agent: 19 April 1956.

g. Other Data Affecting Accuracy of Information: None

h. Status of Case: Coverage continues.

4. REMARKS:

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a. b1

b1

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AA 34

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FILE: XI-567243/a/c/d/f/g
SUBJECT: East German Intelligence - MFS -
Bezirk Chemnitz

b1

b1 In b1 1948, Source was questioned, at the request of the SED, by the MVD (Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del - Ministry for Internal Affairs) concerning his political past. On b1 1950, he was imprisoned for two (2) weeks by the border police in HIRSCHBERG CA 0087, on charges of having driven refugees to the West German border. These charges were never proven, but the East German authorities impounded Source's taxi cab. When the SED learned of this, Source was ejected from the Party on b1 1951, as being "politically unreliable."

b. In 1954, Source divorced his first wife, b6 nee b6 born b6 in b6. She began an attempt to have Source put in prison. She accused Source of being a "Nazi criminal" and a "Western capitalist." She also accused Source of not allowing their son, b6 born b6 in b6 presently residing in b6 b6 to go to school in East Germany. b6 had been taken to reside with Source's parents b6. In b6 1954, Source was brought before the MfS (Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit - Ministry for State Security) in PLAUE. At this meeting, the above charges were made known to Source, and the number of times (approximately 15) that Source had visited West Germany and the fact that Source had a bank account in West Germany were also brought out. Source feels that this information could only have been brought to the attention of the MfS by his ex-wife. Source was released, but was told that he would be kept under observation and the charges would be investigated. In b1 1954, Source was once again summoned to the MfS Office in PLAUE. At this meeting, Source was informed that the MfS had enough information to send him to prison unless he agreed to work for them. Source signed a pledge of silence and agreed to work, if he did not have to inform for the MfS on East Germany and East Germans. Source was then given his first mission. b1

b1

b1

Source attempted this in October 1954,

0487
2

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FILE: XI-567243/a/c/d/f/g

SUBJECT: East German Intelligence - MFS -
Bezirk Chemnitz

and returned to PLAUEN and reported his unsuccessful results. At this time, Source was told that he would be sent back once again on another trip, once approval was granted by East BERLIN. Approval did not come back until [b6] 1955.

c. Source visited his parents [b6] and on the return trip he and his second wife, [b6] [nee [b1]] born [b6] [b6] in [b6] presently residing [b6] [b6] were imprisoned by the [b1] [b1] Source was bringing back his son [b6] at the time, so that custody of the child could be decided. In JUCHHOEH, Source learned that his first wife had accused him with "abduction of a child." The child was taken from Source, and then Source and his second wife were freed.

d. On [b6] 1955, it was Source's turn to have the son for a day. As Source knew that he would soon have to return to HOF on a mission for the MFS, he and his family drove to East BERLIN, left the automobile, and took the S-Bahn to West BERLIN. Source now resides with his parents, his second wife, his son [b6] and another son born of his second marriage on [b6] in [b6]

e. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

6 Incis:

1-5. SOIs, Rgn XI

6. Agent Report, Rgn XI

[b6]

Lt Col, Inf
Commanding

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1-Region XI File

[b6] cc/Wurs Mil 324 803

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
20 April 1956PREPARING OFFICE
Region XI, 66th CIC Group, APO 800, US Army

SUBJECT

East German Intelligence - MFS -
Bezirk Chemnitz
Re: Modus OperandiCODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Informants:

a. Vetting: Source "A-XI" was forced into working for the MFS (Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit - Ministry for State Security) in PLAUEN TR 9597 by threat. Source had made repeated trips to West Germany to conduct business. After repeated questioning about his trips, Source was given the choice of working for the MFS or a prison sentence for an unstated number of years for "sabotaging the East German economy."

b. Oaths Signed: Source was made to sign a pledge of silence.

c. Training: Source received no formal training but was sent on a test mission to HOF QA 0878 to contact the Ostbuero (Eastern Office) of the SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands - Social Democratic Party of Germany). Source was unable to contact anyone in HOF, so upon his return, he was informed that he was to be sent again, once the second proposed trip had been approved from East BERLIN UU 9220. The approval took ten (10) months.

d. Contacting of Informants: Source was recruited in PLAUEN, Gabelsbergerstrasse, number unknown. Two (2) or three (3) later meetings occurred in the City Hall (Rathaus) of PLAUEN in a room reserved for such meetings. The meeting room was changed constantly. Generally, Source was met in his automobile, after which he was forced to drive the handling agent home, at Source's expense.

e. Cover Stories: In HOF, Source was to assume the attitude of an East German bitterly at odds with the East German regime in order to obtain a hearing from the SPD. At least eight (8) to ten (10) meetings were needed to establish Source's cover story for suitable approach to the SPD. It was first considered to say Source was an old SPD member, but this was dropped for being too artificial. It was finally decided to give Source a leaflet from the SPD which had been dropped in East Germany and which Source allegedly found. Source was to seek help in HOF as to whom he should turn for help in fighting Communism. The leaflet was given to Source in a public toilet in PLAUEN on Melanchthonstrasse.

0489

f. Report: Upon his return to PLAUEN after his fruitless trip to HOF, Source was made to write a report, in his own handwriting, of what happened in HOF, in the presence of his handling agent. Source had the feeling that he was not trusted, but received no indication of an evaluation of the report.

g. Transportation: Source came to HOF in his automobile and at his own expense. He crossed legally at TOEPEN-JUCHHOEH QA 0485.

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1-Region XI File

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Region II, 66th CIC Group, APO 800, US Army

D-567243/d
20 April 1956

East German Intelligence - MFS -
Berirk Chemnitz
Re: Modus Operandi

b. Investigations: The interval of about one (1) month between the first and second meetings with the MFS was used to investigate Source's background. Source did not hear about it from neighbors or friends, but the information the MFS revealed indicated that a close background check had been made. The first meeting consisted of questioning Source about his background. The actual approach came at the second meeting. During Source's period of investigation, he could not leave PLAUEN without first notifying the MFS.

SOURCE "A-IX"

2. No further information is available.

SOURCE "A-XI"

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

15 May 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567253/d

b6

awt

SUBJECT

ECIS - MFS - Bezirk Potsdam

Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE

COMPLETELY RELIABLE
USUALLY RELIABLE
FAIRLY RELIABLE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
UNRELIABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

OF INFORMATION

A. CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
B. PROBABLY TRUE
C. POSSIBLY TRUE
D. DOUBTFULLY TRUE
E. IMPROBABLE
F. TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Recruitment by an MFS installation in POTSDAM (UU6808) on

b1 1955. b1 born b1 in b1 was recruited as a part-time informant for the MFS and was obliged to sign a statement wherein she agreed to keep her contact with the MFS a confidential matter. She was assigned the cover name b6. She met her handling agent only once, in early January 1956 at the "Stadt Potsdam" restaurant located at POTSDAM, b6. She was directed to accompany b6 to a restaurant, name forgotten, located at BERLIN-Charlottenburg (British Sector), Meerscheidstrasse, number unknown, while b6 drew a sketch of the interior of the restaurant. Source's handling agent also stated that if Source were to learn to become a teletype operator, he could obtain employment for her with a French agency in West BERLIN. Source completed her mission with b6 and was scheduled to meet her handling agent again on b1 1956. Instead, she defected to West BERLIN on b1 1956. Source received five (5) DM West for expenses from the MFS. (F-6)

2. Region VIII file examination: No information regarding the personalities mentioned in this report was revealed.

0491

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DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
12 May 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

Region XI, 66th CIC Group, APO 800, US Army

SUBJECT

East German Intelligence - MFS -
Besirk Dresden
Re: Mofas Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
USUALLY RELIABLE	B PROBABLY TRUE
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C POSSIBLY TRUE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D DOUBTFULLY TRUE
UNRELIABLE	E IMPROBABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. The MFS (Ministerium fuer Staatssicherheit - Ministry for State Security) in GROSSENHAHN US 9882 is known to use a post card request system to have persons report to their office. (See KINIRIS I and II.) Source received a card such as this, which is translated as follows:

ORDER

You are requested to report on Wednesday, 25 January 1956 at 1400 hours to the Volkspolizeikreisamt (People's Police Kreis Office), GROSSENHAHN, Room 23, by showing this card.

Bring your identity documents.

In case you are not able to come, you are asked to let us know by stating the reason and the file number.

If you fail to report without reasonable excuse, you can be forced according to paragraph 44, 118 SVPD respectively.

Source: "A-II"

2. Both uniformed and plainclothes agents of the MFS in GROSSENHAHN are known to be transferred away, usually after a period of eight (8) weeks in the town.

Source: "A-II"

COMMENTS: Source met an acquaintance of his in West BERLIN US 9770, identifying data unknown, who had received a card similar to the one mentioned above, and had been jailed by the MFS.

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ON: JUN 18 1998
BY: CDR USAINSCOM E07PO
Auth Para 7.603 DOD 5200.11

492
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1-CC, 66th CIC Group
1-File, Region XI

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As

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DEUTSCHE VOLKSPOLIZEI

VPA Großhain

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b1

EXHIBIT I SOI D-567245/a

SUBJECT: East German Intelligence -
MfS - Bezirk DRESDEN

DATED: 12 May 1956

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As

Vorladung

Sie werden gebeten, sich am **Freitag, den 25.1.1956**
um **14.00 Uhr** beim **Volkspolizeikreisamt Großhain**
Zimmer **23** zur Vorladung der Vorladung einzufinden.
Zusammenkünfte sind nicht zulässig.
In Vertretung des Mannes ist eine rechtzeitige Mitteilung unter Angabe des
Hindernisses und des Abwesendbleibens zu machen.
Wenn Sie dieser Vorladung ohne triftigen Grund nicht nachkommen,
kann eine Verurteilung nach § 44 des 12. BVO erfolgen.

b1

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EXHIBIT II SOI D-567245/a

SUBJECT: East German Intelligence
MfS - Bezirk DRESDEN

DATED: 12 May 1956

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SUMMAR. OF INFORMATION		DATE
PREPARING OFFICE 66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567253/d		9 May 1956 b6
SUBJECT EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Potsdam Re: Modus Operandi and Techniques	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION Recruitment by MfS KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-office) KYRITZ (UU2570): In April 1953, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the MfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. He was assigned a mission within his place of employment. He met his handling agent about six (6) times on streets in KYRITZ and was last contacted in May 1955. He received no financial remuneration from the MfS. Source "L" (P-6)		
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ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDR USAF/USMC F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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1 JUN 47

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
8 May 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567244/d

b6 /fs

SUBJECT

ECIS - MfS - Bezirk Cottbus
Re: Modus OperandiCODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:COMPLETELY RELIABLE
USUALLY RELIABLE
FAIRLY RELIABLE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
UNRELIABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWNA
B
C
D
E
F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
PROBABLY TRUE
POSSIBLY TRUE
DUBIOUSLY TRUE
IMPOSSIBLE
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED1
2
3
4
5
6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Recruitment by MfS KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-office) SENFTENBERG (VT3109): In January 1956, just prior to being released from prison, [b1] nee [b1] born [b1] in [b1] the source of this information, was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement wherein she agreed to work for the MfS and to keep her work in this capacity a confidential matter. She met her handling agent on three (3) occasions on the streets of SENFTENBERG, the last meeting taking place on 10 March 1956. [b1] received the mission of observing two (2) residents of SENFTENBERG who were suspected of having connections with the West. Source submitted no reports to the MfS and received no financial remuneration.

Source "L"

(F-6)

2. Region VIII file examination: No information regarding the personality mentioned in this report was revealed.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 7 May 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567242/d

b6 fs

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Berlin
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Technique of a MfS installation in BERLIN: Recently the MfS has been putting pressure on press photographers in BERLIN to furnish the MfS with photographs of inebriated members of the West BERLIN Senate in cafes and restaurants. The MfS has been offering 1,000 DM East for such photographs. Also, the MfS has been trying to obtain photographs of American or other Allied military personnel, and 100 DM East is being offered for these.

Source "G"

(F-6)

2. Recruitment by an MfS installation in BERLIN: On b1 1956, b1 born b1 in b1 the source of this information, was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement in which he agreed to work for the MfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. He met his handling agent only on the day of his recruitment, and he received no financial compensation from the MfS. Source was assigned the mission of inducing his father-in-law, a member of the West BERLIN Fire Department, to visit East BERLIN. b1 did not carry out his mission, and defected to West BERLIN on the same day.

Source "I"

(F-6)

3. Region VIII files revealed no information regarding the personality mentioned in this report.

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~~SECRET~~
HEADQUARTERS REGION VIII
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 742 US ARMY

Cice

D-567241/b/e

3 May 1956

SUBJECT: EGIS - MFS Headquarters, Re: Administration, Installations

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: CE Division

1. FORWARDED: SOI's dated 25 April 1956, subject and file as above.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source: Source "A", P-287-VIII.

b. Evaluation of Source: B.

c. How information was obtained by Source: Personal contact.

d. Date Source obtained information: March and April 1956.

e. Date agent received information: 16 April 1956.

f. Status of case: Coverage of MFS continues.

3. REMARKS:

a. Source will be queried about an opportunity to photograph the new identity document mentioned in SOI, Re: Identification Documents.

0497

b. Attention is invited to the designation of a Department "O" (letter). There is no previous record of such departmental designation, which may possibly be part of the structure of Main Department Miscellaneous (Allgemeines) or Main Department Administration and Supply (Verwaltung und Wirtschaft). An effort to locate and identify this department by query of all possible sources on a continuing basis will be made.

REGRADING DATA
CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED

1 Incl

SOI's dtd 25 Apr 56 (1)

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b6

Lt Col, Inf
Commanding

Copy 2 of 4 copies

Berlin 42323/ b6

WJM/at/3-1

SUMMARY

DATE

25 April 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII

b6

b6

SUBJECT Region VIII, CETeam # 56724/b

EGIS - MFS Headquarters

Re: Administration

(Identification documents)

CODE FOR INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:
COMPLETELY RELIABLE
USUALLY RELIABLE
FAIRLY RELIABLE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
UNRELIABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

OF INFORMATION: ADM ASST
CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
PROBABLY TRUE
POSSIBLY TRUE
DOUBTFULLY TRUE
UNPROBABLE
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. On 1 April 1956, new identification documents were issued to all MFS personnel to permit entry into the headquarters building. The new document is a brown-covered document folding vertically in the center. The dimensions of the document when opened flat are approximately 7½" by 2½". Personal data of the holder are entered on the left half of the document and a photograph and the validity period of the document are on the right half of the document. The new document replaces a white, single page document without photograph of the holder, which is allegedly to be utilized only for visiting personnel or personnel requiring access to the building for short periods of time, i.e. repair or utilities personnel. The new document is renewable quarterly, whereas the old document is now renewable every two weeks.

Source "A"

(B-2)

2. The files of Region VIII, 66th CIC Group, APO 742, have no previous record of the identification document required for entrance to the MFS Headquarters building.

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ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDH USAF/CSM F01/PO
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
25 April 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team, D-567241/b

b6 /art

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS Headquarters
Re: Administration
(MfS Guard Regiment)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
PROBABLY TRUE
POSSIBLY TRUE
DOUBTFULLY TRUE
IMPROBABLE
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED
X

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. The leave policy of the MfS Guard Regiment permits every company in the regiment a long (5 day) week-end off after every 6 - 7 weeks of duty, in addition to the normal annual leaves, which are as follows: Enlisted men and corporals are permitted 18 days annual leave, or 21 days after 3 years of service; officers have 21 days annual leave normally, and after 5 years of duty have 30 days annual leave. Each individual going on leave or pass outside BERLIN is required to inform his company about the precise destination, and how to reach the individual on leave in an alert situation. If an alert is called while the company is on a long week-end pass, all members of the company are expected to commence the return trip to duty station within 8 hours following receipt of notification of the alert. If a member of the regiment is suddenly taken ill on pass or leave, he is required to inform the regiment by telephone, calling BERLIN 64 20 36, and then to bring a medical certificate from the attending doctor to verify the illness reported.

2. The pay scale for personnel of the MfS Guard Regiment is as follows:

Private	356. DME per month	REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON JUN 18 1998 BY CDR USA/COM F01/PO AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R
PFC	387. DME " "	
Corporal	412. DME " "	
M/Sergeant	487. DME " "	
2d Lieutenant	536. DME " " (holding position of 1st Lt.)	
1st Lieutenant	983. DME " " (5 years duty, with 3 children)	
Captain	1100. DME " " (holding position of major)	

The pay scale includes payment of 40% of actual position and 60% of pay of position being served in. A longevity increase of 8% of base pay commences after 3 years of service, and increases to 11% of base pay after 5 years of service.

0499

3. The normal tour of duty in the MfS Guard Regiment is 3 years, but all enlisted personnel are urged (shortly after enlistment) to extend for an additional 3 or 5 years, or for an indefinite term at the convenience of the government. During August 1955, regimental records indicated that 583 members of the regiment had extended for indefinite terms of enlistment, 412 had extended for either 3 or 5 years over the basic tour, and 63 men had not extended. The last group (who had not extended) will be assigned to other organizations, either KVP or Interior Troops, gradually, as being unfit for service in an "elite" guard organization.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

25 April 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team D-567241/h

b6

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS Headquarters
Re: Administration
(MfS Guard Regiment)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

4. The uniforms issued each enlisted man upon entry into the MfS Guard Regiment are as follows:

- Duty uniform
- Dress uniform, which serves as winter uniform
- 2 Overcoats
- 1 summer uniform
- 2 pair boots, pigskin
- 1 pair low quarter dress shoes
- 2 pair underdrawers
- 2 shirts
- 1 pair wool gloves
- 1 set fatigues

Soiled uniform components can be exchanged for clean ones when necessary. Uniform repairs are all made in the barracks and are never permitted elsewhere. The wearing of the summer uniform begins on 1 May each year, and lasts until 15 September. A new summer uniform is issued each year, and the old one is used as fatigue uniform. The winter uniform is OD (green) in color, and the shoulder boards and collar tabs are a wine-red, identical with the color of the uniform worn by members of MfS Main Department PS.

Sub-sources C and D, Sources A and B

(P-3)

5. The files of Region VIII have numerous reports indicating that MfS Main Department PS and MfS Guard Regiment personnel wear olive drab uniforms with wine-red shoulder boards and collar tabs. The files also contain unevaluated traces indicating that Guard Regiment pay scales are approximately as listed in this report.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
2 May 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team, D-567253/4

b6

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Potsdam
Re: Modus Operandi and Techniques

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES ASST
PROBABLY TRUE
POSSIBLY TRUE
DOUBTFULLY TRUE
IMPROBABLE
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED
11

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Recruitment by the MfS in POTSDAM-Babelsberg (UU7309): In early October 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant by an MfS agent whom she had known casually some years back from dance halls and cafes in POTSDAM-Babelsberg. Source was obliged to sign a statement wherein she agreed to work for the MfS and to keep her work in this capacity a confidential matter. Her cover name was "Neumann." Source met her handling agent four (4) times in a forest strip along the highway at DREWITZ (UU7303) near POTSDAM-Babelsberg where the agent waited in a car. The last meeting took place on 1 November 1955. Source was to meet the agent again on 5 November 1955 and was to be given the description of a West BERLIN resident whom Source was to observe, and the name of the West BERLIN cafe which this person was believed to frequent.

Source "G"

(P-6)

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HEADQUARTERS REGION I
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 757 US ARMY

CIC
CENTRAL
FILE

B-567246

1 May 1956

SUBJECT: East German Intelligence - MFS - Bezirk ERFURT

(u)
(c)
Holstiel

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: ANSO-OCB

1. REFERENCE: Headquarters Ops Memo 4/55, revised 31 October 1955.
2. FORWARDED: CPI Card and Summary of Information, dated 1 May 1956, subject and file as above.
3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

A. Source: Source is [b1] aka [b1] born [b1]
in [b1] [b1]

b. Evaluation of Source: Source is evaluated F.

c. Relationship of Source to Target: Had been recruited.

d. How Information Was Obtained: Had been interrogated

e. Date Information Was Obtained, [b1]

f. Date on Which Information Was Reported to Agent: [b1]

[b1]

g. Other Data Affecting Accuracy of Information: None

h. Status of Case: Pending

4. REMARKS:

a. The files of the Regional Registry revealed no record on Source.

2 Incls

1. 1 CPI Card
2. 1 SOI, dtd 1 May 56

0502

[b6]

1st Col
Commanding Inf

[b6]

/etg/ofb M11 802

Reg. ling data cannot
be predetermined

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 1 May 1956
PREPARING OFFICE REGION III 66TH CIC GROUP		D-567246/a
SUBJECT East German Intelligence - MFS - Bezirk ERFURT Re: Modus Operandi	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>On 29 March 1956, SOURCE was interrogated at Field Office Giessen and gave the following information concerning MFS ERFURT PB4249, Bezirk ERFURT, Modus Operandi:</p> <p>INFORMANTS:</p> <p>a. During the first week of March 1956, SOURCE applied for an internal pass for travel to West Germany to visit relatives. When he applied at the pass office in ERFURT he was refused with no reason given for the refusal. SOURCE then, on 17 March 1956, spoke to the KADERLEITER (Personnel Chief) of the factory in which he was employed and explained to him the difficulty he was having in obtaining his internal pass. The KADERLEITER then stated that he would assist SOURCE with his problem. He took SOURCE to a room near his own office and introduced him to the occupant.</p> <p>b. This individual, whose name is unknown to SOURCE, stated that he was a member of the MFS attached to the factory and he would make it possible for SOURCE to obtain a pass to go to West Germany provided SOURCE agreed to act as an informant. After SOURCE agreed, the MFS man dictated a mission to him. SOURCE wrote the dictated mission in his own handwriting on an ordinary sheet of paper. This mission pledged him to silence concerning his activity with the MFS and directed him to observe his fellow workers. SOURCE was to report to the MFS the name of anyone reading anti-DDR propaganda, such as leaflets and other West-inspired printed matter.</p> <p>c. The MFS man then advised SOURCE that he would commence reporting immediately after his return from West Germany and dismissed him with the advice that he should re-apply for his internal pass at the pass office and he would encounter no difficulty.</p> <p>d. On 19 March 1956, SOURCE re-applied for his pass and was again refused. He thereupon went to the office of the MFS man at his place of work and explained what had transpired. The MFS man told him that he would call the pass office and tell them to give SOURCE the pass. Apparently, the MFS man kept his promise for on 23 March 1956 SOURCE received his internal pass without difficulty.</p> <p>REFERENCE: Letter, dated 1 May 1956, subject and file as above.</p>		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

27 April 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Task. D-567245/1

b6

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Dresden
Re: Modus Operandi
(Operational liaison)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
PROBABLY TRUE
POSSIBLY TRUE
DOUBTFULLY TRUE
IMPROBABLE
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Soviet Intelligence Services in DRESDEN (VS1257) utilize MfS Department VIII (investigation, surveillance, searches) for the conduct of background investigations or file checks needed by SIS. SIS personnel are rarely, if ever, utilized for such checks.

Source "A"

(C-3)

2. The files of Region VIII, 66th CIC Group, APO 742, have several reports indicating the possibility of MfS performing checks for SIS, the most specific of these reports being SOI, subject: MfS Gera, file D-567248, dated 28 February 1956, evaluation P-6.

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ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDR USN/USMC F01/PO
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

26 April 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team, D-567253/d

b6

/art

SUBJECT

EGIS - MFS - Sezirk Potsdam
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION: ADM ASST

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES

PROBABLY TRUE

POSSIBLY TRUE

DOUBTFULLY TRUE

IMPROBABLE

TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Recruitment by MFS installation in POTSDAM (UU68C8): In early
b1 Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged
to sign a statement wherein she agreed to work for the MFS and to keep her
work in this capacity a confidential matter. She was assigned the cover
name b1 Source met her handling agent once at her home in January
1956 and received the mission of observing three (3) women in PRIORT (UU6220)
who were often seen with Soviet soldiers and who were suspected of espionage
activity. Source was to report on b1 but she feigned sickness
and did not meet her handling agent again. She did not receive any monetary
compensation from the MFS.

Source "D"

(F-6)

2. An examination of Region VIII files revealed no information con-
cerning the information mentioned in paragraph 1 of this report.

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b6

/bz/Stgt M11 8371

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

25 April 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, United States Army, Europe, APO 154, US Army

SUBJECT

RGIS - MfS Bezirk CHEMNITZ
Re: Modus Operandi (S)(u)

D-567243/d

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Recruitment by MfS KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-office) AUE (US3807):

In [b1] 1955, [b1] born [b1] in [b1] the source of this information, was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the MfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. He was assigned the cover name [b1]. He met his handling agents weekly or bi-monthly [b1].

[b1] In [b1] 1955, he was directed to observe the activities of [b6] residing at KLEINOLBERSDORF (NS6129), and employed at the VEB Kraftverkehr (for motor traffic) in KARL MARX STADT. [b6] was suspected because he boasted of large amounts of money in his possession. Source submitted four reports, stating substantially [b6] was a liar and had only his salary at his disposal. In [b1] 1955 Source was given 100 DME and 10 DMW and directed to contact a friend, [b6] residing at [b6] (British Sector), [b6] and to attempt to recruit [b6] as an informant for the MfS. Source travelled to West BERLIN but did not contact [b6]. When he returned he reported that [b6] was pro-Western and that an attempted recruitment would be dangerous. In [b1] 1955 Source was given 100 DME and 10 DMW and directed to contact some friends of [b6] names unknown, and attempt to recruit an informant for the MfS from among them. Source travelled to West BERLIN but made no attempts to contact anybody. When he returned he reported that none of [b6] friends were interested in working for the MfS. His handling agent was very dissatisfied with this information. In [b1] 1955, Source was directed to observe the activities of Dr. Fnu [b6] male, employed at the Kommunalen Grosshandel (City Wholesale) in AUE, who was suspected of being in contact with the UPJ (Untersuchungsausschuss freiheitlicher Juristen - Investigating Committee of Free Jurists). Source did not want to carry this mission out and told his handling agent that he had finally located a friend [b6] who might be willing to work for the MfS. Source actually had located no one, but fabricated a name of [b1] in order to circumvent his mission against [b6]. In [b1] 1955, Source was given 100 DME and 10 DMW and was directed to contact and attempt to recruit [b1]. Source travelled to West BERLIN, made no contact, and returned to AUE, reporting that [b1] was employed by an American agency located at BERLIN-Lichterfelde (US Sector), Pinckensteinallee, number unknown. Source was immediately taken by car to an installation in KARL MARX STADT, street address unknown, where he was met by a Soviet who ordered him to contact [b1] as soon as possible. In early [b1] 1955, Source was given 100 DME and 10 DMW and directed to contact [b1], and after ascertaining the type of work done by [b1], to recruit him as an informant for the MfS. Source travelled to West BERLIN but did not attempt to contact anybody. He returned to AUE and reported that [b1] had given him some letters which were addressed to GDR residents but that the letters had been confiscated by the East German Police at the border. His handling agent was furious when told this and accused Source of negligence. In [b1] 1955 Source was directed to observe the guests frequenting the "Alt-Aue" restaurant in AUE, street address forgotten, especially [b6] residing at [b6].

DISTRIBUTION

3 cys fwd - G2

1 cy - CIC File

1 cy - CIC Central File

1 cy - Hold

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PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, United States Army, Europe, APO 154, US Army

SUBJECT

EGIS - MFS Bezirk CHEMNITZ

Re: Modus Operandi

D-567243/4

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b6 and employed at the Kommunar Crosshandel, whose political attitude was suspected. Source warned b6 and submitted no reports concerning this mission. In b1 1955 Source was directed to renew his contact with b1. Source travelled to West BERLIN and reported to the West BERLIN Police, who advised him to remain in West BERLIN as a political refugee. He returned to the GDR, however, and was taken once again by car to KARL MARX STADT, where he was interrogated by the same Soviet with whom he had previous contact. The Soviet accused Source of working for the UIC and Source denied the accusation. On b1 1956 he was given 50 DM and 50 DMW and directed to report to West BERLIN as a refugee, and after gaining recognition to obtain employment with an American agency. He was then to use his position to aid in the placing of 40 MFS informants in various positions in West BERLIN. He was ordered to meet his handling agent at the S-Bahn (elevated railroad) Station BERLIN-Gruenau (Soviet Sector) on b1 1956 at 2000 hours. He was given the address b1 and was instructed to write to this address if something unexpected happened. Source did not carry out this mission but defected to West BERLIN instead.

(F-6)

2. An examination of the files of Agency "A" regarding b6 revealed the following:

NAME: b6

BIRTH DATA: b6

RESIDENCES:

b6

REMARKS: b6 defected to West BERLIN in October 1949. Previous to his defection he had been a co-worker of b1 who was later recruited by the MFS, given the cover name b1 and assigned several missions, among them one to contact b6. b1 was interviewed by this Agency on 17 January 1956 and admitted that he did go to b6 home, but that b6 was not home.

b1 stated that he had no intention of attempting to recruit b6 but he merely wanted to talk to him.

(B-2) M

0508

DISTRIBUTION

3 cys fwd - G2

1 cy - CIC File

1 cy - CIC Central File

1 cy - Hold

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WD AGO FORM 568
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

23 April 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CS Team. D-567247/a

b6 /ent

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS -
 Bezirk Frankfurt/Oder
 Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
 USUALLY RELIABLE B
 FAIRLY RELIABLE C
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
 UNRELIABLE E
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
 PROBABLY TRUE 2
 POSSIBLY TRUE 3
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
 IMPROBABLE 5
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Recruitment by an MfS installation in FRANKFURT/Oder (VT6999):
 On b1 1955, b1 born b1 in b1 (VV7020),
 the source of this information, was recruited as a part-time informant and
 was obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the MfS and to
 keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. He was not assigned
 a cover name. On b1 1955, Source was directed to observe the
 political attitude b6, residing in FRANKFURT/Oder, street ad-
 dress forgotten. Source warned b6 that the MfS was interested in
 him and b6 promptly reported this fact to the MfS. On b1
 1955, Source was arrested and imprisoned by the MfS. In late b1
 while in prison, Source was approached by the MfS and directed to write a
 letter to b6 nee b6 c/o "Rinkel" Company, BERLIN-Charlot-
 tenburg (British Sector), Clausewitzstrasse 7. b6 is a political
 defector and is the mother of Source's child, b6 eight (8) years
 of age. In the letter Source was directed to arrange a meeting between
 b6 and himself at the Potsdamer Platz U-Bahn Station on b6
 1956. He phrased the letter in such a manner that b6 would be warned.
 On b1 1956, Source was given two (2) DM East and one (1) DM West
 and directed to meet b6 and to bring her to the Ostbahnhof S-Bahn
 Station in East BERLIN, where she could be arrested. Source was promised a
 commutation of his sentence if he successfully completed this mission.
 Source did not carry out the mission but defected to West BERLIN instead.

Source "A"

(F-6)

2. Region VIII files revealed no information concerning the infor-
 mation mentioned in paragraph 1 of this report.

0509

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HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154 US ARMY

APR 24 1956
20 April 1956

D-567241/d; D-567253/d

SUBJECT: SFS Headquarters BERLIN and Sfs Bezirk POTSDAM
Re: Modus Operandi (S) (U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, US Army
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch, G2CICB

(U)
1. ~~CONF~~ References:

a. Letter, this Group, subject: Source of KFS Bezirk POTSDAM Documents, file as above, dated 7 March 1956.

b. Letter, this Group, subject and file as above, dated 23 January 1956. (U)

2. ~~CONF~~ On 20 January 1956 a meeting took place between the Department I Chief, BERLIN Police Headquarters, and the representatives of Region VIII and the 7983d Army Unit, BERLIN, at the office of the Department I Chief. The Chief of Department I was informed by the US representatives that it had been impossible for them to interview the Criminal Police official [b6] of the Criminal Police Inspection Office, BERLIN-Wedding (French Sector), but that in view of [b6] original contact with the cut-out of KFS BV POTSDAM source, it was of definite interest to have [b6] interrogated as soon as possible regarding the circumstances of the original contact and the identities of the persons involved in this contact. The Department I Chief was also informed that [b6] was obviously aware of the reason for the US representatives' request to interview [b6] personally and was apparently intending to avoid a direct meeting with the US representatives. Therefore, the US representatives suggested to the Chief of Department that a well-qualified and high ranking official of Department I should interrogate [b6] on questions needing clarification. These questions would be submitted in writing by the US representatives to the Chief of Department I. Inasmuch as the Department I Chief had only recently replaced Dr. [b6] his predecessor, and explained that he had been unable to study the case very closely, the US representatives agreed to present along with the questions for the interrogation of [b6] detailed comments analyzing the case in order to brief the Department I Chief and the interrogating official. In the presence of the US representatives, the Department I Chief telephoned the Chief of the BERLIN Criminal Police and obtained clearance to interrogate [b6] 0510

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AA01

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
D-567241/d; D-567253/d

SUBJECT: SFS Headquarters BERLIN and SFS Bezirk POTSDAM

Re: Modus Operandi (C) (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (U)

3. (S) Comments and questions were prepared by the Region VIII representative and submitted to Department I with the full agreement of the 7983d Army Unit representative. The Public Safety Office of Region VIII, when submitting the comments and questions to Department I, again emphasized the following points in order to insure successful interrogation of [b6] and to clarify fully the position of the US representatives in the case:

a. The basic interest of the US representatives in clarifying this case is to safeguard the security of the Allied Forces protecting West BERLIN, as well as the security of the West BERLIN German administration and police. In order to serve this interest best, the true facts, reasons, purpose and circumstances relative to the Department I contact with its source in MFS BV POTSDAM, as well as the previous contact between [b6] and that source, must be determined.

b. Whether the MFS BV POTSDAM source was bonafide or a deception agent of the MFS should be determined through the questioning of [b6] as well as by a thorough survey of all material received from the MFS source. If the interrogation is carried out as outlined by the US representatives, it should provide a much clearer picture on the reliability of that source or on a possible deception attempt by the MFS.

c. It is obvious that if it was a deception attempt, then the manner in which Department I was contacted and whoever was selected for this initial contact should be investigated. In such an event, this initial contact between [b6] and the MFS source must be considered with definite suspicion, and consequently the interrogation must be continued cautiously to prevent [b6] from realizing the trend of the questions or the actual purpose in interviewing him. [b6] should then be told that the questioning is necessary only to complete the Department I records on the source.

d. If the MFS made an attempt to deceive the West to discredit West BERLIN or Western Allied institutions and endeavors and was willing to make sacrifices to achieve this aim, then this dangerous trend must be realized as soon as possible and analyzed completely to enable the Western Allies and West BERLIN organizations to protect themselves against such operations. If, however, a leading official and possibly other similar personalities in any of the West BERLIN organizations established intelligence contact with the MFS or Soviet Intelligence Service (SIS), then an equally high interest exists on the part of the US authorities as well as the West BERLIN Police to determine the facts of such contact.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (U)

4. (S) Following is a translation of Region VIII representative's comments analyzing the status and past performances of the MFS BV POTSDAM source which was presented to the Department I Chief:

0511

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☒

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)
NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s) 512-523

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HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154 US ARMY

19 April 1956

D-567241/d

SUBJECT: MFS Headquarters (U)
Re: Modus Operandi (C)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, US Army
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch, G2CICE

1. Reference is made to message this Group, F-37231, subject: Restriction of Operational Jurisdiction and Authority of the MFS in the GDR, dated 6 April 1956.

2. Forwarded herewith in triplicate is a Region VIII, 66th CIC Group, Summary of Information, subject: EGIS - MFS Headquarters Re: Administration (Policy and Procedures), dated 3 April 1956.

3. Source of the attached report is identified as [b1] date and place of birth unknown, a sub-source of a carded informant of this Group. [b1] who was last reported as an employee of a VEB (State Owned Enterprise) in LEIPZIG, is in personal contact with MFS Agent (Fnu) [b6]

4. Examination of Central Registry files of this Group revealed no additional unforwarded information concerning the personalities mentioned in the attached report.

5. Information contained in the attached report may be released to other US and Allied Intelligence Agencies in its present form. No other distribution of the attached report has been made by this Group.

6. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

0524

~~EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
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1 Incl:
SOI dtd 3 Apr 56 (trip)

Telephone: Stgt Mil 8371

[b6] /bg

[b6]

CWO USA
Asst. Adjutant

A1309

M/R: Above fnds written rept of new trend in operational jurisdiction of the MFS. Source O-69-VIII, sub-source is Claus GUENTHER.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RLM/bg/CE

CIC CENTRAL FILE

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
12 April 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CR Team, D-567242/4

b6

b7C

SUBJECT

ECIS - MFS - Bezirk Berlin
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. In July 1955, while residing in BERLIN-Mitte (Soviet Sector), Voehlerstrasse 7, Source received an invitation in her mail box to report to the police station located in BERLIN-Mitte, Chausseestrasse (number unknown), concerning a personal matter. Source arrived at the police station and was ushered into a private room and introduced to MFS agent [b1]. Source was questioned concerning her life history even though [b1] seemed to know all the details. [b1] knew that Source was being supported by her uncle, [b6] a manager with the "Telefunken" (Radio Manufacturing Firm), BERLIN-Moabit (British Sector), near Buessel Strasse (exact address unknown), residing in [b6] (US Sector). [b6] told her that this was against the law, and that if she did not meet him again she might be punished for the offense.

2. In the early part of October 1955, Source again received a letter requesting her to come to the same police station. This time she was met by two MFS agents, one of whom was named [b1]. She was again questioned about her background; however, nothing was mentioned about her uncle's financial support.

3. On her second meeting with her new handling agent, she was asked about previous MFS contact. Source then related the story concerning [b1]. She was told by [b1] never to see [b1] again, and that he would handle the matter from then on. Source had no further contact with [b1].

4. In the beginning of November 1955, [b1] met Source in her apartment and had her sign an obligation to work for the MFS and to keep her connection with the MFS a confidential matter. At this time Source was also given the cover name [b1].

Source "A"

(F-6)

5. On 9 April 1956, an examination of the records maintained by Region VIII, 66th CIC Group, APO 742, US Army, revealed no information concerning the personalities mentioned in this report.

0525

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HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154 US ARMY

APR 12 1956

11 Apr 56

D-567253

SUBJECT: EGIS-MFS Bezirk POTSDAM (G)
Re: MFS Department M (Censorship)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, United States Army
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch, (G2CICE)

1. Reference is made to Intelligence Collection Memorandum CI-CE-1-55, subject: SFS (State Secretariat for State Security) (GDR/East German Intelligence), dated 18 February 1955.

2. Forwarded herewith in triplicate are the following Region VIII, 66th CIC Group reports:

a. Personality Report, subject: b1 file
b1 dated 9 February 1956.

b. Summary of Information, subject: EGIS-District POTSDAM, Re: Organization, file D-567253/a, dated 16 March 1956, with Exhibit I.

c. Summary of Information, subject: EGIS-District POTSDAM, Re: Administration, file D-567253/b, dated 16 March 1956.

d. Summary of Information, subject: EGIS-District POTSDAM, Re: KEI and Targets, file D-567253/c, dated 16 March 1956.

e. Summary of Information, subject: EGIS-District POTSDAM, Re: Modus Operandi, file D-567253/d, dated 16 March 1956.

f. Summary of Information, subject: EGIS-District POTSDAM, Re: Installations, file D-567253/e, dated 16 March 1956, with Exhibits I through IV.

0526
g. Summary of Information, subject: EGIS-District POTSDAM, Re: Personalities, file D-567253/f, dated 16 March 1956.

3. Source of the attached reports is b1

b1

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JIC CENTRAL FILE

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D-567253

SUBJECT: BGIS-MFS Bezirk POTSDAM (C) (u)
Re: MFS Department M (Censorship)

4. [b1] did not furnish this Group with any leads which might be exploited, and was therefore returned to the Marienfelde Refugee Center on 9 February 1956 to continue processing as a refugee. On 13 February 1956 she was taken into custody by West BERLIN Police authorities and questioned concerning her employment by the MFS, and released on 13 February. The Police again took her into custody on 16 February and determined that she was instrumental in supplying the MFS with information which endangered several German Democratic Republic residents as a result of her normal duties as an MFS mail censor, and liable to prosecution because West BERLIN law considers her actions a violation of the personal freedom law. On the basis of this information, [b1] was arrested and arraigned by West BERLIN authorities, and is presently awaiting trial. West BERLIN newspapers published several articles concerning [b1] denouncing her as an MFS employee of Department "M" who fled to West BERLIN as a political refugee and who was arrested by West BERLIN authorities.

5. This Group feels that the publicity resulting from [b1] arrest might influence MFS and other hostile intelligence personalities who may have contemplated fleeing to West BERLIN or the German Federal Republic. Those intelligence operatives who have heard of [b1] arrest might be discouraged from fleeing from the GDR for fear of arrest and prosecution based upon their intelligence affiliations. In order to prevent recurrence of a similar incident in the future, this Group will evacuate all full-time MFS or other hostile intelligence agents debriefed by Region VIII to the German Federal Republic, where they may be further processed at GIESSEN. Although the possibility exists that hostile intelligence agents evacuated by this Group to the Federal Republic may also face arrest and prosecution threat, the publicity resulting from their arrest and prosecution will not be as effective in determining future defections of intelligence agents to West BERLIN.

6. Central Registry checks concerning personalities mentioned in the attached reports will be submitted at a later date.

7. This Headquarters would appreciate your evaluation of the enclosed reports. Forwarded is an Evaluation Sheet in triplicate, subject and file as above.

8. Information contained in the attached reports may be released to other United States and Allied intelligence agencies.

9. No further distribution of the attached reports has been made by this Group.

0527

2

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D-567253

SUBJECT: ECIS-MFS Bezirk POTSDAM (c) (u)
Re: MFS Department M (Censorship)

10. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

8 Incl

1. PR dtd 9 Feb 56 (trip)
2. SOI dtd 16 March 56 (trip)
w/Exh I (trip)
- 3-5. SOIs dtd 16 Mar 56 (trip)
6. SOI dtd 16 Mar 56 (trip)
w/Exh I-IV (trip)
7. SOI dtd 16 Mar 56 (trip)
8. Eval Sheet (trip)

b6

OWO USA
Asst Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt Mil 8244

b6 bjn

M/R: This fwds info re mail censorship by MFS in POTSDAM area, and advises G2 of arrest by W BERLIN Police of b1 which adversely affects future defections. Coord w/Maj b6 S3.

0528

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3

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		TEAM CHIEF	DATE
PREPARING OFFICE 66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567253/e		OPNS OFF	March 1956
SUBJECT ECIS - District Potsdam Re: Modus Operandi		b6	/awt
CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:		OF INFORMATION:	
COMPLETELY RELIABLE A		CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1	
USUALLY RELIABLE B		PROBABLY TRUE 2	
FAIRLY RELIABLE C		POSSIBLY TRUE 3	
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D		DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4	
UNRELIABLE E		IMPROBABLE 5	
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F		TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION			
<p>1. Origin of Mail Coverage Missions assigned MfS Department M offices (mail censorship) at JUETERBOG (UT6861) and ZOSSEN (UT9487):</p> <p>a. In theory, all mail coverage missions received by the MfS Department M offices at JUETERBOG and ZOSSEN must originate from the MfS Department M BV (Bezirksverwaltung - District Office) POTSDAM (UU6808), address unknown. Such missions are sent from the MfS Department M BV POTSDAM by teletype to the MfS KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-office) in the respective community, and are taken by courier to the MfS Department M office.</p> <p>b. The local MfS KV is not authorized to issue mail coverage missions to a MfS Department M office within the same community without first requesting permission from the MfS Department M BV POTSDAM. However, upon occasion of operational necessity this rule is circumvented, and permission is requested after initiation of the mail coverage mission.</p> <p>2. The MfS Department M Offices at JUETERBOG and ZOSSEN are organized by functions as follows:</p> <p>a. Sorting:</p> <p>(1) Individuals performing mail sorting are furnished lists containing names or addresses, or both, and all mail corresponding to this list in address or return address is given immediately to the mail censor. These lists containing target names or addresses are furnished by the MfS Department M BV POTSDAM, address unknown, and are controlled by the chief of the censorship office, who secures them after working hours in a small safe or steel locker maintained within the censorship office.</p> <p>(2) Most newspapers and magazines of western origin are confiscated, with only a few of professional nature being allowed to be forwarded. Of these, Source remembers only the "Deutsche Zahnarzt Zeitung" (German Dentist's Newspaper). Western newspapers found inclosed in letters or packages are sent with the letter or package to the MfS Department M BV POTSDAM by courier through the local MfS KV.</p> <p>(3) All confiscated correspondence is recorded by the chief of the censorship office within an office ledger through the use of unknown code letters which enable the office to determine the amount and type of correspondence confiscated within a given period of time. The names and addresses of individuals to whom western newspapers are addressed are not recorded, nor is any other action taken.</p>			
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
16 March 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, GE Team, D-567253/a

b6

awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - District Potsdam
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b. Opening: The opening of correspondence is accomplished by the use of a small steam boiler. This process tends to slightly blur or discolor ink or pencil writing on the envelope.

c. Censoring:

(1) Individuals censoring mail are furnished lists containing elements which are checked against the text of the letters. (KEI listed in paragraph b(2), KEI and Targets, Subject and file as above) If information corresponding to these KEI are found in the text of a letter, the censor has a typed copy made which is given to the chief of the censorship office. The chief of the censorship office then determines whether the copy should be delivered to the MfS Department M BV POTSDAM. The original copy of the letter remains with the censorship office until further directions are received from the MfS Department M BV POTSDAM.

(2) Individuals censoring mail are instructed to watch for signs which would indicate the use of a code, or the presence of invisible writing, such as:

- (a) Unusual or unintelligible work order.
- (b) Words spelled in more than one (1) manner in the course of the letter.
- (c) Unusual spacing between the written lines.
- (d) Use of more than one (1) color or texture of ink in the course of the letter.

(3) If correspondence is suspected of containing a latent message, it is given to the chief of the censorship office, who subjects it to examination under black light (Quarz Lampe). Only the chief of the censorship office is authorized to use this lamp, which has the appearance of a small X-ray machine, and has a screen which is approximately 40 to 50 centimeters wide. When in operation this instrument projects a light green Fluorescent light. Exact details regarding the technical construction and operation of this instrument are unknown.

d. Sealing: Censored correspondence found to be of no interest is delivered to the sealing section, where all opened envelopes are resealed with a small machine which resembles a printing press. This instrument is not completely efficient, and small wrinkles sometimes remain on the edges of envelopes thus resealed.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

16 March 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CR Team. D-567253/d

b6

SUBJECT

EGIS - District Potsdam
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

3. Weaknesses existing in MfS Department M censorship procedures in JUETERBOG and ZOSSEN:

a. Small packages are seldom opened because of the difficulty of repacking. This is especially true during the period at the end and beginning of each month when government mail is sent, and during the period before holidays, when there is an exceptionally large amount of correspondence in the mail channels.

b. Cigarette packages are seldom opened if the tax seals appear to be unbroken.

c. Registered and express mail is rarely opened because of the resulting loss of time in delivery. The censorship office prefers to let such correspondence continue unexamined rather than have difficulties with the postal department.

d. Correspondence mailed at railroad stations shortly before train departure time does not undergo censorship at the place of mailing.

e. Mail arriving at JUETERBOG and ZOSSEN after 1200 hours on Sundays and recognized GDR holidays is not examined because MfS Department M personnel in Kreis community offices throughout the GDR are not required to work during these afternoons, and the mail is allowed to continue rather than provide a backlog of work.

f. Technical devices used in opening and resealing mail is not entirely efficient, and evidence of censoring sometimes remains on opened and resealed envelopes, in the form of small wrinkles or faded or discolored ink or pencil writing.

(F-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team.

D-567253/b

TEAM CHIEF

15 March 1956

OPNS OFF

b6

awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - District Potsdam
Re: AdministrationCODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. MfS Department M (Mail censorship) Offices at JUETERBOG (UT6861) and ZOSSEN (UT9487):

a. The MfS Department M offices at JUETERBOG and ZOSSEN, being administratively responsible to MfS Department M BV (Bezirks Verwaltung - District Office) POTSDAM (UU6808), address unknown, are subject to inspections by [b6] director of the latter office, approximately two (2) times monthly. These inspections are informal in nature, and are made at irregular intervals. The MfS Department M BV POTSDAM director is occasionally accompanied by unknown individuals believed to be members of MfS BERLIN Headquarters, address unknown, and by unknown Soviet personalities. Such an inspection has occurred only two (2) times during Source's MfS employment. During the inspections the inspecting personalities have been dressed in civilian clothes.

b. Although the MfS Department M offices at JUETERBOG and ZOSSEN are administratively independent from the MfS KV (Kreis Verwaltung - Sub-office) in these communities, a close operational liaison is maintained with these offices by the chief of the respective mail censorship office, who also maintains a close liaison with the director of the post office in the same community.

c. It is the responsibility of the postal department that all incoming and outgoing mail be delivered to the local MfS Department M office for the period required for censoring. This period causes a normal delay of approximately one (1) day in the delivery of mail in JUETERBOG and ZOSSEN, and an unknown longer delay in the large Bezirk (District) cities. The MfS Department M offices in JUETERBOG and ZOSSEN are required to examine all mail, with the exception of packages weighing over four (4) kilos, which are sent to post offices in the Bezirk cities for examination by the customs authority. All registered and insured mail delivered to these MfS Department M offices is left upon receipt. The percentage of correspondence examined depends upon the number of personnel allocated within each MfS Department M office, which on the Kreis level throughout the GDR are believed to consist of approximately five (5) members. The official norm for each censor during an eight (8) hour work shift is to examine 500 letters. The MfS Department M office at JUETERBOG, which controls mail in JUETERBOG and LUCKENWALDE (UT7573), and the communities under the civil administration of these Kreises, receives about 20,000 pieces of mail daily, of which approximately 1,000 pieces, or 5 per cent of the total daily correspondence, comes under examination.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

16 March 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567253/b

b6

art

SUBJECT

EGIS - District Potsdam
Re: AdministrationCODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

2. Communications between MfS Department M offices and other MfS offices: A direct telephone circuit is maintained between the MfS censorship office and the MfS KV in the same community. Telephone communication between the censorship office and MfS Department M BV POTSDAM is channeled through the local MfS KV. Teletype communication maintained at the MfS KV is utilized by the local censorship office. Any written communication is forwarded by use of a courier, who prior to arrival at the MfS KV is announced by telephone, and is allowed entrance upon showing postal department identification.

3. Recruitment of MfS Department M employees: Persons recruited for MfS Department M employment are selected from among individuals considered politically reliable, who are workers at factories, state retail cooperatives, the postal department, and similar employment. Upon being considered for employment, the individual becomes subject to a MfS background investigation, the extent of which is unknown. The individual is required to write a statement of personal history, and during the final stage of the investigation is interviewed by members of the local SED Kreis Direction, who determine the final disposition regarding the individual's political reliability. Upon MfS and SED acceptance, the individual becomes a MfS Department M member without having undergone qualitative training.

4. Dissimulation of MfS Department M membership: To dissimulate their MfS membership, MfS Department M employees are recorded as members of Department XII of the postal department. Their names are not listed in the personnel files of the local post office, but in the files of Department XII of the postal department at district level, address unknown. These individuals are issued normal postal department identification cards, upon which there is no indication of their MfS Department M employment, and receive no MfS identification documents.

5. Salary of MfS Department M members: In addition to a normal postal employee salary, which was credited directly to Source's bank account, and which totaled approximately 250 DM East monthly, Source received an MfS salary, the amount of which was determined by the MfS rank she held, and her responsibility within the censorship office. At the beginning of her MfS employment, Source held the rank of Corporal, and received 310 DM East monthly. After two (2) years of continual employment, her MfS salary was increased to total 344 DM East monthly. The amount of salary received by her MfS colleagues is unknown. In addition to her normal pay, Source received extra ration cards for the purchase of additional undisclosed amounts of milk, butter and sugar.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 16 March 1956
PREPARING OFFICE 66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567253/h		b6
SUBJECT EGIS - District Potsdam Re: Administration	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A USUALLY RELIABLE B FAIRLY RELIABLE C NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D UNRELIABLE E RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F OF INFORMATION: CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . 1 PROBABLY TRUE 2 POSSIBLY TRUE 3 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 IMPROBABLE 5 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>6. Medical and Sick Leaves granted to MfS Department M members: Medical and sick leave authorizations originate from the postal department, while annual leave is controlled by the MfS Department M BV POTSDAM. All annual leave applications are made during the first part of the year. MfS Department M members with under three (3) years continual service are entitled to an annual leave of three (3) weeks duration. MfS Department M members with three (3) years continual service or over are entitled to an annual leave of four (4) weeks duration.</p> <p>7. MfS Department M office at JUETERBOG:</p> <p>a. This mail censorship office, located in the JUETERBOG post office number two (2), Am Bahnhof, number unknown, and consisting of five (5) members, is administratively responsible to MfS Department M BV POTSDAM, address unknown. b6 Lieutenant, is responsible for the administration of this office. She maintains a close liaison with the chief, name unknown, of MfS KV JUETERBOG, Frieden Strasse, number unknown, and b6 b6 chief of MfS KV LUCKENWALDE, Brambusch Strasse 1a. She also maintains liaison with Pnu b6 male, director of JUETERBOG post office number one (1), address unknown, and b6 director of JUETERBOG post office number two (2), Am Bahnhof, number unknown.</p> <p>b. One (1) telephone, having number 303 JUETERBOG, with direct circuit to JUETERBOG MfS KV, and to the JUETERBOG post offices, is found in this mail censorship office. Telephone communication between MfS Department M BV and the JUETERBOG mail censorship office is channeled through MfS KV JUETERBOG. Courier and teletype service maintained between MfS KV JUETERBOG and MfS BV POTSDAM is utilized by the MfS JUETERBOG mail censorship office.</p> <p>c. Work is organized in shifts as follows:</p> <p>(1) Shift number One (1): From 0500 hours until 1400 hours.</p> <p>(2) Shift number Two (2): From 1400 hours until 2200 hours.</p> <p>(3) On all recognized GDR political and religious holidays work begins at 0800 hours and terminates at 1200 hours.</p> <p>8. MfS Department M Office at ZOSSEN:</p> <p>a. This mail censorship office, located in the ZOSSEN post office building, Bahnhof Strasse, number unknown, and consisting of three (3) members,</p>		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE
PREPARING OFFICE 66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567253/b		16 March 1956
SUBJECT ECIS - District Potsdam Re: Administration		b6 wt
CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6		
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION is administratively responsible to MfS Department M POTSDAM, address unknown. b6 acting Lieutenant, is responsible for the administration of this office. She maintains a close liaison with b6 chief of MfS KV ZOSSEN, Wasser Strasse 2, and Frau b6, male, director of the ZOSSEN post office, Bahnhof Strasse, number unknown. b. One (1) telephone, having number 544 ZOSSEN, with direct circuit to the JUETERBOG MfS KV and to the ZOSSEN post office, is maintained in this mail censorship office. Telephone communication between MfS BV POTSDAM and the ZOSSEN mail censorship office is channeled through MfS KV ZOSSEN. Courier and teletype service between MfS KV ZOSSEN and MfS BV POTSDAM is utilized by the Department M ZOSSEN mail censorship office. 9. Work is organized in shifts as follows: a. Shift number one (1): From 0500 hours until 1400 hours. b. Shift number two (2): From 1400 hours until 2200 hours. c. On all recognized GDR political and religious holidays work begins at 0800 hours and terminates at 1200 hours. 10. Region VIII files revealed the following regarding the above mentioned personality: b6, paragraph 8a. b1 b1 as a member of MfS KV ZOSSEN who wears civilian clothes and was formerly a member of the criminal police. (P-6) This individual may be identical with the b6 mentioned in this report.		
0535		
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HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154 US ARMY

APR 11 1956
10 April 1956

D-567253/a; D-567253/d

SUBJECT: EGIS - MfS Bezirk POTSDAM
Re: EEI and Targets, Modus Operandi (C)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, US Army
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch, G2CICE

1. Reference is made to ICM CI-CE-1-55, subject: SFS (State Secretariat for State Security) (GDR/East Germany Intelligence), dated 18 February 1955.

2. Forwarded herewith are the following reports:

a. Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, Summary of Information, subject: EGIS - MfS Bezirk POTSDAM Re: EEI and Targets, file D-567253/c, dated 10 April 1956, in sextuplet.

b. Region VIII, 66th CIC Group, Summary of Information, subject: EGIS - MfS Bezirk POTSDAM Re: Modus Operandi, file D-567253/d, dated 26 March 1956, in triplicate.

3. Examination of Central Registry files of this Group revealed no information identifying any of the personalities mentioned in the attached reports.

4. Source "A" is [b1], born [b1] [b1] at [b1], presently residing at a refugee camp administered by the BERLIN/Varionfelde Refugee Center. She is a refugee from East Germany and was debriefed by this Group on 9 January 1956. [b1]

b1

5. Information contained in the attached reports may be released to other US and Allied Intelligence Agencies in its present form. No other distribution of the attached reports has been made by this Group.

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CIC CENTRAL FILE

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D-567253/e; D-567253/d

SUBJECT: BGIS - MFS Bezirk POTSDAM

Re: EEI and Targets, Modus Operandi (c) (u)

6. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incls:

- | | | |
|----------------------------------|----------------|-----|
| 1. SOI dtd 10 Apr 56 (sextuplet) | CWO | USA |
| 2. SOI dtd 26 Mar 56 (trip) | Asst. Adjutant | |

Telephone: Stgt Mil 8371

b6 /bg

T/R: Above fwds to G2 info concerning MFS POTSDAM Re: Modus Operandi and EEI and Targets.

b6 /bg/CE

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DECLASSIFIED BY: [illegible]
DATE: [illegible]

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

AL 55
TEAM CHIEF

25 March 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567253/d

OPNS OFF

b6

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Potsdam
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:		OF INFORMATION:	
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

1. Technique of a MfS installation in POTSDAM (UU6808): In late October 1954, [b1] born [b1] in [b1] (n.c.a.), the source of this information, was stopped by the VP (Volkspolizei - People's Police) in S-Bahnhof (elevated train station) Dreilinden, POTSDAM, after arriving in the GDR from West BERLIN. The picture of an American enlisted man and 10 DM West were found on her person and she was subsequently taken to a building near Greibnitzsee (Greibnitz Lake) in POTSDAM and interrogated regarding the identity of the American. She revealed that he is her fiancée, Sergeant [b6] whom she had known since 1950. [b6] born [b6] is a cook in Service Company, Provisional Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment, APO 742). A few hours later, [b1] was driven to a MfS office in POTSDAM and was interrogated by a man in civilian clothes who was introduced to Source as [b1] questioned Source regarding her fiancée and his unit, and then attempted to recruit her as an informant. [b1] hesitated in becoming an informant, and [b1] advised her simply to think the matter over. He suggested that meanwhile Source continue her relationship with [b6] but to obtain as much information as possible regarding [b6] and his comrades and unit. [b1] then made an appointment to see Source the following week and released her. [b1] failed to meet [b1], however. During the next 14 months [b1] contacted Source on several occasions; he wrote her several letters in which he requested that she meet him at a particular time and place, and he visited her on three (3) occasions, once while she was in a hospital and twice more at Source's home at POTSDAM-Dreilinden, Am Kanal. During [b1] third visit to [b1], on 10 December 1955, he asked her if she were still seeing [b6]. She replied no, as he had rotated back to the United States in Summer 1955. Then [b1] asked Source if she would do him a personal favor and mail a letter to a friend in West BERLIN. Source agreed, and [b1] gave her 20 DM West for her trouble. Later, after [b1] had left, [b1] examined the letter and noticed that it was addressed to "Herr [b6] (US Sector). [b6] The return address was [b1] (or 9, Source does not know which)". Source saw that the envelope was not completely sealed, and she was able to remove the letter contained therein. The message proposed another meeting on 12 December (or 27 December, Source cannot remember which) 1955 between [b6] and [b1] "at our usual meeting place". [b1] traveled to West BERLIN the following day and mailed the letter. On 4 January 1956, [b1] returned and announced that he had a mission for her that he hoped she would carry out; he wanted her to go to West BERLIN and personally contact [b6] at [b6] and tell him that she was [b6]

b6

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
26 March 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team.

D-567253/d

b6 /fs

SUBJECT

EGIS - MFS - Bezirk Potsdam

Re: M₀dus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
 USUALLY RELIABLE B
 FAIRLY RELIABLE C
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
 UNRELIABLE E
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
 PROBABLY TRUE 2
 POSSIBLY TRUE 3
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
 IMPROBABLE 5
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b6 would then supposedly proceed to obtain employment for Source at a US installation in BERLIN, probably at the US Army Shopping Center on Clay Allee. In this position Source would then act as an informant for the MFS. Source agreed to carry out this mission. b1 gave b1 a special pass which would allow her to move to West BERLIN. He instructed her to meet him at the Friedrich Strasse S-Bahnhof in BERLIN-Mitte (Soviet Sector) on b1 1956, at which time Source would report on her progress in obtaining a job with the Americans and would receive 500 DM West for living expenses until she was earning a regular salary. However, Source decided to defect to West BERLIN as a refugee instead of carrying out this scheme, and she reported to the Marienfelde Refugee Center in BERLIN-Marienfelde (US Sector) on 9 January 1956.

Source "A"

(F-6)

2. Files of Agency "A" revealed the following:

b1

b1

b1

(B-2)

3. Files of Agency "B" revealed the following:

a.

b1

b1

b1

(B-2)

b.

b6

revealed no record of b6 paragraph 1. Files of Agency "C" re-

4. Region VIII files revealed no information regarding the personalities mentioned in this report.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

10 April 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567252/d

b6

fs

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Neubrandenburg
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
PROBABLY TRUE
POSSIBLY TRUE
DOUBTFULLY TRUE
IMPROBABLE
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

1. Recruitment by MfS KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-office) MALCHIN
(UV5357): In b1 1955, b1 born b1

b1 (VU1310), source of the following information, was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the MfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. He was assigned the cover name b1

b1, the last meeting taking place on b1. Shortly after his recruitment, Source was directed to locate and observe former employees b6 b1, who had fled from the GDR in 1946. b1 was unable to locate any former employees b6 and he reported this fact to the MfS. When the MfS learned that Source intended to visit his parents in TOSTEDT (NE4704), Federal Republic of Germany, during November 1955, they instructed him to ascertain, while on this trip, the whereabouts b6 in the Federal Republic of Germany. b1 did not carry this mission out but defected to West BERLIN instead. He had not received any monetary compensation from the MfS.

Source "F"

b1

(F-6)

2. Recruitment by MfS KV PRENZLAU (VV2408): In b1 1954, b1 b1 the source of this information, was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the MfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. He was assigned the cover name b1

b1

b1 He was ordered to report on the political attitude of his fellow workers, on whom he submitted several reports of a general nature. In early November 1955, Source received a letter from b6 residing at b6 (US Sector), b6 who invited b1 in this letter to travel to West BERLIN and call telephone number b6 b6, who had defected to West BERLIN in late October 1955, was formerly a chairman of the LDP (Liberal Demokratische Partei - Liberal Democratic Party) in Kreise Templin and PRENZLAU. Source was afraid that the MfS intercepted his mail, so he showed this letter to them, whereupon they directed b1 to follow the instructions contained in the letter and attempt to become recruited as an informant by the intelligence agency that b6 would probably put b1 in contact with. Source carried out his assignment, and he contacted b6 on b1 1955. b1 was subsequently taken to an office located at BERLIN-Dahlem (US Sector), b1 where he was debriefed regarding his knowledge

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Page(s) 541

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE
PREPARING OFFICE 66th QIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team, D-567252/d		10 April 1956
SUBJECT EGIS - MFS Bezirk Neubrandenburg Re: Modus Operandi		b6 /awt
CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A USUALLY RELIABLE B FAIRLY RELIABLE C NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D UNRELIABLE E RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F		OF INFORMATION: CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . 1 PROBABLY TRUE 2 POSSIBLY TRUE 3 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 IMPROBABLE 5 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>Subject: Count Gerhard von SCHWERIN, as a former German general who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the so-called "DOENITZ Government" in 1945. This von SCHWERIN may be identical to the von SCHWERIN mentioned in paragraph 1 of this report.</p> <p>c. [b1] paragraph 2. [b1] born [b1] [b1] n [b1] was referred to Region VIII on 17 November 1955 by Agency "A". He was mentioned in the Public Safety Division, US Mission BERLIN, Daily Police Report dated 8 December 1955, file VIII-118, as having been taken into custody by the West BERLIN Police on 7 December 1955, on charges of having been an informant for the MFS. (B-2)</p> <p>d. [b1] [b1] [b1] (B-2)</p> <p>e. [b1] [b1] (B-2)</p>		
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HEADQUARTER REGION VIII
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 742 US ARMY

D-567241/b

5 April 1956

SUBJECT: EGIS - MFS - Headquarters, Re: Administration
(Policy and Procedures)

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: CE Division

1. REFERENCE: Message, I-1335.
2. FORWARDING: SOI dated 3 April 1956, subject and file as above.
3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:
 - a. Source: [b1] date and place of birth unknown, a sub-source of O-69-VIII.
 - b. Evaluation of Source: Source, F; O-69-VIII, E.
 - c. Relationship of Source to target: [b1] is in personal contact with an MFS handling agent. [b1] is last reported to have been employed in a VEB (Volkseigener Betrieb - State Owned Enterprise) in LEIPZIG.
 - d. How information was obtained by Source: A member of the MFS supplied [b1] with information contained in this report.
 - e. Date Source obtained information: March 1956.
 - f. Date agent received information: 2 April 1956.
 - g. Status of case: Coverage of target continues.
4. REMARKS: Information pertaining to transfer of case control and jurisdiction from the MFS to the GDR criminal police was reported by this Region in an SOI dated 27 February 1956, subject and file as above. As the information contained in the present report relates to D-567241/d, EGIS - MFS - Headquarters

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D-567241/b

5 April 1956

SUBJECT: AGIS - MFS - Headquarters, Re: Administration
(Policy and Procedures)

(Modus Operandi, Operational Authority), it is recommended that
a copy of this report be placed in this dossier.

1 Incl

SOI dtd 3 April 56 (1)

b6

Lt Col, Inf
Commanding

Berlin 42323 b6 JJ/at/S-3

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON JUN 18 1998
BY CC F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-c05 DOD 5200.1R

0544

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

April 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team.

D-56721/b

b6

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Headquarters
Re: Administration (Policy and Procedures)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. An MfS agent named Fnu **b6** (presumably male) stated recently to Source that the MfS has been considerably restricted in the extent of its jurisdiction and operational authority. **b6** stated that an MfS report on a morally delinquent state factory manager in GERA (TS9540) was to be forwarded directly to the Bezirk authorities of the SED since the MfS no longer had jurisdiction over the investigation of such cases. The subject of this report, one Fnu **b6** (presumably male) was manager of the VEB (Volkseigener Betrieb - State Owned Factory) Blema in GERA. **b6** had come to the attention of the MfS due to complaints from factory employees about **b6** escapades with women.

2. **b6** stated further that the MfS is being curtailed in respect to much of its former political influence and that the SED is henceforth to assume some of the former responsibilities of the MfS. In the future the MfS is to restrict itself more to "combatting offenses against the State". **b6** said that the most recent official instructions had forbidden the application of any sort of physical means in the conduct of interrogations. **b6** further said that the MfS now no longer had exclusive jurisdiction over certain types of cases and that it had been forced to cede much of its former authority to the People's Police. While it was once possible for an MfS agent to take over a case completely from the People's Police, the MfS has now lost this prerogative and has been considerably limited in the degree to which it may influence cases being conducted by the People's Police or other judicial authorities. The area of responsibility of the People's Police is now reported to be more clearly defined than was formerly the case. (F-3)

3. On 2 April 1956, an examination of the records maintained by Region VIII, 66th CIC Group, APO 742, revealed the following information pertaining to a personality mentioned in this report: Reference is made to an SOI dated 13 July 1955, reference D-347092, Subject: Sfs BERLIN, Re: Activities in West BERLIN, evaluated F-6, in which a **b6** is identified as an MfS agent in BERLIN. It is reported that **b6** was in contact with Source, thus making it appear quite likely that the Fnu **b6** mentioned by Source in the present report is identical with **b6**

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team, P-567245/d

ADM ASST

TEAM CHIEF

OPNS OFF 11 April 1956

b6

awt

b6

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS Bezirk Dresden
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Recruiting of Source:

a. In May 1954, Source fled the GDR to West BERLIN because he had been sentenced to three (3) months imprisonment for assault and battery. Source processed through Marienfelde Refugee center in BERLIN-Marienfelde (US Sector), and was flown to the German Federal Republic. He obtained employment as a coal miner in CASTRUP-BAUXEL (n.c.a.). On approximately 14 February 1955, Source's wife, [b6] nee [b6] born [b6] [b6] in [b6], residing at [b6] wrote a letter to Source and informed him that she had made inquiries with the PIRNA (VS2546) authorities and had been assured that if Source returned voluntarily he would not be prosecuted or sent to prison. Source returned to BAD SCHANDAU, and approximately two (2) weeks after his return, he was visited by an officer of the MfS, who introduced himself as Fnu [b6] [b6] asked Source if he would be willing to cooperate with the MfS, and informed him that unless he did cooperate he would have to serve his prison sentence. Source was told to consider the proposition. Approximately two (2) weeks later, [b6] again visited Source and Source accompanied [b6] to the MfS office in PIRNA. Once again Source was asked to work for the MfS. Source finally agreed, signed a statement obligating him to work for the MfS, and was given the cover name [b6] Source allegedly agreed to work for the MfS in the GDR, but absolutely refused to perform any missions in the German Federal Republic.

b. Source returned to his job and on [b6] 1955 he was arrested and forced to serve his three month prison sentence. After his release in late July 1955, he returned to BAD SCHANDAU and found employment. In late August 1955, [b6] again visited Source and informed him that he had been imprisoned due to his refusal to fully cooperate with the MfS. Source was given a chance to reconsider the proposition of performing missions in West Germany, and was informed that he would be imprisoned as "an enemy of the GDR" if he refused. In October 1955, another MfS agent, a Fnu [b6] contacted Source and informed him that the MfS desired Source to perform a mission in West Germany. The details of the mission were to be discussed with Fnu [b6] an officer of the MfS Bezirks office in DRESDEN (VS1257).

c. The following evening, [b6] drove Source to PIRNA. In the MfS office, Source was introduced to a Fnu [b6] Source was told that he was to perform a mission in West Germany, but no details were discussed at this meeting. Source was given 20 DK-East and instructed to travel within the next few days to DRESDEN. Here he was to call telephone number 51 509. Two (2) days later, Source travelled by bus to DRESDEN and called

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F01/PO

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ALLI Para 1-605 DOD 6200.1B

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568

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
4 April 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567245/d

b6 awt 2 X

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS Bezirk Dresden
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:
COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

the number. Source was instructed to wait at the railroad station, where he would be picked up. At 1100 hours [b6] appeared; both Source and [b6] entered a car and drove to an apartment located in DRESDEN-Alttadt, not far from the Hotel Astoria. The house appeared to be an operational cover house. Here Source met a man named Fnu [b6] who appeared to be [b6]'s boss. The three of them had a conversation concerning the advantages of working for the MfS, but actually nothing was discussed concerning the details or objective of Source's mission. Source was released and informed that he would be contacted later and given actual details of his mission.

d. Approximately four (4) weeks after this meeting, [b6] appeared at Source's home and they had three (3) consecutive meetings discussing Source's mission in West Germany.

e. On 6 December 1955, Source departed to West Germany. Source was provided with 200 DM-West and 100 DM-East. The final instructions were issued in DRESDEN on the day of his departure. This final meeting was held in another cover apartment, located in [b6]. Source was ordered to mail a postcard from every town he visited in West Germany. On 22 December 1955, Source returned to BAD SCHANDAU. Source alleges that he did not attempt nor was he successful in performing his mission. Source attempted to contact [b6] but was informed that [b6] was not in and that he should return to his home. On approximately 3 January 1956, [b6] visited Source in his home and debriefed Source about his trip to West Germany. Source was informed that he would have to return to West Germany and was to attempt to complete his mission. He would again be provided with money. [b6] approached Source's wife and attempted to recruit her as a courier between Source and his MfS handling agent, but was unsuccessful. Source was ordered to report to DRESDEN on 15 January 1956 and to take a room in the Hotel Excelsior. Source did as instructed and was met in his room by [b6], who gave him 350 DM-West and 180 DM-East and ordered Source to travel to MUNICH (PU9135) or STUTTGART (NV1404), where he was to obtain employment and perform his missions. On 16 January 1956, Source left for MUNICH via West BERLIN. He travelled to West BERLIN and entered several bars. Within a few hours Source had spent all his money and returned to East BERLIN. He called his handling agent and informed him of this development. He was instructed to return immediately to DRESDEN. His handling agent, [b6] was quite angry and had Source confined to a room in the DRESDEN MfS office. After three (3) days, Source was released, given a train ticket to MUNICH and only 40 DM-East and was ordered to travel to MUNICH and complete his mission. Source then travelled

0547

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ON 18 JUNE 1998
BY CDR USANSCC/T01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
4 April 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

16th SIG SQUAD, Region VIII, CR Team. D-567245/d

b6 / fs b6

SUBJECT

Source: MFS Berlin Dresden
Act: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

to **OPER KICHSTEPT** (n.c.a.) to visit his parents and wrote a letter to his handling agent, that it was impossible to complete his mission unless he had some money. A few days later, his wife arrived, upon orders from b6 and gave Source 150 DM West. Source attempted to obtain employment in West Germany but was unsuccessful. Source then decided to return to the GDR. He reported to b6 who became very angry and ordered Source to return home, and to await further instructions.

1. On 4 March 1956, b6 took Source to the MFS office in **GOERLITZ** (V89967). Here he gave Source the missions of frequenting bars and restaurants in **GOERLITZ** and to overhear discussions concerning the new railroad bridge over the Oder river. Source followed instructions and remained here until 14 March 1956, but was unsuccessful in completing this mission. Source was debriefed by b6 and then assigned his next mission. Source was given a train ticket to West **BERLIN** and 40 DM East. It was at this time that Source decided to defect to West **BERLIN**.

2. Documentation: Source was provided with the following documentation by his handling agent.

a. Police certificate of conduct ("no convictions"). Source was issued this document to aid him in obtaining employment in the German Federal Republic.

b. International travel permit. Source was issued this document to aid him in travelling unhindered through the GDR.

c. Train tickets: Source was issued train tickets for travel in the GDR and West Germany. The validity of these tickets is unknown to Source.

(F-6)

3. An examination of the Region VIII files revealed that telephone number 51 509 is the **DRESDEN** MFS telephone number. (unclassified)

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0548

DISTRIBUTION

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 4 April 1956
PREPARING OFFICE 66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567246/d		b6 fs
SUBJECT EGIS - MfS - Bezirk ERFURT Re: Modus Operandi	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>1. Operational authority and directives: Supreme operational authority and power to issue directives lies with the MfS Headquarters. All reports originating at a lower level are forwarded to Headquarters and are directed to the attention of the Haupt Abteilung (Main Department) involved. Important decisions are made at the Main Department level; lesser decisions are made at the BV (Bezirksverwaltung - District Office) level, but no decisions may be made autonomously at the KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-office) level. Apprehensions and arrests must be cleared through a department chief at BV level; however, in extreme cases, retroactive clearance is permitted. Theoretically, all arrests are made by Section 3 of Department VIII (responsible for investigations, surveillances, and arrests). Immediately after the arrest, the individual and all of his documentation and belongings is turned over to Department IX (responsible for interrogation of all individuals arrested by the MfS). In emergencies, any MfS agent has the legal power to arrest and interrogate anyone. An MfS agent does not need a Warrant of Arrest or a Search Warrant in order to make an arrest or conduct a search. In theory, the agent in charge should obtain these documents within 24 hours after the action has taken place. In practice, Warrants of Arrest are usually obtained, but Search Warrants are seldom bothered with.</p> <p>2. Informants: There are three (3) categories of MfS informants:</p> <p>a. Loyal Communists who work for ideological reasons; these informants are usually employed at irregular intervals on special missions and rarely receive compensation. The recruitment of this type of informant is usually done through the SED, which is informed of the type of informant desired by the MfS. The SED then summons an individual who will meet the necessary requirements, informs the individual what he is expected to do, urges him to cooperate, and then establishes contact between the individual and the MfS.</p> <p>b. Paid informants, not recruited under duress. Recruitment of this type of informant is done entirely by the MfS. The individual is always well screened and thoroughly investigated. This type of informant receives a regular compensation, is generally considered to be a full-time employee of the MfS, and is often used as an investigator or is placed in a strategic position by the MfS.</p> <p>c. Informants recruited under duress, sometimes paid. The recruitment of informants under duress varies greatly, depending on the needs of the moment and the individual and/or the agent involved. At times, the</p>		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 4 April 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567246/d

b6 /fs

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk ERFURT
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

procedure is spontaneous: a wanted person is arrested, the opportunity for recruitment presents itself and is capitalized upon. Actual criminals are generally promised nothing more than commutation of sentence if they successfully complete their mission. In another case, the MfS may want to employ a specific individual. If no other approach can be successfully made, a false case will be compiled against the individual and he will be arrested and unofficially charged. He will then be offered the alternative of cooperating with the MfS or of going to jail under false pretenses. Usually financial compensation is also offered in these cases, along with commutation of possible sentence. If the individual refuses the offer of the MfS and attempts to make the affair public, he will be additionally charged with defamation of a government agency. In all cases of recruitment, the informant is sworn to secrecy. In all cases of recruitment except those of loyal Communists working for ideological reasons, the individual is forced to sign a document which states that he is an employee of the MfS before he actually does any work for the MfS. There is no special department within the MfS for recruitment of informants. Every agent of the MfS is expected to make as many recruitments as possible, and at times, bonuses and awards are promised for excellent work in this field. All recruitments must be previously approved by MfS Headquarters and the SIS agents maintaining control over the BV. The only case where prior approval is not absolutely necessary is when an agent thinks that the possibility exists for doubling back a Western intelligence agent, and time does not permit any checks whatsoever. However, this situation is unusual and seldom arises. All informants are given cover names and know their handling agents by cover names. Informants are generally met in restaurants, theaters, on the street, and, in more important cases, in operational cover houses.

3. Communications:

a. The MfS BV ERFURT (PB4249) maintains direct private telephone lines to the subordinate sub-offices, MfS Headquarters, and the SIS office in ERFURT. The BV maintains contact with other official agencies by commercial telephone.

b. The BV also maintains contact with the subordinate sub-offices, MfS Headquarters, and the SIS office in ERFURT by means of four (4) teletypewriter sets which are located at the District Office.

c. The MfS does not utilize postal service. All written communication between MfS agencies is done by means of a courier service. A regular courier schedule exists between the BV ERFURT and MfS Headquarters.

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AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

4 April 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567246/d

b6

fs

SUBJECT

EGIS - MFS - Bezirk ERFURT
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION:

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

in East BERLIN. The courier car leaves ERFURT at 0400 hours every Tuesday and Friday, and arrives back in ERFURT at approximately 1900 hours on the same days. The vehicle used is usually a black sedan, EKA (Eisenacher Motor Works) make, and the license plates are changed for every trip. The MFS has three (3) categories of official mail which is transported by couriers:

- (1) Normal documents, which can be transported by any agent or driver.
- (2) Confidential documents, which must be handled by agents of officer rank.
- (3) Secret documents, which must be handled by specifically designated courier officers.

4. Transportation:

a. When an agent of the BV ERFURT needs a vehicle for operational purposes, he must submit a written application to his department chief. The chief approves the request by signing it and the request is then forwarded to the chief of the Motor Pool. The chief of the Motor Pool then makes the necessary arrangements for assigning a vehicle and a driver to the agent. Requests are generally submitted 24 hours prior to the time when the vehicle is used.

b. License plates used by the MFS BV ERFURT are usually normal civilian plates. There are the letters "LA", followed by two (2) blocks of two (2) numbers each. For example a sample number might be LA 16-73. The numbers on the plates are changed frequently at irregular intervals.

5. Investigations, Arrests, Detentions, and Interrogations: Most investigations are conducted by members of Section 1 within Department VIII, who wear civilian clothes and usually operate under the pretense of being representatives of some governmental agency other than the MFS. All arrests are performed by member of Section 3 within Department VIII who also wear civilian clothes and operate under false pretenses. Theoretically, any individual who has been arrested must be arraigned within 24 hours, but this rule is seldom adhered to. Widespread knowledge in the GDR of the fact that pre-arraignment detention may be unlimited often aids the MFS in obtaining quick cooperation from arrested individuals. As soon after arrest

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ON JUN 18 1998 BY CDR J. 8 F01/RO AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1-R

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
4 April 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567246/d

b6 fs

SUBJECT

ECIS - MfS - Bezirk ERFURT
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

as is feasible, the individual is turned over to Department IX, along with all of his personal belongings and all files and documentation which has been compiled on the individual. There are strict regulations within the MfS against mistreatment of prisoners, either during arrest, detention, or interrogation. However, within the BV ERFURT, there were certain "unwritten codes" pertaining to the handling of prisoners, which were adhered to much more closely than were the written regulations. According to the "unwritten codes" a prisoner was treated in accordance with his crime. If an individual was arrested under obviously false charges in order to recruit him, he was generally well-treated. If an individual was arrested for a minor offense and was apparently of little use to the MfS, he was treated indifferently. Individuals arrested for major offenses such as economic sabotage or espionage could be mistreated without danger of reprimand from superiors. (D-3)

6. An examination of Region VIII files revealed the following: Several reports originating in this Region contain information which substantiates the information listed in paragraphs 1 through 5 of this report.

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ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDR USAF
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

0552

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
4 April 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567246/b

b6
fs

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk ERFURT
Re: Administration

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Agents of the MfS BV (Bezirksverwaltung - District Office) ERFURT (PB4249) and its subordinate agencies utilize the following means of identification:

a. MfS Credential: A red booklet which includes the name and picture of the bearer and is officially stamped; this credential is generally used only when conducting business with another official government agency.

b. VP (Volkspolizei - People's Police) Credential: A blue booklet which identifies the bearer as a member of the People's Police; this credential is generally used during searches and arrests.

c. False Credentials: False credentials of various agencies in the GDR, such as the FDJ (Freie Deutsche Jugend - Free German Youth) are maintained at the BV; these credentials are used on special occasions and their use must be cleared through the Department chief concerned.

d. Badge: A small metal badge which identifies the bearer as a member of the GDR Criminal Police; this badge is rarely used. (D-3)

2. Alert Plans: The order for an alert must come from MfS Headquarters. The MfS BV ERFURT has three (3) large sealed envelopes which contain the different alert plans and are maintained in the guard room and whose seals are checked every day by the duty agent. These envelopes are classified secret and can only be opened by the duty agent in the event that an alert is called. The three (3) envelopes are marked with the following code words, which signify the different types of alerts:

a. KARABINER (carbine)

b. GRANATE (grenade)

c. BOMBE (bomb)

(D-6)

3. An examination of Region VIII files revealed the following: Several reports originating in this Region contain information which substantiates the information listed in paragraph 1 of this report.

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ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDR USA/INSCOM/F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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1 JUN 47

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HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154 US ARMY

APR 5 1956

4 April 1956

D-567241/A

SUBJECT: Counter Intelligence Measures of the GDR (C)

TO: Commanding Officer
Region VIII, 66th CIC Group
APO 742, US Army
ATTN: Counter Espionage Section

1. The following information is contained in a 522d Military Intelligence Battalion report obtained from a coded source of that agency, and is forwarded for your information:

There is a new counter intelligence procedure in the GDR. An SSD member controls three "street commanders" and they hold conferences twice each week. Street Commanders are to observe closely all houses in their responsible areas. They are to determine whether persons from the West are in their districts who are unemployed and who stay frequently in West BERLIN. Spending habits of individuals in their districts are also to be observed. (Unvaluated)

2. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

b6

1st Lt, Armor
Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt W11 8971
DIR/HH/hg

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ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDR USAF/COM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

INFO COPY:
CO, CIC Region III
CO, CIC Region XI

M/R: Above fnds info of possible interest to Regions engaged in offensive effort.

0554

A1307

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UIC Central File
16

b6

2-267243/a

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
3 April 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

Region XI, 66th CIC Group, APO 800, US Army

SUBJECT

East German Intelligence - MFS -
Desirk Chemnitz
Re: Medus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Informants

a. Selection Standards - Source was selected as an informant because he was considered "one of the most intelligent" persons the MFS could find. The MFS flattered him by telling him he was capable of doing the work and could mix with anyone.

b. Recruiting - Source attended a movie in which Communists were shown being shot to death by the SS (Schutzstaffeln - Armed Guards). Source applauded at this point and was taken to the MFS. After approximately eight (8) hours of interrogation, he was given the choice of working for the MFS or six (6) years in a penitentiary. Source chose the former. Source was made to sign a Pledge of Silence (Schweigepflicht) and a contract of sorts which stated that Source would work for the MFS in LINDBACH US 4337.

c. Training - Source was given the mission of penetrating a group of young East Germans in LINDBACH who were suspected CIC agents. The MFS assumed there were between twenty (20) and thirty (30) people in the ring which was led by [b6], born about [b6], place of birth unknown, living in [b6]. Members of the ring were thought to travel to West BERLIN UU 9220 periodically in order to pick up leaflets of an unknown nature. The group distributed the leaflets in the CHEMNITZ US 5443 area. Source was to become friendly with [b6] while he was in the "Parkschenke" dance hall in LINDBACH by making anti-East German statements.

d. Contacting of Informants - Source was to report each Monday evening between 1730 and 1800 hours in [b6]. If Source did not appear, no reprisal was taken nor did the MFS attempt to get in contact with Source. Source sometimes went as long as three (3) weeks without going to the above address.

e. Security Factors - Source was instructed to approach CHEMNITZ, Gutenberg Strasse 2, by back streets because it was feared that the main entrance and approaches were under Western intelligence surveillance.

f. Payment - Source received no regular payment but was frequently asked whether he "needed anything". Source declined all aid until the time he came to West Germany for the MFS. At this time, Source accepted RM East 50 for train fare and expenses. Source signed a receipt for the money.

g. Reports - Source submitted written reports on the above mentioned

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ON 18 June 1998
BY CDR USAINSCC:1F31/P
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

WD AGO FORM 568
1 JUN 47

3 April 1936

Region XI, 66th CIC Group, APO 800, US Army

East German Intelligence - MFS -
Bezirk Chemnitz
Re: Modus Operandi

group but waited until he was in CHEMNITZ, Gutenberg Strasse 2 to write them. Clarification came at this time, but Source was not aware of what evaluation was given his reports. He had the feeling that the MFS did not believe him. The reports were written in long hand on plain white paper and were signed "Kapiteen".

2. Border Crossings - Source crossed into West Germany by train at GUTENFURST GA 1089. The crossing was legal and Source used his own identification.

2. No further information is available.

SOURCE "A-XI"

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ON 18 June 1998
BY CDR USAINSCCM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

0556

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HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154 US ARMY

APR 4 1956
2 April 1956

D-567253/d

SUBJECT: MHS - MFS Bezirk POTSDAM
Re: Modus Operandi (C)(U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, US Army
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch, G2CICB

1. Reference is made to ICM CI-CE-1-55, subject: SFS (State Secretariat for State Security) (GDR/East German Intelligence), dated 18 February 1955.

2. Forwarded herewith in triplicate is a Region VIII, 66th CIC Group Summary of Information, subject and file as above, dated 13 February 1956 with three exhibits in duplicate.

3. Examination of Central Registry files of this Group revealed no information in addition to that mentioned in the Region VIII file checks concerning any of the personalities mentioned in the attached reports, except for the following:

Fnu [b6] (probably identical to [b6] nee [b6] female, 5'3" tall, 143 pounds, gray hair, gray eyes, German, and is between 51-56 years old. Fnu [b6] was the Deputy Chief and purchaser at UNIVERMAG, BERLIN-Karlshorst (restricted area), Ehrenfelsstrasse 1 (Soviet Sector) since 1948. (Date of Information: 30 Sep 54) (P-6)

4. The sources listed below defected from East Germany and were debriefed by this Group between October and December 1955:

a. Source "E" is [b1] born [b1] in [b1] presently residing at [b1] (US Sector), [b1] a/c [b1] and was a part-time informant for the MFS. Source "E" was referred [b1]

b. Source "H" is [b1] born [b1] in [b1] presently residing at a refugee camp administered by the BERLIN-Marienfelde Refugee Center, and was a part-time informant for the MFS. Source "H" was referred [b1]

c. Source "J" is [b1] born [b1] in [b1] presently residing at a refugee camp administered by the BERLIN-Marienfelde Refugee Center, and was a part-time informant for the MFS.

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A/A13

CIC CENTRAL FILE
K
LA

CONFIDENTIAL

D-567251/4

2 April 1956

SUBJECT: MERS - MFS Report POTSDAM
Re: Madsen Operant (C)(u)

d. Source "P" is [b1] born [b1] in [b1] presently residing at a refugee camp administered by the MILLIN-Marionfeldt Refugee Center, and was a part-time informant for the MFS.

e. Source "Q" is [b1] born [b1] in [b1] presently residing at a refugee camp administered by the MILLIN-Marionfeldt Refugee Center, and was a part-time informant for the MFS.

f. Source "R" is [b1] born [b1] in [b1] presently residing at [b1] (US Sector) Laborstrasse 36 or 38, a/o [b1], and was a part-time informant for the MFS. Source "R" was referred to the West MILLIN Police.

g. Source "T" is [b1] born [b1] in [b1] presently residing at [b1] (British Sector), [b1], and was a part-time informant for the MFS. Source "T" was [b1]

h. Source "U" is [b1] born [b1] in [b1] presently residing at [b1] (French Sector), [b1], and was a part-time informant for the MFS. Source "U" was [b1]

i. Source "V" is [b1] born [b1] in [b1] presently residing at [b1] and had personal contact with MFS personalities. A report evaluated F-4 indicated that Source "V" was arrested in the GDR in May 1955 for espionage activities.

j. Agency "A" is the [b1]

5. Information contained in the attached reports may be released to other US and Allied Intelligence Agencies in its present form. No other distribution of the attached reports has been made by this Group.

6. Regarding data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

0558

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

1 Incl:

SOI dtd 13 Feb 56 w/Inc (trip)

Telephone: Sgt H11 8371

[b6]

[b6]

1st Lt, Asst
Adjutant

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HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154 US ARMY

D-567242/d/g

2 April 1956

SUBJECT: MOIS - MFS Bezirk BERLIN
Re: Modus Operandi, Source (U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, US Army
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch, G2CICB

1. Reference is made to ICM CI-CE-1-55, subject: MFS (State Secretariat for State Security) (GDR/East German Intelligence) dated 18 February 1955.

2. Forwarded herewith in triplicate are the following Region VIII, 66th CIC Group reports:

a. Summary of Information, subject: MOIS - MFS Bezirk BERLIN, Re: Modus Operandi, file D-567242/d, dated 14 February 1956.

b. Summary of Information, subject: MOIS - MFS Bezirk BERLIN, Re: Sources, file D-567242/g, dated 14 February 1956.

3. Examination of Central Registry files of this Group revealed no information in addition to that contained in the Region VIII file checks concerning personalities mentioned in the attached reports.

4. The Sources listed below are refugees from East Germany and were debriefed by this Group between August and December 1955:

a. Source "A" is [b1] born [b1] in [b1] presently residing at [b1] (US Sector), [b1] and was a part-time informant for MFS.

b. Source "B" is [b1] born [b1] in [b1] presently residing at [b1] (British Sector), and was a part-time informant for MFS. Source "B" was [b1] 0559 EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

c. Source "C" is [b1] born [b1] in [b1] and is presently residing at a refugee camp administered by the BERLIN-Marion-Felde Refugee Center. Source "C" had duty contact with MFS personnel and was [b1]

d. Source "D" is [b1] born [b1] in [b1] presently confined in Alt Moabit Prison in BERLIN-Tiergarten (British

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AA23

CIC CENTRAL FILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

D-567212/G/g

2 April 1956

SUBJECT: SOIS - MFS Bezirk BERLIN

Re: Modus Operandi, Sources (G)

Sector), and was a part-time informant for the MFS.

e. Source "E" is [b1], born [b1] in [b1]
presently residing at [b1] (British Sector) [b1]
[b1] and was a part-time informant for the MFS.

f. Source "F" is [b1] born [b1] in [b1]
presently residing at a refugee camp administered by the BERLIN-Marionfelde
Refugee Center. Source "F" [b1]

b1

g. Source "G" is [b1] nee [b1] born
[b1] in [b1] presently residing at [b1] (US
Sector) [b1] and was a part-time informant for
the MFS.

h. Source "H" is [b1] born [b1] in [b1]
presently residing at [b1] and
had duty contact with MFS personnel. Source "H" [b1]
[b1]

i. Source "I" is [b1] nee [b1] born [b1] in
[b1] presently residing at a refugee camp administered by the
BERLIN-Marionfelde Refugee Center. Source "I" was personally acquainted
with MFS members.

j. Agency "A" is the [b1]

k. Source "AA" is a coded source of this Group.

5. Information contained in the attached reports may be released to
other US and Allied Intelligence Agencies in its present form. No other
dissemination of the attached reports has been made by this Group.

6. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

0560

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

2 Incls:
SOIs dtd 14 Feb 56 (trip)

Telephone: Sgt Mil 8371

[b6] ag

b6

1st Lt, Armer
Adjutant

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0290

M/R: Above fnds to G2 info Re: MFS MO and Sources.

b6 /CE

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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDH 3031000M F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

560A

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HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154 US ARMY

D-547241/b

29 March 1956

SUBJECT: SOIS - MFS Headquarters
Re: Administration (Policies and Procedures) (C)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 409, US Army
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch, G2CICB

1. Reference is made to ICM CI-CE-1-55, subject: SFS (State Secretariat for State Security) (GDR/East German Intelligence), dated 18 February 1955.

2. Forwarded herewith in triplicate is a Region VIII, 66th CIC Group, Summary of Information, subject and file as above, dated 8 March 1956.

3. Source is [b1] born [b1] in [b1] presently a refugee residing at a refugee camp in BERLIN administered by the Marienfelde Refugee Center.

4. Examination of Central Registry files of this Group revealed

b1

(Date of Information: 7 March 1956) (P-6)

5. Information contained in the attached report may be released to other US and Allied Intelligence Agencies in its present form. No other distribution of the attached report has been made by this Group.

6. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

0561

1 Incl:
SOI dtd 8 Mar 56 (trip)

Telephone: Stgt M1 8371

b6

b6

1st Lt, Armor
Adjutant

M/R: Above fnds to G2 info Re: MFS Special Directive 49/55.

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CIC CENTRAL FILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS REGION VIII
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 742 US ARMY

CICP
Ft. Holabird

D-567241

13 March 1956

SUBJECT: BGIS - MFS - Headquarters, Re: Administration

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: GE Division

1. REFERENCE: TWX I-1158.
2. FORWARDED: SOI, dated 8 March 1956, subject and file as above.

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source: [b1] born [b1] in [b1] presently a refugee residing at a refugee camp in BERLIN administered by the Marienfelde Refugee Center.

b. Evaluation of Source: F.

c. Relationship of Source to target: Source was employed [b1]

d. How information was obtained by Source: In the course of instruction received at a VP School located at BERLIN Wilhelmshagen (Soviet Sector).

e. Date Source obtained information: 7-15 January 1956.

f. Date agent received information: 7 March 1956.

g. Status of case: Coverage of target continues.

1 Incl
SOI dtd 8 Mar 56 (1)

0562

[b6]

Lt Col, Inf
Commanding

Berlin 42323 [b6] /at/S-5

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567241/6

CLASS ON

b6

fs

SUBJECT

ESIS - MFS - Headquarters
Re: Administration (Policies
and Procedure)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. VP (Volkspolizei - People's Police) Special Directive 49/55, dated 1 January 1956, classified secret, deals with the re-organization of the mission and case jurisdiction of the GDR Criminal Police. The directive was effective upon date of issue and is expected to be completely in effect by 31 December 1956. According to the directive, the MFS will assume responsibility for the following functions previously held by the MFS: neutralization of anti-GDR and anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation in the GDR; prevention of the distribution of Western propaganda in the GDR; neutralization of sabotage activities within the GDR; neutralization of attempted defections and investigation of past defections from the GDR; screening of immigrants and returnees to the GDR; and neutralization of illegal trade in Western products in the GDR.

2. In any case of the types mentioned in paragraph 1 of this report, the Criminal Police will do the preliminary investigation. If it is determined that espionage is involved, the MFS will be notified and will assume control of the case. However, the MFS will retain the right to request any information or assume control of any case on its own initiative, without waiting to be called in by the Criminal Police.

3. This new directive appears to be an attempt to cut down MFS work on cases of obviously minor stature. It will allow them to concentrate more fully on espionage cases and sensitive political cases in the GDR, and also to expend more effort toward positive espionage in the Federal Republic of Germany.

(F-6)

4. An examination of Region VIII files revealed the following: Specific instructions to the GDR Criminal Police as outlined in Special Directive 49/55 have been described in detail in an SOI from the CS Team this Region, Subject: EVDVP School at BERLIN-Wilhelmshagen, file: D-137899 VIII-23703, dated 29 February 1956, evaluated F-6.

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ON JUN 18 1998

BY CDR USA

AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

0563

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HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154 US ARMY

APR 2 1956

29 March 1956

1-567254/a

SUBJECT: MfS - MfS Benirk BOSTOCK
Re: Mofas Operandi (O)(u)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, US Army
ATTN: Chief Counter Intelligence Branch, G2CICB

1. Reference is made to ICM CI-CK-1-55, subject: MfS (State Secretariat for State Security) (GDR/East German Intelligence), dated 18 February 1955.
2. Forwarded herewith in triplicate is a Region VIII, 66th CIC Group, Summary of Information, subject and file as above, dated 23 February 1956.
3. Examination of Central Registry files of this Group, revealed no information identifying telephone number 5265 or any of the personalities mentioned in the attached report.

4. Sources listed below fled from East Germany and were debriefed by this Group between October 1955 and January 1956: 132210 14 MC

a. Source "C" is b1 born b1 in b1
Source "C" was a part-time informant for the MfS and was debriefed by this Group b1
b1

b. Source "I" is b1 born b1 in b1
presently residing in a refugee camp administered by the BERLIN-Mariefelde Refugee Center. Source "I" was recruited by MfS as a part-time informant.

0564

5. Information contained in the attached report may be released to other interested US and Allied Intelligence Agencies in its present form. No other distribution of the attached reports has been made by this Group.

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

AA08

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CIC READING FILE

36595504

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

D-567254/a

29 March 1956

SUBJECT: EGIS - MFS Bezirk ROSTOCK
Re: Modus Operandi (9)(u)

6. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl:

SOI, dtd 23 Feb 56 (trip)

b6

1st Lt, Armor
Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt Mil 8371

b6

X/R: Above fwds to G2 a Region VIII rept Re; Modus Operandi, MFS
Bezirk ROSTOCK.

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ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDR USAF/CCAF01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

0565

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DM 7023 Feb 56
TEAM CHIEF

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team, D-567254

ORNS OFF

b6

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Besirk Rostock
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Recruitment by an MfS installation in ROSTOCK (UV1397): b1

b1

b1 Source was recruited as an informant by the MfS. Source was ordered to report to the personnel section of the b6, where he was interviewed by Pnu b6 or b6, male, an agent of the MfS in ROSTOCK. During this interview, Source was reminded by b6 that he (Source) had voluntarily entered the GDR from the Federal Republic of Germany and that he had received aid from the GDR in the form of employment at the b6. Consequently, b6 informed Source that he was obligated to support the GDR government. b6 then asked Source if he would be willing to travel to the Federal Republic of Germany on behalf of the GDR. Fearing loss of employment and possible imprisonment, Source agreed to support the GDR government and indicated to b6 that he would fulfill all obligations or assignments. b6 concluded the interview by informing Source that he would be contacted at his apartment in WARNEMUENDE at a later date. On b6 b6 1955, Source was contacted at his apartment by b6 who assigned Source his first espionage mission. Source was ordered to travel to the Federal Republic of Germany and observe the air maneuvers conducted by the Western powers in the vicinity of WILHELMSHAVEN (ME4230) and JEVER (ME2736). b6 provided Source with an interzonal pass, bearing Source's correct name, and 200 DM West for expenses. Further, in the event of a control check by the VP (Volkspolizei - People's Police) or border police, Source was instructed to inform them that he intended to visit relatives in the Federal Republic of Germany. Source departed from WARNEMUENDE for WILHELMSHAVEN on 21 June 1955. Enroute, during a control check in SCHWANHEIDE (PE1222), the VP discovered that Source was in possession of 200 DM West and he was subsequently detained in SCHWANHEIDE for two (2) days. On 23 June 1955, Source was released and he continued to WILHELMSHAVEN. After his arrival in WILHELMSHAVEN, Source obtained a hotel room and proceeded to carry out his mission. He visited the WILHELMSHAVEN and JEVER air terminals on several occasions, but was unable to collect any information of intelligence value. Source remained in WILHELMSHAVEN until 3 July 1954, at which time he returned to WARNEMUENDE. During his stay in WILHELMSHAVEN, Source visited a sister, b6 nee b6 who resides at b6 b6 but he did not inform her of his actual reasons for visiting the Federal Republic of Germany. Instead, Source informed his sister that he was visiting the Federal Republic of Germany to attend a trade union meeting. On 4 July 1955, as previously arranged, Source was visited at his apartment in WARNEMUENDE by b6 Source provided b6 with an oral report concerning his trip to WILHELMSHAVEN; he claimed he was unable to provide substantial information concerning the air maneuvers because of his limited knowledge regarding types and identification of aircraft. Source was severely

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0560

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL

DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

WD ASD FORM 568
1 JUN 47

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

23 Feb 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567254/a

b6

awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MFS - Bezirk Rostock
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

reprimanded by b6 for producing an incomplete and unreliable report, but he was provided with 200 DM East for partially accomplishing his mission. b6 concluded the meeting with Source by advising him to return to his work at the b6 and by informing him that he would be contacted again at his apartment on a later date. On b6 1955, Source was again contacted at his apartment in WARNEMUENDE by b6. At this meeting, Source was alerted to prepare for another mission to the Federal Republic of Germany, but no further arrangements were made. Two (2) days later, on b6 b6 1955, he was met at his place of employment by b6 who provided Source with his second espionage mission. Source was ordered to travel to the Federal Republic of Germany and was instructed to observe the movements of all US military personnel at the BREMERHAVEN (NE7133) Port of Embarkation. Specifically, Source was instructed to observe the US Naval Transport Ships "General Langfitt", "General Hudson" and "General Patch". Source was informed that these three (3) ships would arrive in BREMERHAVEN on 27 July 1955. He was instructed to determine the number of US troop units embarking and debarking from these ships, the types and designations of the units, and the number of troops assigned to each unit. Source was provided with a map of BREMERHAVEN which indicated the location of Columbus Pier, where the "Langfitt", "Hudson" and "Patch" were supposed to dock. Source was further instructed to recruit an informant in BREMERHAVEN, who could continue observation of US troop movements after Source returned to WARNEMUENDE. Source was provided with 80 DM West as an initial payment to this informant and was instructed not to pay him the money until Source had a receipt properly signed with the recruited person's correct name. However, Source made no effort to accomplish this part of his mission, and he returned the 80 DM West to b6 after Source's return to WARNEMUENDE. On 26 July 1955, Source traveled to BREMERHAVEN and remained there for four (4) days. Source visited the port of BREMERHAVEN on only one (1) occasion, which was for about two (2) hours. At that time he noted that the ships "Langfitt", "Hudson" and "Patch" were docked at the Columbus Pier. Subsequently, Source departed from BREMERHAVEN and traveled to KIEL (NE7322), where he visited relatives until b6 1955, on which day he returned to WARNEMUENDE. On the same day Source was met at his apartment in WARNEMUENDE by b6. Source b6 that he had conducted observations in BREMERHAVEN from 26 July until 5 August 1955. Source told b6 that the transport ships "Langfitt", "Hudson" and "Patch" had arrived on 27 July 1955 as scheduled and that 500 troops debarked from the "Patch" and 300 from the "Hudson" and "Langfitt" respectively. Further, Source informed b6 that these troops were unaccompanied by weapons or vehicles and that it was impossible to determine the designations of these units. Source was again reprimanded for submitting an incomplete and unreliable report, but he was again provided with 200 DM East for partially

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ON

BY CDR USAN 8 1998

BY CDR USAN 8 1998 F01/PO

AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

23 Feb 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567254/d

b6

/awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Rostock
Re: Modus OperandiCODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

accomplishing his mission. Then [b6] advised Source to return to his employment at the [b6] and Source was told that he would be contacted at a later date. In early September 1955, Source received a letter from [b6] whereby arrangements were made for Source to meet [b6] at ROSTOCK, Doberaner Platz. After contacting [b6] at the designated time and place, Source and [b6] visited several restaurants in ROSTOCK, during which time Source was alerted for his third espionage mission. Source was informed that naval maneuvers conducted by the Western powers were to take place in the North Sea beginning 20 September 1955. He was told to travel to WILHELMSHAVEN in an attempt to determine the identity and nationality of units participating in these maneuvers. In addition, Source was instructed to locate and establish all information possible regarding military installations in WILHELMSHAVEN and the surrounding area. Source was told to note all main streets leading to the WILHELMSHAVEN harbor and the condition of these streets, and to ascertain the location of supply and munition depots in WILHELMSHAVEN. [b6] advised Source to buy an inexpensive camera for purposes of photographing the port and the various military installations in WILHELMSHAVEN. The meeting with [b6] was then concluded and Source returned to WARNEMUENDE. On [b6] 1955, two (2) days prior to his scheduled departure from WILHELMSHAVEN, Source was contacted by [b6] at Source's apartment in WARNEMUENDE and was informed that his mission had been canceled. Source was told that another person had been chosen to travel to WILHELMSHAVEN. However, instead of this mission, Source was assigned a mission to accomplish in NEUSTADT (WE5411). He was instructed to determine the location of military installations, German police stations and barracks, power and gas works, industrial plants and airports. Source departed from WARNEMUENDE on 17 September 1955, but instead of traveling directly to NEUSTADT, he went to UETERSEN (n.o.a.) and HAMBURG (NE6536) for two (2) days. On 19 September 1955, he traveled to NEUSTADT and was later joined there by his wife, [b6] [b6] nee [b6]. Allegedly, Source made no real effort to accomplish his mission and he spent only one (1) day viewing the city of NEUSTADT. On 25 September 1955, Source returned to WARNEMUENDE. On [b6] 1955, as previously arranged, Source traveled to ROSTOCK and called [b6] through telephone number 52 65, which number was previously given to Source by [b6]. Subsequently Source met [b6] at a restaurant and gave him an oral report of his trip to NEUSTADT. Source told [b6] that there were very few military installations in NEUSTADT and that he had seen no military units there. He provided [b6] with several postcards picturing public buildings in NEUSTADT. [b6] then told Source to write a complete report of his trip and what he had accomplished while in NEUSTADT. He was instructed to send this report to [b6] through post office box number 137 in ROSTOCK.

0568

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
23 Feb 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team.

D-567254/d

b6 /awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Rostock.
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION:
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . .	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

At the meeting's conclusion [b6] provided Source with 200 DM East. On 2 October 1955, in an effort to discontinue relations with the MfS, Source fled to West BERLIN.

Source "C"

(F-6)

2. Recruitment by MfS KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-office) GREVESMUEHLEN (PE4471): On [b6] 1955, Subject was recruited as a part-time informant and obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the MfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source met his handling agent only once, on [b6] 1956, in a street in GREVESMUEHLEN. Source received the mission of reporting on two (2) friends, [b6] about 29 years of age, and [b6] about 28 years of age, who are members of the French Foreign Legion, which Source did. On the day of his obligation, i.e., [b6] 1955, he had received 10 DM East as compensation for having missed work.

Source "I"

(F-6)

3. Region VIII files revealed no information regarding the personalities and telephone number mentioned in this report.

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HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154 US ARMY

MAR 30 1956

D-567242/c/d

(u) 28 March 1956
(c)

SUBJECT: EGIS - MfS Bezirk BERLIN
Re: EEI and Targets, Modus Operandi

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, US Army
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch, G2CICE

1. Reference is made to ICM CI-CE-1-55, subject: Sfs (State Secretariat for State Security) (GDR/East German Intelligence), dated 18 February 1955.

2. Forwarded herewith in triplicate are the following Region VIII, 66th CIC Group reports:

a. Summary of Information, subject: EGIS - MfS Bezirk BERLIN, Re: EEI and Targets, file D-567242/c, dated 13 February 1956.

b. Summary of Information, subject: EGIS - MfS Bezirk BERLIN, Re: Modus Operandi, file D-567242/d, dated 13 February 1956.

3. Examination of Central Registry files of this Group revealed no additional information concerning personalities mentioned in the attached reports except as follows:

a. SCHARNOWSKI, Ernst, born 5 June 1896, has been reported as chairman of the German Trade Union Association in West BERLIN, one of the more important functionaries of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) in West BERLIN. SCHARNOWSKI is pro-American; he delivered a speech on 16 October 1951 criticizing the East German Collective Agreements, and he favored ratification of the PARIS Pacts.

b. [b6] and [b6] (or [b6]), were mentioned in inclosures to letter this Group, subject: [b1] file D-582996, dated 20 January 1956. 0570

4. The sources listed below are refugees from East Germany and were debriefed by this Group between November and December 1955:

a. Source "B" is [b1] born [b1] in [b1]
Source was closely acquainted with MfS personnel.

b. Source "D" is [b1] born [b1]

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14MC AA22

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

D-567242/c/d

SUBJECT: CIS - MFS Bezirk BERLIN

Re: ERI and Targets, Modus Operandi (g)

28 March 1956

in BERLIN, presently residing at [b1] (US Sector) [b1]
[b1] Source "D" was a part-time informant for the MFS and was
previously reported to your office.

c. Source "F" is [b1] [b1] born [b1]
[b1] in [b1] presently residing at [b1] British
Sector), [b1] Source "F" was a part-time informant for the
MFS.

d. Source "K" is [b1] born [b1] in [b1]
[b1] and was a part-time informant for the MFS. Source "K" was referred
[b1] After Source "K" was debriefed,
he was referred [b1]

e. Source "W" is [b1] born [b1] in
[b1] presently in custody of the West BERLIN Police. Source "W"
resided in the same neighborhood as MFS personnel. Files of this Group
revealed that source "W" first reported as a defected MFS informant at
JIAS (Radio in the American Sector) in early November 1955, and confessed
that he had admissions against USSR (United States Mission BERLIN).

f. Source "Y" is [b1] born [b1] in
[b1] and was a part-time informant for the MFS. Source "Y" was
referred [b1]

5. Information contained in the attached reports may be released
to other US and Allied Intelligence Agencies in its present form. No
other distribution of the attached reports has been made by this Group.

6. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

0571

2 incls:

101s dtd 13 Feb 56 (trip)

Telephone: Stgt M11 8371

[b6] /bg

[b6]

1st Lt, Major
Adjutant

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M/R: Above fws to G2 a Rgn VIII rept re: ERI and Targets, Modus Operandi.

211111111111

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567242/d

b6

awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Berlin
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Techniques utilized by MfS installation in BERLIN: Between June and November 1955, a member of a MfS guard unit in BERLIN-Adlershof (Soviet Sector), was sent to West BERLIN with the mission of locating defected VP (Volkspolizei - People's Police) members in refugee camps in BERLIN-Charlottenburg (British Sector) and BERLIN-Gesundbrunnen (French Sector), and to induce them to return to the GDR. For this mission he was equipped with civilian clothes, including "Hietosen" (rivet trousers - freely translated as "blue jeans"), which the MfS termed as "typically American." Also, he was given a civilian personal identification card. The MfS guard crossed over to West BERLIN on four (4) occasions between June and November 1955, but he did not succeed in inducing any defected VP members to return.

(F-6)

Source "B"

2. Recruitment by MfS installation in BERLIN: In June 1954, after being seen riding in East BERLIN in an automobile bearing West BERLIN ("KB" prefix) licence plates, Source was apprehended by the East BERLIN criminal police and MfS and was taken to the police station located at BERLIN-Friedrichshain (Soviet Sector), Comeniusplatz, where she was interrogated and accused of espionage. After the interrogation, one of the MfS agents accompanied Source out of the police station and to the S-Bahnhof (elevated train station) Warschauerstrasse, BERLIN-Friedrichshain; on the way this agent invited Source to become an informant for the MfS, and Source accepted for fear of losing her job. A few days later Source was assigned the mission of obtaining all information possible regarding [b6] and [b6] business partners in a firm selling office machines in East BERLIN. In addition, Source was assigned the missions of ascertaining the political attitude of workers in a VEB (Volkseigener Betrieb - nationalized factory) in East BERLIN, and of obtaining the present addresses of unidentified Polish blackmarketeers in West BERLIN, but Source did not carry out these missions.

(F-6)

Source "D"

0572

3. Recruitment by MfS installation in BERLIN: In October 1954, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement wherein she agreed to work for the MfS and to keep her work in this capacity a confidential matter. She was assigned the cover name "Inge." Source met her handling agent about four (4) times on streets of East BERLIN, the last meeting taking place on 8 December 1955. In October 1954, Source received the mission of observing FDJ (Freie Deutsche Jugend - Free German Youth) members in general. Source submitted no reports. In May 1955, she received the mission of observing [b6] who is presently employed by VEB Werk

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
13 Feb 56

b6

/awt

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team, D-567242/d

SUBJECT
EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Berlin
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:
CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

fuer Sicherungstechnik (safety device engineering firm) at BERLIN-Treptow (Soviet Sector), Eisenstrasse 90. In mid-May 1955 [b6] had defected to West BERLIN and had since returned to the GDR. Source submitted no reports on [b6] and at no time received financial compensation from the MfS. On 12 December 1955 Source defected to West BERLIN.

(F-6)

Source "P"

4. Recruitment by MfS installation in BERLIN: On 4 August 1951, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the MfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. He was assigned the cover name "Otto." Source did not receive a mission until 14 October 1955, when he was ordered to get into contact with post office employees from West BERLIN; Source was given no instructions on how to accomplish this mission. Source did not carry out this mission, and he defected to West BERLIN on 28 November 1955.

(F-6)

Source "K"

5. Recruitment by MfS installation in BERLIN: In June 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant for the MfS, and in July 1955, he was given the mission of contacting [b6] residing at BERLIN-Gartenfeld (British Sector), [b6] Source was instructed to attempt to gain [b6] confidence. Later, Source was to have received specific instructions on this mission. Source did not carry out this mission, but merely confirmed [b6] address.

(F-6)

Source "V"

6. Recruitment by MfS installation in BERLIN: On 15 May 1953, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the MfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source met his handling agent weekly on streets of East BERLIN, the last meeting taking place in early November 1955. Source received the mission of observing two (2) of his fellow workers who were suspected by the MfS of belonging to a Christian sect. Source submitted no written reports and stated orally that he was not able to ascertain any suitable information on the two (2) individuals. He received no monetary remuneration from the MfS. Source defected to West BERLIN on 21 November 1955.

(F-6)

Source "Y"

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
13 Feb 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567242/d

b6 /awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Berlin
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

7. Region VIII files revealed the following:

a. [b6] paragraph 2. [b6] a Polish national residing at [b6] Federal Republic of Germany, was mentioned in Region IV letter dated 13 March 1952, Subject: [b6] as a driver for [b6] who is removing electrical adding machines from BERLIN. Also, [b6] was mentioned in AR dated 15 November 1955, Subject: [b6] file [b6] (F-6)

b. [b6] paragraph 2. [b6] born [b6] in [b6] (n.c.a.), Poland, was mentioned in Internal Routing Slip dated 19 June 1952, Subject: [b6], as a Polish Jew involved in smuggling. Due to [b6] connection with [b6] in this trace it is probable that [b6] and [b6] are identical. [b6] was also mentioned in AR dated 15 November 1955, Subject: [b6] (F-6)

c. SCHARNOWSKI, Ernst, paragraph 5. Ernst SCHARNOWSKI, born 5 June 1896, was mentioned in a large amount of Region VIII correspondence as a leading official of the DGB (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund - German Federation of Trade Unions) and the SPD (Socialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands - Social Democratic Party of Germany) in BERLIN, the most recent being TWX I-9178. This SCHARNOWSKI is probably identical to the SCHARNOWSKI mentioned in this report. SCHARNOWSKI is also mentioned in AR dated 5 January 1956, Subject: [b6] (F-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
27 Mar 56

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team.

D-56748/b

CTG/awt

SUBJECT
AGIS - MFS - Bezirk Gera
Re: Administration
(Policies and Procedure)

QUALITY OF SOURCE	QUALITY OF INFORMATION
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F
	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
	PROBABLY TRUE
	PROBABLY TRUE
	PROBABLY TRUE
	IMPROBABLE
	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Policy decision and expected development by the MFS in GERA (TS9540): On 13 February 1956, a small group met in a MFS installation in GERA and conferred on the question of whether or not economic sabotage should be sponsored by the MFS in the Federal Republic of Germany. The question was negatively decided, on the grounds that such activity might alienate the workers and might operate against the "official course of Eastern politics." It has been intimated that shortly before Christmas 1955, another riot similar to that which occurred on 17 June 1953 was expected by the MFS.

Source "E"

(F-6)

2. Region VIII files did not verify the information contained in paragraph 1 of this report.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

27 Mar 56

PREPARED BY:

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team, D-56748/d

b6

SUBJECT:

ECI - MFS - Bezirk Gera
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE
COMPLETELY RELIABLE
USUALLY RELIABLE
FAIRLY RELIABLE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
UNRELIABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

OF INFORMATION

A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
B PROBABLY TRUE
C POSSIBLY TRUE
D DOUBTFULLY TRUE
E IMPROBABLE
F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

1. Recruitment by MFS KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-office) LORENSTEIN (PA8792): In December 1955, b1 born b1 in b1 (n.c.a.), the source of this information, was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the MFS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. He met his handling agent about four (4) times on streets of b1 and the last meeting took place on b1 1956. b1 received the mission of observing the Fnu b6 family, residing at b1 b6 whose political attitude was suspect. Source did not carry this mission out, and he did not receive money from the MFS.

Source "H"

(F-6)

2. Region VIII files revealed no information regarding the personality and family mentioned in this report.

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SUMMARY OF ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~EAM. CHIEF ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 26 March 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CR Team. D-567244/c

OPNS OFF ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ b6

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Cottbus
Re: Modus OperandiCODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Recruitment by a MfS installation in COTTBUS (VT5335): On 20 b1 1955, b1 born b1 in b1, the source of this information, was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the MfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source received the mission of traveling to West BERLIN and visiting his uncle and aunt, b6 and b6 b6 who reside at b6 (US Sector), b6. Source was directed to make a list of all persons who reside at this address. b1 visited his uncle and aunt on b1 1955, but he did not compile the list. Source reported accordingly to his handling agent on b1 1955, whereupon, the agent threatened b1 with punishment if he did not carry out his mission. Source defected to West BERLIN on b1 1955. He had received no monetary compensation from the MfS.

Source "E"

(P-6)

2. Recruitment by MfS KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-office) BAD ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BERNERDA (UT8909): In Spring 1953, b1 born b1 b1 in b1 (n.c.a.), the source of this information, was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement wherein she agreed to work for the MfS and to keep her work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source was assigned the cover name b1 and she met her handling agents almost daily on the streets of b1 and b1, until b1 1955. She was again contacted in late b1 1955; her final contact with the MfS was on b1 1956. In b1 1953, b1 was ordered to observe b6 a minister, residing at b6 number unknown. b6 political attitude was suspect. Source submitted six (6) written and 20 oral reports to the MfS on b6. In August 1955, she was directed to observe b6 M.D., residing at b6 b6 political attitude was also suspect. b1 did not carry this mission out. In early 1956, Source was instructed to ascertain the acquaintances, habits, and daily pattern of life of b6 b1 future brother-in-law. b6, who is a lathe operator at the Siemens firm in West BERLIN, resides at b6 (British Sector), b6. Source did not carry this mission out, and she defected to West BERLIN on b1 1956.

Source "F"

(P-6)

0577

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

PREPARING OFFICE

DATE
26 March 1956

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567244/d

b6
rs

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Cottbus
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION	
OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
USUALLY RELIABLE	PROBABLY TRUE
FAIRLY RELIABLE	POSSIBLY TRUE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	DOUBTFULLY TRUE
UNRELIABLE	IMPROBABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED
A	1
B	2
C	3
D	4
E	5
F	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

3. Recruitment by MfS KV FORST (VT7633): In [b1] 1955, [b1] born [b1] in [b1] (UV4868), the source of this information, was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the MfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. He was given the cover name [b1] In [b1] 1955, Source was sent to the Federal Republic of Germany to accept a job he had previously applied for at the firm "Beyer" in LEVERKUSEN (LB5956). [b1] feels that the MfS must have found out about his new job by intercepting the letter the firm sent to him awarding him the position. Source reported at the Beyer plant as directed, but he refused, under a pretext, to accept the position. He then returned to the GDR and reported to his handling agent that the firm had refused to employ Source, whereupon the matter was dropped. During [b1] career as a MfS informant, he met his handling agents from eight (8) to 10 times in a cover apartment in [b1] the last meeting taking place in [b1] 1955. Source received no financial compensation from the MfS.

Source "G" - 14M C

(F-6)

4. Recruitment by MfS KV JESSEN (UT5939): On [b1] 1955, [b1] born [b1] in [b1], the source of this information, was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the MfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. He was assigned the cover name [b1] and met his handling agent on three (3) occasions: [b1] [b1] 1955 at Source's [b1] [b1] 1955 at the [b1] in [b1] (n.c.s.) and [b1] [b1] 1955 at the [b1] cafe in [b1] [b1] was directed to ascertain the identity of Pnu [b6] owner of the [b6] cafe, located at BERLIN-Schoeneberg (US Sector), Buelowstrasse, number unknown, and to determine the purpose of a letter Source received from [b6] on [b1] 1955. [b1] had not known anyone by the name of [b6], so shortly after receiving this letter, which contained 20 DM East, he reported the incident to the MfS KV JESSEN. Source was instructed to travel to West BERLIN on [b1] 1955 to carry out this mission; he was to meet his handling agent on the same day on a highway near [b6] between [b1] and [b1] hours to report the results of his efforts. Instead, [b1] defected to West BERLIN on [b1] 1955 without carrying out his mission.

Source "H"

0578

5. Files of Agency "A" revealed the following:

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☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

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Page(s) 579

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

TEAM CHIEF

Mar 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567245/a

OPNS OFF

b6

rt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Dresden
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Recruitment by MfS KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-office) LOERBAU (VS7761): On [b1] 1954, [b1], born [b1] in [b1].

[b1] the source of this information, was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the MfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source was ordered to observe [b6], a student of the Freie Universitaet BERLIN (Free University of BERLIN), who resides at [b6] [b6] (US Sector), [b6] [b1] did not carry out his mission, but instead reported the matter to the West BERLIN criminal police. Source met his handling agent on one (1) occasion after his recruitment: in [b1] [b1] 1954, on Friedrichstrasse in East BERLIN, at which time he reported that he had had no opportunity to observe [b6] [b1] did not receive financial compensation from the MfS.

Source "C"

(F-6)

2. Recruitment by MfS KV PIRNA (US2646): In [b1] 1953, [b1] born [b1] in [b1], the source of this information, was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the MfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source was assigned the cover name [b1]. He met his handling agents monthly on streets of [b1] and in the [b1] [b1] town hall, the last meeting taking place on [b1] 1955. [b1] received the mission of reporting on the personnel and physical facilities of the [b1] located at BERLIN-Wilmersdorf (US Sector), [b1] [b1] was able to carry out this mission, as he entered the Consulate once every three (3) months to collect a pension Source is entitled [b1]. He submitted 20 to 30 reports to the MfS regarding the French Consulate, mentioning no names. [b1] received no monetary remuneration from the MfS.

Source "F"

(F-6)

3. Region VIII files revealed no information regarding the personalities mentioned in this report.

0580

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

TEAM CHIEF

56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567245/

OPNS OFF

b6

avt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Dresden
Re: Administration
(Personnel Policy)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A

USUALLY RELIABLE B

FAIRLY RELIABLE C

NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D

UNRELIABLE E

RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1

PROBABLY TRUE 2

POSSIBLY TRUE 3

DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4

IMPROBABLE 5

TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Personnel recruitment at MfS KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-office) MEISSEN (US9469): At present, a drive is underway to recruit full-time personnel for MfS KV MEISSEN. The present personnel level is low at the KV; the majority of persons employed there are men from 18 to 20 years of age. For this reason, virtually all loyal SED members and functionaries are being approached for MfS employment. These persons are often reluctant to join the MfS, and the MfS occasionally finds it necessary to be forceful in persuading individuals to become members of the MfS.

Source "D"

(F-6)

2. Region VIII files did not verify the above information.

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ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-803 DOD 5200.1R

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

ADM-ASST
JAM CHIEF
OPNS OFF
56
b6

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567242/a

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Besirk Berlin
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Recruitment by a MfS installation in BERLIN: b1
b1 born b1 in b1 the Source of this information, was engaged in smuggling operations between East and West BERLIN with b6 (phonetic spelling), a Yugoslavian national residing at b1 (Soviet Sector), b1 In b1 1954, Source met, through b6 b6 a Yugoslavian national who has been wanted by the West BERLIN Police for some time for smuggling and other crimes. Subsequent to their meeting, b6 employed b1 in b6 smuggling ring, which masquerades as the firm b6 During the next few months Source smuggled four (4) pairs of binoculars from East to West BERLIN for b6 In b6 1954, b1 was instructed by b6 to smuggle a pair of binoculars across the border of East and West BERLIN near Thaelmann-Platz U-Bahnhof (subway station); to make certain that Source would cross the sector border at that point, b6 transported him to the area in his personal automobile. When b1 attempted to cross the border he was seized by East BERLIN customs officials, and turned over to two (2) MfS officials in an office building located near the Stalinallee S-Bahnhof (elevated train station) in BERLIN-Friedrichshain (Soviet Sector). These MfS officials threatened Source with imprisonment on charges of smuggling unless he would agree to work for the MfS. b1 consented to this and signed an obligation in which he promised to work for the MfS and keep this work a confidential matter. The MfS informed Source that he would receive his missions and all further instructions from b6 In order to avoid further entanglement with the East BERLIN Police, b1 was instructed to mention whenever he was accosted by them that he was employed by the firm b6 or to mention b6 personal telephone number, b6 Later Source learned that b6 is employed by the MfS and that his smuggling activities and the firm b6 are cover for MfS espionage activities. The smuggling ring's operations are often discussed at the "Cafe am Hackeschen" in East BERLIN, street address unknown, which is managed by a Yugoslavian or Rumanian national. Listening devices are installed at strategic points in this cafe, and the waiters and kitchen personnel there are MfS informants. The cafe is frequented by men speaking Slavic languages. Often German girls are seen there too, who, according to b6 are former West BERLIN singers, dancers and actresses who are employed by DEFA (Deutsche Film Aktiengesellschaft - German Film Company) in minor acting capacities and are also utilized in MfS espionage operations. In about December 1954, b1 through his smuggling activity, became acquainted with b6, about 42 years of age, who resides at b6 informed Source, after the two got to know each other, that she is employed by an intelligence agency in West BERLIN, and that she receives quite regular payments from this agency for information regarding railroad affairs in the

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
25 Mar 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th GIC Group, Region VIII, OF Penn. D-367242/4

b6

SUBJECT

BOIS - MFS - Berlin
Re: Markus Opanandl

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE
USUALLY RELIABLE
FAIRLY RELIABLE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
UNRELIABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
PROBABLY TRUE
POSSIBLY TRUE
DOUBTFULLY TRUE
IMPROBABLE
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DDR, which is accessible to her through another woman, name unknown, who works for the railroad in the vicinity of FALKENBERG. b1 informed his mother-in-law, b6 and b6 who lives in common-law marriage with b6 about b6. Later the MFS found out about b1 intelligence activities and her acquaintanceship with Source, apparently through b6 and b6. The MFS interrogated Source and ordered him to ascertain as much information as possible regarding b1 employing agency, KFI assigned to her, and possible sub-informants she may have. In the course of carrying out his mission, b6 made four (4) trips to FALKENBERG to visit b1. Eventually Source found out b1

b1 upon reporting this to the MFS, the MFS directed Source to attempt to become recruited as an informant by this British agency, using b1 as a means of getting into the confidence of the agency. The MFS threatened b1 with the arrest of his wife and child if he did not carry out this mission. The MFS assured him that in the event of his arrest by Western authorities he would be safe, because they have trustworthy penetration informants in all Western intelligence agencies. Source attempted to carry out this mission, and he believes that he almost succeeded; b1 claimed that she requested employment for Source through her handling agent, and at the last meeting between b1 and b1 on b6 1955, b1 informed Source that he would be introduced b1. However, Source and b6 defected to West BERLIN on b1 1955 and

b1

Source "A"

b1

(P-6)

Recruitment by a MFS installation in BERLIN: On b1 1955, b1 born b1 in b1 (n.o.e.), the Source of this information, was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the MFS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. He was assigned the cover name b1. He met his handling agent on two (2) occasions on streets of East BERLIN, on b1 and b1 1955. b1 was assigned the mission of obtaining as much personal data as possible regarding Fm b6 b6 male, residing at b6 (US Sector), b6

b6

of the Waffen-SS), a German war veterans' association. Source was instructed to attend a meeting of b6 scheduled for b6 1955 which was expected to be attended by b6 and to participate in an abduction of b6 to East BERLIN from that meeting; b1 did not carry out his mission

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DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☒

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s)

583A

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HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154 US ARMY

MAR 23 1956

22 March 1956

D-567247/d

SUBJECT: EGIS - MFS Bezirk FRANKFURT/Oder
Re: Modus Operandi (Edu)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, US Army
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch, G2CICE

1. Reference is made to ICM CI-CE-1-55, subject: SFS (State Secretariat for State Security) (GDR/East German Intelligence), dated 18 February 1955.

2. Forwarded herewith in triplicate is a Region VIII, 66th CIC Group, Summary of Information, subject and file as above, dated 28 February 1956.

3. Examination of Central Registry files of this Group revealed no information identifying any of the personalities mentioned in the attached report except for the following:

a. Edith ALKER, born 11 February 1905 in LUDWIGSHAVEN, residing at BERLIN-Tempelhof, Renate-Private-Strasse 12, has blond hair, blue eyes, and is 156 cm tall. ALKER has pass number 202/13183/39. She was a member of the following organizations:

1. DEUTSCHE ARBEITSFRONT (German Labor Front) - A Nazi Organization - 1935 to 1945.
2. NATIONALE SAMMLUNG (National Rally) - 1935 to 1945.
3. NS-VOLKSWOHLFAHRT (A National Socialist Public Welfare Organization) - A Nazi Organization - 1933 to 1945.
4. REICHSLUFTSCHUTZBUND - Mentioned in the attached reports. (Date of Information 11 June 1946) (P-6)

b. Telephone Number 55 08 71 could not be identified.

4. Sources listed below are refugees from East Germany and were debriefed by this Group between December 1955 and January 1956:

a. Source "G" is [b1] born [b1] is [b1] presently residing in a refugee camp administered by the BERLIN-Marienfelde Refugee Center. Source "G" was recruited as a part-time informant by the MFS. She was referred [b1]

[b1]

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CIC CENTRAL FILE

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D-567247/d

SUBJECT: EGIS - MFS Bezirk FRANKFURT/Oder
Re: Modus Operandi (b1)

b. Source "K" is [b1] born [b1]
[b1] in [b1] presently residing at a refugee camp administered by
the BERLIN-Marienfelde Refugee Center. Source "K" was recruited as a
part-time informant by the MFS. He was referred [b1]
[b1]

c. Source "P" is [b1] nee [b1] born
[b1] in [b1] presently residing at a refugee camp administered
by the BERLIN-Marienfelde Refugee Center. Source "P" was interrogated by
MFS members.

d. Agency "A" is [b1]

5. Information contained in the attached report may be released
to other interested US and Allied Intelligence Agencies in its present
form. No other distribution of the attached reports has been made by
this Group.

6. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl:

SOI dtd 28 Feb 56 (trip)

[b6]

CWO, USA
Assistant Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt Mil 8371

[b6] bg

M/R: Above fws to G2 info Re: Modus Operandi, MFS Bezirk FRANKFURT/
Oder.

0585

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

TEAM CHIEF
OPNS OFF 22 Feb 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team, D-567247/3

b6

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Frankfurt/
Oder
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Recruitment by a MfS installation in FRANKFURT/Oder (VT6999):
In July 1954, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement wherein she agreed to work for the MfS and to keep her work in this capacity a confidential matter. She was assigned the cover name "Kapalle". She met her handling agent every two (2) weeks on the streets of FRANKFURT/Oder or at a cover apartment located at FRANKFURT/Oder, [REDACTED] b6 The last meeting took place on 19 January 1956. Immediately upon her recruitment, Source was assigned the mission of observing her fellow workers at VEB (Volkseigener Betrieb - nationalized factory) Elektromotorenwerk (for electric motor production) located at FRANKFURT/Oder, Karl-Marx-Strasse, number unknown. She carried out this mission and submitted a number of written reports to her handling agent. On 23 September 1954, Source was directed to attend a seminar conducted by the Evangelische Bahnhofsmision (Protestant railroad station mission) between September 1954 and 16 December 1954 at BERLIN-Steglitz (US Sector), Arno-Holz-Strasse 6-8. Source was told to report the names of all teachers and students who appeared at this seminar, which she did. Source's next mission was to attend a meeting held by the Evangelische Bahnhofsmision on Schwanenwerder Island, BERLIN-Zehlendorf (US Sector), from 28 March to 31 March 1955. Her assignment was to report on all proceedings and participants of the meeting; she successfully carried out this assignment. Source carried out a similar assignment for a meeting held by the Evangelische Bahnhofsmision from 26 April to 31 April 1955 at BERLIN-Steglitz, Arno-Holz-Strasse 6-8. On 19 January 1956, Source was ordered to contact Edith ALKER, a sister of the Evangelische Bahnhofsmision located at BERLIN-Dahlem (US Sector), Altenstein Strasse 51. Source was instructed to use ALKER as a means of finding out as much as possible about the activities and personnel of the Bahnhofsmision at that address. Source did not carry this last mission out. In case she could not meet her handling agent on the next scheduled meeting date, 27 January 1956, Source was instructed to mail her written reports to the following address: BERLIN-Lichtenberg (Soviet Sector) 1, Post Office Box 32, or to call telephone number 55 08 71 for further instructions. Source received a total of 300 DM East for her MfS employment.

Source "C"

(F-6)

2. Recruitment by MfS KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-office) BAD FREIENWALDE (VU3549): In June 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the MfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter.

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AUTH: Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
28 Feb 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CR Team. D-567247/d

b6
fc

SUBJECT

ECIS - MFS - Bezirk Frankfurt/
Oder
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

He was given the cover name "Enna". Source met his handling agent monthly on the streets of WRIEZEN (VU4241); their last meeting was on 7 December 1955. In June 1955, Source was given 20 DM East and was assigned the mission of visiting an acquaintance of Source's, Major Fnu von Muenstermann, male, residing at BERLIN-Lichterfelde (US Sector), Tegler Strasse 8. It is reported that von Muenstermann is the chief of an "underground" organization which operates in the vicinity of WRIEZEN. Source was told to lure von Muenstermann to the GDR; Source visited his friend, but had only a general conversation with him. Upon his return to WRIEZEN, Source reported to his handling agent that Muenstermann would not leave West BERLIN. In July 1955, Source was given 20 DM East and was directed to contact Major Fnu BLUMENBERG, male, residing at BERLIN-Wilmersdorf (British Sector), Tuebinger Strasse 3, for unknown reasons. Source did not contact BLUMENBERG and reported accordingly to his handling agent in WRIEZEN. The agent advised Source to keep this second mission in mind. On 8 December 1955, before Source was given further instructions, he defected to West BERLIN.

Source "K"

(P-6)

3. Technique of MFS KV EBERSWALDE (VU2155): Two (2) weekends per month a female agent is sent to BERLIN to patronize the "Regina" Restaurant, located at BERLIN-Charlottenburg (British Sector), Kurfuerstendamm, number unknown. The purpose of these trips is unknown.

Source "P"

(P-6)

4. Region VIII files revealed the following: ALKER, Edith, paragraph 1. Edith ALKER, born 11 February 1905 in LUDWIGSHAVEN (n.o.a.), residing at BERLIN-Tempelhof (US Sector), Renate Privatstrasse 12, was mentioned in an unevaluated Region VIII trace dated 11 June 1946 as a member of the Reichsluftschutzbund (imperial air protection association - a Nazi organization) from 1933 to 1945. This ALKER may be identical to the personality mentioned in paragraph 1.

5. Files of Agency "A" revealed the following:

a. BLUMENBERG, Fnu, paragraph 2. Heinrich Hermann BLUMENBERG, born 9 December 1887 in DEUTSCH RUHDEN (n.o.a.), has resided at BERLIN-Wilmersdorf, Tuebinger Strasse 3 since 30 June 1952.

b. Muenstermann, Fnu von, paragraph 2. Enno von Muenstermann,

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ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDR USAIN SCUM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

28 Feb 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567247/4

b6

1a

SUBJECT

ECIS - MfS - Bezirk Frankfurt/
Oder
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

born 14 December 1881 in BERLIN, has resided at BERLIN-Lichterfelde, Thaklastrasse 9 since 31 January 1948.

(B-2)

6. The West BERLIN telephone book, edition May, 1955, revealed the following: The "Regina" Restaurant, paragraph 3. A "Regina" bar is located at BERLIN-Schoeneberg (US Sector), Grunewaldstrasse 21. The "Regina-Lichtspiele ('Regina' motion picture theater)" is located at BERLIN-Charlottenburg, Wilmersdorfer Strasse 95.

(B-2)

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HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154 US ARMY

MAR 23 1956

22 March 1956

D-567255/b/d

SUBJECT: EGIS - MfS Bezirk SCHWERIN
Re: Administration and Modus Operandi (C)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, US Army
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch, G2CICE

1. Reference is made to ICM CI-CE-1-55, subject: Sfs (State Secretariat for State Security) (GDR/East German Intelligence), dated 18 February 1955.

2. Forwarded herewith in triplicate are the following Region VIII, 66th CIC Group reports:

a. Summary of Information, subject: EGIS - MfS Bezirk SCHWERIN, Re: Administration (Policies and Procedures), file D-567255/b, dated 24 February 1956.

b. Summary of Information, subject: EGIS - MfS Bezirk SCHWERIN, Re: Modus Operandi, file D-567255/d, dated 24 February 1956.

3. Examination of Central Registry files of this Group revealed no information identifying any of the personalities mentioned in the attached reports.

4. The sources listed below are refugees from East Germany and were debriefed by this Group between October and November 1955:

a. Source "I" is [b1] born [b1] in [b1] presently residing at a refugee camp administered by the BERLIN-Marienfelde Refugee Center. Source "I" was a part-time informant for the MfS.

b. Source "J" is [b1] born [b1] in [b1] presently residing at a refugee camp administered by the BERLIN-Marienfelde Refugee Center. Source "J" was a part-time informant for the MfS and [b1]

c. Agency "A" [b1]

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D-567255/b/d

SUBJECT: EGIS - MFS Bezirk SCHWERIN

Re: Administration and Modus Operandi

22 March 1956

5. Information contained in the attached reports may be released to other interested US and Allied Intelligence Agencies in its present form. No other distribution of the attached reports has been made by this Group.

6. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incls:

SOIs dtd 24 Feb 56 (trip)

Telephone: Stgt Hll 8371

b6 /bg

b6

CWO, USA

Assistant Adjutant

M/R: Above fwds to G2 reports re: Administration and Modus Operandi of MFS Bezirk SCHWERIN.

0590

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ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154 US ARMY

D-567242/d

20 March 1956

SUBJECT: EGIS - MfS Bezirk BERLIN
Re: Modus Operandi (C) (u)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, US Army
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch, G2CICE

CIC FILE

1. Reference is made to ICM CI-CE-1-55, subject: SFS (State Secretariat for State Security) (GDR/East German Intelligence), dated 18 February 1955.

2. Forwarded herewith in triplicate is a Region VIII, 66th CIC Group Summary of Information, subject and file as above, dated 6 December 1955.

3. Examination of Central Registry files of this Group revealed no information identifying personalities mentioned in the attached report.

4. The sources listed below defected from East Germany and were debriefed by this Group between September and December 1955:

a. Source "A" is [b1] born [b1] in [b1] ICM concerning missions assigned to Source [b1]
[b1]

b. Source "C" is [b1] born [b1] in [b1] and was a part-time informant for the MfS. ICM concerning missions assigned to Source [b1]
[b1] 0591

c. Source "D" is [b1] divorced [b1] nee [b1] born [b1] in [b1] and was a part-time informant for the MfS.

d. Source "I" is [b1] born [b1] in [b1] and was a part-time informant for the MfS. She was [b1]
[b1]

e. Source "M" is [b1] born [b1] in [b1] and was a part-time informant for the MfS.

f. Source "S" is [b1] born [b1]

EXCERPT b1

DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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HQ
Loe
3516.C.

AA18

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D-567242/a

20 March 1956

SUBJECT: ECIS - MfS Bezirk BERLIN
Re: Modus Operandi (C) (u)

b1 [] presently residing at [] b1
b1 [] Source was a part-time informant for the
MfS and an IOM concerning missions assigned [] b1
[] b1

g. Source "U" is [] b1 born [] b1 in [] b1
and was a part-time informant for the MfS. IOM concerning missions
assigned to Source [] b1

h. Source "AA" is a coded source of this Group.

i. Agency "A" [] b1

j. Agency "B" is the Civilian Personnel Section, Headquarters,
BERLIN Command, APO 742.

5. Information contained in the attached report may be released
to other US and allied intelligence agencies in its present form. No
other distribution of the attached report has been made by this Group
except as stated in paragraph 4, above.

6. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl:
SOI dtd 6 Dec 55 (trip)

Telephone: Stgt Mil 8371

b6 []

b6 []

CWO, USA
Assistant Adjutant

0592

M/R: Above feds to G2 a Rgn VIII rept re: modus operandi of MfS Bezirk
BERLIN.

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL

DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
16 March 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

REGION III 66TH CIC GROUP

D-567243/d

SUBJECT

East German Intelligence - MfS -
Bezirk CHEMNITZ
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

On 28 February 1956, SOURCE was interrogated at Field Office Glessen and gave the following information concerning MfS REICHENBACH US1011, Bezirk CHEMNITZ Modus Operandi:

a. A member of the MfS in REICHENBACH, named (fmu) b6 can be reached by calling REICHENBACH 3588.

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1 - Region III

WD AGO FORM 568
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DA SST *ph*
 TEAM CHIEF *SEA*
 OPNS OFF 14 March 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CR Team D-567245/a

b6 / *sa* b6

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS Bezirk Dresden
 Re: Modus Operandi
 (Agent Documentation)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
 OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
 USUALLY RELIABLE B
 FAIRLY RELIABLE C
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
 UNRELIABLE E
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
 PROBABLY TRUE 2
 POSSIBLY TRUE 3
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
 IMPROBABLE 5
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. On 13 January 1956, all eleven (11) operative agents of Department II (intelligence and counterintelligence) of MfS Bezirk Dresden were provided with identification cards as employees of the Konsum (consumer cooperative association) in DRESDEN (VS1257). Prior to that time, the MfS agents had only had Kripo badges and normal People's Police identification cards.

Source "A"

(C-3)

2. The files of Region VIII have no previous record of such agent documentation being provided MfS personnel in DRESDEN.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 13 March 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

REGION III 66TH CIC GROUP

D-567246/d

SUBJECT

East German Intelligence - Sfs -
Bezirk ERFURT
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

On 24 and 25 January 1956, SOURCE was interrogated at Field Office Giessen and gave the following information regarding Sfs WEIMAR PB6351, Bezirk ERFURT, Modus Operandi:

a. INFORMANTS: SOURCE was instructed to select possible informants from workers and officials in the factories to which he was assigned. These informants were to be chosen on the basis of their party affiliation, length of service, interest in attaining the goals of the SOZIALISTISCHE EINHEITSPARTEI DEUTSCHLAND (Socialist Unity Party of Germany - SED) and ability to give valuable information. At the time that SOURCE worked for the Sfs, in 1949 and early 1950, the approach to possible informants was made by party officials and not by the Sfs agent. Approaches are now made by the Sfs agent. When contacting an informant or a personnel officer in a factory, SOURCE was instructed to go first to the local police authority and have them make the appointment for him. Then SOURCE would meet with the official and conduct his business. SOURCE never went to a factory official without first going through the local police. SOURCE was informed that the personnel he listed as possible future informants were unsuitable, but he feels that some of these men were still used later. SOURCE feels that he was told that the men were unsuitable so that he would not know who was actually selected for the job of informing for the Sfs.

b. COVER: SOURCE was instructed to always say that he worked for the WEIMAR MINISTERIUM (County administration) and not for the Sfs or any other police authority. SOURCE was given proper identification to back up this cover story.

c. REPORTS: SOURCE was required to submit written reports for anything which he actually saw or heard in person. Written reports were not required for hearsay information until after the hearsay information was substantiated. SOURCE does not remember obtaining written reports from any informant or personnel officer.

d. TRAINING: SOURCE received no formal training before starting to work for the Sfs. He was just given instructions of what was wanted and of how he was to go about getting the information. For the first few days SOURCE worked in the files but then he was sent to APOLDA to handle the factories. SOURCE was told not to use the names of other members of the Sfs but to refer to other agents by their telephone numbers. Lectures, with voluntary attendance, were given after working hours for all interested. The topics of these lectures were such things as Communist Party history, conduct, and similar topics. SOURCE never attended any of these lectures, as he had a ride home every night which he would miss if he stayed for the lectures.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
13 March 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

REGION III 66TH CIC GROUP

D-567246/4

SUBJECT

East German Intelligence - Sfs -
Bezirk ERFURT
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

e. PAY: SOURCE was paid 450 East Marks a month while working for the Sfs. After various deductions, he received a net pay of between 370 and 380 East Marks each month. SOURCE was given an extra ten (10) East Marks a week for travel expenses as his office was in WEIMAR but he was to work in APOLDA PB7756, Germany. SOURCE also received twenty (20) East Marks an evening for when he sat in bars or restaurants to listen to what people were saying. At no time was SOURCE given a reward for any special job or information.

f. COMMUNICATIONS: At the time SOURCE worked for Section III, there were four (4) telephones in the office, one (1) for each agent. SOURCE's extension was 27 and that of (fnu) b6 was 42. SOURCE does not know what the base telephone number was. Section III had no radio or TWX machine.

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66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 742 US ARMY

C100

D-567247/a/e

12 March 1956

SUBJECT: EGIS - Mfs Bezirk FRANKFURT/Oder, Re: Modus
Operandi, Installations

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: CK Division

1. FORWARDED: SOI's dated 1 March 1956, subject and file
as above.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

- a. Source: Source "A", V-401-VIII.
- b. Evaluation of Source: C.
- c. Date Source obtained information: October 1953
through 9 February 1956.
- d. Date agent received information: 9 February 1956.
- e. Status of case: Coverage continues.

2 Incl
SOI's dtd 1 Mar 56 (1)
w/Exhs I-V (3)

b6

Lt Col, Inf
Commanding

Berlin 42323/b6/EJM/at/S-3

0597

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE: 15 March 1956
TEAM CHIEF: [Signature]
OPNS OFF: [Signature]
b6 / [Signature]

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CR Team, D-567247/d

SUBJECT

ECIS - MfS Bezirk Frankfurt/Oder
Re: Modus Operandi (Detention
and Interrogations)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:
COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. The MfS Bezirks-Verwaltung (BY - District Administration) of FRANKFURT/Oder (VT6999) utilizes its installation at Grosse Oder Strasse 67 in that city for both the detention and interrogation of suspects. The installation has been used for that purpose by the MfS as early as 1953 and possibly before that.
2. The offices of the MfS Departments IX (Interrogations) as well as XIV (Prisons) are located in the same installation at Grosse Oder Strasse 67. Interrogations of detained suspects are usually conducted there.
3. Whenever a suspect is taken by the MfS to the installation at Grosse Oder Strasse, he is usually transported alone or with other arrestees in a closed and guarded small truck to the main gate at Number 67, where the vehicle drives into the covered passage way to unload them after the front gate has been closed. They are led by guards to the admission office on the ground floor of the administration building or west wing to the left of the main gate. The prisoner is registered when he is admitted by personnel of Department XIV, and his belongings are listed and taken from him. All papers, money and briefcases, etc., are taken for safekeeping and examination. A receipt for this property is signed by the prisoner only when he is released from custody. From the registration office the prisoner is usually taken by internal guards directly to the east wing or the small cell-block, and in most cases is placed initially in a solitary cell, at least until all important interrogations and most of the investigation of his case have been accomplished by the Department IX of the MfS. Should the period needed for the MfS to ascertain the suspect's innocence be very brief, then the suspect is not moved to a larger cell. As soon as no further need exists to keep the prisoner isolated for operational reasons, he is transferred into another, larger cell accomodating from two to four prisoners. Frequently, such a cell is also utilized operationally by Department IX by placing in it an informant in the guise of another prisoner and/or by placing hidden microphones into the cell to monitor the suspects' conversation. A few days after admission, the prisoner is taken to one of the office rooms of the internal guard on the second floor of the east wing where he is photographed, fingerprinted and carded for the prisoners' files.
4. Interrogations of the prisoners usually take place on the third or fourth floor of the west wing by agents of Department IX. These interrogations vary in length, depending upon the nature of the case and the type of suspect. They are usually conducted in the evenings or during the night, especially in cases of stubborn suspects. They may, however, take place during the day, particularly if it is desired to obtain information quickly

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
1 March 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Task. D-567247/A

b6 []

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS Bezirk Frankfurt/Oder
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

from the prisoner. Source believes there is no rule followed as to the number of interrogators used or whether or not a stenographer is utilized, although the latter practice is rare. Usually, one or two agents interrogate the suspect and keep their own notes.

5. Prisoners are never permitted to leave their cells except when permitted to do so for special reasons, such as in the case of prisoners whose cases have been completed by the MfS, who have been sentenced and are awaiting their transfer to a penitentiary. In such a case, the prisoner may be utilized for odd jobs, always under guard, and may even obtain permission to take a bath on the ground-floor of the main cell-block. All other prisoners usually leave their cells only when taken downstairs for an outdoor walk in one of the two open-air exercise cages facing the Oder river embankment and in front of the east wing. These walks take place under guard twice daily, in the morning and in the afternoon, and last approximately 30 minutes each. The prisoners are fed three times daily, usually very small portions of bread, soup or stew, and in the morning some "Ersatz" coffee. The large cup and plate are handed to each prisoner through the metal door of the cell by the guard and returned to him after the meal. A metal wash basin, one to each cell, is used by the one or more inmates of the cell to wash up. A metal bucket serves as toilet facility for the prisoner or prisoners in each cell and are emptied and washed out twice daily in the one cell for each floor designated for this purpose and equipped with water faucet and drain. One inmate of each cell is selected to empty the bucket under guard at a regular time. A low platform of wooden planks above the floor from one side of the cell to the other and underneath the barred window serves as bunk for all inmates (there are apparently no double bunks) who sleep in their clothes in blankets issued to them. When led from one building to another, or using the stairway in the east wing, steel doors have to be passed through on each floor. These doors are always locked and guarded and have to be opened by the guards to permit anyone to pass through.

6. When a suspect is released because of his innocence or lack of evidence, he has to sign an obligation certifying that he will not state to anyone his reason for arrest and detention or divulge any information concerning the detention facilities, treatment received or interrogations conducted. It is explained to him by an MfS agent that if he violates this obligation he is subject to prosecution. In most cases, where a prisoner is released in this manner, he is asked to agree to serve as informant of the MfS following his release. Apparently, very few prisoners refuse such a recruitment offer for fear of being detained further. Many manage to postpone such a decision until after their release, or if they accepted it, to avoid serving as

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
1 March 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, EX Team. D-567247/4

b6 /avt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS Frankfurt/Oder
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

informants by not carrying out instructions properly or failing to report to meetings.

Source "A"

(C-2)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
9 March 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

REGION III 66TH CIC GROUP

D-567256/a

SUBJECT

East German Intelligence - MFS
Bezirk SUHL
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

On 1 March 1956, SOURCE was interrogated at Field Office Giessen and gave the following information concerning MFS MEININGEN PEO003, Bezirk SUHL, Modus Operandi:

a. From time to time (frequency unknown) 1st Lt [b6] of MFS MEININGEN met with people from West Germany. These persons (not identified) did not cross into the DDR, but simply met with [b6] at the border in order to exchange information and instructions. The place of meeting was at the border between HEIMERSHAUSEN NB8802, DDR, and FLADUNGEN NA8198, West Germany.

b. At the times of these meetings, the East German border patrol is ordered away from the immediate vicinity so that [b6] can conduct his meeting without interruption or mishap. One (1) meeting was seen by SOURCE only because he was curious and had the opportunity to observe part of the meeting through field glasses. A description of the man with whom [b6] talked is impossible because of the distance and short time of observation.

c. [b6] is notified of coming meeting and is helped in arranging them by an unidentified shepherd who resides in [b6] DDR, area. SOURCE has never seen this shepherd nor does he know where the shepherd resides.

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HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154 US ARMY

7 March 1956

D-567242/d/f

SUBJECT: EGIS - MfS Bezirk BERLIN
Re: Medus Operandi and Personalities (u)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, United States Army
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch, G2CICE

1. Reference is made to letter, this Group, subject: [b6]
[b6] file D-585198, dated 2 March 1956.
2. Forwarded herewith in triplicate are the following Region VIII, 66th CIC Group Summaries of Information:
 - a. Summary of Information, subject: EGIS - MfS Bezirk BERLIN, Re: Medus Operandi, file D-567242/d, dated 29 February 1956.
 - b. Summary of Information, subject: EGIS - MfS Bezirk BERLIN, Re: Personalities, file D-567242/f, dated 29 February 1956.
3. The MfS informant referred to in attached reports is [b1]
[b1] Information contained in the attached reports was previously reported to your office in several messages.
4. Attempts to identify the installation involved in the assignment of this mission to the MfS informant have revealed no positive identification. [b1] tentatively identified the installation as the MfS office in BERLIN-Treptow (Soviet Sector); however, further study of this possibility by this Group has revealed that this was not the installation to which the MfS informant was taken.
5. Regarding data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incls:
SOIs dtd 29 Feb 56 (trip)

Telephone: Stgt Mil 8371
[b6] [b6]

[b6]
1st Lt, Armor
Adjutant

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HEADQUARTERS REGION VIII
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 742 US ARMY

CICE

D-567246

27 February 1956

SUBJECT: EGIS - MfS Bezirk ERFURT, Re: Modus Operandi

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: CE Division

1. REFERENCE: TWX's I-9722, I-9723 and I-9724.
2. FORWARDED: SOI, dated 20 February 1956, subject and file as above.

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source: [b1] born [b1] in [b1] who was debriefed by this Region. [b1] was evacuated to the German Federal Republic on [b1] 1956. Sub-source is [b1] nee [b1] divorced [b1] Source's wife, born [b1], presently residing in [b1]

b. Evaluation of Sources: F.

c. Relationship of Source to Target: Sub-source related the information contained in the inclosed report to Source verbally in West BERLIN. The Sub-source of this information is referred to as [b1] in the inclosed report.

d. How information was obtained by Source: Personal experience.

e. Date Source obtained information: Sub-source received the information from 23 November 1955 through 12 January 1956. Source, 31 December 1955 to 15 January 1956.

f. Date agent received information: [b1] 1956.

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D-567246

27 Feb 56

SUBJECT: EGIS - MfS Bezirk ERPFURT, Re: Modus Operandi

g. Other data affecting accuracy of information: Previous information received by this Region from Source was confirmed by independent sources.

h. Status of case: Coverage of target continues.

4. REMARKS:

a. The personality referred to as "the refugee" in the inclosed report is Source.

b. At the time when the MfS was making attempts to contact the refugee, he was in the custody of this Region, undergoing debriefing concerning the MfS. Information contained in the inclosed report illustrates the necessity of providing adequate security for persons being debriefed by this Region, to preclude the possibility of having the refugee or defector abducted by MfS.

c. Information concerning other successful and unsuccessful MfS abduction attempts in West BERLIN have been forwarded to your Headquarters under VIII-22559, Subject: MfS Abductions and Attempted Abductions in German Federal Republic and West BERLIN.

d. This Region is preparing a report concerning the successful abduction from West BERLIN of [b6] former SED functionary and GDR Police official. This report will be forwarded to your Headquarters upon completion.

1 Incl
SOI dtd 20 Feb 56 (1)

[b6]

Lt Col, Inf
Commanding

Berlin 42323

[b6]

WJM/at/S-3

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603a.

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

OPNS OFF 11/29/55

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567246/d

b6

/art

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Erfurt
Re: Modus Operandi (MfS Attempt
to Re-defect GDR Refugee in West
BERLIN)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:
CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Background of Refugee: The refugee had resided in the GDR from 1946 to the time of his flight to West BERLIN on 19 November 1955. From November 1949 to August 1952 he had been employed by the MfS as a Sub-Office Chief in offices in Bezirk Suhl. Due to the fact that he had been a prisoner of war of a Western Allied power following World War II, he was dismissed as a full-time MfS agent in August 1952. However, in August 1954 he was approached and recruited by the MfS as an informant. At that time he had been employed as the Kreis Secretary of the GDSF (Gesellschaft fuer Deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft - German Soviet Friendship Society). Although the refugee agreed to work for the MfS as an informant, he did not cooperate with his handling agents and failed to carry out the missions assigned to him. As a result of this lack of cooperation, he was relieved of his duties as the Kreis Secretary of the GDSF in August 1955 and was prevented by the MfS from obtaining further employment. During the period August to November 1955 he attempted to obtain employment in various cities in the south western districts of the GDR. However, he was unsuccessful in these attempts due to an apparent interference by the MfS. During the later stages of his traveling through the south western territory of the GDR in search of employment, the refugee was aware of a constant surveillance being conducted daily by the same individual. He succeeded in losing his surveillant in the Soviet Sector of BERLIN and was able to enter West BERLIN unobserved in order to apply for political recognition as a GDR refugee.

2. MfS Investigation Following the Refugee's Flight to West BERLIN: The MfS had apparently intercepted a letter from the refugee to his brother in LEIPZIG (US1891) which had been written by the refugee upon his arrival in West BERLIN. On 26 November 1955, the Chief of the MfS sub-office WEIMAR, a personal acquaintance of the refugee, visited the refugee's wife and inquired regarding the refugee's present whereabouts, about the reasons for the refugee's flight and concerning his future plans regarding his family. He indicated to the refugee's wife that it was her duty to assist in attempts to accomplish the refugee's return to the GDR. From 30 November 1955 until 6 December 1955, the Chief of the WEIMAR MfS office visited the refugee's wife daily to inquire if she had received any message from the refugee. On 28 November 1955, the Chief of the WEIMAR MfS office visited the refugee's brother in LEIPZIG and disclosed to him the MfS plans to have him travel to West BERLIN to contact his brother and to attempt to persuade him to return to the GDR.

3. Actual Re-defection Attempt: On 29 November 1955, the refugee's brother departed from LEIPZIG to travel to West BERLIN to contact the refugee. The MfS provided the refugee's brother sufficient funds for travel expenses

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

20 Feb 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567246/d

b6

/awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Erfurt
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

and arranged for him a one day leave of absence at his place of employment to make the trip to West BERLIN to contact his brother. The refugee's brother was instructed to go to the Refugee Screening Center, BERLIN-Marienfelde (US Sector), in an attempt to contact the refugee. He should assure his brother that he could return to the GDR and that he (the refugee) would be assured suitable employment and recognition to continue living in the GDR. The refugee's brother was instructed to bring the refugee to the Ostbahnhof (East Railway Station) in BERLIN-Mitte (Soviet Sector) where the Chief of the WEIMAR office would talk to him. The refugee's brother went to the Refugee Screening Center, inquired about his brother and was informed that the refugee was not billeted in the camp but was either being processed by a refugee agency or had left refugee channels altogether as there was no record of his having completed processing. The refugee's brother returned to the Ostbahnhof, where he met the Chief of the WEIMAR office, who debriefed him completely regarding the visit to the Refugee Screening Center. The refugee's brother was then permitted to return to LEIPZIG.

4. On 6 December 1955, the Chief of the WEIMAR MfS office gave the refugee's wife sufficient funds to pay for her expenses for a trip to LEIPZIG to visit the refugee's brother and to arrange a trip for him to West BERLIN to have him again attempt to contact the refugee and return with him to the GDR. While briefing the refugee's wife for her trip to LEIPZIG the MfS official emphasized the point that the refugee was most probably still in the Refugee Screening Center in BERLIN-Marienfelde since refugees are not evacuated to the German Federal Republic until they have completed processing and have received political recognition. The refugee's wife was also informed that the arrangements had been made for the refugee's brother to have a leave of absence for the trip to West BERLIN which the MfS had arranged. On 8 December 1955, the refugee's brother again inquired at the Refugee Screening Center in BERLIN-Marienfelde concerning the refugee. He was informed that the refugee had undergone the first phase of his processing (physical examination) but that he had not reported to any of the interviewing agencies. On 10 December 1955, the refugee's brother reported this information to the Chief of the WEIMAR MfS office, who assumed that the refugee was still in West BERLIN. No further direct MfS attempts to re-defect this refugee are known to Source. However, the SED Kreis Administration WEIMAR had made attempts to re-defect the refugee. On 29 November 1955, the SED Kreis Administration WEIMAR interviewed the refugee's wife and arranged for her to travel to West BERLIN on 31 December 1955 to attempt to contact the refugee and to persuade him to return to the GDR. The refugee's wife made this trip to West BERLIN on 31 December 1955 and returned to WEIMAR on

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

20 Feb 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567246/d

b6

/awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Erfurt
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

4 January 1956 although she did not report that the refugee reacted favorably to her visit. In discussions with the refugee during this period, it was decided by the refugee and his wife that the refugee's wife would attempt to remain in the GDR until the refugee completed refugee processing. No indication of this was given to GDR authorities. On 15 January 1956, the refugee's wife again came to West BERLIN to contact the refugee on behalf of the SED Kreis Administration, WEIMAR, and to attempt to persuade him to return to the GDR. However, the refugee's wife again returned to the GDR without the refugee and explained that she and the refugee had serious disagreements and were not making definite future plans together. The refugee's wife was able to contact the refugee in West BERLIN through the address which the refugee had sent to her through relatives in the German Federal Republic. No further attempts by the MfS to contact the refugee are known.

(F-6)

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HEADQUARTERS REGION XI
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 800 US ARMY

XI-567255/d

23 February 1956

SUBJECT: East German Intelligence-SfS-Bezirk Potsdam

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: CE Division-Offensive

1. REFERENCE: Headquarters Operational Memorandum 4/55,
Revised as of 31 October 1955; Headquarters Operational Memorandum
15/55, dated 14 November 1955, Subject: East German Intelligence
Collection Plan (C) (Offensive); a Region XI Agent Report dated 14
February 1956, Subject: East German Intelligence-SfS-Bezirk Jena,
Re: [b1] and File No. XI-567248.

2. FORWARDED: One (1) Summary of Information, Subject, file
and date as above.

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION: As stated in report with the
following exceptions:

- a. Source: Source "A" is [b1], born [b1]
[b1] in [b1]
- b. Evaluation of Source: Source "A" is evaluated as "F".
- c. Relationship of Source to Target: On [b1]
Source "A" was interrogated by the SfS (Staatssekretariat fuer
Staatsicherheit-State Secretary for State Security) in BUTZOW BU7535.
- d. How Information was Obtained: Personal contact.
- e. Date Information was Obtained: [b1] 1955.
- f. Date Information was Reported to Agent: 10 January 1956.
- g. Other Data Affecting Accuracy of Information: None.
- h. Status of Case: Coverage continues.

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SUBJECT: XI-557253/d; East German Intelligence-SfB-Bezirk Potsdam;
23 February 1956

4. REMARKS:

a. Complete background data concerning Source "A" can be found in our Agent Report, dated 14 February 1956, Subject: East German Intelligence-SfB-Bezirk Gera, Res. [b1] File No. [b1]

b. Regarding data cannot be predetermined.

1 Incl:

1. SOI, Rgn II, dtd 23 Feb 56

[b6] dda/mok/wu H324 803

b6

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Commanding

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1-File, Region II

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b6

/X-SECRET/

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
23 February 1965

PREPARING OFFICE

Region XI, 66th CIC Group, APO 800, US Army

SUBJECT

EAST GERMAN INTELLIGENCE - SIZ -
HEINRICH POTSDAM
RE: MODUS OPERANDI (u)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. On 2 May 1955, Source "A" crossed into the GDR (Deutsche Demokratische Republik - German Democratic Republic) at the HEIMSTETTEN FERRY, Germany, crossing point, to seek employment in the GDR. Source "A" was apprehended by the People's Police at the border and taken to the Internment Camp at BUTOW UUTSCH, Germany. On 12 May 1955, Source "A" was summoned to the administration office of the Butow Internment Camp, where he was questioned by four persons (further identification unknown) in civilian clothing. Source "A" believes that the four persons were Russian because of their facial features. (P-6)

2. The interrogators had Source "A's" personal history statement before them, which they used as a reference while talking to him. After questioning Source "A" about his activities while he was in Holland, they asked him if he would like to work for the GDR. The interrogators told him that they would give him 3,000 Dutch Guilders to go to Holland and locate the shipyard in which ships for the American Pacific Fleet were being built. They told Source "A" they would furnish him with identification, and they would give him an address in Holland where he could forward the information without running any risk. The interrogators further stated that they had people working in Holland, doing a very good job, and that Source "A" had already worked as a seaman in Holland and would have no trouble in fitting into such a situation. Source "A" was told not to make an immediate decision but to think about the offer and they would contact him later. Source "A" was further questioned about the Smith Company in ROTTERDAM (now), Holland, and was asked if he could give any information concerning the operation or the present production of the company. Source "A" stated that he had never heard of the company. He was informed that the interview was finished and that he could go. (P-6)

SOURCE "A"

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE	ADM ASST
PREPARING OFFICE 66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team, D-567242/a		20 Feb	TEAM CHIEF b6
SUBJECT EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Berlin Re: Modus Operandi		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION	
		OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:	
		COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1	
		USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2	
		FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3	
		NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4	
		UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5	
		RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION			
<p>1. Source arrived in East BERLIN on 3 February 1956. He was arrested at an identification control point by the Transportation Police because he could give no plausible reason for having come to East BERLIN. Source was first taken to Volkspolizei (People's Police) Headquarters, BERLIN-Mitte (Soviet Sector), Neue Koenigstrasse 27-37, and then to Police Inspection (Polizeiinspektion), BERLIN-Mitte, Magazinstrasse 3-5. Here he was detained until 6 February 1956 without questioning. On that day, he was taken from his cell by a man in civilian clothes and driven in a police automobile to the Office for Returnees (Rueckkehrerbuero) on Neue Koenigstrasse 65. Source was first taken to Room #12 and questioned by a member of the Criminal Division. Then, in Room #14, he was questioned by a man in civilian clothes whom he thought to be a member of the MfS. Source was informed by this person that he had made himself liable to punishment by coming illegally to East BERLIN, but that he could avoid the punishment by working for the GDR. Then the chief of the Office for Returnees, Frau b6 male, who was present during the questioning, spoke privately with the interrogator for approximately twenty minutes while Source waited outside the room. He was then told that he would receive a trial mission and that he should await further instructions at the Office for Returnees.</p> <p>2. On 7 February 1956, Source was called to b6 office and taken by one of three men in civilian clothes to Volkspolizei Headquarters. In a room with three other men wearing civilian clothes, he was again informed that he could avoid his impending punishment by carrying out a mission for the GDR. Source was then asked if he were acquainted with FRANKFURT/Main (MA7752) and vicinity and if he were willing to go there. Source agreed and was given a mission to collect information about certain US installations in FRANKFURT/Main. Upon completion of the mission, he was to contact b6 at the firm of "TUERN und PABST," FRANKFURT/Main, Mainzer Landstrasse, and write his reports there. b6 caretaker of the firm, would give Source funds and other necessary aid in the completion of his mission and, in addition, forward the reports to East BERLIN. Source was then told that he would travel on the intersonal train from East BERLIN to FRANKFURT/Main, but that beyond the GDR border he would have to travel without identification. He would receive a train ticket and special identification allowing him to travel to the border. From there, he was to get to FRANKFURT/Main as best he could. After these instructions were discussed, Source had to sign an obligation. Then his identification papers were taken from him and the first page of his GDSP (Gesellschaft fuer Deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft - Society for German-Soviet Friendship) membership book was torn out. Source was given no cover name. He was then told to stand by at the Office for Returnees.</p>			
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
20 Feb 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567242/a

b6 /awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MFS - Besirk Berlin
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . .	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . .	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

3. On 8 February 1956, b6 called Source in and gave him his train ticket and special identification. He was told to be on the inter-zonal train leaving the Ostbahnhof for FRANKFURT/Main at 2015 or 2045 hours that evening and that he should turn his special permit in to the Border Police upon his arrival in WARTHA (WB8550). He was further instructed, upon completion of his mission, to get funds from b6 in FRANKFURT/Main and buy a railroad ticket to WARTHA. Should he be refused a ticket because of lack of identification, he should buy a ticket to the border and then cross into the GDR illegally. In either case, he was to report again to the Border Police in WARTHA.

(P-6)

4. On 15 February 1956, an examination of the files maintained by Region VIII, 66th CIC Group, APO 742, revealed no information concerning the individuals mentioned in this report.

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SUMMAR. OF INFORMATION

ADM

TEAM

DATE 20 Feb 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team, D-567246/a

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Besirk Erfurt
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:		OF INFORMATION:	
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Technique of an MfS installation in ERFURT (PB4349): On 17 June 1955, Source was arrested by the MfS and interrogated. He was not required to sign a statement obliging him to be an informant for the MfS, but he was asked to sign a statement obliging him to keep his contact with the MfS confidential. Source was advised to relay an offer of MfS employment to Source's son, [b6] a schoolteacher in West BERLIN. The MfS told Source that they would be willing to pay Source's son 200 DM West for his services (it was not clear to Source if the MfS meant this as a monthly or only an initial payment). Source did not carry out his mission but instead warned his son. Source saw his handling agent at only one (1) time, i.e., 17 June 1955, when he was originally interrogated. The MfS never asked Source whether or not he had carried out his mission. Source received no monetary compensation from the MfS.

Source "C"

(F-6)

2. Region VIII files revealed no information regarding the personality mentioned in this report.

3. Files of Agency "A" revealed the following: [b6]
paragraph 1. [b6] born [b6]
(TS9540), has resided at [b6] (US Sector), [b6]
[b6] since 1 May 1955. (B-2)

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ADM ASST
DATE
OF 17 Feb 56

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567245/b

b6 / att b6

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Dresden
Re: Administration (Identification Documents - Internal Security)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Special passes are required to enter or leave the Main MfS office in DRESDEN (VS1257). They are described as follows:

a. Everyone employed by the MfS and desiring to enter this office building must first go to the MfS office located in DRESDEN at Bautzener Strasse 125. Here he obtains a small light green card bearing the letter "A". This card is presented to a guard at the entrance to the Main MfS office and the party is allowed to enter. A record is made of all people entering and leaving the building. The card must be returned to the other MfS office upon completion of one's business.

b. An olive-drab card bearing the letters "AE" is given to all KVP officers and criminal police. The same procedure is followed as above-mentioned.

c. The regular police carry a light green card bearing only an official seal. This too must be presented for inspection before admittance can be accomplished.

(F-6)

2. Region VIII files reveal no information concerning the special passes required at the above-mentioned MfS office.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

TEAM PATRIOT

OPN 17 Feb 76

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567245/d.

b6

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SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Dresden
Re: Modus Operandi (Recruitment
and Training)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. On 19 August 1955, Source moved from RUESSELSHEIM (MA5738) to DRESDEN (VS1257) where he intended to join his wife. At the DRESDEN railroad station, Source was apprehended by two VoP6 (Volkspolizei - People's Police) and was brought by them to a small office located in the station. Here Source met two MfS men in civilian clothes who questioned Source about his previous employment with the US Labor Service in RUESSELSHEIM. They questioned Source specifically about his former commanding officers, whose names they apparently already knew. Source allegedly refused to divulge any information and maintained that he did not know their names and knew nothing about them personally. Source was accused of being a spy and threatened when he would not cooperate. However, after approximately one half hour of interrogation, Source was released. No attempt was made to recruit Source at this time.

2. At approximately the end of September 1955, Source was contacted at his place of employment, DRESDEN-Blasewitz Trolley Bus Depot, Heinrich Schuetz Strasse. Source was instructed to report to the MfS office in DRESDEN, Bautzener Strasse 125. Here Source was asked if he was willing to work for the MfS. He was informed that he would no longer be questioned about the US Labor Service. Source maintained that he would reveal no information concerning his employment for the US Labor Service in RUESSELSHEIM. He also declared that he was unwilling to work for the MfS. He was told to consider the proposition and was given a telephone number, 52236, extension 9, to call if he should change his mind. During this interrogation, his wife appeared at the MfS office and was greeted by the MfS authorities as a fellow worker. Source was surprised and questioned his wife concerning her MfS affiliations, to which she replied that everyone has his obligations to the GDR. Source returned to his job and not until 21 December 1955 did he hear from the MfS again. Source was summoned to Bautzener Strasse 125. Here he met the same MfS agents whom he had met previously in September. They asked Source if he was willing to work for the MfS, and, if not, they would accuse him of spying and continue to question him concerning the US Labor Service. Finally, in order to be let alone, Source agreed to work for the MfS and subsequently signed an obligation, and received the cover name [b6]. Immediately after this, Source was taken in a black EMW car, license number I-253650, to the MfS main headquarters in DRESDEN-Neustaedter Markt place, number unknown. Here Source was shown two US infantry rifles and was asked to assemble and disassemble them. This Source proceeded to do, and after completion of this task he was asked if he knew a simple method of sabotaging them. Source was unable to answer this question. Once again Source was reminded that he was now working for the MfS and should remain silent concerning this fact. However, Source was not.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

17 Feb 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567245/d

b6

b6

SUBJECT

ECIS - MfS - Bezirk Dresden.
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

assigned any particular handling agent, and was not even given the name of any of the agents. Source was released and returned to his work.

3. On 27 December 1955, while at work, Source was informed by the Communist party-secretary of his district, that instructions were received from the MfS for Source to leave immediately by train to LEIPZIG (US1891). Source obeyed these instructions and left DRESDEN at 1330 hours on a train bound for LEIPZIG. At the station RIESA (n.c.a.), he was contacted by a VoPo who instructed Source to leave the train, where an MfS agent was waiting with a car. Source was driven to a steel factory located in RIESA, and here he met the same MfS agent by whom he had been previously interrogated. Source was shown a steel smelter and asked if he knew how to sabotage a smelter. Source replied in the negative, and was shown by the MfS agent how a piece of steel especially prepared by the insertion of a stick of dynamite could be casually thrown on a scrap heap. This would eventually be placed in the smelter and consequently would cause its destruction. Source was informed that should he ever be successful in sabotaging a smelter in the German Federal Republic, he would receive 10,000 DM-East. Source and the MfS agent then retired to a small office where Source was assigned three missions. Source was instructed to travel to West BERLIN by train. Here he was to register at the Marienfelde refugee camp, located in BERLIN-Marienfelde (US Sector) as a political refugee. He was instructed to tell the story that the MfS was pressuring him into working for them and to avoid this he had been forced to flee. As soon as he finished processing through the refugee camp, he was to travel to FRANKFURT/Main (MA7752) where he was to send a postcard to WYSTUP. From FRANKFURT, Source was to travel to RUESSELSHEIM and to obtain re-employment with the US Labor Service. After completing his assigned missions, Source was to meet his MfS contact man on 8 March 1956 at 2300 hours in the railroad station in RUESSELSHEIM. Source was given a physical description of this man and was informed he could also recognize him by the fact that this man would order a bottle of red wine. Source was to give this man any and all information concerning his missions and would in turn receive further instructions. Source was told that since he was working, and since one was given all the necessary articles in Marienfelde refugee camp, there was no need to pay him at the present time. He was ordered to return home and continue working, but that in the near future two men would come to his residence and ask for Source. This was to be a signal and Source was immediately to leave for West BERLIN and his assigned missions. On 31 January 1956, Source was informed by his landlady that two men had been to his house and were asking for Source. On 1 February 1956, Source took the 1036 train from DRESDEN to East BERLIN. At SCHOENEFELD (UU9805), near BERLIN, Source was approached by two VoPo and

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
17 Feb 56

PREPARING OFFICE
66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567245/a

b6 awt b6

SUBJECT
EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Dresden
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:
COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

two members of the MfS. The two MfS agents accompanied Source on the train to East BERLIN. From here they travelled by car to BERLIN-Mitte (Soviet Sector), Alexanderplatz, where they entered a building. Here they discussed Source's missions and informed him that if he revealed anything to the US authorities, they would shoot him. Source left the following day for West BERLIN.

(F-6)

4. On 7 February 1956, an examination of the Region VIII files failed to reveal any information concerning any of the personalities mentioned in this report.

5. On 7 February 1956, an examination of the Region VIII files revealed that telephone number 52236 is the DRESDEN MfS switchboard telephone number.

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HEADQUARTERS REGION VIII
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 742 US ARMY

D-567253

17 February 1956

SUBJECT: EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Potsdam, Re: EEI and Targets,
Modue Operandi

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: CE Division

1. (UNCLASSIFIED) FORWARDED: SOI dated 9 February 1956,
subject and file as above.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION: (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)

a. Source: [b1]

[b1]

b. Evaluation of Source: F.

c. Relationship of Source to target: [b1]

[b1]

d. How information was obtained by Source: [b1]

[b1]

e. Date Source obtained information: [b1]

f. Date agent received information: 8 February 1956.

g. Other data affecting accuracy of information: [b1]

[b1]

3. REMARKS: [b1]

[b1]

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D-567253

17 Feb 56

SUBJECT: EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Potsdam, Re: EEI and Targets,
Modus Operandi

b1

2 Incl
SOI's dtd 9 Feb 56 (1)

b6
Lt Col, Inf
Commanding

Berlin 42323, **b6** /GDS/at/S-3

0618

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

[REDACTED]

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

9 Feb 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team, D-567253/a

b6

SUBJECT

EGIS - MFS - Bezirk Potsdam
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1.

b1

b1

DISTRIBUTION

0619

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

WD AGO FORM 568
1 JUN 47

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE	
PREPARING OFFICE 66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567253/d		9 Feb 56	
SUBJECT EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Potsdam Re: Modus Operandi		b6 awt	
CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION			
OF SOURCE		OF INFORMATION:	
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION			
b1			
2. Region VIII files revealed the following:			
paragraph 1.	b1	nee b1	born b1
residing at	b1	(US Sector),	b1
b1	is the Subject of Region VIII		
dossier	b1		
0620			
DISTRIBUTION			
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b6

XI-567252/d

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

11 February 1956

PREPARING OFFICE
Bad Kissingen Resident Agency, Region XI, 66th CIC Group, APO 800, US Army

SUBJECT

East German Intelligence -Sfs-
Bezirk Neubrandenburg
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. The Sfs (Staatssekretariat fuer Staatssicherheits-State Secretariat for State Security) office in ANKLAM VV 1469 requires the People's Police office in ANKLAM to deliver, daily, all hotel visitor registrations to the chief of the Sfs office. No further information was known concerning this requirement.

(P-6)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 18 JUNE 1998
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

0621

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1-Region XI File

WD AGO FORM 568
1 JUN 47

SUMMARY OF

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CR Team

D-567841/4

b6

DATE

10 Feb 56

b6

swt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS Headquarters
Re: Administration (Physical
Examinations administered to new
Employees)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Effective 1 January 1956, physical examinations will be given to MfS employees prior to employment in contrast to previous practice of administering physical examinations after employment begins. The physical examinations will be given in the People's Police Hospital rather than in the MfS Headquarters as had been previously practiced. New MfS employees will not be permitted to enter the MfS Headquarters until they have completed processing for employment.

Source A

(B-2)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 18 JUNE 1998
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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1 JUN 47

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HEADQUARTERS REGION VIII
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 742 US ARMY

C.I.C.C.

D-567256

6 February 1956

SUBJECT: EGIS -- MfS - Bezirk Suhl, Re: Organization, Administration
EEI and Targets, Modus Operandi, Installations, Personalities, Sources

Logged

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: CE Division

1. REFERENCE: TWX, F-21983.
2. FORWARDED: SOI's dated 16 January 1956, subject and file as above.
3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:
 - a. Source: b1, born b1
in b1, presently residing in a refugee camp at GIESSEN, German Federal Republic.
 - b. Evaluation of Source: F.
 - c. Relationship of Source to target: Source was a full-time MfS agent with the rank of Major. b1

b1
 - d. How information was obtained by Source: Primarily in the course of his employment as an officer in the MfS and after August 1952 through social contacts with friends who were members of the MfS.
 - e. Date Source obtained information: 1949 through 21 November 1955.
 - f. Date agent received information: 21-30 November 1955.

0623

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D-567256

6 Feb 56

SUBJECT: EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Suhl, Re: Organization, Administration
EEI and Targets, Modus Operandi, Installations, Personalities, Sources

g. Other data affecting accuracy of information: Source occupied an important position in the target organization, was well informed and continued his social contacts with MfS members after Source left the MfS, therefore his information concerning the MfS should be reasonably accurate and current.

h. Status of case: Coverage of target continues.

4. REMARKS:

a. Attention is invited to the fact that the terminology used in reference to KV organization is German, that is, "department" is used as stated by Source. Usually the equivalent of a BV Department is reported as a "Section2, even though no distinction is made in German.

b. Information concerning b6 re EEI SOI, paragraph 1b, has been forwarded to interested Allied intelligence agencies.

7 Incl
SOI's dtd 16 Jan 56 (1)
w/Exh I-IV

b6
Lt Col, Inf
Commanding

Berlin 42323/b6/GDS/at/S-3

0624

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
16 Jan 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567256/b

b6 awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Suhl
Re: Administration
(Identification documents)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Every full-time agent of a KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-office) has the following documents:

a. MfS credential, a small red-covered booklet with name, picture, and authenticating stamps. This document is supposed to be used as seldom as possible and only in very important cases where no other recourse is advisable.

b. Badge, a small metallic badge bearing a stamp which identifies bearer as an officer of the criminal police.

c. Credential, a small blue booklet which identified the bearer as an officer of the People's Police.

d. East German identity document (Ausweis), such as carried by all East Germans. This card was usually used for gaining admission to factories and offices.

2. Agents assigned to Department VIII were issued special certificates, identifying them generally as employees of the labor office, power plant, or welfare organizations, but also issued to identify them as belonging to any other kind of organization desired.

(P-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
16 Jan 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567256/b

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Suhl
Re: Administration
(Communications)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. MfS KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-office) located at BAD SALZUNGEN (NB8730), used the following means of communication:

a. Private telephone: the agency had a direct telephone line to the VP (Volkspolizei - People's Police) sub-office. Telephones on this line had no numbers since they were connected directly and not through a switchboard.

b. Commercial telephone: the agency had two (2) commercial lines for communication with public officials and civilians. All official calls on this line went through the VP Sub-office switchboard.

c. Inter-office communications: the inter-office communications system was extended to the homes of the agents, utilizing local telephone lines and being connected to a switchboard in the KV, operated by the guards.

d. Teletypewriter: the agency teletypewriter was installed in the guard room on the ground floor, and was connected directly with the superior MfS agency at WEIMAR (PB6351). All teletype messages were forwarded in open text, except for names, places, and important facts, which were encoded. Important facts were those things which might indicate a planned action. The teletypewriter was operated by the duty agent, who also encoded and decoded messages. The code was changed monthly, and classified "Confidential."

e. Courier: the duty agent served as the courier to BV (Bezirksverwaltung - District office) WEIMAR, reporting normally on Tuesday and Friday, usually to pick up mail.

f. Special courier: "Operation Snowball" was used for emergency communications only. To put the operation into effect, the MfS Headquarters called its subordinate agencies to send couriers immediately to Headquarters. Each BV called its subordinate KV agencies to send couriers to the BV, so that KV couriers and BV couriers were simultaneously travelling to their respective higher headquarters. As soon as the couriers at Headquarters had been briefed and returned to their home agencies, they informed the waiting KV couriers who were briefed and returned to their home KV agencies. Couriers from the Aussenstellen (factory branch offices) would be waiting, immediately briefed, and returned to their respective offices. This system was used for surprise actions, such as railroad train checks and changes in border control policies.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
16 Jan 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567256/b

b6 awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Suhl
Re: Administration
(Communications)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

g. Radio: radio communications were in the planning stage only. It was anticipated that when operators and equipment became available, radio transmitters and receivers would be installed in all Kreis and Bezirk offices as well as at Headquarters.

(P-6)

2. An examination of Region VIII files revealed no information concerning the equipment and procedure mentioned in this report.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567256/A

DATE 16 Jan 56

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Suhl
Re: Modus Operandi (Informants)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

b6 awt

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. The three main categories of informants as utilized in 1952 by MfS KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-office) BAD SALZUNGEN (NB8730), Department IV, and believed to be still the same, were:

- a. Category I; waiters, railroad employees, prostitutes, women with many boy friends, and pass office employees.
- b. Category II; friends, relatives, and co-workers of suspects.
- c. Category III; persons making trips to "West Germany," now known as the Federal Republic of Germany.

2. Other departments used informants as needed for particular targets.

3. Person most desired as MfS informants fitted the following pattern:

- a. High level of intelligence and education.
- b. Large number of friends and associates.
- c. High ranking position in any firm or organization.
- d. Previous military or intelligence training.
- e. Scientific knowledge of any kind.
- f. Persons who could be blackmailed.

4. Recruitment was largely conducted by Department III, through the factories and firms they covered. The general steps were as follows:

- a. Careful screening of personnel records.
- b. Request of reports from the personnel manager, labor union secretary, and party official.
- c. File check of personality reports, searching for former members of the Nazi (Nationalsozialistische - National Socialist) Party, former armed forces officers, refugees from districts east of the Oder/Neisse border, persons with previous criminal convictions, technicians, scientists, laboratory personnel, and persons classified as experts in their field of work.
- d. Selection from the persons singled out in the previous steps who most closely met the requirements of paragraph 3, this report.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 16 Jan 56
PREPARING OFFICE 66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567256/d		b6 awt
SUBJECT EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Suhl Re: Modus Operandi (Informants)	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION 5. Recruitment of Sources by departments other than Department III, and of persons screened and selected by Department III, were conducted according to specific recruitment regulations, as follows: a. Perform all possible agency checks; police, resident's registry, labor office checks, court file check and employing agency personal questionnaires. b. Conduct at least three neighborhood interviews, either conducted through informants or by agents. (Interviews of relatives or friends were optional.) Note: Every request for information, to informants or agencies, should contain at least five names, so that the respective informant, employer or agency cannot determine in which person the actual MfS interest lies. c. Upon completion of background checks, informant-to-be is summoned to a meeting to discuss matters personally. This "preliminary interview" to be approved by the chief of the MfS agency responsible for checking all previously gained background information. Interview to be held in any neutral place (employer's personal office, civil service office, or other such place) under a pretext. Interviewer not introduced as a member of MfS, and no hint made that the person was being considered for MfS recruitment. The discussion concerned only general material: work, family, financial situation, military career, relatives, political attitudes, and wages. Interviewing agent wrote report on interview expressing personal impression made by the person interviewed. d. Agent must file an application for recruitment to the appropriate Bezirk office. Following items included: (1) Personal data of informant-to-be (2) Cover name to be used (3) Field of action in which to be used (4) Reasons for recruitment (knowledge of illegal groups, membership in church organization, or other) (5) Picture (6) Summary report of previous investigations (7) Two file cards 0629		
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1 JUN 47

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
16 Jan 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567256/d

b6/awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Suhl
Re: Modus Operandi (Informants)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

e. If approved by Bezirk office, one file card was returned to applying agency, and documents and second file card are kept at Bezirk office in confidential files. If disapproved, everything was returned with remark "disapproved," no reasons given. Reasons for disapproval included:

- (1) Informant for another agency
- (2) Previously dropped as security risk
- (3) Previous involvement in criminal or security case

f. Second application must be sent to appropriate Soviet instructing officer for approval or disapproval as for Bezirk office.

g. After all approvals are completed, informant-to-be is approached for recruitment by agent. Recruitment in a neutral place, but in an important and very urgent case informant-to-be was summoned to MfS office building.

h. Steps in recruitment:

- (1) Blackmail with confidential facts of private or professional life, past or present.
- (2) Blackmail with loss of position
- (3) Talk him into revealing classified information pertaining to his work, or with making any anti-Communist remark (any remark could be treated as anti-Communist for this purpose)
- (4) Assign a very unimportant mission to be carried out fast, then blackmail him with what he revealed
- (5) Have person write his obligation for cooperation and discreetness in longhand. No forms or stencils could be used.
- (6) In the event that a person absolutely refused to sign an obligation, he would work without an obligation, and sign later; however, no one ever refused to sign, for fear or arrest.

6. Recruitment from among criminals was done as follows: The files of the criminal police concerning arrests for minor offenses were checked daily. If a person were believed to be useful to the MfS, the person was again interrogated concerning the offense, and informed of the maximum punishment for which liable, and then recruited with the promise of freedom from such punishment as long as he cooperated with the MfS. No one ever refused this approach. These informants were not considered the best, but

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE
PREPARING OFFICE		16 Jan 56
66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team		
D-567256/a		
SUBJECT		b6 /awt
EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Suhl		
Re: Modus Operandi (Informants)		
CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:		OF INFORMATION
COMPLETELY RELIABLE A		CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B		PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C		POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D		DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E		IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F		TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>their contributions did aid in the effort. A background investigation and approval by Bezirk and Soviet officials were required as in other recruitments.</p> <p>7. No special instructions were utilized or available for the training of informants. Handling agents told the informants exactly what was needed, but not more. Informant's handwritten reports were checked by the handling agent during the informant meeting, and any vague details were clarified at that time. After the informant had proven his reliability, the handling agent briefed him concerning methods of Western agencies, particularly on the points of how East zone residents were approached, how information was smuggled in and out of the country, and how information was collected.</p> <p>8. Informants were never contacted in the home of the informant or agent or in the agent's office. All meetings were held at neutral places. True names were not used, and it was against regulations to learn true names. Trusted informants were used as cut-outs.</p> <p>9. Reports were usually classified confidential, but some reports concerning the CIC were classified "GVV" (Geheime Verschluss Sache - Top Secret). Top Secret reports were for the agents in charge only. The agent in charge briefed other agents on different items, but was not allowed to show diagrams or reports to subordinates. The agents in turn were not allowed to discuss more than what was essential in briefing the informant.</p> <p>10. Informants never received a fixed amount of pay, but were rewarded with money according to the importance of their reports. There were some informants who refused to accept money at first, but were forced to do so during the early stages of their cooperation and to sign a receipt. The MfS kept the receipt for possible later use as blackmail material should the informant want to discontinue working for the MfS.</p> <p>11. Reliable informants could be promoted to resident informants or informant leaders with the approval of the Bezirk office. In such a case the informant was introduced to not more than five (5) other informants, whom he then handled. The usual number of sub-sources was four (4), so that an informant net was composed of five (5) persons. Each sub-source was given a list of four (4) or five (5) names for each investigation, so that he could not tell in which person the MfS was really interested. Use of other than cover names among informant leaders and sub-sources was strictly prohibited. The handling agent had to submit a report on the informant leader</p>		
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0631		

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

16 Jan 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567256/d

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Suhl
Re: Modus Operandi (Informants)CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

b6 awt

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

every six (6) weeks. The informant leader and sub-sources were observed secretly without the knowledge of the handling agent or other persons on Kreis level to insure that the work was being done as desired, and that only cover names were being used. Further details of this operation are not available.

12. Reports covering personal and political reliability of informants and success of efficiency of work for the MfS had to be submitted to the superior agency every six (6) months. Copies of the reports were kept in the confidential personal file of the informant. Neighborhood interviews were conducted at the option of the employing office, usually every six (6) to nine (9) months.

13. All reports from informants were submitted written in longhand by the informant, and signed with the informant's cover name. The use of forms of any type was prohibited.

14. Informants were not used as witnesses in cases that came to court, unless no other course was possible. Once called as a witness, the informant was immediately dropped, had to make a formal written statement concerning what he knew about the case, and then could appear before the court as a witness.

(P-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

16 Jan 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567256/d

b6

awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MFS - Bezirk Suhl -
Re: Modus Operandi
(Detention and Reporting)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. There were no fixed rules for detentions, interrogations, or reports. Procedures were unofficially well defined. As a standing rule every agent was responsible that he keep no person under arrest by the MFS for longer than 48 hours. Every person to be kept longer than that period of time had to be forwarded to the prosecuting attorney or arraigned before a judge. The judge had to make a decision as to the release or pre-trial custody of the person. Kreis office agents were not permitted to finish a case completely, and did not include a charge sheet or arraignment order in their reports. The agent did write a summary report containing all details of the committed crime, and forwarded it with all the records of the case, with the exceptions noted, to the Bezirk office.

2. The respective department of the Bezirk office typed a final report, filled in the charge sheet form, and assembled the case dossier. The entire dossier was then forwarded to the prosecuting attorney's office. Kreis offices were not permitted to make a copy for their use, but did keep file cards on all personalities involved. It was also not permitted to attach original informant reports to a case dossier. Original informant reports were kept in the work file of the respective informants, which were in turn kept in a safe at the Kreis agency.

(F-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
16 Jan 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567256/d

b6 awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Suhl
Re: Modus Operandi
(Training of full-time agents)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Prior to August 1952 there were no formal training courses for MfS agents. During the Summer of 1952 the MfS school at POTSDAM (UU6808) was established. Agents on duty at that time were not called to attend the school, and had to depend upon the training they had picked up during duty, usually with the VP (Volkspolizei - People's Police) or Border police. A Soviet instructing officer visited the agency almost every day to give informal instruction in how to investigate cases, how to make reports, how to keep files, and how to do the administrative work. Each new case had to be reported to the Bezirk (District) office. The agents at Bezirk level issued instructions on how to investigate the case, what the main interests in the case were, and other related suggestions. Meetings were held once each month for the purpose of reviewing completed cases of the Bezirk office, to show what was necessary to clear a case, and how it should be done. Occasionally at the monthly meetings agents from the Bezirk office would report on working methods of Western intelligence agencies, particularly the Free Jurists and the KgU (Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit - Fighting Group against Inhumanity). Every office had copies of the German Penal Code and Allied Control Council Laws, which were to be studied by the agents. Every agent was obligated to study German Code of Criminal Procedures.

(F-6)

2. Examination of Region VIII files revealed that the MfS agent training school is located at POTSDAM/EICHE (UU6308). (F-3)

0634

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1 JUN 47

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
16 Jan 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567256/d

b6 awt

SUBJECT

ECIS - MfS - Bezirk Suhl
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. MfS KV [b6] (PB0220) was instructed in 1951 by higher headquarters to provide [b6] born in [b6] place unknown, with East German credentials to use in travelling to the German Federal Republic. Exact details are not known. Common talk at the KV [b6] was that [b6] later was arrested in the German Federal Republic by Allied authorities, and served a sentence in the LANDSBERG (n.c.a.) prison, being released in June 1954. [b6] returned to WEIMAR (PB6351), and received new documents that concealed the fact that he had been imprisoned in the German Federal Republic. [b6] is believed to be presently employed in a high position in the Ministerium fuer Aufbau (Ministry for Construction) in East BERLIN.

(F-6)

2. An examination of Region VIII files revealed no information concerning the personality mentioned in this report.

0635

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1 JUN 47

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b6

31 Jan 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567254/d

SUBJECT

EGIS - MFS - Pezirk Rostock
Re: Modus Operandi
(Training Schools)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

b6

awt

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. The MFS radio training school operated by MFS Headquarters BERLIN was located at the Border Police training center at Ruegen Island (n.c.a.), from July until September 1955. The school is presently located at POTSDAM (BU6808), Alleestrasse 11.

2. In addition to the 38 MFS radio school students and three (3) instructors, there were about 350 to 400 Grenz Polizei (Border Policemen) and MFS Innere Truppen (Interior Troops). Common talk at that time at the school was that the Innere Truppen would be the cadre for the new East German armed forces. Radio trainees were strictly prohibited from having any contact with other personnel.

(F-6)

3. An examination of Region VIII files revealed no information concerning the installation mentioned in this report.

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BY CDR/USN 18 JUN 81/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

0636

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1 JUN 47

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 31 Jan 56														
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> PREPARING OFFICE 66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567246/d </div> <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px;">b6/awt</div> </div>																
SUBJECT EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Erfurt Re: Modus Operandi (Communications)	<table border="0" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%;">CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:</td> <td style="width: 50%;">OF INFORMATION:</td> </tr> <tr> <td>COMPLETELY RELIABLE A</td> <td>CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>USUALLY RELIABLE B</td> <td>PROBABLY TRUE 2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>FAIRLY RELIABLE C</td> <td>POSSIBLY TRUE 3</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D</td> <td>DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>UNRELIABLE E</td> <td>IMPROBABLE 5</td> </tr> <tr> <td>RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F</td> <td>TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6</td> </tr> </table>		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:	COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1	USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2	FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4	UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5	RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6
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NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4															
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5															
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6															
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION																
<p>1. MfS BV (Bezirksverwaltung - District Office) Erfurt maintains communications contact with MfS Headquarters BERLIN through use of a teletype-writer machine located on the third floor of the MfS office building located at ERFURT(PB4249), Andreasstrasse 38.</p> <p>2. MfS BV Erfurt maintains radio contact with other unidentified units through use of radio equipment located on the fifth floor of the building.</p> <p>3. MfS BV Erfurt maintains a letter drop at the home of b6 grandfather of Source. Letters to the MfS at this address are addressed to: b6 The letters so addressed are picked up by agent Fnu b6 male, cover name b6 of Department II (Positive espionage in West Germany) approximately twice weekly, between noon and 2100 hours. All such incoming mail was postmarked by Federal Republic of Germany post offices. Letters arrive almost every day.</p> <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: center; margin-top: 10px;"> b6 (F-6) </div> <p>4. An examination of Region VIII files revealed no information concerning the personalities mentioned in this report.</p>																
<div style="display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center;"> <div style="margin-right: 20px;">0637</div> <div> REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON JUN 18 1998 BY CDR USA/SCM F01/PO AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R </div> </div>																
DISTRIBUTION																

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b6

DATE
31 Jan 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567246/d

b6

/awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS - Bezirk Erfurt
Re: Modus Operandi (Informants)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. It is believed that MfS BV (Bezirksverwaltung - District Office) Erfurt maintains informants in West BERLIN and in the Federal Republic of Germany. Such informants are said to be reimbursed for all expenses incident to such service and also to receive ten (10) DM West for each day spent in the Federal Republic of Germany.

2. Recruitment and handling of informants travelling to the Federal Republic of Germany are the responsibility of Department II in Erfurt. This department also handled the debriefing and doubling of Western agency informants. Agents of Department II claim to have many doubled agents in their employ.

(F-6)

3. Examination of Region VIII files indicates that Department II is responsible for positive espionage in Western Germany. (F-3)

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0638

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HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154 US ARMY

D-567253/d

30 January 1956

SUBJECT: NCIS - MfS Bezirk POTSDAM (U)
Re: Modus Operandi (MfS Investigation of
Post Office Cross GLIENICKE)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, United States Army
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch, G2CICB

1. Reference is made to Intelligence Collection Memorandum
CI-CE-1-55, subject: SFS (State Secretariat for State Security) (GDR/
East German Intelligence), dated 18 February 1955.

2. Forwarded herewith in triplicate is Summary of Information,
subject as above, dated 18 January 1956. The information contained
therein [b1]

3. Examination of Central Registry files of this Group re-
vealed the following information:

A Colonel [b6] was reported in December 1953
as the Chief of Main Department IV, SFS Headquarters BERLIN. (F-6).
(Main Department IV was allegedly integrated into Main Department II
of SFS Headquarters BERLIN.)

4. No other distribution of the attached report has been made
by this Group. Information contained in the attached report may be
released to other allied intelligence agencies.

5. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

0639

1 Incl
SOI dtd 18 Jan 56 (trip)

Telephone: Stgt Mil #371

[b6] h/bg

H/R: [b1]

[b6]

1st Lt, Armor
Adjutant

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

CONFIDENTIAL

CIC CENTRAL FILE

RLH
4

26
AA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

D: b6 /Stgt M11 8371

18 January 1956

Headquarters, 66th CIC Group, United States Army, Europe, APO 154, US Army

EGIS - MFS Bezirk POTSDAM
Re: Hodus Operandi (MFS Investiga-
tion of Post Office Cross
CLINICHE) (U)

b1

(Unevaluated)

0640

~~REGRAIDING DATA CANNOT BE PREDETERMINED~~

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW

3 cys fwd to G2 1 cy - CIC Central File
1 cy - CIC File 1 cy - Hold File

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

18 January 1956

b1

1. Reference is made to Office Memorandum, this office, file BR56-1, Subject as above, dated 4 January 1956.

b1

Incls: (1) b1
(2) SOI (transl)

Info Copy to: CIG Region VIII
CIS, ATTN: b6

b6 /BLN44125

b6

b1 [redacted] Liaison Officer
Public Safety Division
U.S. Mission, Berlin

064

~~EXCLUDED FROM RELEASE~~
~~DATE 11-11-2011 BY SP-6~~

File: BR56-54

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
18 January 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

b1

SUBJECT
Investigation of Post Office Gross
GLIENICKE by the MFS - RE:
Owners of Mail Boxes at the Soviet
Zone Post Offices including KVP
Units

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . .	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . .	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

A) Persons:

b1

B) Concerning the Facts:

b1

0642

~~EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE~~

DISTRIBUTION

Hq 66th CIC Group - ATTN: Liaison Division
CIC Region VIII

CIS - ATTN:

b6

WD AGO FORM 1 JUN 47 568

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HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154 US ARMY

D-567241/d

30 January 1956

SUBJECT: EGIS - MFS Headquarters
Re: Modus Operandi (Sabotage Maneuver)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, United States Army
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch, G2CICE

1. Reference is made to Intelligence Collection Memorandum
CI-CP-1-55, subject: SFS (State Secretariat for State Security) (GDR/
East German Intelligence), dated 18 February 1955.

2. Forwarded herewith in triplicate is a Region VIII, 66th CIC
Group, Summary of Information, subject and file as above, dated 12
January 1956.

3. Source "A" is a carded informant of this Group; source "B"
is an unidentified sub-source of source "A".

4. Information contained in the attached report may be re-
leased to other allied intelligence agencies in its present form. No
other distribution of the attached report has been made by this Group.

5. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

0643

1 Incl:
SOI dtd 12 Jan 56 (trip)

b6

1st Lt, Armor
Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt Mil 8371

b6/bg

M/R: Above forwards to G2 rept regarding alleged SFS sabotage maneuver.
Source is V-418-VIII, who received the info from an unidentified sub-
source. Coordinated with Capt b6, Tech Spec.

CIC CENTRAL FILE

Ry
Pkr
4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE
PREPARING OFFICE 66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567241/8 OFF		12 Jan 56
SUBJECT EGIS - MfS Headquarters Re: Modus Operandi (Sabotage Maneuver)		b6 /awt
CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A USUALLY RELIABLE B FAIRLY RELIABLE C NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D UNRELIABLE E RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F		OF INFORMATION: CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES. 1 PROBABLY TRUE 2 POSSIBLY TRUE 3 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 IMPROBABLE 5 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>1. On the evening of 10 December 1955, approximately 175 men assigned to MfS Headquarters in East BERLIN participated in sabotage and counter-sabotage maneuvers in the vicinity of BERNAU (VU0448) along the Autobahn (class 1 highway). The problem consisted of three groups of approximately 50 men each dressed in civilian clothing attempting to approach three bridges on the Autobahn inconspicuously and to simulate an attempt to blow up each of the bridges. Defensive forces in each case were groups of approximately 7 men charged with the security of the bridge, checking and strictly controlling all civilians in the vicinity of the bridge. Additional fire power for each attacking group was simulated by assignment of one armored vehicle to each group. The attacking groups were unsuccessful because of premature identification and incautious approach to the bridges, revealing their intent.</p> <p>Sub-source "B" (F-6) Source "A"</p> <p>2. No information about sabotage maneuvers of MfS personnel has been previously recorded in Region VIII.</p>		
DISTRIBUTION		

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ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDR USN/COM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

0644

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
27 January 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region XI, 66th CIC Group, APO 800, US Army

SUBJECT

East German Intelligence - Sfs -
 Bezirk Cera
 Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
 USUALLY RELIABLE B
 FAIRLY RELIABLE C
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
 UNRELIABLE E
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
 PROBABLY TRUE 2
 POSSIBLY TRUE 3
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
 IMPROBABLE 5
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

The Sfs (Staatssekretariat fuer Staatssicherheit - State Secretariat for State Security) Office on Kaehe Kollwitzstrasse, exact number unknown, in JENA PB 8145, is currently attempting to recruit informants by intimidation. The Sfs checked the personal history statement of a personality and having found a discrepancy, attempted to recruit this person as an informant. The Sfs offered to remunerate this person for all work done for the Sfs. No further information available. (P-6)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

ON JUN 18 1998

BY CDR USN 3300W F01/PO

AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

0645

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1-00, 66th CIC Group
 1-Region XI File

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS REGION VIII
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 742 US ARMY

D-237761; VIII-16530

27 January 1956

SUBJECT: Security Alert Police, Re: Service Identity Document

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: Captain [b6]

1. FORWARDED: SOI dated 26 January 1956, subject and file as above.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Sources: [b1], refugee, born [b1]
[b6] in [b1] fled to West Berlin on [b1] 1956
and is presently residing at the BERLIN-Marienfelde Refugee Camp.
Source is not being vetted.

b. Evaluation of Source: F.

c. Relationship of Source to target: Source was a
member of the Security Alert Police from [b1] 1955 until
[b1] 1956, last stationed with the [b1] Abteilung (Battalion)
of the Sicherheits Kommando (Security Regiment) at [b1]
[b1] with the rank of [b1] and position
of [b1]

d. How information was obtained by Source: Routine work.

e. Date Source obtained information: 31 December 1955.

f. Date agent received information: 25 January 1956.

g. Status of case: Coverage continues.

3. REMARKS: Attached is one (1) copy of Exhibit I.

1 Incl
SOI dtd 26 Jan 56 (2)
w/Exh I (1)

[b6]
Lt Col, Inf
Commanding

Berlin 42323/ [b6] /at/S-3

26751
1 FEB. 1956

Reg VIII
Log 395

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
26 January 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CS Team; D-237761; VIII-16530

b6

KCV

SUBJECT

Security Alert Police
RE: Service Identity Document

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Attached hereto as Exhibit "I" is a Dienstbuch (Service Identity Document) of the type which is issued to officers of the Bereitschaftspolizei (Security Alert Police) of the Ministry for State Security. The document contains 23 pages and folds into three (3) parts.

(F-2 - documentary)

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 18 JUNE 1998
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

0647

DISTRIBUTION

WD AGO FORM 568
1 JUN 47

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		b6	DATE 26 Jan 56																
PREPARING OFFICE 66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567241/d		b6/awt																	
SUBJECT ECIS - MFS - Headquarters Re: Modus Operandi	<table border="0" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td colspan="2" style="text-align: center;">CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 50%;">OF SOURCE:</td> <td style="width: 50%;">OF INFORMATION:</td> </tr> <tr> <td>COMPLETELY RELIABLE</td> <td>A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>USUALLY RELIABLE</td> <td>B PROBABLY TRUE 2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>FAIRLY RELIABLE</td> <td>C POSSIBLY TRUE 3</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NOT USUALLY RELIABLE</td> <td>D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>UNRELIABLE</td> <td>E IMPROBABLE 5</td> </tr> <tr> <td>RELIABILITY UNKNOWN</td> <td>F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6</td> </tr> </table>			CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION		OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:	COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1	USUALLY RELIABLE	B PROBABLY TRUE 2	FAIRLY RELIABLE	C POSSIBLY TRUE 3	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4	UNRELIABLE	E IMPROBABLE 5	RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6
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UNRELIABLE	E IMPROBABLE 5																		
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6																		
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION																			
<p>1. The Abteilung Nachrichten (Information Department) radio monitoring station located at the former air field at BERLIN-Johannisthal (Soviet Sector), is believed to be responsible for monitoring the locating radio transmissions within the CDR. There is usually one operator on duty at the station. The operators work a 48 hour tour of duty, alternating approximately four hours listening with four hours sleep, and then have 48 hours free.</p> <p>2. Every mission, or monitored message, is entered in a log book that is essentially a writing pad with square-lined sheets. The information recorded includes the station's call sign and other information, with which Source was not familiar or conversant. The pads are forwarded to the officer in charge when completed, usually by the operator who is being relieved.</p> <p>3. One monitoring check was performed in November 1955 as follows: the officer in charge called the station operator on duty, using the direct telephone line, and gave him three (3) code numbers, which were said by the officer to indicate the frequencies of newly discovered amateur stations. The operator repeated the numbers, checked his code lists, and adjusted the receivers to listen to a message being transmitted on the frequency given. After listening and adjusting the receivers for a few minutes, the operator made notes of the message overheard, also noting the exact times. He finally checked his receiver again for an exact adjustment, and then wrote down the frequency and direction code numbers. He then gave the information to the officer in charge over the telephone. The operator next called the stations at GOTH (PB2045) and HOHEN-LUCKAU (PE9486) (by radio) and gave them the code numbers he had determined, also asking them for the code numbers they had determined. The operator explained that the other two stations had checked the new amateur transmitter simultaneously with him, and that by comparing the code numbers of the three stations it was possible to pinpoint the exact location of the station in question.</p> <p>4. The operator of the station conducting the triangulation operation described in paragraph 1 stated that the Nachrichten section had located many stations by the technique described, and that this was the true purpose of the station.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(F-6)</p>																			
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 18 June 1998 BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R </div> <div style="font-size: 24pt; font-weight: bold;">0648</div> </div>																			
DISTRIBUTION																			

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

26 January 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

REGION III 66TH CIC GROUP

D-567255/A

SUBJECT

East German Intelligence - SFS -
Bezirk SCHWERIN
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE
USUALLY RELIABLE
FAIRLY RELIABLE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
UNRELIABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

A
B
C
D
E
F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
PROBABLY TRUE
POSSIBLY TRUE
DOUBTFULLY TRUE
IMPROBABLE
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

On 18 January 1956, SOURCE was interrogated at Field Office Giesse and was able to furnish the following information on SFS SCHWERIN FE6045, Modus Operandi, informants:

1. SELECTION STANDARDS:

SOURCE was approached by b6 in b6 1955 in her office. She was asked to make contact with a former friend of hers with the intent to find out whether the friend might be willing to return to East Germany. SOURCE was selected for this job as SOURCE had been a close friend of b6 before b6 had fled to West BERLIN in July 1954. Description of b6 is as follows:

NAME:

b6

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH:

b6

NATIONALITY:

German

PRESENT ADDRESS:

West BERLIN

FORMER ADDRESS:

SCHWERIN, before July 1954

HEIGHT:

5'4"

WEIGHT:

110 lbs

HAIR:

Blond

EYES:

Blue

LAST EMPLOYMENT:

Secretary for
SCHWERIN

b6

MARITAL STATUS:

Divorced

2. RECRUITING:

0649

SOURCE was first approached in her office by b6 b6 took plenty of time and outlined his wishes to SOURCE. b6 then allowed SOURCE

(Cont'd)

DISTRIBUTION

1 - CIC Central

1 - Region III

WD AGO FORM 568
1 JUN 47

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
26 January 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

REGION III 66TH CIC GROUP

D-567255/d

SUBJECT

East German Intelligence - Sfs -
Bezirk SCHWERIN
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:
COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

over a week's time in which to make up her mind. b6 and SOURCE met again later, but SOURCE at that time refused to accept the mission. No incentives were offered SOURCE nor did she take any oaths. At one point b6 appeared with pen and paper to persuade SOURCE to sign that she would take the mission, but SOURCE refused. SOURCE received no training, payments, or other aid from the Sfs as she had refused to accept the mission offered to her.

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BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
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0650

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SUM AR. OF INFORMATION

b6

DATE

25 Jan 56

PREPARING OFFICE

6th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team, D-967253/a

b6

unt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MFS Bezirk Potsdam
Re: Modus Operandi
(Radio School)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. The MFS radio monitoring school located at POTSDAM (UU6608), Alleestrassse 11, was primarily interested in teaching radio code and monitoring techniques, and secondarily interested in teaching political affairs.

2. Political courses took 12-hours each week, and included the following studies:

a. Der Sterbende Kapitalismus im Westen (Dying Capitalism in the West). The theme of the course was that the capitalistic system of Western countries would soon die. The instructor explained that the people living in Western countries would awaken and defend themselves against exploitation by war-mongers and big industrial companies, and that the death of capitalism would follow. The people were ready to be formed into a Volks Demokratie (People's Democracy), in which the working classes would dominate everything, and in which only members of the working classes would receive the rewards of their hard labor. Everything would be state-owned and state-governed by the government officials as elected by the laborers and farmers. The government would insure that everyone had his just income, and that nothing was hidden or taken away by mean capitalists for personal profit.

b. Der Aufstrebende Sozialismus (Upward-going Socialism). The theme of this study was the same as Der Sterbende Kapitalismus, paragraph 2a, i.e., that the capitalistic system of Western countries would soon die, but emphasizing the "progress of socialism for the benefit of the working classes in the People's Republics." The main point made was that in the future socialistic state every worker and farmer would have every professional and political chance to gain the highest position in the government, and that all large privately owned farms and industry would become nationalized community property in which all citizens would share the profits.

3. Communist party history and other special classes were to be held during later phases of the training.

4. Military courses took six (6) hours each week, and included only basic courses, as follows: dismounted drill, saluting, calisthenics, rifle drill, squad and platoon attack problems, and familiarization with Soviet weapons. There were no facilities at the school for firing the weapons.

5. Radio training was considered the most important activity at the school, and was studied for about fifty hours each week. The duty day was considered to be from 0600 to 1800 daily. The work week normally included

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
25 Jan 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567253/d

b6 awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - Wfs Reziirk Potsdam
Re: Modus Operandi
(Radio School)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

CODE	DESCRIPTION	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
A	COMPLETELY RELIABLE	1
B	USUALLY RELIABLE	2
C	FAIRLY RELIABLE	3
D	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	4
E	UNRELIABLE	5
F	RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

58 hours of instruction and radio practice which was divided into two main parts as follows:

a. Radio operational practice, with a goal of receiving Morse code at the rate of 70 words per minute after three (3) months with 60 words per minute minimum standard.

b. Electro-technical study, taught primarily by demonstration, with the goal of familiarizing the student with the radio sets he would later operate.

6. The classes were conducted by the head of the school and his two (2) instructor assistants. The greater part of the time was devoted to sending and receiving code with other members of the class. The students also listened to Morse code signals transmitted by amateurs within the GDR. The instructors told the class members that all of them were to be assigned to monitor service groups, listening to amateur radio communications throughout the Soviet zone of Germany.

7. The mid-term examination (Zwischen Pruefung) was conducted in mid-October 1955 at POTSDAM. The examination was divided into three (3) parts as follows:

a. Part I (morning of first day of examinations):

(1) Nine (9) minutes receiving of code groups of unrelated letters; three (3) minutes at 50 words per minute, three (3) minutes at 60 words per minute, and three (3) minutes at 70 words per minute.

(2) Nine (9) minutes receiving of clear text, three (3) minutes at 50, 60, and 70 words per minute each.

(3) Nine (9) minutes receiving of numbers and punctuation, three (3) minutes at 50, 60, and 70 words per minute each.

b. Part II (afternoon of first day of examinations, four hours): A written theme on one of two subjects, either "Dying Capitalism" or "The Present Crisis of Capitalist Economy."

0652

c. Part III (morning of second day of examination, four hours): A written theme on what the student had learned about electro-technical matters with regard to radio operations.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

25 Jan 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team, D-567253/d

b6

ant

SUBJECT

ECIS - MfS Bezirk Potsdam
Re: Modus Operandi
(Radio School)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

8. Following the examinations, all students were granted a one (1) week leave, and learned the results of the examination upon their return to POTSDAM. Source and four (4) others had not submitted sufficient written work on the examination, and were reassigned from the school. Three (3) members were assigned to Abteilung Nachrichten (Information Department) at BERLIN-Johannisthal (Soviet Sector), and two (2) men were assigned to a driver's school, believed to be located at POTSDAM.

9. Students at the school were instructed to go out only in groups because the American Sector of West BERLIN was only twenty (20) minutes away.

(P-6)

10. An examination of Region VIII records revealed no information concerning the installation mentioned in this report.

11. It is believed that Source is in error concerning the radio code speeds mentioned. It is more likely that the figures refer to letters per minute, and not words per minute, as stated in paragraph 7. The speeds claimed would be 10, 12, and 14 words per minute, respectively, which are entirely possible and logical.

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0653

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CONFIDENTIAL

GID 16-1062

**HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY, EUROPE**
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

ALMB-8(12) 333.5 GB

40 403
JAN 20 1956

SUBJECT: SPS Bezirk POTSDAM Re: SPS School - Radio Course (3) -

TO: Commanding Officer
66th SIG Group
APO 154, U. S. Army

1. (UNCLASSIFIED) Reference is made to letter, B-567853/a, your headquarters, 5 January 1956, subject as above.

2. (CONF) Referenced letter indicates [b1] who are being trained by the LRS.

3. (CONF) Details of this case are of considerable interest to this Office. Desire that your headquarters make a concentrated effort to obtain the details of all pertinent data [b1]

b1

4. (UNCLASSIFIED) Downgrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G2:

b6

Colonel GS
Chief, CI Branch

JAN 23 1956

3033

Ty: Reid Mil 7864

0654

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154
US ARMY

CONFIDENTIAL

D-567253/a

17 January 1956

SUBJECT: -SfS Bezirk POTSDAM
Re: SfS School - Radio Course (u)

TO: See Distribution

b1

1. (CONFIDENTIAL) b1 SfS defector presently being debriefed by Region VIII, reported the following:

b1 A joined the SfS on b1 1954 and was assigned to duty at the Kirchtor Investigation Prison in HALLE. On b1 1954, b1 began a course at the SfS School in POTSDAM-Eiche, from which he graduated on b1 1955. A group of approximately 50 students were attending a course in radio at the SfS School from about b1 to b1 1955. When these students arrived, the other students were told in a special meeting that a radio course was beginning and that all other students were instructed not to ask about the course or question the radio students. A student in the radio course told b1 his friend, that the curriculum of the course included electronics, Morse code, German and politics. The student stated he did not know why he was receiving radio training or how he would be assigned following completion of the course.

(F-6)

2. (CONF) (SECRET)
b1

b1

b1

0655

b1

CONFIDENTIAL

CIC CENTRAL FILE

Hy
JB
4

3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

D-567253/a

SUBJECT: SFS Bezirk POTSDAM

Re: SFS School - Radio Course (2) (U)

b1

3. (U) It is not known for what purpose the radio students are being trained. They could be trained as radio operators for internal SFS use; however, the possibility that some are being trained for operations in West Germany should not be excluded.

4. (CONF) Regions should be on the alert to obtain all information possible concerning SFS radio training and operations from personalities being debriefed. Information indicating courses given, dates of graduation, number of graduates, training of SFS personnel for radio operations in, and/or against the German Federal Republic, or that SFS operatives are dispatched to West Germany for the purpose of establishing radio operations, will be reported to this Headquarters on a priority I basis.

b1

b1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

D-567253/a

SUBJECT: SFS Bezirk POTSDAM
Re: SFS School - Radio Course (0)

b1

5.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b1

b1

6. (UNCLASSIFIED) Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

b6

1st Lt, Armor
Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt Mil 8244

b6 /bg

DISTRIBUTION:

1 cy, CO CIC RGN I
1 cy, CO CIC RGN III
1 cy, CO CIC RGN IV
1 cy, CO CIC RGN VI
1 cy, CO CIC RGN VIII
1 cy, CO CIC RGN XI
1 cy, CO CIC RGN XII

0657

M/R: This provides regions with info available re SFS radio training and instructs rgns to be on the alert for such info and rept same as priority I. Above info has been forwarded to G2. Coordinated with Capt b6 Tech Spec.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154 US ARMY

CONFIDENTIAL

D-567253/a

4 January 1956

SUBJECT: SFS Bezirk POTSDAM
Re: SFS School - Radio Course (C)(U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, US Army
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch (G2CICE)

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~) References:

a. Intelligence Collection Memorandum CI-CE-1-55, subject:
SFS (State Secretariat for State Security) (GDR/East German Intelligence),
dated 18 February 1955.

b. Letter, this Group, subject and file as above, dated 30
November 1955.

2. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)

b1

b1

0658
CONFIDENTIAL

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CIC CENTRAL FILE

D-567253/a

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: SFS Bezirk POTSDAM
Re: SFS School - Radio Course (S) (u)

b1

3. (UNCLASSIFIED) No other distribution of the above information has been made by this Group.

4. (UNCLASSIFIED) Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

b6

1st Lt, Armor
Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt M11 8371

b6 /ps

M/R: Ref ltr rept to G2 info concerning Radio Course at SFS POTSDAM/Eiche School.

b1

b1

0659

CONFIDENTIAL

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☒

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)
NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

6660

CONFIDENTIAL

**HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154 US ARMY**

30 November 1955

D-567253/a

SUBJECT: Sfs Bezirk POTSDAM (u)
Re: Sfs School — Radio Course (s)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, US Army
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch (G2CICE)

1. [b1]

[b1]

2. [b1] was informed by a former acquaintance that a group of approximately 50 students were attending a radio course at the Sfs School in POTSDAM/Eiche from about [b1] to [b1]. When these students arrived, the other students were told in a special meeting that a radio course was beginning and that all other students were instructed not to ask about the course or question the radio students. The curriculum of the course included electronics, Morse code, German, and politics. The acquaintance also stated that he did not know why he was receiving radio training or how he would be assigned upon graduation.

3. Examination of Central Registry files of this Group failed to reveal any information concerning [b1]

4. It is not known for what purpose the radio students are being trained. They could be trained as radio operators for internal Sfs use; however, the possibility that some are being trained for operations in West Germany should not be excluded.

5. Department of the Army Detachment and the [b1] have been furnished the above information, with deletion of source information, and queried for information available concerning radio training schools in the GDR, curriculum taught, and types of utilization of students after graduation. Request that the [b1] be queried similarly.

6. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

CONFIDENTIAL

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

[b6]

1st Lt, Armor
Adjutant

Telephone: St. Mil 8371

CIC CENTRAL FILE

AA09

CONFIDENTIAL

M/R: Above rept to G2 info concerning radio course at SFS POTSDAM/Eiche School and req that [b1] be queried for aval info. DAD & [b1] also given above info and queried for aval info. Coordinated with Mr. [b6] CE Div.

661 A

CONFIDENTIAL

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☒

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

6602-670

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CENTER
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154 US ARMY

D-567242/d

20 January 1956

SUBJECT: EGIS - SFS Bezirk BERLIN
Re: Modus Operandi (u)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, United States Army
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch, G2CICE

1. (CONFIDENTIAL) Reference is made to Intelligence Collection Memorandum CI-CE-1-55, subject: SFS (State Secretariat for State Security) (GDR/ East German Intelligence), dated 18 February 1955.

2. (CONFIDENTIAL) Forwarded herewith in triplicate are the following:

a. Region VIII, 66th CIC Group, Summary of Information, subject: EGIS - SFS Bezirk BERLIN, Re: Modus Operandi (Informant Recruiting), file D-567242/d, dated 20 December 1955.

b. Region VIII, 66th CIC Group, Summary of Information, subject: EGIS - SFS Bezirk BERLIN Re: SEI and Targets, file D-567242/c, dated 20 December 1955.

c. Region VIII, 66th CIC Group, Summary of Information, subject: EGIS - SFS Bezirk BERLIN Re: Personalities (Operational Agents), file D-567242/f, dated 20 December 1955.

3. (CONFIDENTIAL) Source of the attached reports is the same source referred to in message F-27680, this Group, dated 18 January 1956, concerning the attempted assassination of [b6]

4. (CONFIDENTIAL) Examination of Central Registry files of this Group revealed the following: 0671

a. (Fnu) [b6] born about [b6] 5'7" tall, medium build, black wavy hair, speaks with a pronounced Thuringian accent, was reported to be a SFS Agent operating in BERLIN/Prenzlauerberg in April 1954.

(C-3)

b. (Fnu) [b6] not identifiable.

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

D-567242/d

SUBJECT: EGIS - SFS Bezirk BERLIN (a)

Re: Modus Operandi (C)

5. (CONF) (Fnu) [b1] is a cover name used by a carded source of this Group who is employed in the Marienfelde Refugee Camp, BERLIN/Marienfelde, as a refugee screener.

6. (CONFIDENTIAL) Request that information contained in the attached reports [b1]

[b1] No other distribution of the attached reports has been made by this Group.

7. (UNCLASSIFIED) Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

3 Incls

SGT's dtd 20 Dec 55 (trip)

Telephone: Stgt Mil 8371

[b6]

og

[b6]

1st Lt, Armor
Adjutant

R/R: Source defected to West BERLIN in [b1] 1954, returned to East Germany on [b6] 1955 and was returned to West BERLIN on [b6] [b6] 1955 by SFS BERLIN, with mission of identifying a (Fnu) [b1] Source reported same to Rgn VIII, [b6]

[b6]

[b6]

which he allegedly received from SFS to mail to [b6]

[b1]

Above informs G2. Coordinated with Capt [b6] Tech Spec Div.

0672

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP

UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154
US ARMY

D-567253/d

19 January 1956

SUBJECT: SFS Bezirk POTSDAM
Re: Modus Operandi (OT) (U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, United States Army
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch, G2CICE

1. (U) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ References:

- a. Message, F-21820, this Group, dated 26 November 1955.
- b. Message, F-21985, this Group, dated 29 November 1955.
- c. Letter, this Group, subject: SFS Headquarters BERLIN and SFS Bezirk POTSDAM, Re: Modus Operandi, file D-567241/d; D-567253/d, dated 11 January 1956.
- d. Two letters, this Group, subject: SFS Bezirk POTSDAM, Re: Modus Operandi, file D-567253/d, dated 12 January 1956.

2. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Forwarded herewith in triplicate is a Region VIII, 66th CIC Group, Summary of Information and inclosure thereto, subject: SFS Bezirk POTSDAM, Re: Modus Operandi (Penetration Attempt Plans), file D-567253/d, dated 4 January 1956.

3. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Source "A" is identified as [b1] who received the information from an unidentified sub-source. Agency "A" is identified as the [b1]

4. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Examination of Central Registry files of this Group revealed the following information concerning personalities mentioned in the attached report:

0673

a. [b1] resided at BERLIN-Wilmersdorf in August 1953, has been reported as an employee of the KGU. (F-3)

b. [b1] born [b1] in [b1] resided at [b1] was waybilled to FRANKFURT/Main from BERLIN on 3 September 1952 by Region VIII, upon the request of a coded source of this Group.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1-567253/d

SUBJECT: SIS Bezirk BATSCHAM
Re: Modus Operandi (S) (U)

c. Rudrecht [b1] born [b1] in [b1]
[b1] resided at [b1]
[b1] in April 1951. [b1] has an amputation of the left forearm. He was waybilled to FRANKFURT/Main from BERLIN on 8 September 1952, by Region VIII, upon the request of the same carded source of this Group who requested the waybill flight for [b1] above. Newspaper reports for the period 27 September 1955 to 21 October 1955 indicate that [b1] fled to East BERLIN with his wife, and that he worked for the GSD (GSS) while he was employed by the KGU. (S-3)

d. No information positively identifying the other personalities mentioned in Enclosure I to the attached report.

5. (S) [b1]
[b1]

6. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (U) In view of the fact that Department of the Army Detachment is conducting an investigation on elements of this case, request that information contained in the attached report not be released to other allied intelligence agencies. No other distribution of the attached reports has been made by this Group.

7. (UNCLASSIFIED) Regarding data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

1 Incl

GVI dtd 4 Jan 56 w/incl (trip)

Telephone: Stgt M11 8371

[b6] bg

0674

M/R:

[b1]

b1

[b6]

1st Lt, Armor
Adjutant

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ADM ASST

b6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

TEAM C
OPNS OFF

TE
8 Jan 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567245/d

b6 awt

SUBJECT

ECIS - MFS Basirk Dresden
Re: Modus Operandi
(Operational Liaison)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES. 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Through liaison with MFS Basirk Dresden, a Soviet intelligence officer in DRESDEN (VS1255), Fnu b6 (cover name), obtained a passport photo of an individual being groomed as a Soviet "resident" (resident source handler) in DRESDEN. The photograph had been taken sometime in 1953, and has never previously been used. During December 1955, this photo was affixed to a cover document for the Soviet source.

2. Department II/4 (intelligence and counter intelligence, German) received information from Czech Intelligence in either October or November 1955 indicating that a Fnu b6 owner of the hotel "Gasthof zum Schustsenhaus" located in LAUNSTEIN (GDR) (VS1726) near the CSR border, is under suspicion. CIS reported that b6 used his hotel as a safe house for intelligence agents entering or leaving the CSR. Department II/4 of the MFS opened investigation of b6 in November 1955.

Source "A"

(C-3)

3. Files of Region VIII have no information on specific liaison matters comparable to the above.

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ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDR USN/USMC F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

0675

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 18 Jan 56
PREPARING OFFICE 66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team.	OPNS OFF	b6 / AWT
SUBJECT EGIS - MfS Bezirk Dresden Re: Modus Operandi (Doubling suspected safe house owner)	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A USUALLY RELIABLE B FAIRLY RELIABLE C NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D UNRELIABLE E RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F OF INFORMATION: CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . 1 PROBABLY TRUE 2 POSSIBLY TRUE 3 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 IMPROBABLE 5 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>1. Lieutenant [b6] M, Department II/4 (intelligence and counter intelligence, German agencies) of MfS Bezirk Dresden, began planning the recruitment of a Frau [b6], owner of "Gasthof zum Schuetzenhaus" (hotel) in LAUENSTEIN (V31726) near the CSR border of the GDR. [b6] is suspected by MfS of providing a safe house for transfer of intelligence agents in and out of the CSR. During December 1955, [b6] dispatched a subordinate MfS agent, Frau [b6] male, to take a qualified Czech-speaking source of MfS Dresden to reconnoiter the border area.</p> <p>2. [b6]'s plan consisted of sending the source to [b6] to request overnight lodging as an ostensible refugee fleeing from the CSR. The source would be instructed to arrive on foot, and to have a cover story of fleeing from either the uranium mining area of JACHIMOV (UR5882) or the aircraft factory in PRAGUE (VR6047). Either story was considered of ample intelligence interest to evoke the aid of [b6]. Source was also to be provided with bean coffee to use in payment of his lodging in [b6] hotel. Source was to be instructed to ingratiate himself with [b6] in order to obtain the maximum information about [b6] activity in connection with aiding people to cross the border. [b6] was then to be apprehended and threatened with a long prison sentence for failing to aid MfS by serving as an informant. [b6] was to be confronted with the source and his story as proof of his treachery and duplicity as a means of forcing him to agree to work for MfS.</p> <p>Source "A" [b6] (C-3)</p> <p>3. The files of Region VIII, 66th CIC Group, APO 742, contain the following information concerning personalities mentioned in this report: SOI, Subject: Sf District Dresden, file D-329162, VIII-16540.4, dated 14 September 1955, lists [b6] born [b6], as a lieutenant in Department II, section 4, as an operative agent, evaluation F-6. [b6] is listed in SOI, Subject: EGIS-SfS Bezirk Dresden, file D-567245/1, as a member of Department II in Dresden, evaluation C-3. Both of these reports refer to the same [b6] mentioned in this report. para. 1.</p>		
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ADM A
TEAM Chief
OPNS OFF
DATE
Jan 56

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567245/b

TEV/awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS Bezirk Dresden
Re: Administration
(Budgetary and Finance)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. During November and December 1955, agent personnel of MfS Bezirk Dresden complained about the lack of confidential funds for use of sources and informants. The complaint centered on the impractical purchase of quantities of unnecessary materials by higher headquarters in order to spend the balance of appropriated funds to avoid turning them back into general funds, without consideration of operational needs.

Source "A"

(C-3)

2. No information pertaining to finances being depleted at the end of the fiscal year for MfS is available in Region VIII files.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
17 January 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

REGION III 66TH CIC GROUP

D-567246/d

SUBJECT

East German Intelligence - Sfs -
Bezirk ERFURT
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

On 5 January 1956, SOURCE was interrogated at Field Office Giessen and gave the following information concerning Sfs APOLDA PB7756, Bezirk ERFURT, Modus Operandi:

1. Operational Authority and Directives:

a. The legal competence of the Sfs to recruit individuals to work for them is based on a statement which is dictated to the prospective worker shortly after he is approached. This statement is as follows: "I (real name of person being recruited), born (actual date of birth) pledge myself to cooperate with an officer of the Sfs in the protection of the DDR and I will carry out all missions given me to the best of my ability. It is known to me that I must remain silent about all my activities and if I do not do so I make myself liable to eight years imprisonment in a penitentiary."

b. All persons that are recruited as SOURCES sign the pledge above with a cover name selected by themselves or given to them by the Sfs.

2. Selection Standards:

SOURCE was selected because he had relatives in the West and had carried on correspondence with other individuals in the West. SOURCE is of the strong opinion that his mail had been intercepted, and by this, the Sfs knew that he had friends in the West.

3. Recruiting:

SOURCE had moved from West Germany to East Germany in 1953. He found employment in the East but was dissatisfied. The approach was not made by the Sfs but rather by a member of the East German Criminal Police. After the criminal police had questioned SOURCE, they introduced him to an Sfs agent who accused him of economic sabotage. The Sfs then stated that they knew SOURCE had been visited by his wife from West Germany. They promised to assist him in getting his wife to East Germany if he would work for them. After SOURCE agreed to work for the Sfs, he signed a pledge of silence.

4. Training:

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Before SOURCE was dispatched to the West he was given a trial mission of reporting the activities of his fellow workers.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

17 January 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

REGION III 66TH CIC GROUP

D-567246/d

SUBJECT

East German Intelligence - Sfs -
Bezirk ERFURT
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

5. Contacting of Informants:

SOURCE was at first contacted by a member of the criminal police who relayed reports and instructions from the Sfs agent. As time went on and SOURCE was given a more important mission, he was contacted by the Sfs agent in person. At first they met at an outdoor meeting place, on a bridge, and later they went to a cover house.

6. Payment:

SOURCE was entertained on two occasions by the Sfs agent at a cover house. He was merely given drinks and cigarettes. In order to perform his mission in West Germany he was given 50 East DM and 50 West DM. This was just enough to pay for expenses and little or nothing was earned by SOURCE. SOURCE was payed in cash by the agent prior to his departure to the West. This payment was receipted for.

7. Interrogations and Meetings:

a. On or about 1 November 1955 SOURCE was interrogated at the VdgB building by a member of the KRIPO (Criminal Police) of Kreis APOLDA. First SOURCE was asked about a fire which he knew nothing about, then SOURCE was questioned about his family affairs. The meeting lasted about one half hour and SOURCE was told he would be contacted again.

b. About 15 November 1955, SOURCE was summoned to the Kripo building. He was greeted by his first interrogator and then taken to a dwelling house, just north and next to the building. Here (fnu) b6 introduced himself to SOURCE and then the Kripo man left. Here SOURCE was questioned about his job, comrades, activities of co-workers. His meeting was concluded by SOURCE signing a statement that he would work for the Sfs. The meeting lasted three and one half hours. Here SOURCE was told to report to the GOETTERBUCKE on or about 22 November 1955 with a list of his relatives, and the finance figures for the company he worked for.

c. On 22 November 1955 he met the Kripo man at the bridge, and gave him a list of his relatives residing in West Germany but was unable to give the financial statement. The meeting lasted five minutes and SOURCE was told to report back to the bridge on or about 29 November 1955.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

17 January 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

REGION III 66TH CIC GROUP

D-567246/d

SUBJECT

East German Intelligence - Sfs -
Bezirk ERFURT
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

d. On 29 November 1955 at about 1900 hours SOURCE was met by Sfs man accompanied by the Kripo man. The meeting lasted ten (10) minutes and SOURCE was instructed to be at the bridge on or about 6 December 1955 at 1900 hours with a list of his former Army comrades.

e. On or about 6 December 1955 SOURCE was met by the Sfs man and was taken to a house located on Compter Strasse 2. SOURCE gave the Sfs man a list of his former comrades. Sfs agent seemed familiar with the names so SOURCE became of the opinion that his mail had been intercepted. SOURCE was instructed to write friends in the West and obtain lodging from them under the pretext that he was coming to KASSEL to visit his divorced wife. The Sfs man wanted carbon copies of any letters written. Arrangements were made to meet on or about 13 December 1955 at 1900 hours at the house on Compter Strasse. Subsequent to the 6 December meeting, SOURCE had been visited by his wife and children. At this time SOURCE told her about the Sfs and danger he was in. They also agreed to re-marry and go to West Germany at the first opportunity.

f. On or about 13 December 1955 SOURCE reported to the house at Compter Strasse and gave the Sfs agent a copy of letters he had written to b6. In the letter SOURCE had asked for lodging. SOURCE was instructed to question his wife about what people in KASSEL thought about re-armament, re-unification and other important issues. SOURCE was then instructed to apply for an interzonal pass for the Christmas holidays. The meeting lasted fifteen (15) minutes and SOURCE was instructed to report back to the house on Compter Strasse on or about 22 December 1955 to receive his instructions for his mission to West Germany. A few days subsequent to this meeting SOURCE's wife left for KASSEL.

g. On 22 December 1955 SOURCE had his last meeting with the Sfs agent. SOURCE related his wife's observations in KASSEL and also the answer he received from b6 invited SOURCE to spend Christmas with him. Agent was pleased with the answer and then gave SOURCE his mission. SOURCE read the mission, committed it to memory, and then signed it. SOURCE was paid and then told to have the VOPO call the nearest Sfs agent if he were given trouble in crossing the border.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
17 January 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region XI, 66th CIC Group, APO 800, US Army

SUBJECT

East German Intelligence - SFS -
Bezirk Gera
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

09 1. On 20 November 1955, Source "A" was summoned to the Police Station in STADTRODA PB 9237, Germany, where he was interviewed by a man who introduced himself as Herr (fnu) b6 (born about 1924, location unknown), of the SFS (Staatssekretariat fuer Staatssicherheits - State Secretariat for State Security). Herr KOLMANN asked Source "A" if he could give any information concerning the American troops and installations in West Germany. Source "A" stated he knew nothing about troops and installations and was released. (F-6)

2. On 4 December 1955, Source "A" was again summoned to the Stadtroda Police Station where he was interviewed by Herr b6 showed Source "A" a map of the KAISERSLAUTERN MV 1178 area and asked Source "A" if he was familiar with this area. Source "A" stated he was familiar with the area since he had lived for several years in LANDAU MV 3650. b6 told Source "A" he wanted him to go to the KAISERSLAUTERN area and obtain employment as a janitor in the American School in the Military Installation in KAISERSLAUTERN. Source "A" did not know to which school b6 was referring to, but believed it to be the American's Grammar School within the installation. b6 told Source "A" that around the corner from the school, American soldiers practiced with the atomic cannon, and Source "A" could observe the operations and personnel who worked with the cannon. b6 told Source "A" that he, b6 often visited KAISERSLAUTERN, and Source "A" could pass on the information to him. Source "A" was told that if he could not obtain employment in the KAISERSLAUTERN area he could be given assignments elsewhere in the district around KAISERSLAUTERN. Source "A" was warned if he did not comply with the wishes of the SFS, pressure could be placed on him which he would not welcome. Source "A" refused, stating he could not perform such a mission. He was released and told to think about the offer. (F-6)

3. On 21 December 1955, Source "A" was arrested by the People's Police after he refused for the second time to work for the SFS in the KAISERSLAUTERN area, and deported into West Germany. (F-6)
SOURCE "A"

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1-Region XI File

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HEADQUARTERS REGION VIII
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 742 US ARMY

CCL

567241/1

D-567241/d

16 January 1956

SUBJECT: EGIS - MfS Headquarters, Re: Modus Operandi
(Sabotage Maneuver)

Ft. Holabund

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: CE Division

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BY CDR USARV LAM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

1. FORWARDED: SOI dated 12 January 1956, subject and file as above.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Sources: Sub-source B is unidentified driver of MfS; Source A, P-287-VIII.

b. Sub-Source B is evaluated F; Source A, B.

c. How information was obtained by Source: Source A learned information from Sub-source B when latter was assigned him as a driver.

d. Date Source obtained information: 10-11 December 1955.

e. Date agent received information: 3 January 1956.

f. Status of case: Coverage of MfS continues.

3. REMARKS: 0682

a. Sub-source was not identified, being assigned as driver (para 2 c above) on only this one occasion.

b. Due to the circumstances of Source receiving information he was unable to obtain further identifying information without potential compromise.

Incl

SOI dtd 12 Jan 56 (1)

b6

Lt Col, Inf
Commanding

Berlin 42323

b6

/at/S-3

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HEADQUARTERS REGION VIII
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 748 [REDACTED] US ARMY
CICC

D-567242/o/d

13 January 1956

SUBJECT: EGIS - MfS Bezirk BERLIN, Re: Modus Operandi,
ERI and Targets

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: CE Division

1. FORWARDED: SOI's dated 10 January 1956, subject and
file as above.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source: V-415-VIII.

b. Evaluation of Source: B.

c. Date Source obtained information: 20 December 1955.

d. Date agent received information: 22 December 1955.

e. Other data affecting accuracy of information:
Attention is invited to the fact that the operational liaison
between the MfS and Soviets as herein reported is confirmed by
previous reports.

f. Status of case: Coverage continues.

3. REMARKS:

a. Evaluation of Source was changed by TWI F-26164
from C to B.

b. Identifying data regarding Fnu [b6] and the fact
that she is the subject of an MfS investigation has been [b6]

[b6]

0683

2 Incl
SOI's dtd 10 Jan 56 (1)

[b6]

Lt Col, Inf
Commanding

Berlin 42323/ [b6] /at/S-3

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team.

D-567242/4

10 Jan 56

b6

/awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS Bezirk BERLIN
Re: Modus Operandi (Operational
Liaison with Soviets)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. From 20 December 1955 to 27 December 1955, the MfS maintained a surveillance on a German national. This surveillance was carried out on behalf of the Soviets in the Soviet Sector of BERLIN. (B-3)

2. Reference material in the Regional Registry revealed numerous references to Soviet-MfS operational liaison. However, there is no recent record of the MfS conducting a surveillance for the Soviets.

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HEADQUARTERS REGION VIII
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 742 ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ US ARMY
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

CICL
367242

D-567242/a/PC

13 January 1956

SUBJECT: EGIS - MfS Bezirk BERLIN, Re: EEI and Targets,
Modus Operandi

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: CE Division

1. REFERENCE: TWX, I-9603, this Region.
2. FORWARDED: SOI's dated 9 January 1956, subject and file as above.
3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:
 - a. Source: V-424-VIII.
 - b. Evaluation of Source: F.
 - c. Date Source obtained information: 15 December 1955.
 - d. Date agent received information: 15 December 1955.
 - e. Other data affecting accuracy of information: The personality herein reported as an MfS target was identified by agents of this Region through the photograph attached as Exhibit III.
 - f. Status of case: Coverage continues.

4. REMARKS: 0685

a. Investigation of [b6] has been referred to CE Internal. Although the tone of the letter allegedly intended for [b6] suggests that he is working for the MfS in an informant capacity, there is no conclusive proof that this is true. It is likely that this mission was a test mission for the MfS courier and the contents of the letter have no actual bearing upon the contact which [b6] has had with the MfS.

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D-567242/c/d

13 Jan 56

SUBJECT: EGIS - MfS Bezirk BERLIN, Re: EEI and Targets
Modus Operandi

b. The contents of the letter and the identification of the person in the photograph (see Exhibits) are unknown to V-424-VIII.

c. The letter which was intended for delivery by the MfS through the MfS informant was opened and photographed by CIS, BERLIN.

d. Source could not elaborate further on the impression intended to be made on the recipient of the letter by mention of "hispartner".

2 Incl

SOI's dtd 9 Jan 56 (1)
w/Exhs I-III (2)

b6

Lt Col, Inf
Commanding

Berlin 42323/

b6

/at/S-3

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
9 Jan 56

PREPARING OFFICE

6th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567242/d

b6

/awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS Bezirk BERLIN
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES. 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

(Communications - Source Contacting)

1. On 15 December 1955, an MfS informant residing in West BERLIN was given the mission of delivering the letter attached as Exhibit " " to the personality whose photograph is attached as Exhibit " ". The letter was contained in a sealed envelope bearing no writing upon it. The MfS informant was given no further information for identifying the person to whom he was to deliver the letter besides the photograph. Contact between the MfS informant delivering the letter and the intended letter recipient was scheduled for 1500 hours on 15 December 1955, at the corner of Clayallee and Berlinerstrasse, BERLIN-Zehlendorf (US Sector). The corner is a busy intersection during daylight and early evening hours and the MfS informant was instructed by his handling agents to carry out the mission with maximum discretion.

2. If contact between the MfS informant and the intended letter recipient took place, the MfS informant was instructed to approach the person and to ask him if he were waiting for someone. The MfS informant's handling agents emphatically stated that the informant should not identify himself in any way, especially by cover name. If the intended letter recipient did not respond, the MfS informant was instructed to inform the person that "his partner" (i.e., the letter recipient's "partner") was ill and could not attend the meeting but that he (the MfS informant) was taking over the contact. As soon as the letter recipient displayed an understanding of the situation, the MfS informant would give the letter to him and ask him if he had anything to give to the MfS informant. If the letter recipient had material, the MfS informant would take the material and submit it to his MfS handling agents.

3. The MfS handling agent was instructed by his handling agents to wait ten (10) minutes for the intended letter recipient and if contact was not established to return the letter and photograph to his MfS handling agents. Contact between the MfS informant and the intended letter recipient did not take place and the photograph and letter were returned to the MfS handling agents by the MfS informant.

(F-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

9 Jan 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team D-5672427c

b6

/awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS Bezirk BERLIN
Re: EEI and Targets

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. The MfS attempted to contact [b6] born [b6] [b6] presently residing at BERLIN-Schoeneberg (US Sector), [b6] an employee of the Special Services Branch, BERLIN Command, US Army, APO 742, as a tour guide and theater cashier. The attempted contact of [b6] was through a courier on 15 December 1955. The courier was given the letter attached as Exhibit " " (translation, Exhibit " ") to deliver to [b6] and a photograph of [b6] which is attached as Exhibit " ". The courier was given no further identifying data to identify [b6] but was given a date and time for the meeting. The courier was unable to contact [b6] at the time and on the date specified by the MfS and returned the letter and photograph to the MfS. (F-6)

2. The Regional Registry revealed the following:

a. Reference is made to an AR, dated 16 November 1954, Subject: [b6] file: VIII-23338, wherein it is reported that [b6] was approached by the MfS on [b6] 1954 and an attempt was made to recruit him for the MfS. [b6] did not respond to the approach attempt according to his statements which are included in the referenced agent report. Evaluation F-6.

b. Reference is made to a letter from the Region VIII Public Safety Liaison Officer, dated 17 January 1955, Subject: [b6] file: VIII-23338, wherein it is reported that the MfS made attempts to arrange a meeting between [b6] and the MfS on 10 and 11 December 1954 and 8 January 1955. Unevaluated.

c. The Regional Registry revealed no further information.

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Werter Herr Kl. I

Fotos erhalten - Bilder leider etwas unscharf.
Bei Personenaufnahmen auf Einstellung der Entfernung
achten, nicht nur Profifotos -
Verrechnung wie immer unter A.L.D.

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Exhibit No. "I"

File: VIII-

D-567242/c/d

Subject: EGIS - Mrs Bezirk BERLIN 0689

Date: 9 January 1955

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BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

Herr K11

b6

Photos received - Pictures unfortunately somewhat unclear - With pictures
of people pay particular attention to distance, not only to profiles.
Charging (of costs) as always under A.L.D.

Exhibit No. "1"

Subject: EGIS -- MFS Bezirk-BERLIN 0090

10-201042/c/d

Date: 9 January 1950

b6

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDR USN CM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

0691

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 403, US ARMY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

D-567253/d

12 January 1956

SUBJ: CT: SFS Bezirk POTSDAM
Re: Modus Operandi (u)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, US Army
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch, G2CICB

(u)

1. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ References:

- a. Message, F-21820, this Group, dated 26 November 1955.
- b. Message, F-21985, this Group, dated 29 November 1955.
- c. Letter, this Group, subject: SFS Headquarters WELIN and SFS Bezirk POTSDAM, Re: Modus Operandi, file D-567241/d; L-567253/d, dated 11 January 1955.
- d. Letter, this Group, subject: SFS Bezirk POTSDAM, Re: Modus Operandi, file L-567253/d, dated 12 January 1955.

(u)

2. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ Forwarded herewith in triplicate are the following Region VIII, 66th CIC Group Summaries of Information:

- a. Summary of Information, subject: GIC-SFS Bezirk POTSDAM, Re: Modus Operandi (West Berlin resident arrested in East Berlin), file as above, dated 19 December 1955, with inclosures thereto.
- b. Summary of Information, subject: SFS Bezirk POTSDAM, Re: Modus Operandi (Informant Obligation), file as above, dated 19 December 1955, with inclosure thereto.

3. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ Source "A" is b1

b1 who received the information from an unidentified sub-source.

0692

~~CONF~~ (u)
4. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ Examination of Central Registry files of this Group revealed the following information, in addition to that contained in the Region VIII file checks, concerning personalities mentioned in the attached reports:

a. b6 born b6 in b6 cur- b6

Copy 5 of 6 Copies

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
E-567253/d

SUBJECT: SFS Bezirk POTSDAM

Re: Modus Operandi (U)

rently residing in BERLIN, was the Second Chairman of the Vereinigung der Opfer des Stalinismus (VOS) (League for the Victims of Stalinism), with offices in BERLIN-Charlottenburg, Richard Wagnerstrasse 51, in May 1953. [b6] was the subject of an abduction attempt allegedly directed by the MGB in May 1953. (F-6)

b. Wilhelm KALWEIT, born 13 January 1898 in BERLIN, residing at BERLIN-Wedding (French Sector), Schererstrasse 8A, has been reported as leader of the VOS in BERLIN-Charlottenburg. (F-3)

c. [b6] born [b6] in [b6] divorced, resided at [b6] in January 1955. [b6] was subject of a Central Registry check requested by Detachment 5, 7228th Special Activities Squadron on 29 November 1954. A CPI card dated 5 January 1955 lists [b6] as being dropped without prejudice as an informant of an allied Intelligence agency. (C-6)

d. No information positively identifying the other personalities mentioned in the attached reports.

5. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Examination of Central Registry files of this Group revealed information confirming the POTSDAM telephone number 9921 as a number utilized by SFS District POTSDAM. [b1]

[b1]

6. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Additional reports concerning films of the SFS documents turned over to the West BERLIN Police will be forwarded as received by this Headquarters.

7. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ In view of the fact that Department of the Army Detachment is conducting an investigation on elements of this case, request that information contained in the attached reports [b1] [b1] No other distribution of the attached reports has been made by this Group.

8. (UNCLASSIFIED) Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

0693

2 Incl

SOIs dtd 19 Dec 55
w/incls (trip)

[b6]

1st Lt, Armor
Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt Mil 6371

[b6] ps

M/R: (OVER)

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐

Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☒

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

DELETED PAGE(S)
NO DUPLICATION FEE
FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

693A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154 US ARMY

D-567255/d

11 January 1956

FROM: SFS Bezirk POTSDAM
Re: Modus Operandi (S) (U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
United States Army
APO 403, US Army
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch, G2CIB

(U)

1. ~~(S) (U)~~ References:

- a. Message, I-21820, this Group, dated 26 November 1955.
- b. Message, I-21881, this Group, dated 29 November 1955.
- c. Letter, this Group, Subject: SFS Headquarters, I-21881 and SFS Bezirk POTSDAM, Re: Modus Operandi, file I-567241/d and I-567255/d, dated 11 January 1956.

(U)

2. ~~(S) (U)~~ Forwarded herewith in triplicate are the following Region VII, 66th CIG Group, Summaries of Information:

a. Summary of Information, subject: SFS-BF Bezirk POTSDAM, Re: Modus Operandi, file I-567255/d, dated 5 December 1955, with exhibits I through X. (Only one copy of Exhibit I is inclosed herewith.)

b. Summary of Information, subject: SFS Bezirk POTSDAM, Re: I and Targets, file I-567255/d, dated 5 December 1955.

Photostats of the above mentioned exhibits will be forwarded to your Headquarters upon receipt.

(U)

0694

3. ~~(S) (U)~~ Examination of Central Registry files of this Group revealed the following information concerning personalities mentioned in the attached reports:

- a. b6 [132211] [135100] approximately 25 to 30 years of age, resides at b6 [19 MC] has been reported to be an Oberleutnant with Department IX of SFS Bezirksverwaltung POTSDAM. b6 is approximately 5'7" tall, has a slender to medium build, dark hair and brown eyes. He is married to b6 born b6 who has been reported to be the secretary of Inspektur b6 of the SFS Bezirksverwaltung POTSDAM. b6 is a former member of the SFS Police. b6 has been reported to use (inu) b6 as an operational cover [B2211] [14 MC]

NAME.

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on
18 JUN 1998
by USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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CIC CENTRAL FILE
Rfr
R

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
1-567253/d

SUBJECT: SFS Bezirk POTSDAM

Re: Modus Operandi

(u)
b6

b. [b6] was reported in 1953 as a VF Hauptwachmeister in the homicide squad of the POTSDAM Criminal Police. A Captain (Fnu) [b6] is alleged to be the chief of Department II, SFS POTSDAM, as of 30 November 1953. (i-6)

c. (Fnu) [b6] has been reported as a member of Department II of the SFS Bezirksverwaltung, POTSDAM. (i-6)

d. [b6] (Fnu) [b6] or the cover name [b6], no record.

4. ~~(CONF)~~ ^(cont) The Source of the attached reports is identified as [b1] who obtained their information from an unidentified sub-source in the POTSDAM SFS office. This report is based upon information contained in photographic prints of material provided [b1] by their unidentified sub-source in the SFS POTSDAM office. Many of the prints of handwritten material are illegible, and others of the typewritten reports do not include the entire face of the report, leaving an illegible portion on one or both margins. In addition, the lower edges of some prints are illegible, apparently due to improper exposure in photographs, a poor lens in the camera, or a combination of these factors. The inclosed translations of this material are as complete and accurate as possible, considering the conditions noted above.

5. ~~(CONF)~~ ^(u) Your attention is invited to Inclosure VII, which contains sufficient detail to determine that [b6] has been under surveillance on both occasions when he was assigned to deliver a glass tube containing a message to a dead letter drop in West Berlin. On the first trip he apparently had been observed going to the dead letter drop and was lost in the vicinity thereof. On the other trip, it appears that he had been under observation going to and coming from the dead letter drop to ascertain if he detoured by way of some other agency. This, no doubt, had been one of the security checks of [b6] and a trial mission at the same time, indicating thorough checking by the handling agent.

6. ~~(CONF)~~ In view of the fact that the Department of the Army Detachment is conducting an investigation on elements of this case, request that information contained in the attached reports [b1]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
0695
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
-2-

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

Information has been withheld in its entirety in accordance with the following exemption(s):

It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

☐


Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☒

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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Page(s) 696



HEADQUARTERS

66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP

UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154 US ARMY

1-567241/d; 1-567253/d

14 January 1956

SUBJECT: SFC Headquarters B.P. 11 and SFS [REDACTED]
Re: Modus Operandi (S) (U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, United States Army
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch, (G2CIB)

1. (UNCLASSIFIED) References:

- a. Message, 1-21820, 66th CIC Group, dated 26 November 1955.
- b. Message, 1-21985, 66th CIC Group, dated 29 November 1955.

2. ~~CONF~~ Forwarded herewith in triplicate are the following reports obtained from [REDACTED] Praesidium by Region VIII, 66th CIC Group. The [REDACTED] received the information from one of their sources, through one or more cutouts, during November 1955.

a. Summary of information 66th CIC Group, subject: SIS-SFS-Headquarters and Bezirk B. T. D. A., Re: Modus Operandi (Turn-over of Soviet Source to SFS Penetration of a US-sponsored organization, Operational Control by SFS Headquarters), dated 20 November 1955.

b. Photostat of letter addressed to SFS Headquarters, dated 23 February 1955.

c. Photostat of letter addressed to SFS Headquarters, dated 1 November 1955.

Reports and photostats concerning other SFS files mentioned in Summary of Information referred to above will be forwarded upon receipt at this headquarters.

3. ~~CONF~~ (U) 0697 Also forwarded herewith in triplicate are the following reports which were extracted from Central Registry files of this headquarters:

a. Three Headquarters, 66th CIC Group Summaries of Information, subject: [REDACTED] dated 20 December 1955.

[REDACTED] with CIC Group Summary of Information, subject: [REDACTED] dated 20 December 1955.

Copy 3 of 6 Copies ABT

CIC CENTRAL FILE

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT
DELETED PAGE (S) INFORMATION SHEET

Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.

☐

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☐

Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

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Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

☒

Information originated with one or more government agencies. We are coordinating to determine the releasability of information under their purview. Upon completion of our coordination, we will advise you of their decision.

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FOR THIS PAGE

Page(s)

698-699

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
10 January 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

REGION III 66TH CIC GROUP

D-567020/d

SUBJECT

Soviet Intelligence - Kreis CHEMNITZ
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

From 4 November 1955 to 10 November 1955, SOURCE was interrogated at Field Office Glessen and gave the following information concerning Soviet Intelligence, Kreis CHEMNITZ, Modus Operandi:

a. Operational Authority and Directives:

SOURCE stated that the Soviet Intelligence has its own laws and courts. It never interferes with German courts and never makes arrests. If a person is to be arrested the arrest is made by the German Criminal Police acting for the Soviet Intelligence.

b. Informants:

According to SOURCE the Soviet Intelligence has no informants as such. The State Secretariate for State Security (SfS) is often directed by the Soviet Intelligence to make an investigation by use of informants and the result of the investigation is then turned over to the Soviets. The Soviet Intelligence prefers to operate in such a manner that they remain in the background and do not come to the attention of the public.

c. Interrogations:

SOURCE claimed to have assisted in three hundred (300) interrogations during the period he was employed as an interpreter. All interrogations took place at the Soviet Intelligence and SfS prison in CHEMNITZ.

d. Techniques (Preliminary interrogation)

Prisoner is brought to the jail and locked in a solitary confinement cell. Then the interpreter questions him concerning his personal history. This usually takes one-half hour. The prisoner is also told to write his last will and testament which is then stamped with a German stamp in order that it will stand up in court. During this preliminary interrogation the Russian interrogator is seldom present. The prisoner is kept in solitary confinement for a period of three to four weeks before he is interrogated in detail. He is permitted no visitors and receives no mail. During this period he is not permitted to sit down from 0600 hours to 2200 hours. The furniture of the cell is very elementary, consisting of a latrine bucket and a hard bed. When he is permitted to lie down he is required to lay on his back with his hands outside the blanket. The prisoner is under observation at all times and during the day he is forced to pace up and down in his

0700

(Cont'd)

1 - CIC Central

1 - Region III

WD AGO FORM 568
1 JUN 47

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 18 JUNE 1998
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
10 January 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

REGION III 66TH CIC GROUP

D-567020/d

SUBJECT

Soviet Intelligence - Kreis CHEMNITZ
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

cell. The purpose of this treatment, according to SOURCE, is to soften up the prisoner in order that the detailed interrogation will be easy. At the end of four weeks the prisoner is usually so physically tired that he has very little will left to oppose his interrogators.

e. Interrogators:

All interrogators are Russian, however, they are assisted by a German interpreter. The German is allowed much freedom in conducting an interrogation and the Russian seldom questions the prisoner directly.

Use of coercion: The interrogator implies by speech and gesture that, if the prisoner does not cooperate, force and violence will be used against him. When a prisoner proves to be difficult, then extreme physical measures are taken.

Use of inducements, promises, rewards: During the first part of the interrogation a prisoner is promised freedom if he agrees to the demands of the interrogator. During some interrogations, the prisoner is told that a close relative of his has died. The interrogator expresses sympathy for the prisoner and promises that he can make arrangements for him to attend the funeral if he cooperates.

Time periods utilized for interrogations: Prisoner is usually confined in solitary confinement for a period of four to six weeks prior to the detailed interrogation. Detailed interrogation is usually carried on from 2200 hours to 0600 hours. Interrogation ceases only when prisoner confesses to a crime, fancied or real.

Facilities utilized: In CHEMNITZ all interrogations took place at the Soviet Intelligence and Sfs jail at Hohestrasse.

Use of Interpreters: Interpreters are used by Soviet Intelligence. To illustrate this, the case of SOURCE is used as an example. SOURCE during his youth had resided in a neighborhood in CHEMNITZ where lived many Russian emigres. By his close contact with these people he learned the Russian language. After World War II, when the Russians moved into CHEMNITZ, a Russian major was quartered in his home. SOURCE and the major became quite friendly and the major offered him a job as interpreter with the Russian Kommandantura. In 1948, SOURCE was turned over to the Soviet Intelligence in CHEMNITZ where he became the chief interpreter and translator. SOURCE, according to himself, became well liked by the Russians and was given many privileges. In order that his activities for the

(Cont'd)

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1 JUN 47

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 10 January 1956																
PREPARING OFFICE REGION III 66TH CIC GROUP <div style="text-align: right;">D-567020/d</div>																		
SUBJECT Soviet Intelligence - Kreis CHEMNITZ Re: Modus Operandi	<table style="width: 100%; font-size: small;"> <tr> <th colspan="2" style="text-align: left;">CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION</th> </tr> <tr> <td style="width: 60%;">OF SOURCE:</td> <td>OF INFORMATION:</td> </tr> <tr> <td>COMPLETELY RELIABLE</td> <td>CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>USUALLY RELIABLE</td> <td>PROBABLY TRUE 2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>FAIRLY RELIABLE</td> <td>POSSIBLY TRUE 3</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NOT USUALLY RELIABLE</td> <td>DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>UNRELIABLE</td> <td>IMPROBABLE 5</td> </tr> <tr> <td>RELIABILITY UNKNOWN</td> <td>TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6</td> </tr> </table>		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION		OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:	COMPLETELY RELIABLE	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1	USUALLY RELIABLE	PROBABLY TRUE 2	FAIRLY RELIABLE	POSSIBLY TRUE 3	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4	UNRELIABLE	IMPROBABLE 5	RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6
CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION																		
OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:																	
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1																	
USUALLY RELIABLE	PROBABLY TRUE 2																	
FAIRLY RELIABLE	POSSIBLY TRUE 3																	
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4																	
UNRELIABLE	IMPROBABLE 5																	
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6																	
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION <p>Soviets would not become public knowledge, he was provided with an ARBEITSEUCH (Worker's Book) and was instructed to tell his friends that he was employed in a large factory. He was cautioned to keep his acquaintances to a minimum and avoid any discussion of his work.</p> <p style="margin-left: 40px;">f. <u>Transportation:</u></p> <p style="margin-left: 80px;">(1) Air: Russian Army airplanes are used.</p> <p style="margin-left: 80px;">(2) Water: When watercraft are needed by the Soviet Intelligence for operational use, they are obtained from the Sfs. The Sfs provides the crews.</p> <p style="margin-left: 80px;">(3) Road: The following motor cars are used by the Soviet Intelligence in CHEMNITZ:</p> <div style="margin-left: 120px;"> <p>(a) Russian ZIS, year 1951, black sedan with much chrome, License No. SR 150-26.</p> <p>(b) German BMW, year 1950, two-tone blue sedan, License No. SR 150-27.</p> <p>(c) Five gray passenger cars of German manufacture with license numbers as follows: 150-29, 151-00, 151-80, 151-81, and 151-82. All license plates have the prefix SR.</p> <p>(d) Two prison vans with license numbers SR 151-83 and SR 151-84.</p> </div> <p style="margin-left: 80px;">(4) Rail: Trains are used when there is no necessity for speed or punctuality.</p> <p>COMMENT: Reference is made to Summaries of Information, dated 10 January 1956, subject: East German Intelligence - Sfs - Bezirk CHEMNITZ, D-567243.</p>																		
<div style="text-align: right; margin-top: 20px;"> REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON JUN 18 1998 BY CDR UBAINSCOM F01/PO AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R </div> <div style="text-align: center; margin-top: 10px; font-size: 24px;">0702</div>																		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
10 January 1956

PREPARING OFFICE

REGION III 66TH CIC GROUP

D-567020/b

SUBJECT

Soviet Intelligence - Kreis CHEMNITZ
Re: Administration

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

From 4 November 1955 to 10 November 1955, SOURCE was interrogated at Field Office Giessen, and gave the following information concerning Soviet Intelligence, Kreis CHEMNITZ, Administration:

1. Communication:

a. Courier (officer) is used between Headquarters of the Soviet Intelligence in KARLSHORST VU0016, Germany, and the fourteen (14) bezirks. In most cases, the courier drives an automobile.

b. Teletype: Each bezirk Headquarters has teletype machines with which it can communicate with KARLSHORST. The connection from CHEMNITZ US5436, Germany, to KARLSHORST is not direct as the message must be relayed through DRESDEN VS1257, COTTBUS VT5434 and BRANDENBURG UU3310, Germany. All messages over this system are in code, which is changed every three (3) days. The machines are manufactured by the SIEMENS SCHUCKERT Firm and the key board has Russian figures.

c. Telephone: Seldom used in operations because of security.

d. Mail: Use is made of the Russian Army Field Post for all communications to and from Russia. The East German Postal system is not used.

2. Uniform and Insignia:

Officers and senior non-commissioned officers wear the standard Russian Army uniform. The cap differs from the Army cap in that the band around the outside is green. Ranks of Soviet Intelligence personnel are the same as Army ranks.

COMMENT: Reference is made to Summaries of Information, dated 10 January 1956, subject: East German Intelligence - SFS - Bezirk CHEMNITZ, File D-567243.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

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0700

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1 - CIC Central

1 - Region III

WD AGO FORM 568
1 JUN 47

**HEADQUARTERS REGION VIII
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 742**

CICC
367253/A

D-567253/d

9 January 1956

**SUBJECT: EGIS - MfS Bezirk Potsdam, Re: Modus Operandi
(Penetration Attempt Plans)**

Ft. Holabrd

**TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: CE Division**

1. REFERENCE: TWX, I-9408.
2. FORWARDED: SOI dated 4 January 1956, subject and file as above.
3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Sources: Source "A" is

b1

b1

b. Evaluation of Sources: Source "A" and Agency "A", B; Sub-source, F.

c. How information was obtained by Source: Personal contact.

d. Date Source obtained information: Source "A", during

b1

Agency "A",

b1

e. Date agent received information: From Source "A",
From Agency "A",

b1

b1

f. Status of case: Coverage of MfS continues.

4. REMARKS:

0704

a. This report is one of a series

b1

b1

Page 1 of 2 pages
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CONFIDENTIAL

AB02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
D-567253/d

9 Jan 56

SUBJECT: EGIS - MfS Bezirk Potsdam, Re: Modus Operandi
(Penetration Attempt Plans)

b1

b.

b1

b1

c. The MfS form was followed in the translation for
Inclosure 1 of SOI.

1 Incl

SOI dtd 4 Jan 56 (1)
w/1 Incl thereto dtd
8 Oct 55 (1)

b6

Lt Col, Inf
Commanding

Berlin 42323, b6 *JW/at/S-3

0705

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
-2-

Page 2 of 2 pages
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

CHIEF

DATE

4 Jan 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567253/d

TEV/awt

SUBJECT

EO18 - MFS Bezirk Potsdam
Re: Modus Operandi (Penetration
Attempt Plans)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. b1

b1

2. b1

b1

Source "A"

(F-3)

3. b1

b1

Agency "A"

(B-2)

4. The files of Region VIII, 66th CIC Group, APO 742, contain the following information:

a. SOI, subject: Alleged Employment of Sfs Contact, file VIII-23702, dated 12 October 1955, indicates that b1 born b1

b1 in b1 is b1

b1

b1 (B-6) b1 is also mentioned in TWX I-9408

b1 (F-3)

Both of these references b1 are indications of activity of b1 mentioned in para 1 of this report.

b. TWX I-9408 mentions b1

b1 (F-3) This is the same b1

b1 mentioned in para 1 and 2 of this report.

0706

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 6 Jan 56

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567247/a

b6 awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS
Bezirk Frankfurt/Oder
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. MfS KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-office) STRAUSBERG (VU2526), covers Department I (political activity) of the West BERLIN police through the doubled operation of Fnu [b6] female, whose true loyalties are believed to lie with the GDR government.

2. Fnu [b6] conducts her double-agent activities with the cooperation and support of the STRAUSBERG District Attorney's office. [b6] appeared to have no obligations to the District Attorney's office, but the District Attorney appeared to be responsible for coordinating special privileges enjoyed by [b6] in connection with her MfS work. [b6] was allowed to be absent from work at her place of employment in the HO (Handels Organisation - State-owned Retail Organization), without apparent good cause, by instructions from the office of the District Attorney.

3. [b6] stated that she worked for both the MfS and SIS, but did not further elaborate on any relationships that may have existed between the MfS and SIS.

4. Source was not required to sign a statement of obligation until September 1954, following his introduction to the activities of [b6] mentioned above. Source was not recruited as an informant at that time, but was required to sign the obligation that he would cooperate with the MfS and keep his connection with the MfS a confidential matter. The pledge was to insure that Source not talk concerning what he knew about [b6] and the MfS. His cooperation amounted to not questioning [b6] concerning her absences from work.

(E-6)

5. a. An examination of Region VIII files revealed no information concerning the personality mentioned in this report.

b. An examination of West BERLIN police files on 12 December 1955 revealed no information concerning [b6]

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 27 Dec 55

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567241/d

b6 /awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS Headquarters
Main Department VIII
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. On or about [b6] 1955, MfS Main Department VIII opened investigation of a Frau Fnu [b6], member of the Kulturbund in POTSDAM (UU6808), who is suspected of having contact with some Western intelligence agency. Frau [b6] was described as being approximately 38 years of age, 5'7" tall and of a stocky build. She lives in [b6]

2. On or about [b6] 1955, MfS opened investigation of a Fnu [b6] male, living in BERLIN-Karlshof (Soviet Sector), Maulsdorferstrasse, approximately 38 years of age, 5'7" tall, who is employed in the engineering office of Ulbrichtwerke, located in BERLIN-Mitte (Soviet Sector), Inselstrasse 9. An unidentified working associate of [b6] has fled to West BERLIN, taking a number of drawings or plans with him. MfS anticipates that [b6] friend will attempt to recruit him for service with some Western agency.

3. On 18 November 1955, MfS Main Department VIII received a lead from MfS Bezirk DRESDEN (VS1255) indicating that a DRESDEN resident, approximately 6' tall and 40 years of age, was enroute to BERLIN, ostensibly to meet an unidentified representative of some Western intelligence agency. Main Department VIII placed surveillance on the DRESDEN man who obtained a room in the Hotel Stadt Copenhagen, located on Gartenstrasse, BERLIN-Mitte (Soviet Sector). During the evening, the DRESDEN resident met an unidentified man who was approximately 5'8" tall, 48-50 years of age and had a stocky build. He was wearing dark horn-rimmed glasses, had a high forehead and thinning dark blond hair and a slight limp with his left leg. The meeting took place in a bar "Onkel Paul", located on Badstrasse, in BERLIN-Reinickendorf (French Sector). This latter unidentified man was later observed entering a building at Bugenhagenstrasse 9, BERLIN-Tiergarten (British Sector), and is suspected of being the contact to Western intelligence for the DRESDEN resident.

4. On or about 19 November, Main Department VIII scheduled surveillance of an unnamed young woman employed in the GDR Ministry of Finance office located on Unterwasserstrasse in BERLIN-Mitte. She was described as being approximately 21 years of age, 5'4" tall, dark (almost black) hair worn with bangs and a roll on the neck leaving her ears exposed, and with a long oval face with a fresh complexion. Her residence was given as [b6]. Investigators assigned to observe this young woman were instructed to maintain close surveillance and to prevent her flight to West BERLIN. She was to be permitted to

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
27 Dec 55

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567241/d

b6 /awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS Headquarters
Main Department VIII
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

enter the S-bahn (city rail line) or U-bahn (subway) train, but, before the train reached the sector borders, the investigators were ordered to pull the emergency brake to halt the train, and to escort the young woman to the nearest member of the People's Police for detention.

Source "A"

(C-3)

5. The files of Region VIII, 66th CIC Group, APO 742, contain no identifying information on personalities mentioned in this report.

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HEADQUARTERS REGION VIII
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 742 US ARMY

D-567253/a

3 January 1956

SUBJECT: EGIS - MfS Bezirk Potsdam, Re: Modus Operandi
(Informant Obligation) (West Berlin Residents
arrested in East Berlin)

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: CE Division

Arland
CICC
567253

1. REFERENCE: TWX I-9408.
2. FORWARDED: SOI, dated 19 December 1955, subject and file as above.
3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:
 - a. Source: Source "A" is b1
b1 who received the material from an unnamed sub-source.
 - b. Evaluation of Sources: Source "A", B.
 - c. How information was obtained by Source: Direct contact with sub-source.
 - d. Date Source obtained information: November 1955.
 - e. Date agent received information: 15 November 1955.
 - f. Status of case: Coverage of MfS continues.

4. REMARKS:

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a. b1

b1

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D-567253/d

3 Jan 56

SUBJECT: EGIS - MFS-Bezirk Potsdam, Re: Modus Operandi
(Informant Obligation) (West Berlin Residents
arrested in East Berlin)

b.

b1

b1

c. SOI's on Personalities and EEI will be forwarded
under separate cover.

d.

b1

b1

e.

b1

b1

2 Incl

1. SOI dtd 19 Dec 55 (1)
w/5 incl
2. SOI dtd 19 Dec 55 (1)
2/1 incl

b6

Lt Col, Inf
Commanding

Berlin 42323/ b6 /WJM/at/S-3

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Page(s) 719-730

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
19 Dec 55

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567255/a

b6 /awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - SFS Bezirk Potsdam
Re: Modus Operandi (Informant
Obligation)

**CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:**

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Each informant recruited and vetted by SFS Bezirk Potsdam (UU6808) is required to submit a handwritten obligation (See Inclosure I) stating that he is willing to cooperate with the State Secretariat for State Security voluntarily to uncover criminal activity of enemies of the GDR. The obligation also includes a statement that the informant binds himself to discuss such cooperation with noother person, including immediate members of his family, relatives, or acquaintances. A statement that the informant will use an assigned cover name in signing his reports may also be included. The informant guarantees to fulfill all assigned missions honestly and reliably. A statement to the effect that the informant realizes that any violation of the secrecy oath makes him liable to punishment is also included in the form.

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Vol IV of IV

As of 8 NOV. 78 all material
(Date)

included in this file conforms with

DA policies currently in effect.

Lois E Ward 8 NOV. 78
(Signature) (Date Signed)

LOIS E. WARD 7
(Printed Name) (Grade)

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UP AR 361-10
REVIEWER [Signature] DATE 31 Aug 92

REVIEWED FOR RETENTION CRITERIA
UP AR 361-10
REVIEWER [Signature] DATE 1 Aug 96

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Review on
25 May 86

REVIEWED FOR RETENTION CRITERIA
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REVIEWER [Signature] DATE 28 Dec 99

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
23 Dec 55

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VII, CE Team. D-567243/d

b6

SUBJECT

ECIS - MFS
Bezirk Chemnitz
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE

A COMPLETELY RELIABLE
B USUALLY RELIABLE
C FAIRLY RELIABLE
D NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
E UNRELIABLE
F RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

OF INFORMATION

A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
B PROBABLY TRUE
C POSSIBLY TRUE
D DOUBTFULLY TRUE
E IMPROBABLE
F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Recruitment by MFS installation in KARL MARX STADT (US5433).
In 15 September 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement wherein she agreed to work for the MFS and to keep her work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source received the mission of reporting on the activities of four (4) residents of KARL MARX STADT suspected of espionage, but instead of carrying out this mission Source warned the persons concerned. Source was scheduled to meet her handling agent on 25 October 1955 at the VPKA (Volkspolizei Kreisamt - People's Police Kreis Office) at KARL MARX STADT, Hartmannstrasse, number unknown, but instead she defected to West BERLIN on that day. She received no monetary compensation from the MFS.

Source "C"

(F-6)

2. Recruitment by MFS installation in KARL MARX STADT. In March 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the MFS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source was assigned the cover name [b6]. In early March 1955, Source had received a letter from [b6] a former colleague of Source who had defected to West BERLIN in early 1955, and in this letter [b6] invited Source to meet him in West BERLIN. Source showed this letter to friends and subsequently it came to the attention of the MFS, whereupon Source was contacted by the MFS and obliged to become an informant. Source was directed to meet [b6] in West BERLIN according to the terms in [b6] letter, and Source was given 150 DM West in order to perform his mission. In late March or early April 1955 Source met [b6] near the "Zoologischer Garten" elevated railway station located at BERLIN-Charlottenburg (British Sector), Joachimstaerstrasse at Hardenburgstrasse, and Source was escorted to the "Rox" Restaurant located at BERLIN-Charlottenburg, Kurfuerstendamm 34. Source was introduced by [b6] to a Captain [b6], a US Army officer; [b6] asked Source for information regarding the Soviets, whereupon Source replied that he had no such information. Source did not inform [b6] of his MFS obligation. Source agreed to meet [b6] again in eight (8) days at the "Kempinski Restaurant", located at BERLIN-Charlottenburg, Kurfuerstendamm 27. Upon returning to KARL MARX STADT, Source reported to his MFS handling agent untruthfully that Source was scheduled to meet [b6] in 14 days. Source returned to West BERLIN in eight (8) days, but he did not meet [b6]. Source went to West BERLIN in 14 days, but, of course, Source did not meet [b6] then either. Source reported his failure to meet [b6] on the second trip to West BERLIN to the MFS. The MFS seemed suspicious, but they let the matter drop. In early October 1955, Source reported to the MFS that he

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE: 23 Dec 55

PREPARING OFFICE:

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team, D-567243/d

b6

/awt

SUBJECT:

ECTS - MfS
 Bezirk Chemnitz
 Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE	OF INFORMATION
A COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
B USUALLY RELIABLE	B PROBABLY TRUE
C FAIRLY RELIABLE	C POSSIBLY TRUE
D NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D DOUBTFULLY TRUE
E UNRELIABLE	E IMPROBABLE
F RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

desired to travel to the German Federal Republic to visit a friend who was a traveling salesman for various publishing firms in the German Federal Republic. Source was instructed to attempt to induce this salesman to enter East BERLIN so that the MfS could employ him as an informant. Source defected to West BERLIN on 26 November 1955 so that he did not have to carry out this mission.

Source "H"

(F-6)

3. Recruitment by MfS KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-office) LAITZCHEN (US6849). In September 1954, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the MfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source was assigned the cover name b6. He met his handling agent three (3) times at the police station located at MITTWEIDA (U 5850), Am Markt. Source was given the mission of corresponding with his father, who resides in HORNEBURG (MU3687), German Federal Republic, and who is presently employed by the "Meissner" printing firm in HORNEBURG. Source's father, who was previously director of the HO (Handelorganisation - state retail organization) in MITTWEIDA, had defected to West BERLIN in August 1954, because he had been sentenced to a five (5) month prison term for alleged misappropriation of government property. Source was instructed to ask his father in this correspondence to find out what firms in the German Federal Republic print anti-Communist literature. Also, Source was directed to attempt to persuade his father to return to the GDR. Source delayed writing his father by pretending not to know his father's address. Source finally defected to West BERLIN on 15 November 1955 without carrying the mission out. Source received no financial support from the MfS.

Source "K"

(F-6)

4. Recruitment by MfS KV JOELSNITZ (US3822). In early January 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the MfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source was assigned the cover name b6. Source received the mission of reporting on the political attitudes of his fellow workers, on whom he submitted only general reports, mentioning no names. Also, Source was directed to observe the activities of a moving picture projectionist residing in BAD ELSTER (UR0374). Source met his handling agent either at Source's place of work or at the DSP (Deutsche-Sowjetische-Freundschaft - German-Soviet Friendship) clubhouse, located at BAD ELSTER, street address unknown, the last meeting taking

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
23 Dec 55

b6

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PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team D-567243/d

SUBJECT

EGIS - MFS
Bezirk Chemnitz
Re: Modus OperandiCODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCECOMpletely RELIABLE
USUALLY RELIABLE
FAIRLY RELIABLE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
UNRELIABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

OF INFORMATION

A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
B PROBABLY TRUE
C POSSIBLY TRUE
D DOUBTFULLY TRUE
E IMPROBABLE
F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

place on 2 November 1955. At this last meeting Source was ordered to make a statement to the effect that the moving picture projectionist against whom Source had been assigned a mission had repeatedly insulted the GDR Government. Source defected to West BERLIN on 7 November 1955.

Source "N"

(P-6)

5. Region VIII files revealed no information regarding the personalities mentioned in this report.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

22 December 1955

REPORTING OFFICE

REGION III 66TH CIC GROUP

D-567246/d

SUBJECT

East German Intelligence - Sfs -
 Bezirk ERFURT
 Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE
 USUALLY RELIABLE
 FAIRLY RELIABLE
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
 UNRELIABLE
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

A
 B
 C
 D
 E
 F

OF INFORMATION

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
 PROBABLY TRUE
 POSSIBLY TRUE
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE
 IMPROBABLE
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

On 18 November 1955, SOURCE was interviewed at Field Office Giessen and gave the following information concerning Sfs ERFURT PBL249, Bezirk ERFURT, Modus Operandi:

1. COVER:

a. For Agents: SOURCE was given the cover name of ERICH.

b. Cover Firms: The following addresses were used by the ERFURT Sfs in their meetings with SOURCE, excluding the Sfs office:

- (1) ALTEN MORITZ, Moritzgasse, ERFURT.
- (2) Trolley stop on Iderhoffstrasse, ERFURT.
- (3) Vestibule of a pharmacist's office on Iderhoffstrasse, ERFURT.
- (4) Room #2, located in building of pharmacy on Iderhoffstrasse, ERFURT. Card on door of room showed name of KIMM.
- (5) THALSCHULE, ERFURT.

2. DOCUMENTATION:

Sfs was able to procure an interzonal pass for SOURCE. SOURCE brought a passport photograph and the Sfs affixed it to the pass and then had the pass properly stamped and authenticated.

3. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES:

Two (2) members of the Sfs used the pretext of searching for a sweater allegedly missing from SOURCE's place of employment in order to search her home. It soon became obvious to SOURCE that the sweater was only a pretext and that they were more interested in her past correspondence. Two (2) men arrived at 0900 hours. After a search and preliminary interrogation which lasted about one (1) hour SOURCE was taken in a gray-blue car of unknown make to the Sfs office, Andreastrasse, ERFURT. SOURCE was kept at the Sfs office until 1900 hours before being released.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
22 December 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

REGION III 66TH CIC GROUP

D-567246/a

SUBJECT

East German Intelligence - Sfs -
Besirk ERFURT
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE

COMPLETELY RELIABLE
USUALLY RELIABLE
FAIRLY RELIABLE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
UNRELIABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

OF INFORMATION

A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
B PROBABLY TRUE
C POSSIBLY TRUE
D DOUBTFULLY TRUE
E IMPROBABLE
F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

4. INTERROGATIONS:

a. Techniques: SOURCE was given a brief interrogation regarding the missing sweater while still at her home, but she was questioned more thoroughly on a variety of subjects while at the office of the Sfs.

b. Interrogators: The identity, rank, and position of SOURCE's interrogators were always kept concealed. Many questions were asked regarding SOURCE's friends and relatives in ERFURT and in WIESBADEN MA4648, Germany.

c. Use of Coercion and Inducements: SOURCE was charged with having something to do with the sweater missing from her place of employ, and she was offered the chance to make amends for this missing sweater by working for the Sfs. The chance to see her daughter, who was at that time visiting SOURCE's divorced husband, was also used to persuade her to go on a mission to West Germany.

5. COMMUNICATIONS:

SOURCE was given a telephone number, which she has since forgotten, which she was to use to get in touch with the Sfs on her return to East Germany.

6. TRANSPORTATION:

It was agreed between the Sfs and SOURCE that SOURCE would use the railroad to cross from ERFURT to West Germany.

7. BORDER CROSSINGS:

SOURCE was given an interzonal pass by the Sfs ERFURT so she could make the border crossing legally. She made the crossing on 1 November 1955 without mishap.

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CR: I-579462

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

21 December 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

Region I, 66th CIC Group, STUTTGART, Germany, APO 154, US Army

SUBJECT

East German Intelligence

SfS-Resirk CHERNITZ I-567243/4

Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE

COMPLETELY RELIABLE

USUALLY RELIABLE

FAIRLY RELIABLE

NOT USUALLY RELIABLE

UNRELIABLE

RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

OF INFORMATION

A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES

B PROBABLY TRUE

C POSSIBLY TRUE

D DOUBTFULLY TRUE

E IMPROBABLE

F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Selection Standards: Source was an electrician who had moved from HANLIN, West Germany to SCHNEEBERG, East Germany in November 1954. Source is of above average intelligence and fairly clever. He had attended eight years of grade school and high school. He was first contacted by the SfS (Staatsssekretariat fuer Staatssicherheit-State Secretariat for State Security) shortly after having been involved in a drunken fight, during which Source had knocked his brother-in-law down.

Recruiting: Source was recruited after he had been interrogated by the SfS under the charge of having been sent into East Germany as an agent by a Western Intelligence agency. The SfS handling agent told Source that he had been impressed with the way Source had answered the questions, that Source was intelligent, and that such intelligence could be of use to the SfS in its battle against Capitalism. Inasmuch as Source was a laborer, the handling agent always made much of the labor-versus-capitalism argument. Source was also told that as an immigrant to East Germany, he would have to prove his allegiance to the East German regime and the ideals of communism. When Source refused to accept any missions to go to West Germany, he was recruited as a "factory informant." He was to keep his eyes open for anti regime sentiment or activity.

Training: Source received none. The handling agent seemed to devote the majority of the time with Source in orientating him politically.

Contacting Source: Source was either contacted in his apartment by his handling agent, or he would wait at some appointed spot, usually a public building, until the handling agent came by. He would then follow him a few seconds later, into the building. Source could also telephone the SfS office in AUR, using a cover name.

Payment: None. However, Source had come to East Germany to obtain a free engineer's education. Before he could get such an education, it would be necessary for him to work in East Germany for at least six months during which time he must prove his allegiance to the state.

(7-6)

(Source "A") REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

ON 18 JUN 1998

BY USAINSCOM/FOLPA

Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

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HEADQUARTERS REGION VIII
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 742 US ARMY

D-567241/d

20 December 1955

SUBJECT: EGIS - MfS Headquarters, Re: Modus Operandi
(Measures concerning Sector borders)

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: CE Division

C1 CC
567241/d

1. REFERENCE: TWX, I-9504.
2. FORWARDED: SOI, dated 13 December 1955, subject and file as above.
3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:
 - a. Source: Source "A", V-415-VIII.
 - b. Evaluation of Source: C.
 - c. How information was obtained by Source: Personal knowledge.
 - d. Date Source obtained information: 1-5 December 1955.
 - e. Date agent received information: 6 December 1955.
 - f. Status of case: Coverage of MfS continues.

1 Inol
SOI dtd 13 Dec 55 (1)
w/Exhs I-II (1)

b6
Lt Col, Inf
Commanding

Berlin 42323/ b6 /WJM/at/Ops 0739

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

AD: A 93T

DATE 13 Dec 55

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team.

D-567241/d

b6

awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS Headquarters
 Re: Modus Operandi, Main Department VIII (Measures concerning Sector borders)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
 USUALLY RELIABLE B
 FAIRLY RELIABLE C
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
 UNRELIABLE E
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
 PROBABLY TRUE 2
 POSSIBLY TRUE 3
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
 IMPROBABLE 5
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Main Department VIII surveyed the borders between the Soviet Sector and the French Sector of BERLIN from 1 to 5 December 1955, to plan measures to be instituted in the event of establishment of more stringent border controls between the Allied Sectors and the Soviet Sector of BERLIN. As a result of this survey, two plans were drawn, as follows:

a. The underpass of a bridge for the S-bahn (city rail line) located northwest of S-bahn station Wollankstrasse, where the rail line crosses the Panke, a stream approximately 25 feet wide, is to be used to provide a path of travel between the Soviet and French Sectors for MfS sources. A man walking along the banks of the stream cannot be observed readily on the French Sector side of the border, formed by the S-bahn line, due to being below ground level. On the French Sector side of the border at this point, the immediate area is undeveloped. On the Soviet Sector side, bushes along the banks of the stream afford additional protection from observation. Direct line of sight communication is possible from the bridge on Kuehnemannstrasse over the Panke in the French Sector to the Bahnhofstrasse bridge over the Panke in the Soviet Sector, making signalling by flashlight possible during dark hours. In addition, Main Department VIII is checking the masonry of the underpass to find a fault or defect there which can serve as a dead letter drop, to be available to both sides of the border, with the above-mentioned security from observation of couriers delivering material to, or picking up material from the drop. (Incl. 1)

b. Another stream, the Nord Graben, flows from east to west from BERLIN-Wilhelmsruh (Soviet Sector) to BERLIN-Wittenau (French Sector), forming the border for some distance until it reaches the S-bahn line, where the border then follows the latter. This stream flows at an approximate rate of 35 - 40 centimeters per second, and the banks of the stream have been lined with paving stone, leaving no obstructions along the banks. This stream, approximately 22 feet wide and 7 feet deep, passes through a culvert approximately 6 feet wide under the S-bahn line. This stream is to be used to float messages from the Soviet Sector into the French Sector by placing the messages in sealed containers such as bottles or cans. Recipients of the messages can retrieve them unobserved by passers-by in the French Sector, where there are only uncultivated fields on both sides of the stream. (Incl. 2)

c. Sketches have been made of both areas noted above, but photography of each from the required 6 or 8 points has been postponed for better lighting conditions.

Source "A"

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(C-3)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
13 Dec 55

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567241/d

b6 /awt

SUBJECT:

EGIS - MFS Headquarters
Re: Modus Operandi, Main Department VIII (Measures concerning Sector borders)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

3. The files of Region VIII, 66th CIC Group, APO 742, have no previous information about use of streams to transport messages or using bridges as border crossing points.

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
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
20 December 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region II, 66th CIC Group, APO 800, US Army

SUBJECT

East German Intelligence - SFS -
Bezirk Erfurt
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE
USUALLY RELIABLE
FAIRLY RELIABLE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
UNRELIABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
PROBABLY TRUE
POSSIBLY TRUE
DOUBTFULLY TRUE
IMPROBABLE
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. An informant or agent to be sent to West Germany by the SFS (Staatsssekretariat fuer Staatssicherheit - State Secretariat for State Security) of EISENACH NB 9348 is provided with an interzonal pass which lists the person's address as [b6]. This is known to the People's Police at railroad stations and border crossing points as the address of the SFS in EISENACH and such persons are allowed to proceed without any control.

SOURCE "A"

(F-6)

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1-Region II File

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		ADM AS. 207	DATE 19 Dec 55																								
PREPARING OFFICE 66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team.		OPNS OFF 7/10	b6 awt																								
SUBJECT EGIS - Sfs Headquarters, BERLIN Re: Administration (Budgetary and Financial Matters)	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: <table border="0"> <tr> <td>COMPLETELY RELIABLE</td> <td>A</td> <td>CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES</td> <td>1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>USUALLY RELIABLE</td> <td>B</td> <td>PROBABLY TRUE</td> <td>2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>FAIRLY RELIABLE</td> <td>C</td> <td>POSSIBLY TRUE</td> <td>3</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NOT USUALLY RELIABLE</td> <td>D</td> <td>DOUBTFULLY TRUE</td> <td>4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>UNRELIABLE</td> <td>E</td> <td>IMPROBABLE</td> <td>5</td> </tr> <tr> <td>RELIABILITY UNKNOWN</td> <td>F</td> <td>TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED</td> <td>6</td> </tr> </table>			COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1	USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2	FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4	UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5	RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6
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UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5																								
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6																								
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION																											
<p>1. Within Haupt Abteilung PS (Personenschutz - Security of Personnel), drivers and bodyguards are commissioned according to the rank of the official to whom they are assigned, and receive the normal pay of that rank.</p> <p>2. An Unterleutnant (junior lieutenant) on agent status receives a monthly basic pay of 870.00 DM East, food allowance of 66.00 DM East, housing allowance of 35.00 DM East, and expense allowance of 30.00 DM East. Tax, social, and other deductions from the basic pay leave a net pay of 825.65 monthly for a junior lieutenant with one child. Drivers receive an additional tax-free allowance, paid by the ZK (Zentralkomitee - Central Committee) of the SED, as follows: for driving one of the three top officials, 150.00 DM East; members of the Polit Bureau, 100.00 DM East; and Polit Bureau Secretaries 75.00 DM East.</p> <p>3. Bodyguards and escorts do not receive the additional pay from the ZK, because they receive an extra clothing allowance, and usually hold a higher rank than the driver assigned to the same official. Bodyguards and escorts hold permanent rank, as compared to the drivers' temporary rank, and are transferred with that rank, while the drivers lose their rank if transferred.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(F-6)</p> <p>4. Region VIII records reveal no information concerning this subject.</p>																											
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 19 Dec 55
TEAM CHIEF 29

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team, D-562241/h

b6 avt

SUBJECT

EGIS - SFS
Headquarters, BERLIN
Re: Modus Operandi (Transportation, Road)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE

A. COMPLETELY RELIABLE
B. USUALLY RELIABLE
C. FAIRLY RELIABLE
D. NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
E. UNRELIABLE
F. RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

OF INFORMATION

A. CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
B. PROBABLY TRUE
C. POSSIBLY TRUE
D. DOUBTFULLY TRUE
E. IMPROBABLE
F. TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Transportation of GDR officials is a responsibility of Haupt Abteilung (Main Department) PS (Personenschutz - Security of Personnel), and is further delegated to PS Abteilung (Department) III. Within Abteilung III, operational groups are arranged in teams, consisting usually of one bodyguard, one or more escorts, and one or more drivers, all armed SFS officers. Each GDR official is normally in the company of one personal bodyguard and one driver, both of whom are permanently assigned to the official and who are given temporary rank according to the rank of the official to whom assigned. The drivers receive no operational training. Operational personnel have frequently protested against this system.

2. GDR officials are not permitted to drive into or through West BERLIN, except in unusual and special cases. SFS agents are permitted to drive into West BERLIN, but must be accompanied by the driver assigned to the car. All official cars must observe a speed limit of 60 km (38 mph) within the city of BERLIN.

3. All licenses used by Fahrbereitschaft B start with "1A" or "1B", as do all passenger cars registered in East BERLIN. The license plates used by Fahrbereitschaft B are not assigned to any particular car. There are extra license plates for all cars registered at the motor pool. The license plates are changed at irregular intervals, sometimes after a few days, sometimes not for several months. Each car has a permanent "1A" registration which is never used. The car is registered according to a supply number, which does not change. The supply number is written on the registration certificate, one copy of which is kept with the car. The supply number of each car is printed with red paint under the hood on the top edge of the fire wall on the left side, in front of the driver's seat.

4. On trips outside of East BERLIN the GDR official is accompanied by his personal bodyguard and driver, and is in addition in the company of an operational team, as described above. Each team has a cover number, which is changed at irregular intervals. The vehicles to be used for various operations are determined according to the drivers assigned to the team, since each vehicle at the motor pool is the direct responsibility of one driver. Reserve vehicles are not driven, and so not assigned. The driver is assigned with his vehicle for the various operations. The vehicle is assigned a different license plate for each trip out of BERLIN.

5. It is the duty of the ranking escort man to report by radio to the radio department upon leaving the motor pool, and upon returning to the motor pool. The senior escort must also make a radio report.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
19 Dec 55

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567241/d

b6/ep

SUBJECT

ECIS - Sfs
Headquarters, BERLIN
Re: Modus Operandi (Transporta-
tion, Road)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE OF INFORMATION

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

every thirty minutes while away from the motor pool with an official, giving the exact location of the team. When a team is using a car or cars without radio equipment, the senior escort reports by telephone to the Officer of the Day at Main Department PS at irregular intervals.

6. Trips outside East BERLIN are made along the autobahn (national limited access highway) whenever possible. A convoy system is utilized.

a. Convoys for b6 are composed of the respective dignitary, three cars, and ten men in command of a senior lieutenant. The convoy occupies two lanes of the highway, and travels in the formation shown in the attached Exhibit " ". The maximum convoy speed is 60 kph (38 mph) in cities and 100 kph (63 mph) on the autobahn. Traffic is not permitted to pass the convoy. Traffic traveling in the same direction slower than the convoy is warned by a siren to clear the highway, and must pull off the roadway until the convoy has passed. The formation used allows the personal bodyguard of the dignitary unobstructed vision in both directions along the highway as well as to the sides. The function of the lead escort car is to clear the highway. The function of the following escort car is to block the highway to traffic that may overtake the convoy. In the event of an accident to the dignitary's car, where possible, the car continues and the driver returns later. If the car is damaged to such an extent that it cannot continue, the dignitary changes to an escort car, and the driver remains with his assigned car. When approaching a city the convoy cars turn on blue lights. By previous arrangement the route through the city has been cleared and blocked off.

b. On the occasion of special assignments, such as "state visits" from officials of the Soviet Union, an additional escort car precedes the main convoy by an interval of from three to five minutes. The hood of the advance car is covered by a large red cloth, to inform the VP (Volkspolizei - People's Police) personnel to block off traffic within the city. The last escort car displays a large yellow cloth, to inform the VP that the entire convoy has passed and that further restriction of traffic is no longer necessary. In all larger cities, the main streets along the route of the convoy are occupied by Sfs personnel in civilian clothes.

0747

c. Convoys for GDR officials other than b6 or b6 are composed of the official concerned, two cars, and six men in command of a lieutenant. The convoy is formed as shown in the Exhibit " ". The team commander may ride in either of the two cars, but will usually ride in the lead escort car.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
19 Dec 55

PREPARING OFFICE

65th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567241/d

b6 b7c

SUBJECT

EGIS - Sfs
Headquarters, BERLIN
Re: Modus Operandi (Transporta-
tion, Road)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE OF INFORMATION

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A. CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
USUALLY RELIABLE	B. PROBABLY TRUE
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C. POSSIBLY TRUE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D. DOUBTFUL/TRUE
UNRELIABLE	E. IMPROBABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F. TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

d. It is noted that the personal bodyguard of GDR officials may be of higher rank than the team commander. The team commander, however, is in charge of the personnel, and in the event of trouble will act as the commander of the unit. The personal bodyguard is primarily concerned with the safety of the official to whom assigned, and does not undertake to control the operational use of the convoy members.

7. All GDR officials must use certain routes as assigned by Department PS, and which are guarded by the VP and Sfs.

a. There are three routes for trips between East BERLIN and PANKOW (UU9226) as follows:

- (1) Route 1: PANKOW, Berlinerstrasse, Schoenhauserallee.
- (2) Route 2: PANKOW, Schwarze Bruecke, Prenzlauer Promenade, Prenzlauer Allee.
- (3) Route 3: PANKOW, Berlinerstrasse, Binzstrasse, Prenzlauer Promenade, Prenzlauer Allee.

b. During September and October 1955 only Route 1 was used.

c. For trips into the GDR the following route is usually used: PANKOW, Weissensee, Lichtenberg, Karlshorst, Adlgestell, Waltersdorf or SCHOENEFEELD (UU9805), to the Rangsdorf Highway.

d. The intersection at Berlinerstrasse and Florastrasse in PANKOW is regarded by the Sfs as an important point of possible ambush. For that reason the traffic lanes at that corner were widened.

e. The intersection at Schoenhauser Allee, Dimitroffstrasse, and Kastanienallee is considered as second in importance as an ambush point.

8. The automobiles used by high ranking officials of the GDR government are of Russian manufacture, and utilize a higher compression engine than the cars manufactured in the GDR. Operation of the Russian cars on ordinary fuel causes premature valve failure. To overcome this difficulty, the Sfs maintains a special gas supply at each KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-office). The fuel is delivered by a gas tanker truck from Fahrbereitschaft B at BERLIN-Hohenschonhausen. Only the Russian automobiles assigned to the officials may use fuel from the special supply. The special fuel is

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

19 Dec 55

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team D-567241/a

SUBJECT

EGIS - SFS

Headquarters, BERLIN

Re: Modus Operandi (Transportation, Road)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE

A COMPLETELY RELIABLE

B USUALLY RELIABLE

C FAIRLY RELIABLE

D NOT USUALLY RELIABLE

E UNRELIABLE

F RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

OF INFORMATION

A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES

B PROBABLY TRUE

C POSSIBLY TRUE

D DOUBTFULLY TRUE

E IMPROBABLE

F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

b6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

known as "SG" (Sonder Gemisch - Special Mixture).

(P-6)

9. The installations mentioned in this report are mentioned in SOI dated 10 June 1955, reference D-505925; VIII-16540.16, Subject: BERLIN SFS, Main Department PS. (P-6)

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
AA33

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
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CONVOY PLAN

a. PIECK
GROTEWOHL
ULBRICHT



b. OTHER DIGNITARIES



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BY USAINSCOM FOIPA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

EXHIBIT 11

SOI REGION VIII

FILE: D-567241/a

SUBJECT: SOIS - SIS - Headquarters, BERLIN, Re: Modus Operandi

DATE: 19 December 1955

0750

EVALUATION: F-6

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
19 Dec 55

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567241/d

b6 awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - Sfs
Headquarters, BERLIN
Re: Modus Operandi (Border
Crossings)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. In the Fall of 1954, [b6] was to make a political appearance in West BERLIN and to campaign for the SED. He had prepared a speech for the occasion. [b6] was to be accompanied to West BERLIN by his driver, [b6] using a Pobeda car. The driver was to travel unarmed, and to carry only a GDR ausweis (personal identity document). However, the trip was not made.

2. On 21 and 22 December 1954, [b6] attended a political rally at HAMBURG (NE6534), German Federal Republic. During the trip [b6] mentioned that he hoped that all would go well and that he hoped that the arrangements for his crossing of the border were all in order. [b6] was driven first to the operational house at BOIZENBURG (PE1416). The trip was arranged so that [b6] would arrive at the house during the hours of darkness. There was a wait of approximately an hour after [b6] arrived at the house. A telephone call was received, and then [b6] left in a black, post-war, but not new, Mercedes 220 bearing a "KB" (West BERLIN registration) license plate. The car was waiting at the house when [b6] arrived there. It is believed that [b6] crossed the border illegally, using a false name.

3. Most GDR officials vary the place at which they cross the border. [b6] uses the same special crossing point, location unknown. Information concerning border crossing points is classified by the Sfs as Top Secret.

(F-6)

4. a. An examination of Region VIII files revealed that [b6] [b6] are mentioned in numerous reports, including other sections of this report.

b. [b6] paragraph 1. [b6] is SUBJECT of PR dated 2 November 1955, reference [b6] Subject: [b6] [b6] evaluated F-6, as driver of [b6]

c. An examination of Region VIII files revealed no information concerning the installation mentioned in this report.

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b6

II-567248/d

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

16 December 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region XI, 66th CIC Group, APO 800, US Army

SUBJECT

East German Intelligence - Sfs -
 Bezirk Gera
 Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
 USUALLY RELIABLE B
 FAIRLY RELIABLE C
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
 UNRELIABLE E
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
 PROBABLY TRUE 2
 POSSIBLY TRUE 3
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
 IMPROBABLE 5
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Involuntary Recruiting Informants: During October 1953, Source was interrogated by the Sfs (Staatssekretariat fuer Staatsicherheit - State Secretariat for State Security) in SCHLEIZ PB 9807 for having made slanderous statements against East Zone Government officials. As a result of this interrogation, Source fled to West Germany. During October 1955, Source returned to SCHLEIZ to visit relatives. At this time, he was interrogated by a (fmu) [b6] (born about 1925) of the SCHLEIZ Sfs. [b6] using the slanderous statements of 1953 as a prod, threatened Source and inferred that harm would come to Source's aged parents unless he agreed to obtain information concerning U.S. Army installations in HOF QA 0878, the Federal Border Guard (Bundesgrenzschutz) in HOF, and general information concerning U.S. Army troop movements in Western Germany. Source returned to HOF. During the first week in November 1955, Source received a Residence Permit (Aufenthaltsgenehmigung) from an unknown person in SCHLEIZ, but refused to return to SCHLEIZ. He did not fulfill his mission.

(F-6)

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 ON 18 JUN 1998
 BY USAINSCOM FOL/PA
 Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

0752

DISTRIBUTION

1-OO, 66th CIC Group
 1-Region XI File

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HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154 US ARMY

D-567242/d

16 December 1955

SUBJECT: Sfs District BERLIN (C)
Re: Modus Operandi

TO: Commanding Officer
Region VIII, 66th CIC Group
APO 742, US Army

1. Forwarded herewith in duplicate for your information and retention is a Region III, 66th CIC Group, Summary of Information, subject: East Zone Installation, Re: Railroad Transportation between BERLIN/CHEMNITZ, file as above, dated 8 December 1955.

2. Source of the attached report is identified as a carded source of this Group and is evaluated "F."

3. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL [b6]

1 Incl
SOI, Rgn III, dtd 8 Dec 55
(dupe)

[b6]

1st Lt, Armor
Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt M11 8371
[b6]/pc

M/R: Above fwd to Rgn VIII info of possible interest concerning Sfs M/O in checking on railway travellers between BERLIN and CHEMNITZ. Source of this info is V-106-III (temp). Coordinated w/ [b6] Tech Spec.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON JUN 18 1998
BY CDR [b6] F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

0752A

AA 24
AF 01

CIC CENTRAL FILE
15

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b6

DATE

14 Dec 55

b6

awt

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567247/d

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS
Bezirk Frankfurt/Oder
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Recruitment by MfS installation in FRANKFURT/Oder (VT6999):
In early January 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement wherein she agreed to work for the MfS and to keep her work in this capacity a confidential matter. She received the cover name b6. Source met her handling agent two times per week at Source's home or at various other points in and around FRANKFURT/Oder. Source was directed to obtain information regarding b6 b6 a former resident of FRANKFURT/Oder who defected to West BERLIN in Spring 1953, and who is now residing in FRANKFURT/Main (MA7752), German Federal Republic. Source reported that two (2) persons had been associated with b6 in some type of East-West business dealings before defection: b6 a railroad employee residing at b6 b6 and b6 a railroad employee residing at b6. In early September 1955, Source was ordered to travel to West BERLIN and obtain information regarding b6 a former inmate of a prison in BAUTZEN (VS6070) who had defected to West BERLIN upon his release from prison in 1953. Source had met b6 in a West BERLIN refugee camp in 1953, after Source had defected to West BERLIN on a previous occasion in early October 1953. Source went to West BERLIN, contacted b6, and upon returning to FRANKFURT/Oder reported that b6 still resided at the address in West BERLIN that the MfS had furnished Source. On 18 September 1955, Source was again sent to West BERLIN to contact b6 and also to obtain employment with any agency in West BERLIN engaged in refugee work; Source visited b6 and, upon b6 advice, Source submitted a fake report to the MfS regarding an organization engaged in refugee work. Source was to return to West BERLIN for additional information but instead she defected to West BERLIN on 3 October 1955. By that time Source had received a total of 230 DM East for traveling expenses accrued while on MfS missions.

Source "A"

(F-3)

2. Recruitment by MfS installation in FRANKFURT/Oder: In Fall 1951, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the MfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source met his handling agents weekly at Source's working place, the last meeting taking place in early October 1955. Source received no financial remuneration for his work.

Source "B"

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BY USAINSCOM FOIPA
AKA Part 4-102 DOD 3200.1R

0753

(F-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
14 Dec 55

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team, D-567247/d

b6 /awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS
Bezirk Frankfurt/Oder
Re: Modus OperandiCODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

3. Recruitment by MfS installation in FRANKFURT/Oder: In February 1955, Source received an anonymous letter which instructed her to dial a certain telephone number, since forgotten, and to report to the party answering by the name [b6]. Source submitted the letter to the VPKA (Volkspolizei Kreisamt - People's Police Sub-district Administration) in FRANKFURT/Oder, whereupon Source was immediately recruited by the MfS as a part-time informant with the cover name [b6] and was obliged to sign a statement wherein she agreed to work for the MfS and to keep her work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source was assigned the mission of attempting to penetrate a Russian Refugee Committee in West BERLIN by means of contacting one Frau [b6] female, in West BERLIN. Source met [b6] in West BERLIN a number of times, and after each meeting Source reported to her MfS handling agent in a cover apartment located at [b6]. [b6] Source defected to West BERLIN on 30 October 1955.

Source "C"

(F-6)

4. Technique of MfS BV (Bezirksverwaltung - District Office) FRANKFURT/Oder: A member of MfS BV FRANKFURT/Oder is responsible for checking all rooms of the BV building after office hours and to seal the doors with brown wax and string as a security precaution.

Source "H"

(F-6)

5. Recruitment by MfS KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-office) BAD FREIENWALDE (VU3549): On or about 15 February 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the MfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source was assigned the cover name [b6]. He met his handling agent two (2) times at Source's place of work, the last meeting taking place on or about 20 March 1955. Source was given the mission of observing two (2) of Source's fellow workers who were suspected by the MfS of having Western connections, and Source warned his colleagues of the MfS's interest in them. On 13 August 1955, Source learned that the MfS had found out that Source had warned these persons, and Source defected to West BERLIN immediately for fear of arrest.

Source "K"

0754

(F-6)

6. Recruitment by MfS KV FUERSTENBERG (VT7878): In August 1953, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

14 Dec 55

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567247/d

b6

awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MfS
Bezirk Frankfurt/Oder
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

statement wherein he agreed to work for the MfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source met his handling agents monthly on streets of FRANKFURT/Oder and BRIESKOW-FINKENHERD (VT7190), the last meeting taking place in October 1955. Source received the mission of observing his fellow workers, on whom Source submitted approximately twelve reports. Source received no financial compensation from the MfS.

Source "T"

(F-6)

7. Recruitment by MfS KV FUERSTENBERG: In March 1954, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement wherein she agreed to work for the MfS and to keep her work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source was given the cover name b6. Source met her handling agent about ten times at Source's working place, the last meeting taking place on 21 September 1955. Source received the mission of observing her fellow workers, on whom Source submitted three (3) reports of a general nature, mentioning no names. Source received no monetary compensation for her work.

Source "U"

(F-6)

8. Recruitment by MfS KV FUERSTENWALDE (VU3602): In mid-July 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time MfS informant without having to sign a statement of any kind. Source met his handling agent weekly at Kulturhaus (culture house) for German-Soviet Friendship, located at FUERSTENWALDE, Karl-Marx-Strasse 14 or 15, or in Townhall I located at FUERSTENWALDE, Ernst-Thaelmann-Strasse, number unknown. Source received no financial remuneration for his work.

Source "V"

(F-6)

9. Recruitment by MfS KV FUERSTENWALDE: In November 1954, Source was recruited as a part-time MfS informant without having to sign an obligation of any kind. Source met his handling agent in Source's apartment, located at FUERSTENWALDE, August-Bebel-Strasse 133. Source was given the mission of observing a motion picture theater owner in RUEDERSDOFF (VU1816) and of corresponding with a resident of HANNOVER (ND4905), German Federal Republic, but Source did not carry these missions out. Source defected to West BERLIN on 28 July 1955 in order to avoid further contact with the MfS. He received no financial compensation for his work.

Source ~~REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED~~
ON 18 JUN 1980

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AA 386

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

14 Dec 55

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team, D-567247/d

b6

awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - MFS
 Bezirk Frankfurt/Oder
 Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
 USUALLY RELIABLE B
 FAIRLY RELIABLE C
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
 UNRELIABLE E
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
 PROBABLY TRUE 2
 POSSIBLY TRUE 3
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
 IMPROBABLE 5
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

10. Region VIII files revealed the following: b6 paragraph
 1. b6 nee b6 born b6 in b6
 was mentioned in letter dated 21 April 1953 from Agency "A", file VIII-119,
 as a refugee to West BERLIN for whom Agency "A" was interested in obtaining
 political recognition.

11. Files of Agencies "A", "B", "C", "D", and "E" revealed no informa-
 tion regarding b6 paragraph 1.

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ON

18 JUN 1998

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66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP

UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154 US ARMY

CIC CENTRAL FILE

D-567245/d

13 December 1955

SUBJECT: SFS Bezirk DRESDEN
Re: Modus Operandi (Department II -
Intelligence and Counterintelligence) (C)(U)

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
United States Army, Europe
APO 403, US Army
ATTN: Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch (G2CICE)

1. (UNCLASSIFIED) Reference is made to Intelligence Collection Memorandum CI-CE-1-55, subject: SFS (State Secretariat for State Security) (GDR/East German Intelligence), dated 18 February 1955.

2. (CONFIDENTIAL) Forwarded herewith in triplicate is 66th CIC Group Summary of Information, subject and file as above, dated 21 November 1955. ~~CONF~~(U)

3. (CONFIDENTIAL) Examination of Central Registry files, this Group, revealed the following information concerning personalities:

114709 14M
a. [b6] residence DRESDEN, member of National Front Committee Land Saxony; report dated 7 June 1950.

b. (Pnu) [b6] (son of [b6]), no record.

c. M/Sgt [b6] handling agent in Referat 4, Abteilung IV, SFS DRESDEN, believed to be identical with Lieutenant [b6]

d. 2d Lt [b6] age approximately 23 years, assigned as SFS Agent in Department K & S (Personnel and Training), SFS DRESDEN; report dated 25 March 1955. [b6] is believed to be identical with [b6]

e. [b6] no record. 0757

f. (Pnu) [b6] (alleged cousin of [b6]) no record.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 6 JUN 1998
BY USAINSCOM FOIPA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

HA 19

AA05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HEADQUARTERS
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 154 US ARMY

D-567242/d

16 December 1955

SUBJECT: Sfs District BERLIN (C) (U)
Re: Modus Operandi

TO: Commanding Officer
Region VIII, 66th CIC Group
APO 742, US Army

1. Forwarded herewith in duplicate for your information and retention is a Region III, 66th CIC Group, Summary of Information, subject: East Zone Installation, Re: Railroad Transportation between BERLIN/CHEMNITZ, file as above, dated 8 December 1955.
2. Source of the attached report is identified as a carded source of this Group and is evaluated "F."
3. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL b6

1 Incl
SOI, Rgn III, dtd 8 Dec 55
(dupe)

b6

1st Lt, Armor
Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt M1 8371

b6 RLM/pa

M/R: Above fwd to Rgn VIII info of possible interest concerning Sfs M/O in checking on railway travellers between BERLIN and CHEMNITZ. Source of this info is V-106-III (temp). Coordinated w/Capt b6 Tech Spec.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 18 JUN 1988
BY USAINSCOM/FULPA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

0757 a.
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AF 24
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CIC CENTRAL FILE
158

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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D-567245/d

SUBJECT: Sfs Berirk DRESDEN

Re: Modus Operandi (Department II - Intelligence and Counterintelligence) (U) (C)

4. ~~(SECRET)~~ ^{CONF (U)} The [b1] was furnished with an extract of information pertaining to the [b6], with deletion of particulars which might pinpoint the source of the report, a carded informant of this Group. The [b1] was advised that any investigation at the present time on their part would be premature and might compromise a sensitive operation of this Group.

5. ~~(SECRET)~~ ^{CONF (U)} A discreet investigation will be conducted by this Group to identify [b6] and [b6]. No other distribution of information pertaining to these individuals has been made.

6. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~ ^(U) Request that information contained in attached report not be released to other allied intelligence agencies in its present form, in order to guarantee protection of a carded source of this Group.

7. (UNCLASSIFIED) Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

1 Incl

SOI dtd 21 Nov 55 (trip)

[b6]

1st Lt, Armor
Adjutant

Telephone: Stgt M11 8371

[b6] HLM/pa

M/R: Above fwd to G2 info concerning an Sfs attempt to penetrate the Bank Office, and an attempt to establish a cover apartment near the GEHLEN Group. Source is V-418-VIII, a penetration informant in Sfs DRESDEN. Source obtained info from personal contact with Lt [b6] and M/Sgt [b6], Dept II, DRESDEN, who are conducting a very discreet inves to ident [b6] and [b6]. Primary concern is to prevent compromise of V-418. Coor with Capt [b6] Tech Spec; Mr. [b6], C3; and S3 office.

0758

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

21 November 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567245/d

b6 /awt

SUBJECT

EGIS

SfS - Bezirk Dresden

Re: Modus Operandi (Department II - intelligence & counter intelligence)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. SfS BV (Bezirksverwaltung - District Office) Dresden:

a. During October 1955, Lieutenant [b6] (*) and Master Sergeant [b6] (*) of Department II (Intelligence and Counter intelligence) of the SfS BV Dresden, spent many days in investigations. An unidentified GM (Geheimer Mitarbeiter - secret co-worker) had informed [b6] and [b6] that a (Fnu) [b6] approximately 23 years of age, a former resident of DRESDEN (VS1257) who had fled to the Federal Republic of Germany, is now employed in the Political Information Department of the Ministry of Defense (Blank Ministry), presumably in BOWN. (LB6623). The investigation conducted by [b6] and [b6] revealed that (Fnu) [b6] is the son of [b6] approximately 47 years of age, also a former resident of DRESDEN who had fled to the Federal Republic of Germany, in the past. The investigation included interviews of all former contacts, associates and friends of [b6] who had been a departmental head in the Rat des Bezirkes (District Council) for DRESDEN in the past, and had also been a member of the Landesverband der VdGB Sachsen (Vereinigung der Gegenseitige Bauernhilfe - State association for Mutual Farmers' assistance). All previous contacts of [b6] in and near DRESDEN are being interviewed and studied for approach possibilities. At the end of October, the most likely contact appeared to be some unnamed woman with whom [b6] had had an illegitimate child in the past. The unidentified GM is expected to return to DRESDEN at the end of November or early in December 1955 with further information, at which time an approach contact to [b6] will be recruited.

b. An informant of [b6] (Fnu) [b6] approximately 60 years of age, is aiding in the recruitment attempt of [b6] s cousin, [b6] [b6] foreman in a factory making floor coverings, located either in MUNICH or PULLACH (QV1114). [b6] lives in [b6] at either [b6] [b6] hopes to recruit [b6] in order to establish a cover room in PULLACH, reputed to be near an operational headquarters of the Gehlen group.

Source "A"

0759

(C-3)

All persons identified with an asterisk (*) have been previously identified.

2. The files of Region VIII, 66th CIC Group, APO 742, have no additional information on personalities mentioned in this report.

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ON 18 JUN 1998

BY USAINSCOM FOIPA

Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.12

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**HEADQUARTERS REGION VIII
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 742 US ARMY**

CONFIDENTIAL

8 December 1955

D-567253/d/c

**SUBJECT: EGIS - Sfs - Bezirk Potsdam, Re: Modus Operandi
(Informant Recruiting Handling, etc.), EEI and Targets**

**TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: OE Division**

- T**
1. **REFERENCE:** TWX, I-9408.
 2. **FORWARDED:** SOI, dated 5 December 1955, subject and file as above.

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. **Source:** Source "A" b1

b1

b. **Evaluation of Source:** B.

c. **How information was obtained by Source:** Through an unidentified sub-source in the Potsdam Sfs office.

d. **Date Source obtained information:** From b1

b1

e. **Date agent received information:** b1

f. **Status of case:** Coverage of Sfs continues.

4. REMARKS:

a. b1

b1

0760

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Page 1 of 2 pages

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A A 12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

D-567253/d/c

8 Dec 55

SUBJECT: EGIS - SfS - Bezirk Potsdam, Re: Modus Operandi
(Informant Recruiting Handling, etc.), EEI and Targets

b1

b. The inclosed translations of the material from files of the SfS are as complete and accurate as possible considering the conditions noted above.

c. It has been noted that installations of the occupying powers were included in the EEI's of the SfS, but a thorough check of available information failed to indicate any developments in this respect. Otherwise, [b1] appears to have been diligent in collecting information.

d. Other reports based on additional material provided by the unidentified sub-source will also be forwarded.

e.

b1

b1

2 Incl

1. SOI, MO, w/10 incl thereto
2. SOI EEI

b6

Lt Col, Inf
Commanding

Berlin 42323/ [b6] /at/Ops

0761

-2-

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

ADJUTANT GENERAL

DATE
5 December 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team... D-567253/a

OPNS OFF

b6 /avl

SUBJECT

EGIS - Sfs
Bezirk Potsdam
Re: Modus Operandi (Informant
Recruiting, Handling, etc.)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. b1

b1

a. b1

b1

b. b1

b1

c. b1

b1

d. b1

b1

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

5 December 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CB Team, D-567253/d

b6 /awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - Sfs

Bezirk Potsdam

Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A

USUALLY RELIABLE B

FAIRLY RELIABLE C

NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D

UNRELIABLE E

RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1

PROBABLY TRUE 2

POSSIBLY TRUE 3

DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4

IMPROBABLE 5

TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

b1

b1

f.

b1

b1

(1)

b1

b1

(2)

b1

b1

(3)

b1

b1

(4)

b1

b1

(5)

b1

b1

(6)

b1

g.

b1

b1

h.

b1

b1

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
5 December 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567253/a

b6 /awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - SFS

Bezirk Potsdam

Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b1

1. b1

b1

Source "A"

(B-3)

2. The files of Region VIII, 66th CIC Group, APO 742, contain the following information concerning personalities mentioned in this report:

a. b1

b1

b. b1

b1

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WD AGO FORM 568
1 JUN 47

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
5 December 1955

PREPARING OFFICE
66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567253/d

b6 /awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - Sfs
Bezirk Potsdam
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

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c.

b1

b1

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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT/PRIVACY ACT
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Indicated below are one or more statements which provide a brief rationale for the deletion of this page.



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5 USC 552 (b)(1)


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Page(s) 766-778

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

December 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team, D-567254/3

b6

awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - Sfs

District Rostock

Re: Modus Operandi and Techniques

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Sfs Control of MTS (Maschinen-Traktoren Station - Machine Tractor Station) ROGGENTIN (UV1795): An undisclosed agent of Sfs BV (Bezirksverwaltung - District Office) ROSTOCK (UV1297), together with agents of Sfs KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-office) ROSTOCK, appear at the office of MTS ROGGENTIN about every other day to check the personnel files and inquire regarding MTS employees who request permission to travel in the German Federal Republic. If sabotage is suspected, the chief of the MTS or his representative is instructed to call the agricultural section of Sfs BV ROSTOCK, telephone number 2007.

(F-6)

Source "A"

2. Sfs recruitment of Source: In May 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant, given the cover name [b6] and was obliged to sign a statement wherein she agreed to work for the Sfs and to keep her work in this capacity a confidential matter. She met her handling agent three (3) times, either at her place of work, or on a street near an undisclosed hospital in ROSTOCK-Gehlsdorf, address unknown. She was instructed to visit pastor Fnu [b6] BARTH (UA5227), Am Markt, number unknown, and tell him that she was to be released from her place of work because of her religious convictions. She was to determine whether [b6] had connections with individuals residing in West BERLIN or the German Federal Republic. She met her handling agent last in late May 1955, and received no monetary compensation from the Sfs.

(F-6)

Source "D"

3. Sfs recruitment of Source: In August 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the Sfs and to keep his activity in this capacity a confidential matter. He met his handling agent from time to time on undisclosed streets in ROSTOCK, and received the mission of observing the political attitudes of his fellow workers at the nationalized Dieselmotorenwerk (Diesel Motor Works) in ROSTOCK, Schwaner Landstrasse 200. He submitted two (2) reports of a general nature and had his last contact with his handling agent in late October 1955. He received no financial support from the Sfs.

(F-6)

Source "I"

4. Sfs control of the Association for Sports and Technical Crafts in CAMPEHOF (n.c.a.): Member of Sfs KV BERGEN (UA9831), Fnu [b6] male,

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

7 December 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team D-567254/d

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SUBJECT

EGIS - Sfs

District Rostock

Re: Modus Operandi and Techniques

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

sometimes accompanied by Sfs member Fnu [b6] male, appeared once each week at the office of the Association for Sport and Technical Crafts in CAMPEHOF to examine personnel files and reports of meetings of the Association.

Source "L"

(F-6)

5. Sfs recruitment of Source: On 24 December 1954 Source was recruited as a part-time informant, given the cover name [b6], and was obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the Sfs and to keep his activities in this capacity a confidential matter. He met his handling agent once each week in the woods near SASSNITZ (VAL342), and was instructed to observe the political attitude of his fellow workers at the Fisch-Kombinat (Fishing industry union) SASSNITZ. Source had his last meeting with the handling agent in Spring 1955. He submitted no written reports and received no monetary compensation from the Sfs.

Source "M"

(F-6)

6. Region VIII files revealed the following: Fnu [b6] paragraph 4, is mentioned in SOI dated 2 August 1955, file D-329160; VIII-16540.13, Subject: Sfs Rostock, as an agent of Sfs KV BERGEN. (F-6) This individual may be identical with the [b6] mentioned in this report.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

6 December 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team, D-567242/d

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SUBJECT

EGIS - SFS
 Bezirk Berlin
 Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
 USUALLY RELIABLE B
 FAIRLY RELIABLE C
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
 UNRELIABLE E
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
 PROBABLY TRUE 2
 POSSIBLY TRUE 3
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
 IMPROBABLE 5
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Recruitment by SFS installation in BERLIN: In October 1954, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the SFS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source met his handling agent every two weeks on streets of East BERLIN, the last meeting taking place on 16 October 1955. Source was instructed to observe buildings at the following addresses: BERLIN-Charlottenburg (British Sector), Olympische Strasse 9; Source reported there were no name plates at the entrance door; BERLIN-Charlottenburg, Warnenweg 4; Source reported that this is a military billet; BERLIN-Tiergarten (British Sector), Tiergarten Strasse 48; Source reported that this is an office building; BERLIN-Konradshoehe (French Sector), Stoesserstrasse 16-18; Source reported the exact location of the house. Also, Source was ordered to ascertain the country to which a military mission located at BERLIN-Grunewald (British Sector), Taubert Strasse, number unknown, belongs, and Source reported that the mission is Yugoslavian. Furthermore, Source was told to investigate the possibility of photographing a house located at BERLIN-Zehlendorf (US Sector), Sven-Hedin-Strasse 7-11; Source reported that doing this would be difficult to accomplish, but it was made known to Source that Source would receive a camera on 26 October 1955 for this purpose. In addition, Source received the mission of confirming the addresses of [b6] residing at [b6] (US Sector), [b6] and [b6] residing at [b6] (US Sector), [b6] also Source was to determine whether these persons work for US agencies. Source did not carry this mission out. He defected to West BERLIN on 26 October 1955. Source received no financial remuneration from the SFS.

Source "A"

(F-6)

2. Recruitment by SFS installation in BERLIN: On 12 October 1955, Source was arrested by the SFS, taken to the VP (Volkspolizei - People's Police) inspection station at BERLIN-Mitte (Soviet Sector), Magazinstrasse, number unknown, and was recruited as a part-time informant and obliged to sign a statement wherein she agreed to work for the SFS and to keep her work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source was assigned the mission of luring an alleged employee of an American intelligence agency in West BERLIN to East BERLIN; Source was to receive detailed instructions on how to carry out this mission on 2 November 1955 at the "Franziskaner" cafe located at BERLIN-Mitte, Friedrichstrasse, number unknown, but she defected instead.

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Source "C" ON 18 JUN 1998

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(F-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE: 6 December 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, OE Team, D-567242/d

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SUBJECT

EGIS - SFS
 Bezirk Berlin
 Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE

COMPLETELY RELIABLE
 USUALLY RELIABLE
 FAIRLY RELIABLE
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
 UNRELIABLE
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

OF INFORMATION

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
 PROBABLY TRUE
 POSSIBLY TRUE
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE
 IMPROBABLE
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

3. Recruitment by SFS installation in BERLIN. In early August 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement wherein she agreed to work for the SFS and to keep her work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source met her handling agent two (2) times on streets of BERLIN-Mitte, the last meeting taking place on 18 October 1955. Source was assigned the mission of telephoning the SFS, using telephone numbers 63 28 41 or 63 28 61, in case a defected member of the KVP (Kasernierte Volkspolizei - Garrisoned People's Police) returned to the GDR to visit his parents.

Source "D"

(P-6)

4. Recruitment by SFS installation in BERLIN. On 9 September 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement wherein she agreed to work for the SFS and to keep her work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source was given the cover name "Patsner". Source met her handling agent two (2) times, once in late September 1955 and again on 6 October 1955, at the "Astoria" Cafe, located at BERLIN-Frenslauerberg (Soviet Sector), Kastanienallee, number unknown. Source received the mission of supplying information regarding the social activities of two employees of a GDR government guest house, but Source did not carry it out. Source received no financial remuneration from the SFS.

Source "I"

(P-6)

5. Recruitment by SFS installation in BERLIN. On 22 October 1955, Source was summoned to Police Station Number 92, located at BERLIN-Friedrichshain (Soviet Sector), Mueggelstrasse, number unknown, and was recruited as a part-time informant for the SFS without having to sign a statement obliging Source in any way. Source's next meeting with his handling agent was scheduled for 28 October 1955 at BERLIN-Friedrichshain, corner of Mueggelstrasse and Scharnweberstrasse, but instead of making this appointment, Source defected to West BERLIN on 28 October 1955.

Source "M"

(P-6)

6. Recruitment by SFS installation in BERLIN. On 30 August 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the SFS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source met his handling agent about eight (8) times on streets of East BERLIN, in neighborhoods other than

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SUMMARY C. INFORMATION

DATE

6 Dec 55

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team, D-567242/d

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SUBJECT

KGIS - SFS
 Bezirk Berlin
 Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE	OF INFORMATION		
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Source's own. Source was assigned the mission of contacting the KgU (Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit - Fighting Group Against Inhumanity); to accomplish this mission, Source was instructed to contact Katharina DUKEWITZ nee BRESKE, born 28 November 1903, residing at BERLIN-Tempelhof, Wittekindstrasse 19g with her husband, Felix DUKEWITZ, about 62 years of age, an employee of the Tempelhof air terminal in BERLIN-Tempelhof, and also Eugen SCHWECK, a bookkeeper, about 65 years of age, residing at BERLIN-Reinickendorf (French Sector) Olbrichweg, number unknown. Source does not know how DUKEWITZ or SCHWECK could aid Source in establishing contact with the KgU. Source carried out his mission only to the extent of visiting SCHWECK; Source did not inform SCHWECK of his mission. Even though Source submitted about eight (8) reports to the Sfs, he received no monetary compensation for his efforts.

Source "S"

(P-6)

7. Recruitment by SFS installation in BERLIN: On 23 August 1955, in her home, Source was recruited as a part-time SFS informant without having to sign a statement obliging herself in any way. Source was ordered to attempt to induce her fiancé, a former member of the VP in LEIPZIG (US1891) who had defected to the German Federal Republic, to return to the GDR. Instead of fulfilling her mission, Source traveled to FRANKFURT/Main (MA7752), where Source's fiancé is residing, and informed her fiancé and the FRANKFURT/Main police of her mission. Source received no financial compensation from the SFS.

Source "U"

(P-6)

8. Region VIII files revealed no information regarding the personalities or telephone numbers mentioned in this report.

9. Investigation by Source "AA" revealed the following:

a. BERLIN-Charlottenburg, Olympische Strasse 9, paragraph 1. BERLIN-Charlottenburg, Olympische Strasse 9 is a two (2) story, private home. Name plates on the front gate of the house bear the names b6 and

b6

b. BERLIN-Charlottenburg, Warnowweg 4, paragraph 1. BERLIN-Charlottenburg, Warnowweg 4, is a three (3) story house located near the NAIFI Club, and is probably used as a private dwelling by British personnel.

c. BERLIN-Tiergarten, Tiergarten Strasse 48, paragraph 1. BERLIN-

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SUMMARY C. INFORMATION		DATE
PREPARING OFFICE 66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team, D-567242/d		6 Dec 55
SUBJECT EQIS - SFS Bezirk Berlin Re: Modus Operandi		b6 awt
CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION		
OF SOURCE		OF INFORMATION
COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
Tiergarten, Tiergarten Strasse 48 is the location of the Danish Military Mission to West BERLIN.		
d. BERLIN-Konradshoeh, Stoesserstrasse 16-18, paragraph 1. BERLIN-Konradshoeh, Stoesserstrasse 16-18 is the location of the Belgian Military Mission to West BERLIN.		
e. BERLIN-Zehlendorf, Sven-Hedin-Strasse 7-11, paragraph 1. BERLIN-Zehlendorf, Sven-Hedin-Strasse 7-11 is a house used by the US Military Mission to POTSDAM.		
(B-2)		
10. Files of Agency "A" revealed the following:		
a. [b6] paragraph 1. [b6] born [b6] in [b6] (n.c.a.), was mentioned as a target of an Sfs mission assigned to [b6] born [b6] On 7 November 1955, [b6] was given protection by Agency "A" against any Sfs abduction attempt at McNair Barracks, located at BERLIN-Lichterfelde (US Sector), Goers Allee 190-238. On 21 November 1955, a letter was written to Agency "A" by the firm "Herfurth," located at HAMBURG-Altona (NE6536), Beerenweg 6-8, requesting information regarding [b6] for the purpose of considering him for employment.		
b. BINGEL, Fnu, Dr., paragraph 9a. Dr. Rudolf BINGEL, born 2 June 1882 in WIESBADEN, has not appeared in the files since 1945. His wife, Frieda BINGEL nee JOOST, born 15 April 1883 in WIESBADEN, formerly residing at BERLIN-Charlottenburg, Olympische Strasse 9, died on 3 January 1955 in BERLIN. (Region VIII files revealed in an unevaluated trace dated 15 October 1946 that Rudolf BINGEL, born 2 June 1882 in WIESBADEN, a NSDAP (National-socialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei - National Socialist German Workers' Party) member and functionary, died in a Soviet internment camp in 1945.)		
c. DUKEWITZ, Katharina nee BRESKE, paragraph 6. Katharina DUKEWITZ nee BRESKE, born 28 December 1903 in STETTIN, has resided at BERLIN-Tempelhof, Wittekindstrasse 19g since 29 October 1938.		
d. THOMAS, Gerhard, paragraph 1. Gerhard THOMAS, born 21 July 1905 in BRESLAU (X34364), was mentioned as a target of a Sfs mission assigned to [b6] (see paragraph 10a above), born [b6] On 7 November 1955, THOMAS was given protection by Agency "A" against any Sfs abduction attempt at McNair Barracks, located at BERLIN-Lichterfelde, Goers Allee 190-238. On 23 July 1954, one [b6] born [b6] in [b6]		
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SUMMARY INFORMATION		DATE
PREPARING OFFICE		6 Dec 55
66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567242/d		b6
SUBJECT		awt
EGIS - SFS Bezirk Berlin Re: Modus Operandi		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION: COMPLETELY RELIABLE A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . 1 USUALLY RELIABLE B PROBABLY TRUE 2 FAIRLY RELIABLE C POSSIBLY TRUE 3 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4 UNRELIABLE E IMPROBABLE 5 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
<p>was accused of swindling THOMAS in an automobile sale.</p> <p>e. WICHERT, Fnu, Dr., paragraph 9a. Dr. Ernst Karl Albert WICHERT, born 20 September 1897 in BERLIN, residing at BERLIN-Charlottenburg, Olympische Strasse 9 since 1 August 1954, is a West BERLIN Senatopräsident (Senat president).</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(B-2)</p> <p>11. Files of Agency "B" revealed the following:</p> <p>a. [b6] paragraph 1. [b6] born [b6] in [b6] n.c.s.), residing at [b6] [b6] was an electronics technician employed by Signal Section, Supply and Maintenance Branch, at McNair Barracks, BERLIN-Lichterfelde, from 30 September 1954 to 1 April 1955. (B-2)</p> <p>b. THOMAS, Gerhard, paragraph 1. Gerhard THOMAS, born 21 July 1905 in BRESLAU, residing at BERLIN-Tempelhof, Renate-Privat Strasse 1, has been an electronics technician employed by Signal Section, Supply and Maintenance Branch, at McNair Barracks, BERLIN-Lichterfelde, since 20 February 1954. (B-2)</p>		
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HEADQUARTERS REGION XI
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 800 US ARMY

FILE: XI-393060

1 December 1955

SUBJECT: Miscellaneous Information for CE Division (U)
Re: List of Wanted Persons of DDR

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: CE Division

CIC
567241

1. REFERENCE: Letter, Region XI, dated 18 January 1955, Subject: Sfs, DDR, Re: Bezirk Halle, file XI-329154.

2. FORWARDED: One (1) Agent Report, dated 1 December 1955, subject and file as above.

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION: As stated in the attached report with the following exceptions:

- a. Sources: Source "A" is V-500-XI; Source "B" is b1 born b1 in b1 UU 9220.
- b. Reliability of Sources: V-500-XI is usually reliable; the reliability of b1 is unknown.
- c. Relationship of Sources to Target: V-500-XI is using b1 in current efforts to contact a former friend of hers who is still in the DDR; b1 was formerly employed in the office handling this work.
- d. How Information Was Obtained: By b1 through her official duties while in the DDR.
- e. When Information Was Obtained: In 1951.
- f. Date Information Was Reported to Agent: 22 November 1955.
- g. Other Data Affecting Accuracy of Information: None.
- h. Status of Case: Investigation continues.

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A B 12
A 83

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FILE: XI-393060

1 December 1955

SUBJECT: Miscellaneous Information for OE Division (U)

Re: List of Wanted Persons of DDR

h. REMARKS:

a. All details relative to b1 has been reported to your office.

b. Regrading data cannot be predetermined.

1 Incl:

AR, Rgn XI, dtd 1 Dec 55

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Commanding

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mmw/wu M324 835

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1-CIC Central File

1-Region XI File

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AGENT REPORT

(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Miscellaneous Information for X Division
Re: List of Wanted Persons of DDR

2. DATE SUBMITTED

1 December 1955

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER

XI-393060

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

. On 22 November 1955, Source "A" learned the following information from Source "B" relative to SUBJECT:

a. The Lists of Wanted Persons in the DDR is printed in the Government's Printing Enterprise (Staatsdruckerei) in East BERLIN UU 9220 and sent to the Police Headquarters (Polizei - Praesidium) in East BERLIN. From there the Lists are forwarded to Kreis Police Offices, direct. It is not known whether lists are sent to the Sfs offices from another bureau or whether the kreis police offices provide them with a copy. The main police office in a kreis distribute the books to police stations within the kreis.

b. The lists contain all persons wanted by legal authorities plus the personal documentation reported lost by name and number. No refugees who had fled from the DDR were listed.

c. Only one copy of the lists was known to Source "B". The existence of a confidential or secret list was not known. Lists were reprinted each year in the fall with irregular supplements added at three month intervals.

(F-6)

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6 S/A
66th CIC Group

b6
for b6

DA FORM 341
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

AGL (1) 12-52-200M-30093

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team, D-5672557d

DATE

10 November 1955

b6

SUBJECT

EGIS - Sfs

Bezirk Schwerin

Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
 USUALLY RELIABLE B
 FAIRLY RELIABLE C
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
 UNRELIABLE E
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
 PROBABLY TRUE 2
 POSSIBLY TRUE 3
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
 IMPROBABLE 5
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Recruitment by Sfs installation in SCHWERIN (PE6045): In April 1952, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obligated to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the Sfs and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source met his handling agents weekly on streets of SCHWERIN, the last meeting taking place on 31 July 1952. He was instructed to observe his fellow workers and Source submitted four (4) reports on them. Also, Source was ordered to attempt to induce a locomotive engineer, who had defected to West BERLIN in early 1952, to return to the GDR. Source reported this mission to the KgU (Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit - Fighting Group Against Inhumanity) in West BERLIN, but the KgU did not believe Source. Source returned to SCHWERIN and was promptly arrested by the Sfs on grounds of having contacted the KgU. However, Source was soon released by the Sfs. Source received no financial remuneration from the Sfs.

Source "P"

(F-6)

2. Recruitment by Sfs KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-office) GUESTROW (UV1465): In June 1953, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obligated to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the Sfs and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source met his handling agent monthly on streets of GUESTROW and was last contacted in early August 1955. Source was instructed to observe the political attitude of the public, on which he submitted five (5) reports. Also, he was directed to observe the mayors of SCHLIEFENBERG (UV2865) and RADAN (n.c.a.), on whom he submitted two (?) general reports. In addition, Source was ordered to observe the MTS (Maschinen Traktoren Station - machine tractor station) at VIETGEST (UV2561), but Source did not carry out this mission. Source received approximately 30 DM East from the Sfs for his activities.

Source "O"

(F-6)

3. Technique of Sfs KV HAGENOW (PE4523): Approximately once a month, but at irregular intervals, an agent of Sfs KV HAGENOW appears at the telephone amplifying station in VELLAHN (PE3019) to inspect security measures there. Approximately once every three months the same agent inspects personnel files of the station.

Source "R"

(F-6)

4. Recruitment by Sfs KV LUEBZ (UVO228): In September 1953, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obligated to sign a statement

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
30 November 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567255/d

b6

awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - Sfs
Bazirk Schwerin
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	...	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	...	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	...	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	...	D
UNRELIABLE	...	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	...	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

wherein she agreed to work for the Sfs and to keep her work in this capacity a confidential matter. She was assigned the cover name b6. She met her handling agent about every four (4) weeks on the streets of LUEBZ. From January to July 1955, Source was not contacted by the Sfs, apparently because she had changed her place of work. Source received no monetary compensation from the Sfs.

Source "T"

(F-6)

5. Sfs KV LUDWIGSLUST (PE6712):

a. Recruitment: In June or July 1954, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obligated to sign a statement wherein she agreed to work for the Sfs and to keep her work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source was assigned the cover name b6. Her handling agent appeared every two weeks at Source's place of work to pick up Source's reports, which had to be signed with Source's cover name.

b. Techniques: Agents of the Sfs KV LUDWIGSLUST frequently appear at the Kreis (sub-district) Police Headquarters in LUDWIGSLUST to check personnel records of the Headquarters and files of the Pass and Registration Section. Even if the agents are known personally to members of the Headquarters, the agents are required to show their Sfs credentials in order to get information. Also, the agents must first contact the head of the Headquarters before they are able to get information.

Source "U"

(F-6)

6. Recruitment by Sfs KV LUDWIGSLUST: On 27 July 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obligated to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the Sfs and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source met his handling agent weekly on streets of LUDWIGSLUST and had the last meeting on 26 October 1955. Source received the mission of observing his fellow workers, on whom he submitted approximately five (5) reports of a general nature. Source received no monetary compensation from the Sfs.

Source "V"

0790

(F-6)

7. Recruitment by Sfs KV PERLEBERG (PD9285): On 12 August 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obligated to sign a statement wherein she agreed to work for the Sfs and to keep her work in

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

30 November 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567255/d

b6

SUBJECT

EGIS - Sfs
 Bezirk Schwerin
 Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
 USUALLY RELIABLE B
 FAIRLY RELIABLE C
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
 UNRELIABLE E
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
 PROBABLY TRUE 2
 POSSIBLY TRUE 3
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
 IMPROBABLE 5
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

this capacity a confidential matter. Source met her handling agent every two weeks, the last meeting taking place on 27 October 1955. She received the mission of observing her fellow workers, on whom she submitted two (2) reports of a general nature. Source received no financial remuneration from the Sfs.

Source "AA"

(P-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

10 November 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team, D-567252/a

b6

/awt

SUBJECT

EGIS - Sfs
 Bezirk Neubrandenburg
 Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE
 USUALLY RELIABLE
 FAIRLY RELIABLE
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
 UNRELIABLE
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

A
 B
 C
 D
 E
 F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
 PROBABLY TRUE
 POSSIBLY TRUE
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE
 IMPROBABLE
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Sfs installation in NEUBRANDENBURG (UV85360). In January 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant at her place of work, the VEB (Volkseigener Betrieb - Nationalized Enterprise) Local Wholesale Company located at NEUBRANDENBURG, Speicherstrasse 8. She was obliged to sign a statement wherein she agreed to work for the Sfs and to keep her work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source met her handling agent about every four (4) weeks at street corners in NEUBRANDENBURG and in public places, the last time on or about 26 July 1955. Source received no money for her Sfs services.

Source "A"

(F-6)

2. Sfs installation in NEUBRANDENBURG. In May 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the Sfs and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source met his handling agent about ten (10) times at a cover apartment located at [b6] and had the last meeting at the beginning of August 1955. Source received a total of 40 DM East from the Sfs.

Source "G"

(F-6)

3. Sfs KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-office) UECKERMUEHDE (VV3755). On 11 or 12 August 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant with the cover name [b6] and obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the Sfs and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. He received a general mission to be accomplished at his place of work and later received two (2) additional missions requiring him to travel to West BERLIN and to the German Federal Republic, where he was to perform his mission by meeting [b6] whose husband is a driver with a British firm in the Rhineland, further details unknown to Source. Source met his handling agent four (4) times at the Town Administration of TORPELOW (VV3443), Bahnhofstrasse, number unknown. Source received no money from the Sfs.

Source "T"

(F-6)

4. Region VIII files revealed no information pertaining to the personality mentioned in this report.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 30 November 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team, D-567252/b

b6 /bwt

SUBJECT

EGIS - Sfs
 Bezirk Neubrandenburg
 Re: Administration

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION:

OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:
COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Liaison between Sfs installation in NEUBRANDENBURG (UV8536) and the Homicide Squad of the VP (Volkspolizei - People's Police) in NEUBRANDENBURG: An Sfs representative sits in on interrogations conducted by the Homicide Squad in important murder cases or in cases involving politics. There are no regularly scheduled meetings between Sfs and Homicide Squad personnel.

Source "F"

(F-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 23 November 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567245/d

b6

awt

SUBJECT

EGIS
SfS - District Dresden
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Recruitment by SfS installation in DRESDEN (VS1257): On 24 March 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obligated to sign a statement wherein she agreed to work for the SfS and to keep her work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source met her handling agent every two weeks on streets of DRESDEN, the last meeting taking place on 14 September 1955. Source was assigned the mission of observing the employees and visitors of her working place, on whom she submitted about 10 reports of a general nature. She received 100 DM East per month from the SfS.

Source "B"

(F-6)

2. Recruitment by SfS installation in DRESDEN: In December 1953, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obligated to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the SfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source met his handling agent weekly on streets of ZWICKAU (US6424), the last meeting taking place in January 1954. Source was ordered to submit reports on fellow employees at his working place, but he did not carry out this mission. He received no financial remuneration from the SfS.

Source "E"

(F-6)

3. Recruitment by SfS installation in DRESDEN: On 24 October 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obligated to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the SfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source met his handling agent one additional time, on 28 October 1955, in a cover apartment located in [redacted] Source was assigned the mission of observing the guests of a restaurant, on whom he submitted one (1) report of a general nature. Source received no monetary compensation from the SfS.

Source "G"

(F-6)

4. Recruitment by SfS installation in DRESDEN: In early October 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obligated to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the SfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source met his handling agent twice on streets of DRESDEN, the last meeting taking place on 10 October 1955. Source was ordered to report on fellow employees of his working place, a mission Source did not carry out. Source received no financial remuneration from the SfS.

Source "H"

(F-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

23 November 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567245/d

CTG/awt

SUBJECT

EGIS
SfS - District Dresden
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

5. Recruitment by SfS installation in DRESDEN: In Summer 1954, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obligated to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the SfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source was assigned the cover name "Siegfried". He met his handling agent weekly at Source's working place or in restaurants of DRESDEN. Source received no monetary compensation from the SfS.

Source "K"

(F-6)

6. Recruitment by SfS KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-office) BISCHOF-SWERDA (VS4365): In the middle of 1951 Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obligated to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the SfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source received the cover name "Anatom". Source was ordered to report on conditions at his working place, but, because Source was transferred several times in his job from one locality to another, he had practically no contact with a handling agent from 1951 to 1953, and during this time Source submitted only five (5) or six (6) reports. In the middle of 1953 Source was approached by an SfS agent who reminded Source of his obligation, and Source subsequently met this agent six (6) times in the town hall of NEUSTADT (VS4553), at which meetings Source gave only verbal, general reports. Source received no financial remuneration from the SfS.

Source "Q"

(F-6)

7. Technique of SfS KV GOERLITZ (VS9967): About two (2) times per week an SfS agent appears at the Second Elementary School, NIESKY (VS9782), and queries the Pionierleiter (Pioneer leader) of the school concerning the political attitude of the pupils. At irregular intervals the Pionierleiter is required to attend political classes on principles of Marxism which are held for all Pionierleiter of Kreise Goerlitz and Niesky at SfS KV GOERLITZ.

Source "T"

(F-6)

8. Recruitment by SfS KV LOEBAU (VS7761): On 2 September 1955, Source was approached by an SfS agent on a street of LOEBAU, was taken in an automobile to the VP (Volkspolizei - People's Police) headquarters located at LOEBAU, Richard Mueller Strasse, and was asked to report on the political attitude of former residents of Silesia who now are living in the Loebau area. Source was not required to sign an obligation. Source

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

25 November 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567245/a

b6

awt

SUBJECT

EGIS
SfS - District Dresden
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

met his handling agent on two more occasions, and the next meeting was to have taken place on 24 October 1955 but Source defected to West BERLIN.

Source "BB"

(F-6)

9. Recruitment by SfS KV ZITTAU (VS8738): On 14 May 1955, while imprisoned for having defected to West BERLIN, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obligated to sign a statement wherein she agreed to work for the SfS and to keep her work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source was released from prison on 17 May 1955, and received the mission of having intimate relations with KVP (Kasernierte Volkspolizei - Garrisoned People's Police) members with the object of discovering potential defectors among them. Source did not carry out this mission and was arrested. Source had been meeting her handling agent daily in her home. She received no financial remuneration from the SfS.

Source "HH"

(F-6)

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HEADQUARTERS, REGION VIII
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 742 US ARMY

D-567241/d

22 November 1955

SUBJECT: EOIS - Sfs Headquarters Main Department VIII,
Re: Modus Operandi

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: CE Division

CICC
567241

1. FORWARDED: SOI, dated 17 November 1955, subject and file as above.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

- a. Source: Source "A", V-415-VIII; Source "B", IOUSCOB.
- b. Evaluation of Sources: Source "A", C; Source "B", B.
- c. How information was obtained by Source: Personal contact.
- d. Date Sources obtained information: "A", from 15 October to 6 November 1955.
- e. Date agent received information: 15 October to 6 November 1955.
- f. Other data affecting accuracy of information: X-43-VIII obtained the information provided by the b1
b1 X-43-VIII is evaluated B.
- g. Status of case: Coverage of Sfs continues.

3. REMARKS:

0797

- a. Agency "A" is 7983d Army Unit.
- b. No information has yet been developed on the unnamed individual living at Wangenheimstrasse 3, BERLIN-Grunewald (para 1).

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D-567241/4

22 Nov 55

SUBJECT: EGIS - Sfs Headquarters Main Department VIII,
Re: Modus Operandi

who may be employed by some Allied agency. If information is received indicating that any resident of that particular house is connected with an Allied intelligence agency, it will be forwarded separately.

c. Reference is made to Karl SCHMOK, listed in paragraph 2 of the report as being under surveillance by Sfs. Records checks indicate that Karl SCHMOK died in 1932. His son and daughter still live at the Residenzstrasse address, which may indicate that one or the other may have been observed by Sfs, and followed home, and then the name obtained from the name plate by the door. The name Karl SCHMOK, in association with the address, did not evoke positive indication of interest from any local US agency to date. A check will be initiated to determine if either the son or daughter is of interest to any US agency.

d. No interest has yet been developed in [b6] and [b6] listed in the confession of some unidentified man arrested by Sfs, who had listed these people in his confession as friends or associates. Identity of the man arrested has not been established. Because of the likelihood that V-416-VIII has been arrested by Sfs and subjected to detailed interrogation, the check of these names in Region VIII registry included a check of the Top Secret files, with negative results.

e. No interest has arisen in connection with the address on Soldinerstrasse, US agencies replying negatively to a Region VIII query in that connection.

f. The address listed in paragraph 5 of the report is that of a villa assigned to the 7983d Army Unit. However, V-415-VIII, in making the sketch of the villa, noticed that Military Police radio vehicles passed along Biesalskistrasse quite frequently at irregular intervals, and that in addition, the house was guarded by a uniformed policeman (Industrial Police), leading V-415-VIII to state in his report to Sfs that observation of the villa would be highly difficult.

g. A query for operational interest on the part of other US agencies in [b6] mentioned in paragraph 6, produced negative results.

0798

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D-567241/a

22 Nov 55

SUBJECT: ECIS - Sfs Headquarters Main Department VIII,
Re: Modus Operandi

h. The precise identity of [b6] has not yet been determined by V-415-VIII, who stated in meetings with his Region VIII handling agent that the People's Policeman (whose identity as [b6] has not been revealed to him by Sfs) visited either [b6] or [b6]. The activities of 2 November, mentioned in paragraph 7 of this report, when V-415-VIII was scheduled to follow [b6] to [b6] and the observation of [b6] by another investigator, prompted V-415-VIII to state with emphasis that the Sfs must have a penetration source who had provided Sfs such specific information concerning meetings, indicating addresses and meeting points. It is noted that V-415-VIII lists the Sybelstrasse address as 44, and 7983d gives it as 45, stating that it is a large apartment house. This minor difference can easily arise, when the numbers run consecutively on one side of the street with several assigned to one building. Inasmuch as the surveillance of Sybelstrasse on 2 November was ineffective, no further information has been forwarded to the 7983d AU. The 7983d AU is aware of Sfs interest in [b6] but claim to have no contact with him.

1 Incl

SOI dtd 17 Nov 55 (1)

[b6]

Lt Col, Inf
Commanding

Berlin 42323/[b6]/at/Ops

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
17 November 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567241/d

TEV/awt

SUBJECT

EGIS
SfS Headquarters
Main Department VIII
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. On 15 October 1955, Main Department VIII surveillance of an unidentified man led them to BERLIN-Grunewald (British Sector), Wangenheimstrasse 3, where the object of surveillance made contact with a man approximately 35 years of age, 5'6" tall, with wavy blond hair, a long nose and thin face. The latter individual was then placed under surveillance for approximately a week to ascertain his place of employment and other particulars. The resident of Wangenheimerstrasse 3 is suspected of being a source handling agent or recruiting agent for some Western intelligence agency.

2. On or about 18 October 1955, Main Department VIII dispatched an investigator to BERLIN-Reinickendorf (French Sector), Residenzstrasse 144, to sketch the location of the house, its entrances and exits, for the purpose of ascertaining all possible points affording inconspicuous surveillance of the house. An engineer, [b6] suspected of being in contact with some Western intelligence agency, allegedly lives on the third floor, left, of this house. On or about 19 October 1955, the same investigator was dispatched to Residenzstrasse 144 to effect a face to face meeting with [b6] under a reasonable pretext, to enable the investigator to describe [b6] and to recognize him in the future. [b6] was not to be reached on that day.

3. On or about 19 October 1955, Main Department VIII dispatched an investigator to BERLIN-Schoeneberg (US Sector) to verify the following names as being established residents at the given addresses, all of which are in Schoeneberg:

[b6]

Erwin WINKLER, Hauptstrasse 21

[b6]

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These three names had been obtained by SfS from an unnamed man, recently arrested by the SfS. The arrested man had named these people as friends or associates. The investigator was dispatched to verify the names to check the arrested man's confession as being factual.

4. On or about 21 October 1955, Main Department VIII dispatched an investigator to BERLIN-Wedding (French Sector), to make a sketch of the house at Soldinerstrasse 43, to indicate all positions on the sketch affording unobtrusive observation of the house. An unidentified resident of the house is suspected of contact with persons in the Soviet Sector of BERLIN.

5. On or about 24 October 1955, Main Department VIII dispatched an investigator to sketch a villa located at Biesalskistrasse 19, in BERLIN.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

17 November 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567241/a

b6

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SUBJECT

EGIS

SfS Headquarters

Main Department VIII

Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Zehlendorf (US Sector). The sketch was to include the villa and surroundings, and to indicate points affording inconspicuous observation of the entrances and exits. This villa is considered by SfS to be a cover residence for operational activity of an American or British agent.

6. On or about 25 October 1955, Main Department VIII assigned investigators to surveillance of an unnamed employee of the Amt fuer Wasserwissenschaft (office for research concerning water supply). The target of surveillance was designated b6 and was described as being approximately 30 years of age, with dark blond hair, approximately 5'7" tall, and having a residence on Schoenhouse Allee in BERLIN-Prenzlauer Berg (Soviet Sector), number unknown. b6 is suspected of having contact with some Western intelligence agency.

7. On 29 October 1955, Main Department VIII resumed surveillance of a man identified as either b6 or b6, resident of the third floor of the house at b6 (British Sector). Approximately two months ago an unidentified member of the People's Police visited the address on b6 in the company of a b6. The People's Policeman had been suspected of contact with some Western intelligence agency, and had been followed to a meeting in West BERLIN with b6 and then he and b6 were followed to the house on b6. On 2 November 1955, the investigator assigned to the observation of b6 (or b6) at the Kantstrasse address was told to anticipate the departure of b6 from quarters shortly prior to 2000 hours, when he would proceed to a meeting of other sources of the same Western intelligence agency in a house located at Sybelstrasse 44, BERLIN-Charlottenburg, approximately a quarter-mile away from the b6 address. A meeting of three or four sources was to occur at approximately 2000 hours, and the investigator was instructed to follow some unidentified member of the group to his or her home, to locate it and ascertain the name of the contact if possible. Simultaneously with this surveillance, another investigator was dispatched to the Halensee bridge near the Westkreuz S-bahn (city rail line) station, to observe a meeting scheduled to occur at approximately 2000 hours. According to information in the possession of Main Department VIII, the People's Policeman already under surveillance was to meet some unidentified American or British agent on the Halensee bridge at 2000 hours. The investigator was instructed to observe the meeting to obtain a description of the American or British agent met by the People's Policeman, the description of the vehicle (including the license number), and to note whether or not the People's Policeman left the scene in the vehicle. Following this, the investigator was to join his colleague at the Sybelstrasse 44 address to join him in the observation.

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568

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 17 November 1955

PREPARING OFFICE:

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team... D-567241/d

b6 /awt

SUBJECT

EGIS
SfS Headquarters
Main Department VIII
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE
A COMPLETELY RELIABLE
B USUALLY RELIABLE
C FAIRLY RELIABLE
D NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
E UNRELIABLE
F RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

OF INFORMATION

A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
B PROBABLY TRUE
C POSSIBLY TRUE
D DOUBTFULLY TRUE
E IMPROBABLE
F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

On the night of 2 November, [b6] did not attend the meeting at Sybelstrasse. The other surveillance was unsuccessful because the observation point was some 100 yards distant from the point where a vehicle was seen to stop, the driver receive an envelope from the People's Policeman, who then departed on foot hastily, avoiding further surveillance. The vehicle remained standing and very soon another vehicle stopped some 30 yards to the rear of the first. An unidentified man from the second vehicle approached the driver of the first for what appeared to be a short conversation, following which both vehicles drove off, after the second had left one man at the meeting place. The latter appeared to be checking the area carefully, leading the SfS investigator to conclude that he had been observed, so he left quickly, and by circuitous route joined his colleague in the vicinity of the [b6] address. Both investigators then returned to the Soviet Sector of BERLIN to avoid compromise or observation. On 5 November, surveillance of the [b6] address was resumed because SfS was of the opinion that [b6] (or [b6]) and the People's Policeman were meeting there on that evening, and that they would possibly leave the house and go to the Soviet Sector of BERLIN. In such an event, they were to be followed into the Soviet Sector, and pointed out to the police, who would apprehend the pair. The surveillance on 5 November was unproductive.

8. On or about 6 November 1955, Main Department VIII opened surveillance on an employee of the "Investitions" Bank in POTSDAM (UU6908). The subject of the surveillance was described as being approximately 5'10" tall, with brown hair, deep-set eyes, and wearing glasses. His residence was given as [b6]. He is suspected of having contact with some Western intelligence agency.

Source "A"

(C-3)

9. Available official West BERLIN Police Praesidium records contain the following information:

a. [b6] born [b6] is a resident of [b6] (US Sector), [b6] living there with her mother, Luise PIESKE nee STARKE, born 3 May 1901 in HAVELBERG (UU0357), and her sister, Frieda PIESKE, born 19 July 1907 in BERLIN-Schoeneberg. Hertha is of German citizenship and nationality, single, has no profession, is a Protestant by religious preference and has the West BERLIN identity card 172/1912/53, re-issued on 23 July 1953. Otto PIESKE, born 7 September 1876 in HAVELBERG, father of [b6] died on 4 August 1945. [b6] has no criminal record.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE: 17 November 1955

PREPARING OFFICE:

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567241/d

b6 /awt

SUBJECT:

EGIS

SfS Headquarters

Main Department VIII

Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE
USUALLY RELIABLE
FAIRLY RELIABLE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
UNRELIABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

OF INFORMATION

A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
B PROBABLY TRUE
C POSSIBLY TRUE
D DOUBTFULLY TRUE
E IMPROBABLE
F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b. Erwin Wilhelm WINKLER, born 19 October 1905 in BERLIN-Eriedrichshain, a chauffeur by occupation, is a resident of BERLIN-Schoenberg, Hauptstrasse 21. On 12 August 1954, WINKLER married Helene August Wilhelmine BERGMANN, divorced from a (Fnu) LUCKOW. Helene WINKLER nee BERGMANN was born 27 July 1902 in BAERLIN/Kreis Ruppini (M44276). Wilhelm WINKLER, born 9 November 1873, is the father of Erwin WINKLER, and his mother is Alwine WINKLER nee RICHTER, who was born 10 July 1874. Erwin WINKLER is German by citizenship and nationality and has the West BERLIN identity card 174/1778/54, issued on 16 August 1954. Erwin WINKLER has no criminal record.

c. [redacted] born [redacted] in [redacted] (n.c.a.), an auto mechanic by trade, is the son of [redacted] and [redacted] nee [redacted] [redacted] is German by citizenship and nationality, Catholic by religious preference, and lives in [redacted]. On 11 October 1938, [redacted] married [redacted] born [redacted] in [redacted] a German national. The [redacted] couple have two children, [redacted] born [redacted] in [redacted] and [redacted] born [redacted] in [redacted] [redacted] has the West Berlin identity card [redacted] dated 4 March 1946, and has no criminal record.

d. Karl SCHMOK, born 2 October 1886 in GROSS SCHOENEBECK (V00163), died on 19 December 1932, leaving Lucia SCHMOK nee MUENSTER, born 3 June 1891, a widow. His son, [redacted] born [redacted] in [redacted] a German national and citizen, single, no known occupation, holding West Berlin identity card 291/2008/53, issued 24 January 1953, resides at [redacted] [redacted] as does his (Werner's) sister, [redacted] born [redacted] in [redacted] [redacted] is a German national, a typist, and holder of West Berlin identity card 291/[redacted] issued 16 February 1953. (B-2)

10. Agency "A" is currently staging an operation involving someone connected with SfS, and that person believes that SfS is watching. The operation is located at [redacted] in a large apartment house.

Agency "A"

(B-2)

11. The villa located at [redacted] is currently listed as under the control of Agency "A".

Source "B"

(B-2)

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on

0803

18 Jun 1998

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5300.1

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE: 17 November 1955

PREPARING OFFICE:
66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567241/d

b6 awt

SUBJECT

EGIS

SfS Headquarters

Main Department VIII

Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE

COMPLETELY RELIABLE
USUALLY RELIABLE
FAIRLY RELIABLE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
UNRELIABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

OF INFORMATION

A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
B PROBABLY TRUE
C POSSIBLY TRUE
D DOUBTFULLY TRUE
E IMPROBABLE
F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

12. The records of Region VIII, 66th CIC Group, APO 742, contain the following information: SOI, Subject: Main Department VIII, SfS Hqs, Re: Investigation of People's Policeman, file VIII-16540.16, D-305930, indicates that b6 born b6 in b6 (UUS147), member of the People's Police, had been observed by SfS to have contacted a b6 ostensibly residing at b6 (British Sector), who then placed b6 in contact with a b6 living at b6 (British Sector). b6 was revealed to be a recruiter for an agency cooperating closely with Agency "A" (para. 10 above). Date of above report is 14 Sep 1955. (C-3)

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

0804

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HEADQUARTERS REGION VIII
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 742 US ARMY

D-567241/b

18 November 1955

SUBJECT: East German Intelligence Agencies, Sfs Headquarters,
Re: Administration (Personnel Administration)

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: CE Division

CIC
567241

1. FORWARDED: SOI, dated 14 November 1955, subject and file as above.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

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Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

a. Source: Source "A", P-287-VIII.

b. Evaluation of Source: B.

c. How information was obtained by Source: Personal contact.

d. Date Source obtained information: 20 October to 4 November 1955.

e. Date agent received information: 4 November 1955.

f. Status of case: Coverage of Sfs continues.

3. REMARKS:

a. Source indicated that this form is new, and has not been used heretofore.

b. Present concern of Sfs over former SS personnel infiltrating Sfs is reflected in the statement required of the examining physician, to the effect that SS tattoo marks were not discernible, nor were indications of surgical removal of such tattoos.

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1 Incl
SOI dtd 14 Nov 55 (1)
W/Enk (3)

0805 [b6]
Lt Col, Inf
Commanding

Berlin 42383 [b6] WJH/at/Ops

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

14 November 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team.

D-567241/b

b6

awt

SUBJECT

East German Intelligence Agencies
SfS Headquarters
Re: Administration
(Personnel Administration)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE OF INFORMATION

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. During late October or early November 1955, all personnel of SfS headquarters were given a new four-page medical history questionnaire to fill out. (See Exhibit " ") The form provides space for a complete physical examination and the examining physician's report of findings. The questionnaire, consisting of 19 questions to be answered, is to be filed within the Main Department Kader und Schulung (personnel and training). No announcement has been made yet concerning impending physical examinations for all personnel. The name space on the form is to be left blank, and a number will be inserted later. Adjacent to the name block is a block for statement of age, civilian occupation, last employment, date of birth, place of birth and present residence. The questions on the form include: congenital or hereditary diseases which might have afflicted the parents, causes of death of parents or brothers and sisters, childhood diseases or other contagious diseases contracted, whether or not the applicant has had nervous disorders, eye, ear, throat or nose difficulties (including operations), accidents, wounds suffered in combat, and when, where and how long the applicant may have been confined to a hospital, clinic or rest home. The applicant is asked for information concerning any addiction to narcotics, tobacco, alcohol, whether or not he has had venereal disease, respiratory difficulty, and about his health for the past three months. Women applicants are required to certify that they are not pregnant. Each applicant is required to list all previous illness without exception, in full knowledge that failing to report some previous illness can be considered cause for dismissal from the SfS. The examining physician, in his report of findings, is required to state his recommendation for physical profile classification of the applicant. The classification includes: completely fit for service, fit for service with one or two minor shortcomings, fit only for inside duty (limited duty), not fit for duty with the VP (Volkspolizei - People's Police), and temporarily unfit for service, with a recommendation for re-examination after a specified period. The examining physician is also required to certify at the end of the examination that the applicant did not have the tattoo mark (blutgruppenzeichen) of the SS (Schutz Staffel - Nazi elite guard group), nor any indication of such tattoo having been removed surgically.

Source "A"

(B-2)

2. Records of Region VIII Registry contain no previous information concerning medical history forms for SfS personnel.

FORM UNCLASSIFIED

0806

BY HEADS COMBOLT

AND DATE 1-10-1998

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(Deutschland)

Fragebogen

zur ärztlichen Untersuchung auf Diensttauglichkeit

Name: Vorname:	Alter: Jahre, Zivilstand: Zuletzt 1899 als: Geburtsdatum: Geburtsort: Wohnung:
1. Leben Ihre Eltern? Gegebenenfalls: an welcher Krankheit und in welchem Alter verstarben sie?	
2. Sind in Ihrer Familie vorgekommen und bei wem: a) Körperliche Missbildungen b) Nervöse und geistige Störungen c) Fehlbildung oder Verfallsst. d) Lungenkrankheiten e) Blutkrankheiten f) Rheumatismus, Gicht, Zuckerkrankheit g) Kropfbildung h) Krebs	a) b) c) d) e) f) g) h)
3. Wieviel Geschwister haben Sie? Sind Zwillinge darunter? An welcher Krankheit litten diese? Sind Geschwister gestorben, in welchem Alter, an welchem Leiden?	
4. Welche Kinderkrankheiten haben Sie selbst überstanden?	
5. Haben Sie später ansteckende Krankheiten wie Diphtherie, Scharlach, Typhus, Paratyphus, Ruhr, Flecktyphus durchgemacht? Wann?	
6. Wenn und gegen welche Krankheiten wurden Sie geimpft? Wann zuletzt?	
7. Haben Sie Operationen oder Leiden Sie an: a) Augenleiden (Brillenträger) b) Ohrenleiden (Operation) an welchem Ohr? c) Halsleiden (Mandolentzündung, Operation) d) Gelenkrheumatismus e) Herzleiden, Kreislaufstörungen f) Rippenfellentzündung, Lungenentzündung, Lungenabszess, Lungenemphysem g) Magenleiden, Verdauungsstörungen h) Gebärmutter, Nierenkrankheiten i) Blinddarmentzündung (Operation)	(Gegebenenfalls Angabe der Daten) a) b) c) d) e) f) g) h) i)

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Exhibit No. I

File: VIII-

D-567241/b

Subject: E-Ger Intel Agencies, StS Hqs

0807

Date: 14 November 1955

Re: Administration

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 by USAINSCOM FOIPA
 Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R

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l) Leistenbruch, Hämorrhoiden, Krampfadern (Operation.)	j)
k) Ohnmächten, Krampfanfälle, Bohnen	k)
l) Plattfüßen (waren oder sind Sie Einlagenträger? Beschwerden bei längerem Gehen oder Stehen?)	l)
m) Leiden Sie an Heuschnuppen, Asthma, Haut- ausschlägen, häufigen Erkältungen, Schnupfen, Husten, Grippe?	m)
n) Sonstige Krankheiten oder Operationen	n)
8. Haben Sie sich übermäßigem Alkohol- oder Nikotingenuß hingegen? Welche Mengen rauchen Sie täglich?	
9. Hatten Sie eine Geschlechtskrankheit? Wann, welche, wo behandelt?	
10. Sind Sie verwundet gewesen? Haben Sie Unfälle durchgemacht? Wann, was für welche? Beziehen Sie (oder bezogen Sie) Rente? Wieviel Prozent?	
11. Waren Sie in einer Nervenheilanstalt oder Nervenklinik? a) Weswegen b) Wurden Sie sterilisiert?	
12. Waren Sie in einer Lungenheilstätte? a) Wann b) Wo c) Stehen Sie in der Überwachung einer Lungenüberkultosefürsorge?	
13. Waren Sie in den letzten 3 Monaten krank oder krank geschrieben? Von wann bis wann? Wegen welchen Krankheiten? Sind Sie z. Zt. krank geschrieben? Weswegen? Waren Sie schon einmal im Krankenhaus der Volkspolizei in ambulanter oder stationärer Behandlung? Falls ja, wann, weswegen?	
14. Welche Schulen haben Sie besucht? Sind Sie sitzengelieben, wie oft? Wieviel Klassen haben Sie durchgemacht?	
15. Haben Sie Sport getrieben, welchen?	
16. Waren Sie schon einmal im Dienste der Volkspolizei? Wann, wo? Entlassungsgrund?	EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE
17. Sind Sie leicht erregbar, nervös? Schlafen Sie gut oder schlecht?	0808

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18. Füllen Sie sich gesund und leistungsfähig?

19. Bei Frauen: Ich versichere durch meine nachfolgende Unterschrift eidesstattlich, daß ich nicht schwanger bin.

Meine letzte Regelblutung war am

Meine erste Regelblutung hatte ich mit

Jahren

Monaten

Tagen

Erbindungen: (wann?)

Falschgeburten: (wann?)

Vor Untersuchung müssen vorgelegt werden: alle vorhandenen Krankenpapiere, Arztbriefe, Bescheinigungen, Röntgenaufnahmen und sonstige Befunde.

Zu den Fragen 5, 6, 7, 11 ist anzugeben (bei Platzmangel auf besonderem Blatt) der Aufenthalt in Krankenhäusern, Kliniken, Lazaretten, Heilanstalten, Kuranstalten usw. in welchen Häusern und wie lange.

- Ich bin zur Beschaffung von Unterlagen über meine körperliche Tauglichkeit einverstanden mit der Nachfrage durch den Arzt der Dienststelle bei Behörden, Krankenkassen, Ärzten, Krankenanstalten usw.
- Ich bin darüber unterrichtet, daß das Verschweigen früher durchgemachter Krankheiten unter Umständen Entlassung aus dem Dienst des Staatssekretariats für Staatsicherheit bzw. der nachgeordneten Dienststelle nach sich ziehen kann.
- Ich bin darüber belehrt, daß ich während meiner Zugehörigkeit zu im Erkrankungsfall und bei sonstigen gesundheitlichen Belangen mich an den Arzt der Dienststelle zu wenden und in der Sanitätsstelle der Dienststelle sofort vorzustellen habe.

(Unterschrift)

Untersuchungsbefund

Körpergröße in m	Gewicht kg mit — ohne Kleidung — halbtrocken	Halsumfang in cm	Brustumfang in cm eing. — ausg.
Körperform:	Fehler-Nr.	Augen: ohne Brille — mit Brille Sr. — Sl.	Fehler-Nr.
Allgemeinzustand:		Farbemündigkeit: nicht — vorhanden	
Kräftezustand:		Facharztbefund: nicht — nötig, anliegend	
Haut und sichtbare Schleimhäute: gut — genügend — mäßig — schlecht durchblutet		Otten:	
Kopf:		Hörfähigkeit für Hörsprache:	
Zunge: normal — taucht nicht — gering — belegt		Facharztbefund: nicht — nötig, anliegend	
Gebiß: o. B. sanfter, sanierungsbedürftig, stark verschlängert		Speichel:	
Erklärungen: / karöse oder anderweitig beschädigt + Wurzelrest ? fehlende Weichheitsähne O lehr P Gaumenplatte • gefüllt Br Brückenglied B Stütz Zahn Ka überkappter Zahn Zahnersatz erforderlich — vorhanden Gingivitis Parodontose		Halb: Beweglichkeit: Schilddrüse vergrößert Lymphdrüsen	
Rachenraum:		Thorax: Form: Atembeweglichkeit:	
		Lungen: Grenzen: verschieblich Physikalischer Befund: Röntgenbefund vom Ergebnis:	
		Herz und Kreislauf: Spitzenstoß: Perkussion: Auskultation: Pulszahl in Ruhe (Stehen) 4 X nach 10 Kniebeugen 4 X nach 1 Minute 4 X Blutdruck: R R min Hg	

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Abdomen: Engeweide: Bruchstellen: Geschlechtsorgane (äußerlich): Wunden: Form: Bruchstellen: Extremitäten: Arme und Hände: Narben: Gelenke: Muskulatur: Kraftleistung: Gefühlsinn:	Fähigkeit: Balance, Fülle: Narben: Gelenke: Muskulatur: Gang: Fußgelenke: Fußstellung: Blutdruck: Nervensystem, Dermographismus: Transpiration: Urtikaria: Rheumatischer Perforator, Schenkelknochen Psychischer Gesamtzustand: Urin: Farbe: Bodensenk: Reaktion: sauer — alkalisch, Spez. Gew. Eiweiß: Zucker: Blutuntersuchung: BSR: Wa. R: M. K. R: Kern: Chlorid:	Fähigkeit: Balance, Fülle: Narben: Gelenke: Muskulatur: Gang: Fußgelenke: Fußstellung: Blutdruck: Nervensystem, Dermographismus: Transpiration: Urtikaria: Rheumatischer Perforator, Schenkelknochen Psychischer Gesamtzustand: Urin: Farbe: Bodensenk: Reaktion: sauer — alkalisch, Spez. Gew. Eiweiß: Zucker: Blutuntersuchung: BSR: Wa. R: M. K. R: Kern: Chlorid:
---	--	--

An weiteren Untersuchungen ist erforderlich:
deren Ergebnisse:

Ärztliches Urteil *)

Zusammenfassung der Fehler:

1. Vollkommen fehlerfrei
2. A-Fehler
3. B-Fehler

Diensttauglich I
Diensttauglich II
Diensttauglich III
Nachuntersuchung in

4. Fehler (Nur für Instandsetzer)
5. U-Fehler: VP-untauglich
6. Zeitlich untauglich

Diensttauglich III
Diensttauglich IV

Wochen/Monaten

Ich bestätige hiermit ausdrücklich, daß bei der von mir geleiteten Einstellungsuntersuchung des Bewerbers

des Blutgruppenrisikos der ehemaligen SS oder Gefangenen nicht festgestellt wurde und auch keine Merkmale vorhanden sind, daß durch operativen Eingriff eine Entfernung dieses Zeichens erfolge.

Bemerkungen:

*) Nichtanforderung ist bei der Einstellungsgesundheitsuntersuchung zu vermeiden.

Der hauptamtliche (Vertrags-) Arzt

Name in Druckform

Unterschrift des Arztes

0810

den

7.7.1956

Nach Einstellung Gesundheitsbuch angelegt am

Ort

Abt. Gesundheitswesen

Ort

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b6

S/A XI-567256/d

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
18 November 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

Headquarters, Region XI, 66th CIC Group, APO 800, US Army

SUBJECT

East German Intelligence - Sfs -
Bezirk Suhl
Re: Modus Operandi (Transporta-
tion)

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

A red EMW four door sedan is used by the Sfs (Staatssekretariat fuer Staatssicherheits - State Secretariat for State Security) office in HILD-BURGHAUSEN PA 2388. The license plates on this vehicle are changed every few days, and they bear civilian numbers from all parts of East Germany.

(P-6)

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1-Region XI File

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

17 November 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567059/d

b6 /awt

SUBJECT

Soviet Intelligence Services
 Kreis Dresden (VS1257)
 Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

During early October 1955, [b6] 31 years of age, formerly employed in the Sfs, BV (Bezirksverwaltung - District Office) in DRESDEN, as a captain in charge of Department VIII (investigations, searches, arrests and surveillance), was called to the BV where he was offered employment as an informant for the Soviet Intelligence Service by two unidentified Soviet officers. On 20 October 1955, [b6] was called home from a meeting of the SED executive committee meeting to meet the two Soviet officers again, relative to his recruitment. (C-3)

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1 JUN 47

CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

14 November 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567242/d

b6

awt

SUBJECT

East German Intelligence
SfS * Bezirk Berlin
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

she had failed to do so. However, the SfS persisted in its attempts to find out [b6] address, and Source defected to West BERLIN on 30 August 1955 to avoid further contact with the SfS. Source usually met her handling agent at the "Schillerglocke" cafe in BERLIN-Lichtenberg (Soviet Sector), Hohenschoenhausener Strasse, the last meeting taking place on or about 25 August 1955. She was instructed to call telephone number 55 45 67, extensions 297, 2418, or 2514, in case of emergency, asking for "HAFT" and using the cover name [b6]. Source never used these numbers. For her services to the SfS Source received 50 DM East in August 1954.

Source "D"

(F-6)

3. Recruitment by SfS installation in BERLIN: On 17 August 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obligated to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the SfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. The recruitment took place in Source's apartment, and Source met his handling agent only on 17 August 1955. Source was instructed to report on the political attitude of his clerical colleagues in WUSTERHAUSEN (UU3063) but did not comply. Source was ordered to contact his handling agent by telephone number 55 72 35 on 19 September 1955, but he defected to West BERLIN on 23 August 1955.

Source "E"

(F-6)

4. Recruitment by SfS installation in BERLIN: In early June 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obligated to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the SfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source was assigned the cover name [b6]. He was instructed to report on the political attitude of his fellow workers and the conversation of patrons of a restaurant. On 13 September 1955, Source was directed to induce his son, a resident of West BERLIN, to East BERLIN. Source's son had been imprisoned in COTTBUS (VT5335) from 7 July 1951 to 31 July 1955 for selling suits to Soviet soldiers. On 1 September 1955, Source's son had defected to West BERLIN because he was questioned by the criminal police (presumably of COTTBUS) concerning sabotage Source's son allegedly had committed while in prison. Source was to induce his son to cross the sector border on 19 September 1955 in BERLIN-Wedding (French Sector), Brunnenstrasse, by inviting him to accompany Source while Source bought some cigarettes in a shop situated barely inside the Soviet Sector. Source was instructed to report the results of this mission to his handling agent at 1500 hours on 19 September 1955 at BERLIN-Prenzlauer Berg (Soviet Sector), Koenigstor. Formerly, Source had met his handling agent

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WD AGO FORM 1 JUN 47 568

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

14 November 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567242/d

b6

awt

SUBJECT

East German Intelligence
SfS - Bezirk Berlin
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

weekly in apartments located at BERLIN-Weissensee (Soviet Sector), Clement-Gottwald-Strasse 23, c/o LOEWENSTEIN, and BERLIN-Weissensee, Busch Allee 73, c/o SCHULTZ. Source received no monetary compensation from the SfS. He defected to West BERLIN on 15 September 1955 in order to avoid the mission of luring his son into East BERLIN.

Source "F"

(F-6)

5. Region VIII files revealed the following: Telephone number 55 45 67, paragraph 2, was mentioned in Region VIII files as a telephone number of the SfS Secretariat, located at BERLIN-Lichtenberg (Soviet Sector), Normannenstrasse 22. (F-3)

6. The files of Agency "A" revealed that one [b6] born [b6] in [b6] (n.c.a.), was charged with embezzlement in May 1951, and was reported missing in February 1952. This [b6] is possibly identical with the [b6] mentioned in paragraph 2 of this report. The files of Agency "A" revealed no information regarding [b6] [b6] paragraph 2.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b6

ATE

4 November 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567248/d

b6

wt

SUBJECT

ECIS

Sfs - Bezirk GERA

Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Source believes the liaison existing between Soviet Intelligence and the Sfs Sub-office at JENA (PB8145) is managed through Soviet "instructors" who are assigned to the Sfs Sub-office. There was at least one Soviet liaison officer and possibly a second Soviet liaison officer assigned to work with the Sfs in JENA. One room of the Sub-office was reserved for the use of the Soviets, although they were only present at the Sub-office once or twice a week. The Soviets were always accompanied by a woman interpreter who was also a Soviet national. The influence of the Soviets appeared to be decisive in the manner in which planned operations were to be carried out. It was generally accepted that any decision made by the chief of the Sub-office could be reversed by the Soviet instructor.

2. Source believes that liaison with the KVP (Kasernierte Volkspolizei - Garrisoned People's Police) is the responsibility of Department VII of the Sfs Sub-office at JENA. Source has hears that the Sfs maintains extensive systems of informants within the KVP in order to insure the security of the organization. Liaison officers to the KVP from the Sfs normally dress in uniform with the insignia of the military units to which they are assigned. Liaison officers are normally expected to have the rank of captain or above.

(F-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b6

DATE

10 November 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team. D-567247/a

b6

/awt

SUBJECT

EGIS

SfS District Frankfurt/Oder

Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A

USUALLY RELIABLE B

FAIRLY RELIABLE C

NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D

UNRELIABLE E

RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1

PROBABLY TRUE 2

POSSIBLY TRUE 3

DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4

IMPROBABLE 5

TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Recruitment by SfS installation in FRANKFURT/Oder (VT6999): In July 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obligated to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the SfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. He met his handling agent two times in a cover apartment located at FRANKFURT/Oder, Goethe Strasse 22, c/o MIERS. His last contact was on 1 September 1955, when Source received 50 DM East and was ordered to go to West BERLIN and observe the East Office of the Free Democratic Party. Source was instructed to mail the information he gained concerning this mission to the following address: FRANKFURT/Oder, Post-schlieesfach (post office box) 217, URBAN. Source defected to West BERLIN on 2 September 1955.

Source "G"

(F-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
10 November 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

REGION III 66TH CIC Group

SUBJECT

STATE SECRETARIATE for (U)
 STATE SECURITY - Sfs (C)
 MUEHLHAUSEN PBO375, Bezirke
 Erfurt, Germany

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. On 20 October 1955, SOURCE was interrogated at Field Office Giessen, GIESSEN MB7704, Germany, and gave the following information concerning Sfs MUEHLHAUSEN, Bezirke Erfurt, Modus Operandi:

SOURCE was contacted by an unidentified member of Sfs MUEHLHAUSEN on the morning after her return to East Germany. She was told then to report to the police to have her pass exchanged. From this initial contact, she was put in touch with a handling agent of the Sfs, [b6] and was given the mission to return to West Germany to persuade her husband to return to East Germany. During the time that SOURCE was to be in West Germany, her children were to remain in East Germany living with SOURCE's parents-in-law. The children were kept presumably as hostages to ensure the return of SOURCE to the East Zone of Germany.

F-6

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE
PREPARING OFFICE		6 November 1955
Region XII, 66th CIC Group, APO 227, US Army		
SUBJECT	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION	
SFS Desirk ERFURT - Physical Facilities	OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:	
RE: Dead Letter Drop	COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
	USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2
	FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3
	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
	UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5
	RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		
D-567245/e		
<p>As of August 1955, the SFS, Desirk ERFURT, was using the ruins of an old castle in ASCHAFFENBURG, Germany, for a dead letter drop. There is a promenade along the left bank of the Main River, as one faces downstream. Along this promenade is a row of benches, behind which are the ruins of an old castle. The dead letter drop is a cubby hole in the ruins, situated near the ground, and approximately behind the third bench.</p>		
Source A (P-6)		
<p>Regraded UNCLASSIFIED on 18 Jun 1998 by USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth para 4-102, DOD 5200-1R</p>		
0818		
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b6

DATE

8 November 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team.

b6

/awt

SUBJECT

SfS District Chemnitz

Re: Modus Operandi and Techniques

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A

USUALLY RELIABLE B

FAIRLY RELIABLE C

NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D

UNRELIABLE E

RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1

PROBABLY TRUE 2

POSSIBLY TRUE 3

DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4

IMPROBABLE 5

TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. SfS KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-office) FREIBERG (US8442): On or about 25 August 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant without a cover name and was obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the SfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source was instructed to write a letter to a mechanic at a Volkswagen factory in STUTTGART (NV1404), German Federal Republic. The mechanic had formerly resided at FREIBERG, Dammstrasse 18 or 22, had been employed in FREIBERG as an instructor in VEB (Volkseigener Betrieb - Nationalized Enterprise) Bleierzgruben (ore mines) Albert Funk, located at FREIBERG, Himmelfahrts-gasse 33c and had defected because he was being pressed to join the KVP (Kasernierte Volkspolizei - Garrisoned People's Police). Source wrote a letter to the mechanic but received no reply. Source received no money for his work for the SfS. Source was told that it might be necessary for him to make a trip to the German Federal Republic in order to induce the mechanic to return to the GDR.

Source "D"

(F-6)

2. SfS KV GLAUCHAU (US2733): In the Fall of 1954, Source was recruited as a part-time informant with the cover name b6 and was obliged to sign a statement wherein she agreed to work for the SfS and to keep her work in this capacity a confidential matter. She met her handling agent about once a month at her place of work, the VP (Volkspolizei - People's Police) Fire Department, located at GLAUCHAU, Ernst-Thaelmann-Strasse 3. Source submitted no reports and received no money from the SfS.

Source "E"

(F-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

4 November 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team.

b6

awt

SUBJECT

SfS District Berlin
Re: Modus Operandi and Techniques

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Attempted recruitment by SfS installation in BERLIN: SfS agents b6 and Fnu b6 confer about two (2) times each week with b6 Fnu b6 in his office at the German Academy of Science, address unknown, in the Soviet Sector of BERLIN. The purpose of these meetings is not known. b6 about 43 years of age, is an SED member and resides at b6 (Soviet Sector), b6 On 13 October 1955 b6 attempted to recruit Source, then employed as b6 secretary at the German Academy of Science, as a part-time informant, and instructed her to make copies, for later examination by the SfS, of all letters she considered important. She was informed that at some later undisclosed date she would accompany b6 to PRAGUE (VR6045) and to MOSCOW on a trip, the purpose of which was not disclosed.

Source "G"

(F-6)

2. Recruitment by SfS installation in BERLIN: On 12 September 1955 Source was questioned by SfS agents Fnu b6 and Fnu b6 regarding her relationship with b6, about 44 years of age, residing at b6 b6 (Soviet Sector), b6 was once housekeeper for Dr. b6 about 50 years of age, who defected to the West in 1949, and has resided since that time in West BERLIN, address unknown. Source was recruited as a part-time informant with the cover name b6 and obliged to sign a statement wherein she agreed to work for the SfS and to keep her work in this capacity a confidential matter. She was directed to find out why b6 had defected to the West, and for this reason was to contact b6, whom she had not seen for two (2) years. Source defected to West BERLIN and did not effect this mission.

Source "H"

(F-6)

3. Recruitment by SfS installation in BERLIN: Source was arrested on 22 September 1955 in the Soviet Sector of BERLIN, after a disagreement with Fnu b6 female, about 55 years of age, residing at b6 b6 (Soviet Sector), b6 who is a representative of the BERLIN-Koepenick District in an undisclosed capacity. Source was then interrogated by SfS members in the VP (Volkspolizei - People's Police) building at BERLIN-Koepenick (Soviet Sector), Wendenschloss Strasse, number unknown, was recruited as a part-time informant, given the cover name b6, and was obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the SfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. He was directed to maintain contact with the "Falken" youth group in West BERLIN, to which he had applied for membership in mid-July 1955,

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

4 November 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team

b6

awt

SUBJECT

SfS District Berlin

Re: Modus Operandi and Techniques

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
 USUALLY RELIABLE B
 FAIRLY RELIABLE C
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
 UNRELIABLE E
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
 PROBABLY TRUE 2
 POSSIBLY TRUE 3
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
 IMPROBABLE 5
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

and was sent to the Social Democratic Party headquarters at BERLIN-Schoeneberg (US Sector), Zietenstrasse, number unknown, which sponsors the Falken Youth Group, to request information regarding the processing of his membership application. Source effected this mission on 5 October 1955, and was informed that his application had been forwarded to the proper office at BERLIN-Neukoelln (US Sector), Karl-Marx-Strasse, number unknown. The SfS then instructed Source to write a letter expressing dissatisfaction with living conditions in the GDR to his uncle [b6] about 45 years of age, who is employed by an undisclosed US agency in BERCHTESGADEN (UN4978), where he resides at Haus Rottel Sepp. Source did not effect this mission. He was then directed to bring his uncle, [b6] about 39 years of age, salesman, residing at [b6] to an undisclosed restaurant in BERLIN-Koepenick (Soviet Sector), number unknown, where he could be contacted by members of the SfS. Source did not effect this mission. He met his handling agent on 26 and 30 September, and on 10 and 18 October 1955, at 1400 hours at People's Police Revier 244 at BERLIN-Koepenick, Seelenbinder Strasse, number unknown, which is also the local court building.

Source "J"

(F-6)

4. Recruitment by SfS installation in BERLIN: On 2 August 1955, Source, a streetwalker in the Soviet Sector of BERLIN, was arrested and questioned by members of the SfS at People's Police Revier 71, BERLIN-Prenzlauer Berg (Soviet Sector), Schoenhauser Allee, number unknown, and was recruited as a part-time informant, signing a statement wherein she agreed to work for the SfS and to keep her work in this capacity a confidential matter. She was directed to report the names of all Catholic priests with whom she could become acquainted, and if possible to induce them to remain over-night in her apartment. On 10, 18 and 25 August, she had meetings with her handling agent at the HO (Handelsorganisation - Retail Organization) Restaurant "Braeustuebl" on Schoenhauserallee, address unknown. The next meeting was to take place on 3 September 1955 at the same restaurant, but Source defected to West BERLIN on this date and did not attend the meeting.

Source "K"

0821

(F-6)

5. Region VIII files revealed the following:

a. [b6] paragraph 3. [b6] is mentioned in TWX number F-16800, as having returned to the GDR and is now processing through refugee channels for reentry into the German Federal Republic. (F-6)

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1 JUN 47

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

4 November 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team.

b6

ext

SUBJECT

SfS District Berlin

Re: Modus Operandi and Techniques

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b. [b6] Fnu, paragraph 1. [b6] is mentioned in AR dated 21 December 1949, as an instructor at the German Paedagogical Academy in BERLIN-Mitte (Soviet Sector), Burgstrasse 27, and as an SED and Union of Free German Workers member. (F-6) This individual may be identical with the [b6] mentioned in this report.

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WD AGO FORM 568
1 JUN 47

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 3 November 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

REGION III 66TH CIC GROUP

SUBJECT

STATE SECRETARIATE for (U)
 STATE SECURITY - SFS (C)
 GLAUCHAU US2752, Bezirke
 Chemnitz, Germany

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
 USUALLY RELIABLE B
 FAIRLY RELIABLE C
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
 UNRELIABLE E
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
 PROBABLY TRUE 2
 POSSIBLY TRUE 3
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
 IMPROBABLE 5
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. On 21 October 1955, SOURCE was interrogated at Field Office Giessen, GIESSEN MB7704, Germany, and gave the following information concerning SFS GLAUCHAU US2752, Bezirke Chemnitz, Modus Operandi:

a. Recruiting:

SOURCE had moved from BERLIN UU9220, Germany to Kreis GLAUCHAU. As soon as he arrived there he was contacted by the SFS. SFS informed SOURCE that they had intelligence that he had been active in BERLIN for them. SOURCE was then instructed to commence work again. After being given small missions in the East, he was then told he would have to perform a mission in West Germany.

b. Training:

As SOURCE had proved to the SFS that he was a reliable individual when he acted as an informant in BERLIN, he was given no training or a trial mission.

c. Payment:

SOURCE was given 200 West DM and 200 East DM to finance his trip to West Germany. Money had to be receipted for. The amount of payment was determined by figuring in cost of rail transportation from the DDR, air transportation back to DDR, and cost of meals and lodging. SOURCE also was to purchase from this sum his working material (magazines) and pay for one (1) telegram to his handling agent.

d. Transfer Disengagement and Disposition of Informants:

SOURCE moved from BERLIN to Bezirk Chemnitz. In this connection, Bezirk Chemnitz was notified of SOURCE's move and he was re-employed in CHEMNITZ, Kreis GLAUCHAU, Germany, as an informant.

e. Communications:

0823

SOURCE after receiving his West Mission verbally from his handling agent was instructed that as soon as he had accomplished his mission to communicate with him by telegram. The telegram would be sent from the West to "Hugo SELTMANN, GLAUCHAU, Damaschkeweg 43," with the message: KOMME SOFORT MUTTI KRANK, WALTER. This telegram would indicate to the handling agent that SOURCE had accomplished his mission and was on his way back to West BERLIN where he would meet him. The meeting place had been designated prior to SOURCE leaving the East Zone.

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BY USAINSCOM FOLPA

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1 - CIC Central

1 - Region III

WD AGO FORM 1 JUN 47 568

CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
3 November 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

REGION III 66TH CIC GROUP

SUBJECT

STATE SECRETARIATE for
STATE SECURITY - Sfs (C)(U)
GLAUCHAU, Bezirke Chemnitz, Germany

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

f. Transportation:

(1) Air: SOURCE was instructed and provided with funds to return to East BERLIN from West Germany by commercial airline.

(2) Road: SOURCE was transported from GLAUCHAU to SAALFELD PB6713, Germany, in order to board interzonal train to West Germany. Transportation was in handling agent's automobile.

(3) Rail: SOURCE was provided funds to buy a railroad ticket on the interzonal train from SAALFELD to West Germany. In order to buy a ticket in the East Zone for interzonal travel, it is necessary to display an interzonal pass at the ticket office. SOURCE's handling agent provided him with this, a short time before he commenced his trip to the West. When SOURCE purchased his ticket, the handling agent accompanied him to the ticket office.

g. Cover Stories:

In order that SOURCE's wife would not know of his activities for the Sfs when he went to West Germany for them, he was instructed to tell her that he was going to another city in the DDR for a number of days to attend a party function as a delegate. When SOURCE arrived in West Germany, he was to accomplish his mission by posing as a door-to-door magazine salesman soliciting subscriptions.

h. Border Crossings:

SOURCE was furnished with false identification in order that he could purchase an interzonal train ticket without arousing suspicion. As a result, the crossing was made in a legal manner.

i. Handling Agent:

While at IFA factory in MERRANE, SOURCE's handling agent was DIETRICH. SOURCE also met a SCHULZE through DIETRICH who arranged a meeting with a Soviet Intelligence General and Colonel.

F-6

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
3 November 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

REGION III 66TH CIC GROUP

SUBJECT

STATE SECRETARIATE for (U)
 STATE SECURITY - Sfs (C)
 BERLIN-TREPTOW UU9220, Bezirke

Berlin, Germany
 SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

1. On 21 October 1955, SOURCE was interrogated at Field Office Giessen, GIESSEN MB7704, Germany, and gave the following information concerning Sfs BERLIN-TREPTOW UU9220, Bezirke Berlin, Modus Operandi:

a. OPERATIONAL AUTHORITY AND DIRECTIVES:

Sfs, according to SOURCE, has the right to grant amnesty to anyone undergoing punishment by order of the minor judiciary of the DDR, provided that person agrees to work for the Sfs as an informant.

b. INFORMANTS:

(1) Recruiting:

An individual who has been accused of a crime is given the opportunity to redeem himself by working for the Sfs. The VP gives the Sfs the names of individuals arrested and these people are directed to report to the VP station where they are greeted by an Sfs man. SOURCE stated that he had worked for a period of six (6) months before signing a pledge to work for the Sfs.

(2) Training: ~~SECRET~~

SOURCE after agreeing to work for the Sfs was ordered to report once a week to the Sfs agent at a cover address for the purpose of receiving political indoctrination, turning in his reports and receiving new targets.

(3) Contacting of Informants:

SOURCE directed by Sfs agent to report to a specific room in the VP office. The reporting periods were once a week always at the same place and the same time.

(4) Payment:

SOURCE was given only the necessary funds to defray expenses.

c. TRANSFER DISENGAGEMENT AND DISPOSITION OF INFORMANTS:

SOURCE moved from BERLIN to Bezirke Chemnitz. In this connection, Bezirke Chemnitz was notified of SOURCE's move and he was re-employed in CHEMNITZ, Kreis GLAUCHAU US2752, Germany as an informant.

(Cont'd)

0825

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1 - Region III

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 3 November 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

REGION III 66TH CIC GROUP

SUBJECT

STATE SECRETARIATE for
STATE SECURITY - Sfs (e)
BERLIN-TREPTOW, Bezirke Berlin,
Germany

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . .	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . .	8

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

d. REPORTS:

SOURCE made oral reports to his handling agent before he signed the pledge to work for the Sfs. After the pledge was signed, he submitted written reports.

e. HANDLING AGENTS:

[b6] was agent who met SOURCE in Room 21, RATHAUS (City Hall) when SOURCE was recruited in BERLIN-TREPTOW. [b6] displayed an Sfs identification book and badge, but did not give SOURCE time to read it, and SOURCE is of the opinion that [b6] is a cover name. (fmu) [b6] occasionally substituted for [b6] as handling agents.

F-6

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

2 November 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team.

OPNS OFF

b6

awt

SUBJECT

SfS District Dresden
Re: Modus Operandi and Techniques

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Recruitment by SfS KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-office) DIPPOLDIS-WALDE (VS0739): On 26 May 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant without a cover name and obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the SfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. In order to perform his mission, Source was instructed to obtain employment at any VEB (Volkseigener Betrieb - Nationalized Enterprise). Source failed to do this. He met his handling agent two (2) times, once on 12 August 1955 and once on 14 August 1955, at Source's home. Source did not receive any monetary compensation from the SfS nor did he submit any reports to the SfS.

Source "D"

(F-6)

2. Recruitment by SfS KV GOERLITZ (VS9967): In early September 1953, Source was recruited as a part-time informant with the cover name "Greif" and obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the SfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. Until June 1955, he met his handling agent every second Thursday at the apartment of [b6], mentioned in paragraph 6a of SOI, Subject and date as above, Re: Personalities. After June 1955, Source submitted his reports to [b6], mentioned in paragraph 6b of SOI, Subject and date as above, Re: Personalities, at their place of work, the VEB (Volkseigener Betrieb - Nationalized Enterprise) Waggonbau (railroad car construction) located at GOERLITZ, Brunnenstrasse, number unknown. Source received no monetary compensation from the SfS and submitted only reports of a general nature.

Source "F"

(F-6)

3. Region VIII files revealed no information pertaining to the personalities mentioned in this report.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE												
PREPARING OFFICE		1 November 1955												
66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CR Team.		OPNS OFF b6 /awt												
SUBJECT	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION													
SfS District Potsdam	OF SOURCE:													
Re: Modus Operandi and	OF INFORMATION:													
Techniques	<table border="0"> <tr> <td>COMPLETELY RELIABLE A</td> <td>CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>USUALLY RELIABLE B</td> <td>PROBABLY TRUE 2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>FAIRLY RELIABLE C</td> <td>POSSIBLY TRUE 3</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D</td> <td>DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>UNRELIABLE E</td> <td>IMPROBABLE 5</td> </tr> <tr> <td>RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F</td> <td>TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6</td> </tr> </table>		COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1	USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2	FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4	UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5	RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6
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RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6													
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION														
<p>1. Recruitment by SfS KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-office) BRANDENBURG (UU3410): In August 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obligated to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the SfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. He was assigned the cover name "Gottstein". He met his handling agent three (3) times on streets of BRANDENBURG, the last meeting taking place on 29 August 1955. Source received no financial compensation for his activity from the SfS.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(F-6)</p> <p>Source "B"</p> <p>2. Recruitment by SfS KV LUCKENWALDE (UT7473): In November 1954, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obligated to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the SfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. He was assigned the cover name "Wander". He met his handling agent every third Tuesday at 1930 hours at the dairy at LUCKENWALDE, Beelitzer Strasse, number unknown. Source was recruited despite the fact that the SfS knew Source had assisted in the defecting of b6, former head of the tourist station at DOBBRIKOW (UT6881), Villa 1, to West BERLIN. b6 is now residing at b6 (n.c.a.), b6. The last meeting between Source and his handling agent took place in July 1955. Although it was promised, Source received no remuneration from the SfS.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(F-6)</p> <p>Source "G"</p> <p>3. Region VIII files revealed no information regarding the personality mentioned in this report.</p>														
<p>REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 18 JUN 1998 BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R</p> <p style="text-align: center;">0828</p> <p style="text-align: center;">EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE</p>														
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

31 October 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team.

b6

/awt

SUBJECT

SfS District Neubrandenburg
Re: Modus Operandi and Techniques

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Recruitment by SfS KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-office) WAREN (UV4732): In January 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obligated to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the SfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source was instructed to observe his working place colleagues in general and two individuals in particular. He met his handling agent about five (5) times on streets of WAREN, and was last contacted in May 1955. Source received no financial remuneration for his work.

Source "H"

(F-6)

2. Recruitment by SfS KV NEUBRANDENBURG (UV8536): On 2 July 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obligated to sign a statement wherein she agreed to work for the SfS and to keep her work in this capacity a confidential matter. She met her handling agent about twice a week in a wood near NEUBRANDENBURG at Lake Tolensensee. Source received the mission of learning whether or not two female residents of NEUBRANDENBURG had connections in the West. Source obtained no information and reported accordingly. Her last meeting with her handling agent took place on 22 August 1955. Source received 5 DM East for travel expenses from BURG STARGARD (UV8829) to NEUBRANDENBURG.

Source "I"

(F-6)

3. Recruitment by SfS KV NEUBRANDENBURG: In Summer 1954, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obligated to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the SfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. He was visited by his handling agents every week at his restaurant in SILZ-NOSSENTIN (UV3033), and was last contacted on 26 August 1955. Source was directed to observe the guests frequenting his restaurant, but he did not comply. Source received no financial remuneration.

Source "J"

(F-6)

4. Recruitment by SfS KV ANKLAM (VV1468): On 23 December 1954, Source was approached for recruitment by the SfS, but Source refused to sign a statement obligating himself and only promised in writing to keep whatever proposition the SfS made to him a confidential matter. Source was asked about the political attitude of the head of gas production at ANKLAM and Source replied that he believed this individual to be loyal to the GDR. Source had no further contact with the SfS, and he did not receive monetary compensation.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

31 October 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team.

b6

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SUBJECT

SfS District Neubrandenburg
Re: Modus Operandi and TechniquesCODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE: OF INFORMATION:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
USUALLY RELIABLE	B	PROBABLY TRUE	2
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C	POSSIBLY TRUE	3
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
UNRELIABLE	E	IMPROBABLE	5
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

5. Recruitment by SfS KV ANKLAM: In December 1954, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obligated to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the SfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. He met his handling agent weekly at the KVP (Kasernierte Volkspolizei - Garrisoned People's Police) office in TORGELOW-Spechtberg (UV5337), and had the last contact in March 1955. Source was directed to observe one of his fellow KVP comrades, since this comrade had relatives residing in the German Federal Republic. Source warned his comrade, and submitted about eight (8) reports of a general nature. He received no monetary compensation from the SfS.

Source "Q"

(F-6)

6. Recruitment by SfS BV (Bezirksverwaltung - District Office) NEUSTRELITZ (UV7115): In early 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obligated to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the SfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. He was assigned the cover name "Mueller" and was directed to submit reports on the general political attitude of the teachers in the Kreis of Neustrelitz. He met this handling agent once a week between 0800 and 0830 hours in the Schlossgarten in NEUSTRELITZ, the last meeting taking place on or about 22 July 1955. Source submitted one (1) report on the reaction of the teachers to a conference in GENF (n.c.a.) without mentioning any names. Source received no monetary compensation.

Source "T"

(F-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

28 October 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team.

b6

awt

SUBJECT

SfS District Dresden
 Re: Modus Operandi and Techniques

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
 USUALLY RELIABLE B
 FAIRLY RELIABLE C
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
 UNRELIABLE E
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
 PROBABLY TRUE 2
 POSSIBLY TRUE 3
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
 IMPROBABLE 5
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 8

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Recruitment by SfS KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-office) BISCHOFSWERDA (VS4365): In December 1954, Source was recruited as a part-time informant, was given the cover name "Lammers", and was obligated to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the SfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. He met his handling agent about every four weeks, usually in a room of the PULSNITZ (US7275) town hall. His mission was to report on the political attitude of his fellow workers and to ascertain whether any of them made trips to West BERLIN. The last meeting took place on 29 August 1955, and at that time Source was warned by his handling agent that the SfS would take steps against him if his reports did not improve. Source defected on 11 September 1955. He received no money for his services for the SfS.

Source "D"

(F-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

28 October 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team.

b6

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SUBJECT

SfS District Rostock

Re: Modus Operandi and Techniques

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
 USUALLY RELIABLE B
 FAIRLY RELIABLE C
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
 UNRELIABLE E
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
 PROBABLY TRUE 2
 POSSIBLY TRUE 3
 DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
 IMPROBABLE 5
 TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Recruitment by SfS KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-office) GREIFSWALD (UV9495):
 In January 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was
 obligated to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the SfS and to
 keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. He met his handling
 agent approximately every fortnight and had the last contact on 30 July
 1955. The meetings took place in a cover apartment at [b6]

[b6] Source was to report at this apartment on 31
 August 1955 but fled to West BERLIN instead. He was instructed to report
 on the general political attitude of the public and the activities of a
 grocer in GREIFSWALD. Source received no financial remuneration for his
 work for the SfS.

Source "Q"

(F-6)

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HEADQUARTERS REGION VIII
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 742 US ARMY

27 October 1955

SUBJECT: Main Department VIII, Sfs Headquarters, Re: NO

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group, USAREUR
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: CE Division

567241/d
CICC

1. **FORWARDED:** SOI, dated 24 October 1955, Subject and file as above.

2. **CONTROL OF INFORMATION:**

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ON 18 JUN 1998
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

a. Source: "A" is Y-415-VIII

b. Evaluation of Source: "A" -- "G"

c. How information was obtained by Source: Personal participation.

d. Date Source obtained information: 4 and 11 October 1955.

e. Date Agent received information: 12 October 1955.

f. Status of case: Coverage of Sfs continues.

3. **REMARKS:**

0833

a. Other local US agencies have been queried concerning potential operational interest in [b6] and [b6]

b6 To date, one negative reply has been received from the 7983d Army Unit and one negative reply has been received from MID.

b. A police records check on [b6] indicates that he was born on [b6] in [b6]

[b6] married to [b6] [b6] on [b6] and that he owns his own home in [b6]

He was tried in a Magistrate's Court in 1951 and fined 30 days for violation of an Allied directive, apparently a minor misdemeanor. Information on [b6] will be filed for reference.

1 Incl

SOI dtd 24 Oct 1955

[b6]

Lt Col, Inf
Commanding

Page 1 of 1 pages
Copy 2 of 2 copies

Serial 42323 [b6]

CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE 24 October 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team.

OPNS OFF

b6

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SUBJECT

Main Department VIII
SFS Headquarters
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE

OF INFORMATION

COMPLETELY RELIABLE
USUALLY RELIABLE
FAIRLY RELIABLE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
UNRELIABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
B PROBABLY TRUE
C POSSIBLY TRUE
D DOUBTFULLY TRUE
E IMPROBABLE
F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. On 4 October 1955, Main Department VIII dispatched an investigator to West BERLIN to effect a face to face meeting with a (Fnu) b6 in b6 (US Sector), b6 fifth floor left, the alleged residence of b6. The alleged purpose of this meeting was to enable the investigator to recognize b6 at any time in the future. b6 was described as being approximately 5'7" tall, and approximately 35 years of age.

2. On 11 October 1955, Main Department VIII dispatched an approach letter by courier to an b6 living in BERLIN-Rudow (US Sector), b6 in a Stedlung (low income barracks) colony. b6 was requested to meet a b6 (both cover names) in front of the main entrance of the S-bahn (city rail line) station Schoeneweide, in BERLIN-Treptow (Soviet Sector), on 13 October 1955 at 1730 hours, even though it were to require a short wait.

3. On 12 October 1955, Main Department VIII dispatched an investigator to study the area surrounding the Pension Wollitz, BERLIN-Wilmersdorf (British Sector), to ascertain unobtrusive observation points affording a good view of the pension and its entrances. Main Department VIII had previously established that some unidentified individual of operational interest to them is utilizing it for contacts operating in East BERLIN or the GDR. This individual has already been under investigation by Main Department VIII in the recent past.

Source "A"

(C-3)

4. Region VIII Registry contains the following information: A Region VIII trace, dated 8 August 1951, lists a b6 b6 aka b6 born b6, approximately 5'9" tall, 140 pounds, with dark hair and blue eyes, reportedly a married student, is registered with Police Revier #297. b6 is known as FRK 555, and works with or for a German national, b6 (Fnu) b6 from West Germany. Document downgraded to Confidential from Top Secret on 6 October 1954, file VIII-119. This trace may be a reference to the b6 (Par. 1) mentioned in this report.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
26 October 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIO Group, Region VIII, CR Team

CORNS OF

b6

/ant

SUBJECT

SfS District Frankfurt/Oder
Re: Modus Operandi and
Techniques

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE
COMPLETELY RELIABLE
USUALLY RELIABLE
FAIRLY RELIABLE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
UNRELIABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

OF INFORMATION

A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
B PROBABLY TRUE
C POSSIBLY TRUE
D DOUBTFULLY TRUE
E IMPROBABLE
F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Recruitment by SfS BV (Bezirksverwaltung - District Office) FRANKFURT/Oder (VF6999): On 4 June 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obligated to sign a statement wherein she agreed to work for the SfS and to keep her work in this capacity a confidential matter. Source met her handling agent every week on streets of FRANKFURT/Oder, the last meeting taking place on 1 August 1955. Source received no financial remuneration for her work for the SfS. She was directed to observe the activities of [b6] residing at [b6] [b6] a railroad employee who is suspected of sabotage by the SfS.

Source "A"

(P-6)

2. Recruitment by SfS KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-Office) EDELSWALDE (VU2155): In April 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obligated to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the SfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. He was given the cover name "Rudolf". He met his handling agent three (3) times in a field near GOLZOW (VU2060), the last meeting taking place in July 1955. Source received the mission of submitting reports on the general political attitude of the LPG (Landwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaft - Agricultural Production Cooperative) employees, but he submitted only one report, which was on the subject of pig slaughtering at the LPG. Source received no monetary compensation for his work for the SfS.

Source "B"

(P-6)

3. Recruitment by SfS BV FRANKFURT/Oder: On 16 July 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and obligated to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the SfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. He received the mission of reporting on the political attitude of his colleagues in the Abteilung "Körperkultur und Sport" (Gymnastics and Sport Department) of the Rat des Kreises (District Administration), FRANKFURT/Oder. Source cannot understand why he was chosen for that mission since he had not been an SED member and had been a member of the FDJ (Freie Deutsche Jugend - Free German Youth) for only one and one-half (1 1/2) years, from 1949 to 1950. From 16 July to 16 August 1955, Source met his handling agent five (5) times, always in room 142 of the Rat des Kreises building, street address unknown. Source did not receive any monetary compensation from the SfS.

Source "D"

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(P-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

26 October 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team

b6

SUBJECT

SfS District Frankfurt/Oder
Re: Modus Operandi and
Techniques

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL/PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE

OF INFORMATION

A COMPLETELY RELIABLE

A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES

B USUALLY RELIABLE

B PROBABLY TRUE

C FAIRLY RELIABLE

C POSSIBLY TRUE

D NOT USUALLY RELIABLE

D DOUBTFULLY TRUE

E UNRELIABLE

E IMPROBABLE

F RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

4. Recruitment by SfS BY FRANKFURT/Oder: In August 1954, Source was recruited as a part-time informant and was obligated to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the SfS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. He received no financial remuneration from the SfS. He met his handling agent approximately once a month in the J.W. Stalin Eisenhuettenkombinat (Iron Processing Factory) in STALLSTADT (a.o.a.), the last meeting taking place on 26 August 1955. Source received the mission of observing his fellow workers at the Eisenhuettenkombinat, but Source did not carry this mission out.

Source "E"

(F-6)

5. Region VIII files revealed the following:

b6

graph 1.

b6

residing at

b6

b6

was mentioned in Memorandum dated 6 September 1955, file VIII-23700, from another US agency. This agency revealed that Source "A" was recruited by the SfS to observe the activities of b6 makes frequent trips to West BERLIN to visit one Frau b6 residence Pohlstrasse (presumably BERLIN-Tiergarten - British Sector), number unknown, and the SfS is attempting to determine the purpose of these visits.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
26 October 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIO Group, Region VIII, GE Team

OPNS OFF

b6

AVI

SUBJECT

SFS District Gera
Re: Modus Operandi and
Techniques

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE

COMPLETELY RELIABLE
USUALLY RELIABLE
FAIRLY RELIABLE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
UNRELIABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

OF INFORMATION

A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
B PROBABLY TRUE
C POSSIBLY TRUE
D DOUBTFULLY TRUE
E IMPROBABLE
F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Recruitment by SFS KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-office) STADTRODA (RB92377): In July 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time SFS informant with the cover name [b6], and was obligated to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the SFS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. He was directed to submit reports on the general political attitude of the public. His handling agent was [b6] about 47 years of age, who is employed at the Kreis Hospital of STADTRODA. Source met [b6] three times at this hospital, the last meeting taking place in August 1955. Source never did submit a report or receive monetary compensation.

Source "B"

(P-6)

2. Recruitment by SFS KV ZULENRODA (QB1115): In April 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time SFS informant with the cover name [b6] and was obligated to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the SFS and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. He met his handling agent a total of six (6) or seven (7) times in an office room at Source's place of work or at the Gewerkschaftshaus (House of the Labor Union) in PAUSA (QB1207), Badestrassse, number unknown. Source received the mission of reporting on the political attitude of his fellow workers and on all incidents prejudicial to the interests of the GDR. He received no monetary compensation for his services to the SFS.

Source "E"

(P-6)

3. Region VIII files revealed no record regarding the personality mentioned in this report.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

PREPARING OFFICE

DATE 26 October 1955

SUBJECT 66th CMC Group, Region VIII, CR Team

b6

awt

SfS District Cottbus
 Re: Modus Operandi and
 Techniques

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
 OF SOURCE
 COMPLETELY RELIABLE
 USUALLY RELIABLE
 FAIRLY RELIABLE
 NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
 UNRELIABLE
 RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

OF INFORMATION
 A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
 B PROBABLY TRUE
 C POSSIBLY TRUE
 D DOUBTFULLY TRUE
 E IMPROBABLE
 F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

Recruitment by SfS KV (Kreisverwaltung - Sub-office) LUCKAU (VT1246).
 On 27 August 1955, Source was recruited as a part-time informant without a
 cover name and without having to sign a statement. He received the mission
 of submitting reports on the political attitude of his fellow workers.
 Source was to meet his handling agent again on 12 September 1955 in a
 small wooded area at LUCKAU, Am Heim. Source never met the agent again and
 he received no monetary compensation.

Source "C"

(P-6)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

ADM

TEAM

DATE

10/21

October 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team

OPNC

WFB

HFB/aw

SUBJECT

SfS Berlin
Re: Modus Operandi and
TechniquesCODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCECOMpletely RELIABLE
USUALLY RELIABLE
FAIRLY RELIABLE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
UNRELIABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWNOF INFORMATION
A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
B PROBABLY TRUE
C POSSIBLY TRUE
D DOUBTFULLY TRUE
E IMPROBABLE
F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Recruitment of Source by SfS BERLIN: In August 1953 Source was recruited as a part-time informant and obliged to sign a statement wherein he agreed to work for the SfS, and to keep his work in this capacity a confidential matter. He received 70 DM East monthly for his work, met his handling agents weekly on undisclosed streets in BERLIN, and was last contacted in mid-August 1955. In August 1953 he was directed to contact [b6] whose address was not known to the SfS, and whom Source had known since 1946. [b6] speaks good English, French, and Russian, and it was assumed that he was employed as an interpreter for an undisclosed Allied agency. Source met [b6] by chance in East BERLIN on an undisclosed date, and during their conversation requested that Source procure for her from the Soviet Sector a Wanted Persons book. Source reported this to his handling agents, who took no action in the matter. In July 1955 Source was informed by the SfS that the [b6] were residing at [b6] (US Sector). [b6] and was directed to recruit Anita [b6] to work for the SfS, and to induce her to enter the Soviet Sector of BERLIN so that she could come into direct contact with SfS members. In early August 1955 Source carried out these instructions, and although she and her husband live in very uncomfortable economic circumstances, [b6] refused to work for the SfS. She accepted, however, a pair of binoculars which she sold in West BERLIN in late August 1955.

Source "F"

(P-6)

2. Region VIII Files revealed the following:

b6

b1

3. Files of Agency "A" revealed the following:

b6

of Dutch nationality, born [b6]

in [b6]

and [b6]

[b6]


nee [b6]

stateless, born [b6]

in [b6]

[b6]

have no recorded connection with an Allied agency, and have not appeared in the files for political offences. (B-2)



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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
21 October 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIO Group, Region VIII, CE Team.

b6 awt

SUBJECT

SfS Berlin
Re: Modus Operandi and
TechniquesCODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCECOMPLETELY RELIABLE
USUALLY RELIABLE
FAIRLY RELIABLE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
UNRELIABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

OF INFORMATION

A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
B PROBABLY TRUE
C POSSIBLY TRUE
D DOUBTFULLY TRUE
E IMPROBABLE
F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Recruitment by SfS installation in BERLIN. In November 1953, Source, at that time a student at Humboldt University, BERLIN-Mitte (Soviet Sector), Unter den Linden, was recruited as a part-time SfS informant and ordered to report on the political attitude of her fellow students. Source left the university in February 1954 because she did not want to work for the SfS. She was not contacted again until 27 August 1955, when her former handling agent visited her at her home. This time Source was assigned two (2) missions. Source met her handling agent once, on 15 September 1955, at the "Pikkolo" cafe located at BERLIN-Mitte, Taubenstrasse, number unknown and was instructed to meet him again on 21 September 1955 at the Friedrichstrasse railroad station in BERLIN-Mitte. Source defected to West BERLIN on the latter date in order to avoid working for the SfS.

Source "C"

(F-6)

2. Region VIII files revealed no information pertaining to the "Pikkolo" cafe mentioned in this report.

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HEADQUARTERS REGION VIII
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 742 US ARMY

12 October 1955

SUBJECT: Sfs District Rostock; Re: Modus Operandi

D. 329160

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: ME Division

CICC

1. REFERENCES: TWXs I-8883, I-8894, I-8930.

2. FORWARDED: SOI, dated 7 October 1955, subject and file as above.

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Source: [b6] born [b6] in [b6] (n.c.a.), formerly residing at [b6]
[b6]

b. Evaluation of Source: F.

c. Relationship of Source to target: Source was a full-time agent of the Sfs District Office in ROSTOCK.

d. How information was obtained by Source: In the course of routine duties.

e. Date agent received information: 19-26 September 1955.

f. Status of case: coverage continues.

4. REMARKS: Source was unusually cooperative in revealing information and appears to have fled the GDR out of sincere political motives.

0841

1 Incl
SOI dtd 7 Oct 55 (1)

[b6]
Lt Col, Inf
Commanding

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Berlin 42323, [b6] /WJM/at/Ops

PA/30

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE														
PREPARING OFFICE	TEAM CHIEF	7 October 1955														
66th CI ^C Group, Region VIII, CE Team.	OPNS OFF	b6 b6 mk														
SUBJECT	CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION															
SfS District Rostock Re: Modus Operandi	<table border="0"> <tr> <td>OF SOURCE:</td> <td>OF INFORMATION:</td> </tr> <tr> <td>COMPLETELY RELIABLE A</td> <td>CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>USUALLY RELIABLE B</td> <td>PROBABLY TRUE 2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>FAIRLY RELIABLE C</td> <td>POSSIBLY TRUE 3</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D</td> <td>DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>UNRELIABLE E</td> <td>IMPROBABLE 5</td> </tr> <tr> <td>RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F</td> <td>TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6</td> </tr> </table>		OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:	COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1	USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2	FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4	UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5	RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6
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RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6															
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION																
<p>1. The recruitment of new agent personnel in the SfS BV (Bezirksverwaltung - District Office) at ROSTOCK (UV1391) is the responsibility of the Personnel and Training Department (Abteilung Kader und Schulung). During the period of May 1955 to September 1955 a recruitment drive was in effect throughout the SfS and considerable emphasis was placed upon recruitment in ROSTOCK as well as in the other SfS districts. Source was approached by the SfS shortly before his graduation from a high school (Oberschule) in ROSTOCK. He was encouraged to voluntarily sign a statement obliging him to become an SfS agent, but was placed under considerable pressure to do so. Source felt that if he had not signed the SfS statement of obligation he would have been excluded from entering any GDR university, would probably have been forced to enter the KVP (Kasernierte Volkspolizei - Garrisoned People's Police), and would have been regarded the rest of his life as a politically suspect individual. Another common method of recruitment is through the relatively high salary that an SfS agent receives as compared with the salaries of persons in unskilled trades. As persons employed as laborers can often be attracted by an SfS salary, many former working men have been recruited by the SfS. Although the agents who have been recruited by this method are generally well screened for their loyalty to the regime, they often lack the educational preparation required to do an efficient job in the SfS. An appeal to patriotism and political conviction is often used as a method of attracting persons with a strong Communist background into the SfS. Although most SfS agents are members of the SED, Source does not know of many cases in which persons have come to the SfS as a result of Party orders. As a matter of fact, recommendations from outside the SfS, even from the SED, are seldom given attention in choosing prospective agents. Recruitments are almost invariably initiated by the SfS itself. Source believes that he himself came to the attention of the SfS as a result of his participation in various Communist mass organizations and the generally reliable appearance of his political background.</p> <p>2. The organization of the SED within the SfS BV in ROSTOCK is the responsibility of three SfS officers who constitute the Party Control Group (Partelleitung). Each department within the BV has its own party group headed by a party secretary. Most of these department party groups meet one evening every two weeks, normally at 1800 hours every other Monday. From time to time special party group meetings are held to discuss special events which arise such as the Geneva Conference during the summer of 1955. In addition to supervising the organization of SED groups within the BV, the Party Control Group manages the political training sessions which take</p>																
<p style="text-align: center;">0842</p>																
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
7 October 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team.

b6

b6

b6

SUBJECT

SfS District Rostock
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

place between 0800 and 1000 hours every other Wednesday. These training sessions are organized as the normal "Party School Year" (Parteischuljahr) and consist of four or five different courses which are carried on simultaneously. The different study groups, known as "circles", were concerned with such topics as the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the classic authors of Communism. The first Party Year Course normally taken is the Basic Party Course (Grundschule der Kommunistischen Partei).

3. Technical training sessions are the responsibility of the Personnel and Training Department. These sessions take place at the same time as the political training sessions, only on alternate Wednesdays. Normally a lecture is given followed by small discussion groups in which the participants are encouraged to make comments. During the late summer of 1955 a series of lectures was in progress on the topic of "The West German State as an Instrument of American Monopoly Capital".

4. Although the paramilitary nature of the SfS does not receive much attention in the day to day functioning of the organization, the military aspects of the SfS are nonetheless emphasized in certain areas. All agents are expected to address one another with the title "Comrade" (Genosse) followed by the rank of the person addressed. Although the word "order" (Befehl) is never used in the SfS, an "instruction" (Anweisung) is conceived of as having the force of a military order. Source does not believe that SfS agents are ever judged in civil courts, but are subject to military law and always tried accordingly. For minor offenses a member of the SfS may be brought before a Legal Commission (Rechtskommission) composed of SfS officers, but in the case of serious offenses the defendant is tried before a KVP military court. Although the SfS is completely independent of the KVP in all operational matters, the KVP commander of the ROSTOCK military district has the right of issuing certain categories of orders to the chief of the SfS BV. This right is largely restricted to orders concerning public places which are off limits to military or SfS personnel, weapons training within the SfS, and wearing of the uniform (which is identical with the uniform worn in the KVP).

5. Liaison with Soviet Intelligence is accomplished through a group of Soviet "instructors" who are assigned to the BV. Although the instructors are supposedly present in an advisory capacity, they exert a considerable influence on the way in which operations are carried out and are universally looked upon as the ultimate deciding force whenever any doubt arises as to how an operation is to be handled. A Soviet instructor is assigned to each

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
7 October 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team.

b6

b6 /mk

SUBJECT

SfS District Rostock
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

department within the BV and a group of three or four instructors are attached to Department I (Administration). Source feels that the influence of the Soviets is such that any instructor can contradict the decision of the department chief to which he is assigned. The Soviet instructors have their offices within the various departments of the BV and do not appear to be connected with any Soviet intelligence agency with separate offices in ROSTOCK. Source assumes that they are ultimately responsible to a Soviet headquarters in BERLIN. Source knows of only one case which was ever completely taken over from the SfS by Soviet Intelligence. This case involved an individual who was found in the possession of anti-Soviet literature printed in Russian.

6. The following methods of informant recruitment are regarded by the SfS as standard procedure:

a. The "Doubling Method" (Methode der Usberwerbung). This method of informant recruitment involves the approach of persons who are suspected of being in contact with Western intelligence agencies or even informants of Western intelligence agencies. By offering a better salary than the person is already receiving from the West, the attempt is made to "turn the person around" in the interests of the SfS.

b. The Pressure Method (Methode des Drucks). This is the normal method of recruiting persons with previous or pending criminal convictions. Persons recruited by this method are normally given the alternative of working for the SfS or being put in prison.

c. Appeal to political convictions. This method is often used in the recruiting of informants covering industrial and agricultural targets within the GDR. Persons employed within enterprises under SfS surveillance are approached on the basis of their demonstrated political reliability and encouraged to report on their fellow workers. Source feels that appeal to political convictions is less effective in the recruitment of informants who are expected to carry on operations outside the GDR.

7. Source is not well informed on the methods by which the SfS maintains contact with informants operating outside the GDR; he believes, however, that periodic personal contact between handling agent and informant is preferred to radio contact, secret writing, or other possible methods. Meetings with informants operating within the GDR are referred to as

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
7 October 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team.

b6

b6

mk

SUBJECT

SfS District Rostock
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

"Treffe", a word which is otherwise seldom used in German. SfS agents frequently abbreviate this to simply "T" when referring to informant meetings. Informant meetings preferably take place in a KW (Konspirative Wohnung - Conspirative House), but in actual practice there are not enough KW's established in ROSTOCK to meet the demand. KW's are normally houses or apartments which are not directly owned by the SfS but are used for operational purposes by agreement with the owners. Source estimates that only about half of the informant meetings which take place in ROSTOCK are held in KW's; a few of the remainder take place in automobiles or on the street, but it is more usual to meet informants in cafes and restaurants when a KW is not available. Written reports from informants are encouraged, though according to regulations such reports are supposed to be written during the meeting with the handling agent. In actual practice, however, written reports are usually prepared by the informant in advance.

8. The SfS BV in ROSTOCK is reached with the public telephone number 7071. In addition, the BV is connected with other SfS offices, including its sub-offices, by means of an SfS telephone system. When one BV calls another, code designations are substituted for the names of the respective BV's. These code names are all the names of flowers; "Edelweiss", for example, is the code word which designates the SfS BV in SCHWERIN (PE6045). Source recalls that "Tulpe" (tulip) was one of these code words, but does not know which BV it designates. Incoming calls to the BV in ROSTOCK are made through a switchboard. There is at least one telephone in each office within the BV, each having its own extension number. Calls can be made from one office to another within the BV by merely dialing the proper extension number. Calls outside the BV are made by first dialing zero. Source recalls the following extension numbers used within the BV:

- a. Message Center: 350
- b. Office of the chief of the BV: 210
- c. Chief's secretary: 212
- d. Soviet instructor assigned to Department III: 235
- e. Assistant Deputy Chief of the BV: 214
- f. Chief of Department III: 230

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

7 October 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team.

b6

b6 mk

SUBJECT

SfS District Rostock
Re: Modus OperandiCODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

- g. Deputy Chief of Department III: 233
- h. Chief of Referat 2, Department III: 239
- i. Chief janitor: 377
- j. Referat 3, Department III: 398
- k. Referat Personnel, Department III: 396
- l. Photography Section: 348
- m. Referat 1, Department III: 394
- n. Personnel and Training Department: 215
- o. Secretary to Chief of Department III: 231
- p. Chief of Referat 1, Department III: 234
- q. Party secretary of Department III: 236
- r. Referat 2, Department III: 238
- s. Referat 1, Department III: 392

9. Source is not informed whether or not the BV is in communication with the other BV's by teletype or whether teletype connections exist between the BV in ROSTOCK and its subordinate offices. Teletype facilities do, however, connect the SfS in ROSTOCK with SfS Headquarters in BERLIN. BERLIN and ROSTOCK are also in communication with one another by radio. Source does not believe radio connections exist directly between the various BV's at this time.

10. A courier service is maintained between BERLIN and ROSTOCK every Tuesday and Friday. The courier is always the same agent and the courier automobile is always the same EMW (Eisenacher Motorenwerke - Eisenach Motor Works) vehicle. A courier service is also maintained between ROSTOCK and its sub-offices. Couriers drive to the sub-offices at least every Saturday and possibly more often. Source does not know exactly how many agents are assigned to courier duty between ROSTOCK and the sub-offices,

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION		DATE 7 October 1955														
PREPARING OFFICE 66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team.		66 mk														
SUBJECT SfS District Rostock Re: Modus Operandi	<table border="0"> <tr> <td>CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:</td> <td>OF INFORMATION:</td> </tr> <tr> <td>COMPLETELY RELIABLE A</td> <td>CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>USUALLY RELIABLE B</td> <td>PROBABLY TRUE 2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>FAIRLY RELIABLE C</td> <td>POSSIBLY TRUE 3</td> </tr> <tr> <td>NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D</td> <td>DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>UNRELIABLE E</td> <td>IMPROBABLE 5</td> </tr> <tr> <td>RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F</td> <td>TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6</td> </tr> </table>		CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE:	OF INFORMATION:	COMPLETELY RELIABLE A	CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1	USUALLY RELIABLE B	PROBABLY TRUE 2	FAIRLY RELIABLE C	POSSIBLY TRUE 3	NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D	DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4	UNRELIABLE E	IMPROBABLE 5	RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F	TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION																
<p>but believes there must be several. Incoming and outgoing documents always go through the Message Center (Poststelle), but they are logged in and out by the particular departments handling them.</p> <p>11. Communications and document security do not appear to be the special responsibility of any group within the BV. Some teletype communications are considered sensitive enough to require encoding, but when this is done the responsibility rests with the chief of the department sending the message. All documents having anything to do with SfS operations are serialized and marked "GVS" (Geheime Verschluss Sache - Secret Material). Source knows of no further distinctions being made between classified material of greater and lesser sensitivity. Classified documents are kept by the agents using them, and no agent is allowed to look at the documents in another agent's custody unless it becomes operationally necessary. Theoretically each agent is supposed to have a safe in which to keep his own classified material, but in practice there are not nearly enough safes to go around without sharing.</p> <p>12. Any agent wishing to examine the postal correspondence of a person under operational observation may do so by submitting a written request to Department M (Postal Interception). Each request for interception must be approved by the department chief of the requesting agent. Intercepted letters are brought to the Department M office within the BV building and are there opened by steam. Letters which have been glued closed or sealed with sealing wax are not opened unless there is an unusual necessity for examining the letter. Source has not heard of ultraviolet light or other methods of secret writing detection being used. After being opened by Department M, the letters are picked up by the various departments in the BV and examined in the original by the requesting agents. Photographic copies may then be made by the photography section if the responsible agent wishes them. Source does not know whether the SfS categorically intercepts all mail coming from the West or all mail addressed to SfS agents. All SfS agents are, however, obligated by duty to report any mail they receive from Western countries. Source believes that letters which are intercepted by the SfS are intercepted according to the address which they are sent to rather than the individual they are addressed to. For this reason, Source believes that the greatest loophole in the postal interception system is the fact that a person's correspondence is not liable to be controlled if it is sent to an address other than the one which the SfS has requested interception on. In a person were under suspicion by the SfS, Source feels that any letters mailed to him would have a better chance of</p>																
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6 0847

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WD AGO FORM 568
1 JUN 47

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE
7 October 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team.

SUBJECT

SfS District Rostock
Re: Modus OperandiCODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

escaping postal interception if they were sent through the address of a friend who was less likely to be on the interception list. Source does not know what categories of mail undergo spot checks, but thinks that such interception would probably be limited to mail coming from the West and letters addressed to persons of more than average importance (including SfS agents).

13. Each department within the SfS BV in ROSTOCK maintains frequent contact with the corresponding Main Department at SfS Headquarters in BERLIN. Every two months a situation report is prepared by each department in ROSTOCK and taken to BERLIN by courier.

14. Confidential funds are referred to as "operational funds" (Operativ-gelder) and are distributed to the various departments by Department I. Each department keeps a careful record of its own expenditures and is reimbursed at the beginning of each month for the expenditures of the previous month. Operational funds are used for such purposes as the payment of informants and the renting of certain types of KW's. Department III operates on a monthly budget which varies between 700 and 800 DM East.

15. Source believes that arrests and searches are carried out by the various departments rather than being the special responsibility of any one department. Surveillances, however, are the responsibility of Department VIII. Requests for surveillance are submitted to Department VIII in the form of a letter from the requesting agent. All such requests must be approved by the requesting agent's department chief.

16. The principal mission of Department III of the SfS in ROSTOCK is the security of state controlled enterprises against either passive or aggressive acts of sabotage. In order to accomplish this mission, Department III is divided internally into sub-departments (Referate) which are responsible for the security of a number of specific installations. The various sub-departments function through informants within each of the targets they are covering and attempt to determine 1) the general climate of opinion among the workers in each target and 2) the particular workers in each target who appear to be politically unreliable. The targets of the various sub-departments are as follows:

a. Targets of Referat 1 (Industry):

(1) The Neptune Docks in WARNEMUENDE (UA1008)

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

7 October 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team.

b6

b6 /mk

SUBJECT

SfS District Rostock
Re: Modus OperandiCODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE	A
USUALLY RELIABLE	B
FAIRLY RELIABLE	C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE	D
UNRELIABLE	E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN	F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES	1
PROBABLY TRUE	2
POSSIBLY TRUE	3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE	4
IMPROBABLE	5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED	6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

(2) The Warnow Docks in WARNEMUENDE

b. Targets of Referat 2 (Trade and Supply):

(1) Fish packing enterprises, including all FPG's (Fischerei Produktionsgenossenschaften - Fishing Production Collectives), and FGS's (Fischerei Geraetestationen - Fishing Implements Stations)

(2) The Bau Union (Construction Union)

(3) Other construction enterprises, including the VEB Ausbau (Volkseigener Betrieb Ausbau - State Owned Factory Extension) at ROSTOCK, Doberanerstrasse; VEB Baustadt (City Construction) at ROSTOCK, August Bebelstrasse; the Konstruktionsbuero fuer Industriebau (Construction Bureau for Industrial Building) at ROSTOCK, Freiligradstrasse, and the VEB Bau Union Kueste (Coast Construction Union) in ROSTOCK.

c. Targets of Referat 3 (Agriculture):

(1) All MTS's (Maschinen Traktoren Stationen - Machine Tractor Stations).

(2) All VEAB's (Volkseigene Aufkaufbetriebe - State Owned Purchasing Enterprises)

(3) The VDGB (Vereinigung der gegenseitigen Bauernhilfe - Farmers' Mutual Assistance League) and the BHG (Baerliche Handelsgenossenschaft - Farmers' Trade Collective)

(4) LPG's (Landwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaften - Agricultural Production Collectives), VEG's (Volkseigene Gueter - State Owned Properties), and OeLB's (Oertliche Landwirtschaftsbetriebe - Local Agricultural Enterprises).

d. Targets of Referat 4 (Concerns): The surveillance of all former employees and executives of large West German firms and combines. Particularly important are former employees of the I.G. Farben company and the AEG (Allgemeine Elektrizitaetsgesellschaft - General Electric Corporation).

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

7 October 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team.

b6

b6 /mk

SUBJECT

SfS District Rostock
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED . . . 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

17. Source believes that espionage activities directed against the German Federal Republic and the Western powers are the responsibility of Department XVI. As increasing emphasis is being placed upon this mission, Department XVI is being increased in size. Two specific targets of this Department at the BV in ROSTOCK are the West German armaments industries and the West German marine construction industries.

18. Department S is described as one of the most secretive departments in the BV at ROSTOCK. Its offices are separated from the offices of the other departments in the BV and few agents are allowed to enter their offices unless they are members of the department. The mission of Department S is telephone interception and presumably other types of work involving technical apparatus.

19. The Port Department (Abteilung Hafen) exists as an independent department in the organizational structure of the Rostock BV. The mission of this department is the control of foreign ships entering the port of ROSTOCK and the control of persons arriving in ROSTOCK by ship. Sailors' shore passes are normally issued to foreign seamen through the People's Police Kreis Office, but a record of all foreign nationals entering ROSTOCK by ship is maintained by the SfS.

(F-6)

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SECRET

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

b6

DATE
0 October 1955

b6

awt

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team.

SUBJECT

Main Department VIII
SfS BERLIN
Re: Modus Operandi

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. On or about 14 September 1955, [b6] (cover name), SfS handling agent of a Main Department VIII surveillance team, began operating out of an office in the Volks Polizei Inspektion (People's Police Precinct) located in the Rathaus, BERLIN-Treptow (Soviet Sector), at the intersection of Megede and Fielitzstrasse. His new telephone number is 63 68 54 and is a line direct to him. The old telephone number 63 64 68 was an indirect contact, necessitating contact through a third person.

2. Main Department VIII is attempting to locate and utilize dead letter drops in West BERLIN. Two recommendations have been made for such letter drops. One of them is based on the utilization of a former air raid defense bunker located in BERLIN-Wedding (French Sector), close to the S-Bahn (city rail line) station Humboldthain. This bunker is covered by dirt and rubble on three sides and on top. The fourth side, the one nearest the S-Bahn, is not fully concealed, and has a number of large cracks in it as a result of attempts at demolition. Pieces of concrete broken from the wall of the bunker still resting in the cracks can be removed, a letter or small package inserted in the space (approximately three to four inches wide), and the piece of concrete replaced, affording protection to the letter from the elements. A drawing of the letter drop near the S-Bahn station Humboldthain will be submitted to Main Department VIII in the near future. The other proposed letter drop is one of a general nature, utilizing the space between advertising billboards and the window or wall behind. There are innumerable such billboards in West BERLIN. The plan consists of placing the message in a tube, inserting the tube behind a billboard, and then utilizing a carpenter's measure to move the tube to such a point where it can be grasped by the fingers. This latter method has been received with gratitude in Main Department VIII because it affords use of a number of varied locations in West BERLIN for letter drops. A practice run on such letter drops will be made in East BERLIN within the next few days.

Source "A"

(C-3)

3. Region VIII files have no information concerning Main Department VIII activity in locating or developing dead letter drops in West BERLIN, nor any information concerning the use of the BERLIN-Treptow Rathaus for an office nor the telephone numbers listed in the above report.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team.

ADJ. GEN. CHIEF

OPNS OFF

DATE 29 September 1955

b6

/sk

SUBJECT

SfS FRANKFURT/Oder
Re: SfS Orientation Course
in SEELOW

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION OF SOURCE

COMPLETELY RELIABLE
USUALLY RELIABLE
FAIRLY RELIABLE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
UNRELIABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

OF INFORMATION

A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
B PROBABLY TRUE
C POSSIBLY TRUE
D DOUBTFULLY TRUE
E IMPROBABLE
F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. On 11 and 12 August 1955, the SfS conducted orientation classes in SEELOW (VU5821). These classes were conducted for students projected for enrollment in a three (3) month SfS course to be conducted in FRANKFURT/Oder (VF6999) commencing on 16 August 1955. The orientation classes were conducted in the conference room of SfS offices in SEELOW. Five (5) students attended these classes. Students were given political instruction, general instruction regarding the personal discretion of an SfS informant, and orientation regarding their studies in the FRANKFURT/Oder school. Students were informed that they were representatives to the FRANKFURT/Oder school from their Kreis and that all Kreise in the FRANKFURT/Oder district would send students to this school.

2. Political instruction at this course consisted of routine propaganda speeches. Instruction regarding personal discretion as an SfS informant embodied cursory discussion of the conduct of investigations, including surveillance conduct, to avoid compromise and behavior toward superior and subordinate officials whose cooperation would be needed in the course of investigations. Students were told that they would receive extensive training in FRANKFURT/Oder regarding effective conduct as operative informants. Students were told to expect assignments in West BERLIN and in the German Federal Republic upon completion of the FRANKFURT/Oder school. Training in FRANKFURT/Oder would involve preparation for missions in refugee camps in West BERLIN where informants would be sent to establish contact with GDR refugees in order to determine the reasons for their flight and to effect re-defection. Informants sent on such missions would also determine refugees' personal backgrounds, contacts, and future plans. Emphasis would be placed upon former Peoples' Policemen in missions of this type. Students were told to anticipate assistance from West BERLIN SED members in accomplishing such missions. Missions in the German Federal Republic would be more general in nature, involving the West German Army, industrial firms, political attitudes, and public opinion, always with the object of exploiting West German fallibilities to the advantage of the GDR. Missions in the German Federal Republic would be carried out through the cooperation of Communist Party members in the Federal Republic.

3. Training in the FRANKFURT/Oder School would involve camera training, passenger vehicle operation, surveillance training, report writing, weapons training including the use of explosives, and briefings on target areas including pertinent training on political and economic conditions. All training at this school was to be conducted by "police officers". Further description of instructors was not given. Students attending the orientation

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

29 September 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CE Team.

b6 /mk

SUBJECT

SfS FRANKFURT/Oder
Re: SfS Orientation Course
in SEELOW

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION
OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

classes in SEELOW and presently most probably enrolled in the FRANKFURT/Oder School are:

a. b6, 2d Secretary of the FDJ (Freie Deutsche Jugend - Free German Youth), born circa b6 5'7" tall, dark blond hair, brown eyes, tan complexion, stout build. b6 was probably born in b6 (VU5625) and was residing there at the time of his attendance at the orientation classes. b6 is single, is a teacher by profession, and formerly worked for the Peoples' Police and the SfS, probably in an informant capacity for the latter.

b. b6, born circa b6 5'7" tall, long dark wavy hair, slender build. b6 originates from Saxony and speaks with a Saxon dialect. She is single and previously worked in a factory.

c. Heinrich MAHNIGEL, an SED Party Secretary, born circa 1904, 5'9" tall, dark hair, receding hairline, large scar on right hand, married.

d. b6, born b6 in b6 (PC8210), a poultry and cattle breeder by profession, last residing in SEELOW.

4. Upon completion of the orientation classes, identity documents were taken from students and they were instructed to report to SfS SEELOW office on 15 August 1955, prepared to take up residence in FRANKFURT/Oder for the three month period of the school. In lieu of identity documents, students received a certificate authorizing travel within District FRANKFURT/Oder.

Source "A"

(F-6)

5. Examination of the records maintained by Region VIII, 66th CIC Group, APO 742, revealed no record of the personalities mentioned in this report, with the exception of b6 who is mentioned in PR, Subject: b6 file: VIII-23758, dated 6 September 1955. This person is identical with the person mentioned in paragraph 3d of this report.

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TEIN/etg/Pax Mail 802

HEADQUARTERS REGION III
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 757 US ARMY

CIC
CENTRAL
FILE

29 September 1955

SUBJECT: STATE SECRETARIATE for STATE SECURITY - SFS (C) (U)
ERFURT FB4249, Bezirk Erfurt, Germany

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: CIOCB

567246
CIC

1. REFERENCE: Ops Memo 8/54
2. FORWARDED: CPI Cards and Agent Report, dated 28 September 1955, subject as above.

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

- a. Source is [b1] who is evaluated F and obtained information through personal observation.
- b. Date Information Was Obtained: From 1946 to 1955.
- c. Date on Which Information Was Reported to Agent: 30 August 1955.
- d. Status of Case: Pending

4. REMARKS:

- a. The files of the Regional Registry revealed no record of any of the personalities mentioned in this report with the exception of (fnu) [b6] who cannot be positively identified.
- b. Reference is made to SFS Work Book Volume II, Index No. 2602,090000. An individual is mentioned named [b6] (fnu). This may well be the [b6] mentioned by Source.
- c. Personality information concerning Source "A", mentioned in paragraph 3 above, is on file in the Regional Registry.
- d. This report was prepared by S/A [b6] Clemen P/O.

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2 Incls

1. CPI Cards
2. AS, dtd 28 Sept 55

[b6]
Lt Col Inf
Commanding

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Regrading data cannot
be predetermined

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AGENT REPORT

(SR 300-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

STATE SECRETARIATE for STATE SECURITY - Sfs (C) (U)
ERFURT PB4249, Bezirk Erfurt, Germany

2. DATE SUBMITTED

28 September 1955

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

On 30 August 1955, Source "A", an East Zone refugee, processing through the Glessen Refugee Camp, GIESSEN MB7704, Germany, was interrogated concerning his knowledge of censorship methods employed by the Sfs in ERFURT PB4249, Bezirk Erfurt, Germany, and stated substantially:

a. Source was employed as a mail sorter in the Main Post Office in Erfurt, DDR from 1946 to 1955. During this period, he was able to see what methods were used by the Sfs in establishing and maintaining mail censorship. He himself had never entered that portion of the Main Post Office that was set aside by the Sfs for their work. His knowledge of the personnel employed for this work is limited to the two (2) Sfs Agents assigned to supervise the censorship. (Source was interrogated according to "Interrogation Briefs", dated 28 September 1954 and the outline set forth in this brief is followed paragraph for paragraph.)

(1) COMMENT:

Source has no knowledge of the Sfs departmental designation of the unit selected to perform censorship. Further, he was not able to state whether or not telephone or telegraph coverage was effected.

(2) EEI

(a) Function or Mission:

The main function was to censor all mail within the DDR as well as mail going to or coming from West Germany.

(b) At what Level Does This Department Exist:

This censorship section existed at Land Level. The main post office in ERFURT is responsible for all mail between Land Thuringia and the West. According to Source, Land Thuringia contains three (3) Bezirke: Erfurt, Suhl and Gera. Therefore, according to the regulations of the DDR Postal System, censorship of mail for a Land is performed in one of the large cities within a particular Land. (Apparently the Postal Service does not adhere to the Bezirk system of dividing the country into administrative sections as does the Sfs.)

(c) Location and Description:

The censorship department of the main Post Office in ERFURT is located on the second floor of the building. The building is at Am Anger

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(Cont'd)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

S/A, 66th CIC Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

DA FORM 341
1 APR 52

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED

AGS (1) 12-22-5007-1300

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AGENT REPORT

(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

STATE SECRETARIATE for STATE SECURITY-SfS (c)(U)
ERFURT PBL249, Bezirk Erfurt, Germany

2. DATE SUBMITTED

28 September 1955

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(Cont'd)

near the main railroad station. There are about six (6) rooms in the department and this section is not visited by anyone not directly connected with the activities there. The entrance is also separated from the entrance for the public. To gain entrance to the room, it is necessary to first ring a bell as the door is always kept locked from the inside.

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(d) Special Operational Groups:

Source can only state that the censorship office is controlled by two (2) SfS Agents. These are [b6] and [b6] (see paragraphs 2 a and b). They have under them ten (10) other employees. These individuals are for the most part unknown to the regular employees of the Postal System and they are never permitted to consort with them. These censorship employees always leave and enter the building by a private entrance.

(e) Details of Internal Structure:

The ten (10) individuals mentioned are controlled and supervised by [b6] and [b6]

(f) Immediate Supervisory Department or Headquarters, Details of Supervision:

Source opined that the SfS Bezirk Headquarters in ERFURT is the employing agency of [b6] and [b6]. These two men are no doubt SfS agents. The others are merely in the employee of the SfS and can best be described as informants. The agents, however, are all powerful in the post office and no one, including the highest postal official, can interfere with their activities. The employees of the SfS commence work every morning at 0500 hours and work until 1300 hours each day except Sunday. After 1300 hours, there is a pause until 1500 hours and then work continues until 2200 hour. [b6] and [b6] divide the working day between themselves so that there is always one of them on duty.

(g) Modus Operandi:

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Mail to and from points within the DDR:

As stated heretofore, ERFURT is responsible for censorship for all incoming and outgoing mail between Land Thuringia and the west. In the case of mail between points in the DDR there is more decentralization. A

0856

(Cont'd)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

S/A, 66th CIC Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

DA FORM 341

REFRAGS WD AGO FORM 341 (JUN 4) WHICH MAY BE USED

AGS (1) 12-52 (10M-3009)

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AGENT REPORT

(SF 380-20-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT	2. DATE SUBMITTED 28 September 1955
STATE SECRETARIATE for STATE SECURITY -Sfs ERFURT PE4249, Bezirk Erfurt, Germany	3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

censorship station is located at the large post offices within the Land. In the case of Land THURINGIA, these are GERA TS9540, MEININGEN PB0003, WEIMAR PB6351, SUHL PH259 and others. ERFURT too is responsible for censorship of intra-DDR mail within its own particular area. This area extends for a distance of about fifteen (15) miles in all directions, from the city.

As soon as the mail is collected from the outlying post offices, it is brought by truck to the main post office in ERFURT. The mail sacks, before cancellation of the stamps, are taken to the censor room and examined. After the examination, they go into postal channels. Source claims that 20,000 letters are processed each day.

Mail to and from West Germany:

Officials of the DDR are not permitted to mail official mail through ordinary mail boxes. This mail is brought to the main post office and goes through separate channels. However, it is the opinion of Source that it is also censored. Any official who had deviated from this procedure is severely reprimanded for any violation.

Source stated that mail is opened by a steam process as he has noticed letters bearing the effects of this are easily detected.

(h.) TOTAL STRENGTH:

At the ERFURT Post Office, there are about ten (10) individuals employed by the Sfs to censor mail. In addition to this there are two (2) Sfs agents, b6 and b6 who are supervisors.

(i). See Paragraph 2.

(j). No knowledge

(k). No knowledge

(l). No knowledge

(m). No knowledge

(n) All mail is censored, according to Source.

(o) Source claims that mail is never picked up from a mail box or collection point and passed on to a mail train, without first having gone through censorship at a post office. The weakness in the censorship is that large

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT b6 S/A, 66th CIC Group	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT 0857 b6
---	--

DA FORM 341

REPLACES DA FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED

PAGE (1) 12-52 200M-30093

CONFIDENTIAL

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AGENT REPORT

(SR 320-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

STATE SECRETARIATE for STATE SECURITY - Sfs (C)(U)
ERFURT PB4249, Bezirk Erfurt, Germany

2. DATE SUBMITTED

28 September 1955

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

amounts of mail are censored by a limited amount of people. Source noted that out of 5000 letters examined only 200 bore an indication that they had been steamed open.

(p) Source had no knowledge

(q) Source had no knowledge

(r) Source had no knowledge

(s) Source had no knowledge

2. The following is a list of Personalities mentioned in the above report:

NAME and/or COVER NAME:

b6 (fmu)

AGE:

About b6 in b6 PB4045, b6

HOME ADDRESS:

b6 DDR

HAIR:

Dark Brown

EYES:

Unknown

BUILD:

Large

HEIGHT:

6 feet

WEIGHT:

220 lbs.

SEX:

Male

MARITAL STATUS:

Married with children

CITIZENSHIP:

German

NATIONALITY:

German

OTHER:

Known to Source for three (3) years as being in charge of the Sfs censor room in the Main Post Office in ERFURT.

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(Cont'd)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6 S/A, 66th CIO Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

DA FORM 341

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED

AGL (1) 12-52-1000-100

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CONFIDENTIAL AGENT REPORT

(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

STATE SECRETARIATE for STATE SECURITY - SFS (C)(U)
ERFURT PB4249, Bezirk Erfurt, Germany

2. DATE SUBMITTED

28 September 1955

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OF FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

NAME and/or COVER NAME:

BARTUSCH, Alois

AGE:

About 1895 in CSR

HOME ADDRESS:

ERFURT PB4249, DDR

HAIR:

White

EYES:

Gray

BUILD:

Stocky

HEIGHT:

5 ft. 7 inches

WEIGHT:

200 lbs.

SEX:

Male

MARITAL STATUS:

Married

CITIZENSHIP:

German

NATIONALITY:

German

OTHER:

Was in Russia until 1945. Speaks good Russian. Has been in the SFS for the past two (2) years as co-worker of [b6] in the Post Office in ERFURT.

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0859

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5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

S/A, 66th CIC Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

b6

DA FORM 341

REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341 (JUN 47) WHICH MAY BE USED

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AGE (1) 12-52-200M-30093

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HEADQUARTERS REGION VIII
66th COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 742 US ARMY

16630

D-329162; VIII-16540.4

12 September 1955

SUBJECT: Sfs District Dresden, Re: Operational Change within
Department II

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: Captain b6

567245
CICE

1. FORWARDED: SOI, dated 8 September 1955, subject and file
as above.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

- a. Source: V-418-VIII.
- b. Evaluation of Source: C.
- c. How information was obtained by Source: In the course
of regular duties.
- d. Date Source obtained information: August-September
1955.
- e. Date agent received information 5-6 September 1955.
- f. Status of case: Coverage continues.

1 Incl
SOI dtd 8 Sep 55 (1)

b6

Lt Col, Inf
Commanding

Berlin 42323/ b6 at/Ops

0860

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AA/01

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PAGE 1 of 1
COPY 2 of 3 PAGES
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE: 22 September 1955

PREPARING OFFICE:

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CF Team

D-52162

VIII-16540.4

b6

/avt

SUBJECT:

SFS District Dresden
Re: Operational Change within
Dept. II

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE
USUALLY RELIABLE
FAIRLY RELIABLE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
UNRELIABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

OF INFORMATION:

A. CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
B. PROBABLY TRUE
C. POSSIBLY TRUE
D. DOUBTFULLY TRUE
E. IMPROBABLE
F. TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. Department II (intelligence and counterintelligence) of the BV (Bezirksverwaltung - District Office), SFS District Dresden is commencing to recruit "Kontaktmaenner" (contact, or out men), by direct orders of b6 the Commanding Officer. These "Kontaktmaenner" will have some of the duties of the qualified SFS agents, in that they will be responsible for the handling of informants, assignment of their missions, and as intermediaries in payment of the informants. Heretofore such use of source handlers has been restricted to Department III (industrial, agricultural espionage) in DRESDEN.

a. On 12 September 1955, Lieutenant b6 born b6 holder of DPA (Deutsche Personalausweis - German personal identity document) b6 a member of Department II, currently responsible for coverage of West German intelligence activity in the Dresden district as a member of section 4 of Dept. II, is having a meeting with the first of such "Kontaktmaenner" to be recruited in a cover apartment located on Grunauer Strasse in DRESDEN (YS1257). At this meeting the "Kontaktmann" will be instructed in his duties and responsibilities. Currently b6 has developed leads on the existence of at least three (3) West German intelligence nets operating in the DRESDEN area.

b. A subsequent mission of the "Kontaktmann" will be the establishment of a cover apartment in PULLACH (QV114). An unidentified GI (Geheime Informantoren - Secret Informants), whose son is an engineer in DRESDEN, has relatives living in the community through whom the apartment is to be established. PULLACH is near the headquarters of the GEHELEN group, according to b6, and for that reason this cover apartment will become necessary.

Source: "A"

(C-3)

2. An examination of the files of Region VIII reveals that numerous reports in VIII-16540.4 mention b6 as the commanding officer of SFS District Dresden.

0861

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HEADQUARTERS REGION VIII
66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 742 US ARMY

D-329162, VIII-16540.4

16 June 1955

SUBJECT: SFS DRESDEN, Re: Telephone and Vehicle Numbers

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIC Group
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: Capt b6

QICC

1. FORWARDED: SOI, dated 15 June 1955, subject and file as above.

2. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Sources: Source "A", P-288-VIII; Source "B", Sfs Workbook, published by 66th CIC Group.

b. Evaluation of Sources: C.

c. Relationship of Source to target: Source is an SED member having occasional contact with the SFS DRESDEN.

d. How Source obtained information: Personal observation.

e. Date Source obtained information: March to June 1955.

f. Date agent received information: 9 June 1955.

g. Status of case: Coverage continues.

1 Incl
SOI dtd 15 Jun 55 (1)

b6

Lt Col, Inf
Commanding

Berlin 42323 b6

W1/Ops

0862

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

15 June 1955

PREPARING OFFICE

OPNS OF

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, CR Team

VS 29162, TIGR 16540.4

b6

SUBJECT

Sfs DRESDEN
RE: Telephone and vehicle
numbers

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE

COMpletely RELIABLE
USUALLY RELIABLE
FAIRLY RELIABLE
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE
UNRELIABLE
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN

OF INFORMATION

A CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES
B PROBABLY TRUE
C POSSIBLY TRUE
D DOUBTFULLY TRUE
E IMPROBABLE
F TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. The following information concerns vehicle and telephone numbers of Sfs in DRESDEN (VS1257) and numbers of Sfs vehicles from BERLIN seen in the immediate vicinity of Sfs installations in DRESDEN.

a. Vehicle numbers of Sfs DRESDEN

RA 57-99

RA 01-32

RA 52-21

RJ 15-94

RJ 02-39

b. Vehicle numbers of Sfs installations in BERLIN seen in DRESDEN:

TB 26-86

TB 40-18

c. A telephone number of DRESDEN EV (Berl. Keverwaltung) is 55 630.

d. A telephone number of the FREITAL (VS0551) Sfs installation is 88 16 85. This installation is located on Schillerstrasse 12, FREITAL.

Source "A"

(C-6)

2. Vehicle number RA 52-21 is listed as belonging to Sfs DRESDEN, and telephone number 55 630 as also belonging to Sfs DRESDEN.

Source "B"

(C-6)

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WD AGO FORM 1 JUN 55 568

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HEADQUARTERS AB OF VIII
66TH COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE
APO 742 US ARMY

15/26

D-329165; 111-16540:10

14 February 1954

SUBJECT: SFS (Staatssekretariat fuer Staatssicherheit - State
Secretariat for State Security) Bezirksverwaltung (Admin-
istrative District) MAGDEBURG (PG8179)

TO: Commanding Officer
66th CIG Group
APO 154, US Army
ATTN: Capt. [b6]

CIC
CENTRAL FILE

1. REFERENCE: Headquarters letter dated 5 October 1951,
Subject: "Coverage of HSB/MGB," File D-305925.

2. FORWARDED: SOI dated 25 January 1954, Subject and file
as above.

3. CONTROL OF INFORMATION:

a. Sources: "A" is O-74-VIII. Sub-source of "A" is
[b1] born [b1] in [b1] "B" is the HSB
Workbook.

b. Evaluation of Sources: "A" is evaluated P. Sub-
source of "A" is evaluated P.

c. How Information Was Obtained: The attached documents
were stolen from the SFS MAGDEBURG, presumably during the 17 June
riots.

d. Date Agent Received Information: August 1953.

1 Incl

SOI dtd 25 Jan 54 (6)
w/exhibit "X" (2)

Berlin 42521/

[b6]

0864

[b6]

Col Army
Commanding

/rob/ops

1	4
2	5
3	6
CCIC/DOC NO 4113857	
DOSSIER NO	

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25 January 1954

66th CIC Group, Region VIII, 62 Team, File No. VIII-16540.10; D-329156 RJH/VJA/
SfS (Statenssekretariat fuer Staats-
sicherheit - State Secretariat for
State Security) Bezirksverwaltung
(Administrative District) MAGDEBURG

RE:

b6

1. On 9 September 1953 information concerning the MBS Bezirksverwaltung
MAGDEBURG (PO 8179) was obtained from Source "A".

2. The following is the translation of a case developed by the SfS
Bezirksverwaltung MAGDEBURG, concerning the arrest of b6 nee b6
born b6 in b6, and the modus operandi of the SfS
MAGDEBURG in preparing the case for prosecution. The dossier is indexed as
follows:

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Page 1: Resolution to start the investigation
Page 2: Warrant of arrest
Page 3: Preliminary hearing
Page 4: Resolution of the court on b6 appeal of her arrest
Page 5: Notification of arrest (Einlieferungsanzeige)
Page 6 and 7: Body search of the arrestee
Page 8: House search
Page 9: Property taken
Page 10-13: Interrogation of b6 on 26 February 1953
Page 14 and 15: Interrogation of b6 on 3 March 1953
Page 16-22: Interrogation of b6 on 17 March 1953
Page 23-25: Interrogation of b6 on 9 April 1953
Page 26-27: Interrogation of witness b6
Page 28: Interrogation of witness Clara HUNNING
Page 29-31: Interrogation of witness b6
Page 32-34: Interrogation of witness b6
Page 35-37: Interrogation of witness b6 on 16 February 1953
Page 45-57: Interrogation of witness b6 on 14 April 1953

3. Page one is a Beschluss zur Eröffnung des Untersuchungsverfahrens
(Resolution to Start the Investigation). Listed on this form are the name of
the accused, b6 nee b6 her birthdate, b6 birth
place, b6 the reason for the investigation, Espionage, and the
date that the investigation was initiated, 27 February 1953. This form is
signed by the Richtermeister (Agent) (Jm) b6 who worked this case, and
either the Chief of Abteilung II or his Deputy, (Jm) b6 A
photograph of b6 is attached. 0865

4. Page two is the Haftbefehl (Warrant of Arrest) issued on 27 February
1953, by the Kreisgericht MAGDEBURG (PO 8179) (County Court of MAGDEBURG). It
is signed by (Jm) b6 Richtermeister (Judge), and states that b6
nee b6 born b6 in b6 residing at b6 mar-
ried and has one child, is to be brought to the Detention Jail. She is co-

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VIII-16540.10; D-329156, CIC Region VIII, Subj: "373 (Staatssekretariat fuer Staatsicherheit - State Secretariat for State Security) Bezirksverwaltung (Administrative District) MAGDEBURG" RE: [b6] 25 January 1954

oused of Espionage in that she worked as a paid agent of a West BERLIN (UU 9220) Intelligence Agency and submitted reports on bridge construction and personnel. The warrant states that an appeal against this warrant is authorized.

5. Page three is the Strafsache (Punishable Act). On 27 February 1953 [b6] was questioned by the Judge and stated that she had nothing to add to the information that she had given to the police on 26 February 1953.

6. Page five is the rejection of [b6] appeal against the warrant of arrest. The appeal was made on 3 March 1953 and rejected on 4 March 1953 by the Strafsenat des Bezirksgerichts (Punishment Chamber of the District Court) MAGDEBURG, on the grounds that she is charged with an offense which carries a penalty of over two years in jail.

7. Page five is an Einlieferungsanzeige (Notification of Arrest), dated 27 February 1953, concerning [b6]

8. Pages six and seven is a report listing the items found in the clothing of [b6]

- a. One brown imitation leather handbag.
- b. One brown leather purse containing 1.40 DMs and one 24 DM stamp.
- c. One Deutscher Personal Ausweise (German Personal Identity Document number [b6])
- d. One identity card for Confidential House Informant No. 558.
- e. One folder with control card number 32. Authorization for social welfare.
- f. Ten photos.
- g. One identity card issued for the authorization of medical treatment.
- h. Four complete food ration cards; two cards with 17 rations.
- i. Two food ration cards for February 1953.
- j. One receipt for .40 DM.
- k. One slip of paper containing the address of [b6]
- l. One stub receipt for repairs of children's shoes.

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VIII-16340.10; D-329156, CIC Region VIII, Subj: "SFS (Staatssekretariat fuer Staatssicherheit - State Secretariat for State Security) Bezirksverwaltung (Administrative District) MAGDEBURG" RE: [b6], 25 January 1954

- [b6] m. One slip of paper containing the address of Public Prosecutor District Court LEIPZIG Q 1.
- n. Two cancelled food ration cards, issued to [b6]
- o. One certificate issued by the Social Welfare Office in TORGAV.
- p. One certificate issued by VP Oberrat [b6] in TORGAV, stating that [b6] is confined in a detention jail.
- q. One black wallet.
- r. One key ring with three keys.
- s. One pair of dark knitted gloves.
9. The following items were found on [b6] body:
- a. One pair of glasses.
 - b. One black coat.
 - c. One colored scarf.
 - d. One checkered skirt.
 - e. One brown blouse.
 - f. One light brown jacket.
 - g. One pair of stockings.
 - h. One pair of brown leather shoes.
 - i. One wedding ring (333 gold).
 - j. One yellow friendship ring with yellow stone.
 - k. One petticoat.
 - l. One pair of panties.
 - m. One shirt.
 - n. One brassiere.
 - o. One garter belt.

SUBJECT certified that the above named articles are her property.

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VIII-16540.10; D-329156, CIC Region VIII Subj: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (Staatssekretariat fuer
Staatsicherheit - State Secretariat for State Security) Bezirksverwaltung
(Administrative District) MAGDEBURG RE: [b6] 25 January 1954

10. Pages eight and nine are a search warrant and a list of the articles confiscated. The title of this document is Durchsuchungs-Sicherstellungs-Beschlagnahme-Protokoll (House Search and Confiscation Report). This search was conducted by Abteilung V of the Ministerium fuer Staatsicherheit (Ministry for State Security), the warrant being signed by [b6] (agent) (fnn) [b6]. It was approved by (fnn) [b6] the Kreisgerichtsdirektor (Director of the County Court). The following items were found in a closet in [b6] apartment:

- a. One card listing the address of [b6]
[b6]
- b. Two copies of correspondence from [b6] lawyer, concerning the criminal case of [b6]
- c. Four notices of the delivery of packages, delivered to K. SCHMIDT.
- d. One receipt of delivery to the District Public Prosecutor in LEIPZIG.
- e. One slip of paper containing the address of the Amtsgericht BERLIN-Mitte, Public Prosecutor [b6]
- f. One slip of paper with the address of [b6] in ALLENDORF.
- g. One slip of paper with the address of [b6] in LEIPZIG.
- h. One money order made out for 110 DMs, with the return address of L. HESSE.
- i. One slip of paper bearing the message "We are at the movie".
- j. One slip of paper listing numbers and the name [b6]
- k. One envelope with the return address of the Czech Diplomatic Mission.
- l. One notebook for the year of 1953.
11. Page nine lists the furniture and property that is located in [b6] apartment. This is signed by Sacharbeiter (Qualified worker or Agent) (fnn) [b6] Unteroffizier (Sergeant), and is dated 19 March 1953.

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12. Pages ten through thirteen are the interrogation of b6 on 26 February 1953. She stated as follows: She comes from a workers family and attended the Volkshochschule in TORGAU from 1929 to 1937. After completion of school she worked one year for a printing and publication firm in TORGAU. From 1938 to 1948 she worked as a saleslady for a food store in TORGAU owned by b6 the grandmother of her husband. b6 has not been employed since 1948. On 28 August 1948 she married b6 born b6 in b6 b6 was employed as a clerk by the city administration of TORGAU until June 1952 when he was arrested and sentenced to two years imprisonment for assisting in espionage activities. He is now jailed at the prison in LEIPZIG. b6 parents are Willi HESSE, born 14 May 1880 in GELBERS near KRYVIZ, residing in TORGAU, Leipzigerstrasse 34, and Minna HESSE, nee NEUMANN, who died on 13 August 1945. b6 has two brothers: b6, 32 years old, residing in HOMBURG by WORMS, and b6 45 years old, residing in b6

Question: How often and why were you in West BERLIN after your husband's arrest?

Answer : After my husband was arrested I was in BERLIN three times. Once, in July 1952, I contacted the municipal court (Amtsgericht) in BERLIN-Mitte (Soviet Sector), Lindenstrasse, because I had found out from the criminal police in TORGAU that the warrant of arrest for my husband had come from BERLIN. I wanted to ascertain the reason for my husband's arrest. I did not enter the Western Sector of BERLIN.

Question: What was the reason for your second trip to West BERLIN?

Answer : In October 1952 I intended to visit relative b6 b6 I in b6

Question: Did you converse with other persons during the trip to West BERLIN?

Answer : While transferring at the S-Bahn station Schoenberg in West BERLIN, I met b6 who formerly resided in TORGAU, Bahnhofstrasse and was employed as a clerk at the labor office in TORGAU. He greeted me and asked what I was doing there. He knew that my husband had been arrested. To my question of how he knew about it he replied "We all know about it", and laughed. We then visited a restaurant in the vicinity of the S-Bahn station Schoenberg and b6 left the table for a short time. After he returned we talked for approximately another half an hour.

Question: What did you talk about with b6

Answer : We talked about TORGAU. He asked several questions, which I answered. He asked how far the construction of the Ho store in TORGAU had advanced, how many of the

burned out buildings had been reconstructed, whether the labor office still has the same personnel as at the time that he was employed there, and whether [redacted] the former chief of the labor office, was still there. During the time I answered these questions, a friend of [redacted] named [redacted] joined our table.

Question:

Answer :

[redacted] asked me if I came from TORAU and I told him that I did. To my question of whether he knows [redacted] he answered that he did and stated that he had been there after the capitulation in 1945 and was at the ELBE-Holzbrücke. I told him that the Elbe bridge had been rebuilt. [redacted] told me that I should interest myself in everything, also to find out whether the Vopos held maneuvers. He told me that as soon as I obtained some information I should return to West BERLIN and submit my report to [redacted] in BERLIN-Lichterfelde-West, Kadettenweg 66. I informed [redacted] that my husband had been arrested and sent to a jail in LEIPZIG because he gave three birthdates to a woman by the name [redacted] who wanted to take them to West BERLIN.

Question:

Answer :

Did you receive any monetary compensation on this date? I did not receive any money on this day. I received my first payment of 200 DMs on 9 January 1953, and, on 16 February 1953, another 110 DMs. For this purpose I gave two cover addresses to which [redacted] or [redacted] could forward the money. I gave the address of the family of [redacted]

[redacted] who resides in [redacted] and the address of [redacted] my brother, who resides in HONBURG near WÜRZEN.

Question:

Answer :

When did you visit [redacted] again in BERLIN after you received the money? After I received the 200 DMs, I went to West BERLIN on 13 January 1953, but did not visit [redacted] On 12 January 1953, I wrote [redacted] a postcard, and informed him that I had received the 200 DMs and that I could not visit him at this time. I only visited my cousin [redacted] who resides in [redacted]

Question:

Answer :

Did you know that you were to work for a criminal organization in West BERLIN? Yes, this was known to me. I gave my consent because I was promised the financial assistance from this hostile organization.

I made this statement without coercion and have told the truth.

0869

read and signed

/s/ [redacted]

closed;

signed signature illegible

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15. Pages 14 and 15 are the interrogation of [b6] on 5 March 1953 between 1400 and 1600 hours by (fnu) [b6] Personal data: [b6] Else, nee [b6] born [b6] in [b6] residing in [b6] profession housewife.

Question: In your statement of 26 February 1952 did you state that you were in contact with Volks Polizei Meister [b6] What did [b6] tell you about his official duties?

Answer : He told me nothing of his official duties, and I did not ask him about them. [b6] never told me anything about his work. We only talked about books and other general subjects. He inquired about my husband and asked whether I had received any mail from him. We often played chess and cards together.

Question: How often did [b6] visit you, and how long did he stay?

Answer : [b6] visited me in my apartment approximately five times from December 1952 until my arrest. The longest he ever stayed was one hour. Prior to this, [b6] and his wife had visited me in my apartment. [b6] s wife once accompanied me while I was moving, and another time she came to visit me on a Sunday, when, after a short time, we took a walk together. I have known Herr [b6] since 1948 and from [b6] since the end of World War II.

Question: In your statement of 26 February 1953 you stated that your brother [b6] sent you 110 RM through the post. Whose money was this and why did you receive it?

Answer : I wrote a short letter to my brother in January 1953 in which I stated that I expected some money, and should it be sent to him he was to forward it to me as the money was mine. I do not know where the money came from. The money belonged to [b6] In October 1952, I informed [b6] of my brother's address as a cover address for me, since he told me that he would support me financially.

Question: What did your brother write about that?

Answer : The 110 RM was sent to me by my brother, but it was actually my sister-in-law, [b6] who mailed it, since she is living with him. It was sent on the 16th or 18th of February 1952. On the money order there was a note saying "letter follows". On the day of my arrest I received a letter from my sister-in-law, the contents of which were more or less as follows: "You wrote that you expected 200 RM, but we only received 110 RM. I am enclosing the postal money order stub." The enclosed money order stub was stamped in Berlin. The return address was again listed as [b6] I never told my brother or my sister-in-law where the money had come from. I have read the entire statement myself, and signed

signature

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14. Pages 16 through 22 are the interrogation of [b6] by the SFS on 17 March 1953 from 1030 to 1400 hours. Personal data: [b6] nee [b6] housewife, born [b6] in [b6] last residence [b6] [b6] Nationality: German; Religion: Protestant; Marital Status: married; Husband's name: [b6] Address of husband: [b6] entrance 9; Children: One child eight years old; Name of father, occupation and residence: [b6] laborer, resides in [b6] [b6] First name of mother and maiden name, occupation, residence; Minna, nee [b6] deceased in 1945. [b6] submitted the following information concerning her life history: I came from a workers family and attended the Volksschule in FORGAV from 1929 to 1937. After completion of school I worked one year for a printing and publishing firm in FORGAV. From 1938 to 1945 I was employed as a saleslady for a food store located in FORGAV, Kurtstrasse 8, owned by Frau [b6] Frau [b6] is my husband's grandmother. After 1945, I took care of my husband's household. In June 1952, my husband was arrested and sentenced to two years in prison for assisting in espionage activity, and is now serving this sentence at the LEIPZIG prison. I was politically not active.

Question: During the interrogation on 26 February 1951, you stated that you had received money by mail from [b6] How much money did you receive?

Answer : All together I received 110 DMs from [b6] one time 200 DMs and the other time 110 DMs. On 9 January, I received 200 DMs and the other 110 DMs I received on 16 February 1953, all through the mail.

Question: Explain again how you met [b6] in West BERLIN and what he told you.

Answer : I have known [b6] since my school days. His full name is [b6] and his last address was in FORGAV, Bahnhofstrasse, house number unknown. Until 1951 [b6] was employed by the labor office in FORGAV. After that I heard that he had moved with his wife to an unknown address. It was also rumored in FORGAV that [b6] had been arrested because he had stolen a wallet. In October 1952, I intended to visit my relative in West BERLIN, [b6] who resides in [b6]

[b6] During October I went to West BERLIN and, during the time I was waiting to change trains at the S-Bahn station Schoenberg, met [b6] [b6] greeted me and asked me what I was doing in West BERLIN. I informed [b6] what had happened to me. I also told him that my husband had been arrested because he had assisted in espionage activities. [b6] [b6] replied that he knew all about this, and laughed.

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Then we visited a restaurant in the vicinity of the S-Bahn station Schoenberg. After we had been seated a short time, [redacted] b6 left the table. Where he went I do not know. After a short time [redacted] b6 returned, and we conversed for half an hour. We especially talked about TORGAU. [redacted] b6 wanted to find out from me how far the construction of the EP store in TORGAU has advanced, the progress made in the rebuilding of burned out homes, whether the labor office still has the same personnel as was employed during the time he was working there and whether [redacted] b6 the former chief of the labor office, was still there. After I had answered all the questions a friend of [redacted] b6 who introduced himself as [redacted] b6 came to our table.

Question:

Answer :

[redacted] b6 asked me right from the start if I came from TORGAU, to which I answered that I did. To my question of whether he knew TORGAU, he replied that he did and stated that he had been there at the Elbe wooden bridge after the capitulation in 1945. I informed [redacted] b6 that the Elbe bridge had been rebuilt. During the conversation [redacted] b6 told me that I should interest myself in everything, and to find out if the VOPOS held maneuvers. He also told me that as soon as I obtained some information I should return to West BERLIN and submit my report to [redacted] b6 at ZEHLEN-Lichterfelde-West, Kadettenweg 66. [redacted] b6 then asked me whether I was employed. When I told him that I receive a pension, he told me in substance that it was not sufficient and that he would give me some assistance. [redacted] b6 remarked that he could not send the money to my address. To my question of why he could not, he replied that it would be better not to. [redacted] b6 told me that he needs a cover address for this purpose. I gave him the address of Frau [redacted] b6 who resides in [redacted] b6 and the address of my brother, [redacted] b6 who resides in HANNOVER near VUKEN. [redacted] b6 and [redacted] b6 then asked me if I wanted something to drink, which I refused because I did not have enough time. I said goodbye to [redacted] b6 and [redacted] b6 and went to my relatives. Both of them remained in the restaurant.

Question:

Answer :

Give a personal description of [redacted] b6 [redacted] b6 is approximately 33 years old, approximately 5'5" tall, dark hair combed straight back without a part, slightly bald on the forehead, dark eyes, and oval face. [redacted] b6 wore a brown coat and no hat.

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Question: Give a personal description of b6

Answer : b6 is slightly taller than b6 and also has dark hair. b6 has a full round face. He wore a dark green leather coat. I can not give any further description.

Question: Which espionage missions did you receive from b6 and b6

Answer : I did not receive any definite assignments from either agent. I only conversed with them about the information already mentioned. The assignment was of a general nature. I was to take an interest in everything.

Question: When was the next meeting arranged and which espionage missions did you perform?

Answer : I did not set a definite meeting date with the agents. b6 however, told me that I should look him up when I return to West BERLIN. b6 gave me his address, b6 I told b6 that I would look him up. I did not carry out any espionage missions.

Question: What did b6 and b6 promise you for completed missions, or what did they give you and what new missions were you assigned?

Answer : Neither agent promised me anything nor did they give me anything. When b6 found out that I was receiving a pension, he told me, literally, that he would give me some assistance. I only conversed with b6 and b6 on 13 October 1953 and not since that time. I did not receive a new assignment.

Question: Who assisted you during the fulfillment of your assignments?

Answer : I did not carry out any assignments and nobody assisted me.

Question: Who are your acquaintances and relatives?

Answer : I have two brothers, b6 who resides in b6 near WURZEN, and b6 who resides in WURZEN. b6 near b6 VP Minister b6 who resides in b6 is an acquaintance of mine.

Question: What are your connections with Fritz b6

Answer : I have known b6 since 1940, and before that time I was acquainted with Frau Klara SCHUBERT, b6 was, until 1940, in a Soviet PW camp. When my husband was at home, we both visited the b6 family. After my husband was arrested, in June 1952, I often went alone to visit the b6. b6 also visited me several times in my apartment. We were on friendly terms; it was not a love affair. At my home we played chess and talked about things in general. We discussed books and talked about my husband.

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Question: Which espionage mission did you give to b6
Answer : I did not give b6 any espionage assignments. We never discussed this subject.
Question: How did b6 carry his espionage assignments out and what did he report to you?
Answer : b6 did not carry out any espionage assignments and never reported about his activities at work.
Question: What did you give b6 for the completed espionage assignments or what did you promise him?
Answer : I did not give b6 anything or promise him anything. I wish to re-emphasize that b6 did not carry out any espionage assignments and that I did not give him any assignments.
Question: What do you know about b6's hostile activity?
Answer : I do not know anything about this and b6 never has told me anything about any hostile activity.
Question: Have those persons who are involved in hostile activities against the GDR.
Answer : I do not know any persons who are engaged in hostile activities against the GDR. I only know b6 and b6. I have not met any other persons.
Question: Why didn't you tell the truth during your first interrogation?
Answer : I was afraid to become involved in something which did not concern me.
Question: Do you know that you can be punished if you make false statements concerning a crime and deceive the state concerning a person involved in a crime?
Answer : This is known to me. I have told the truth. It is all based on facts.
Question: Why did you engage in this hostile activity?
Answer : I did not carry out any hostile activity. I only received 310 DM from agent b6. Even so this may seem improbable, it is nevertheless the truth. I realized that with this money, the agents tried to recruit me to carry out hostile activities for them.

Read and signed

Interrogated and closed

Signature illegible

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/s/ b6

15. Pages 23 through 25 are the interrogation of b6, born b6 in b6 residing in b6 by the Sfz on 9 April 1953 from 1100 to 2250 hours.

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Question: During the interrogation on 17 March 1953, you stated that you were in contact with two members of the so-called "Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit" (KgU - Fighting Group against Inhumanity) and that you have answered questions asked by them. Which questions, outside of those you already have stated, did you answer and what hostile missions did you receive?

Answer : I did not give the members of the hostile organization any additional answers and did not receive any additional missions. I was to take an interest in the activities of the Volkspolizei (People's Police) and then report to the members of the KgU. For this purpose I was to return and report to b6 in BERLIN-Lichterfelde-West (US Sector), Kadettenweg 66. I did not carry out this assignment. I did not return to West BERLIN. b6 also told me that I should interest myself in all activities in FORGAY. I did not receive a cover name.

Question: During the interrogation on 17 March 1953, you stated that you visited b6 who resides in b6 (US Sector), b6 How long were you there and what did you do there?

Answer : I stayed two days with the b6 and attended, on 15 October, the birthday party of b6 girl, b6 I am b6 godmother. I arrived at the b6 home at 1200 hours and left the following day at 1700 hours.

Question: What is b6's occupation?

Answer : b6 is employed as a clerk at the West BERLIN custom office.

Question: What do you know about b6

Answer : b6
These persons are not known to me.

Question: Why did you get in contact and answer questions of the co-workers of the so-called "Fighting Group against Inhumanity"?

Answer : I did not think anything about it when I answered these questions. b6 is an old resident of FORGAY. While I answered these questions I was not aware that b6 was a co-worker of the "Fighting Group against Inhumanity". When I received the assignment from b6 to take an interest in the activities in FORGAY, with emphasis on the People's Police, and to submit a report concerning this activity to b6 I realized that these persons were engaged in hostile activity against the German Democratic Republic. I realized, that when I gave my con-

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sent to carry out this assignment, I committed a criminal act for which I can be punished.

Read and signed:

Interrogated and closed

/s/ b6

Signature illegible

16. Pages 26 and 27 are the interrogation of b6, VP sister, born b6 in b6 (VF 0124), residing in b6 by (fmu) b6 (no date listed).

Question: With whom were you in contact and are still in contact?
Answer: In 1948, I was associated with b6 and b6. This association was not too friendly, because I did not feel sympathetic towards b6. He is a know-it-all type of person.

Question: What are your relations toward b6?
Answer: After the husband of b6 was arrested in the spring of 1952, b6 frequently visited us and often helped my wife with housework. From the middle of summer till December 1952, b6 was at our home practically every day. As stated before, she assisted my wife in the housework and in the evenings we played "Mensch erger dich nicht" (do not lose your temper, man) and later I taught her to play chess. Since November 1952, b6 and myself have become intimate friends.

Question: How often did you meet b6?
Answer: As I have already stated, we were together every day until December, as well as every evening. Until this time I was in her apartment approximately once a week. On my birthday my wife and b6 became involved in an argument. My wife suspected that an intimate relationship existed between b6 and myself, blamed b6 for this, and forbade her to return to our apartment. b6 has not been to our apartment since that time. Since that incident I continued to visit b6 once a week and usually stayed from 1700 to 1900 hours and on two occasions stayed all night.

Question: What assignments did b6 give you?
Answer: b6 did not give me any assignments nor did she ask questions concerning my place of employment.

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Question: What do you know about [b6] criminal activity?

Answer : I do not know anything concerning criminal activity by

[b6] I was told by [b6] that after her husband's arrest she received 40 DMs financial support from her brother in ZHITZ and 200 DMs from a cousin in West BERLIN. The 200 DMs were sent to my wife. [b6]

[b6] and the money sent to my wife because she was, as I have already mentioned, at our home daily.

Question: Name persons who are engaged in hostile activities?

Answer : No persons are known by me who are engaged in hostile activities. I can not state anything further concerning this case, as I have told the whole truth and have not withheld or added to it.

Read and signed

Closed:

/s/ [b6]

/s/ [b6]

17. Page 28 is the interrogation of Klara SCHMIDT, nee STIEHLER, born 23 July 1907 in SIEZENHODA (WE 5901), Kreis Torgau, residing in TORGAU, Breitestrasse 18, by (fmr) [b6], a member of the SFS in TORGAU. After SCHMIDT was informed why she was called for this interrogation and reminded to tell the truth, she gave the following answers to questions asked by (fmr)

[b6]

Question: With whom did you associate and with whom are you in contact?

Answer : [b6], her husband and her son [b6] often came to our apartment.

Question: How often did you meet [b6] and what was the spirit of your association?

Answer : We were on familiar terms with [b6] and she often came to visit us. After the arrest of her husband [b6] came to our apartment almost daily until 7 November. Since then [b6] was in our apartment only once.

Question: What do you know concerning [b6] criminal activity?

Answer : I do not know anything about [b6] criminal activity. I only know that [b6] was in BERLIN in October and that she mentioned, after her return, that she had spent some pleasant days and had had good food and some drinks. I also want to mention that [b6] never told me everything about herself even though close ties existed between us.

Question: Name persons who are engaged in hostile activity.

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VIII-16340.10; D-329156, OIC Region VIII, Subj: "SSS (Staatssekretariat fuer
Statistik) - State Secretariat (for Social Statistics) Statistikverwaltung
(Administrative District) MAGDEBURG" b6 25 January 1954

Answer : I do not know any persons who are engaged in hostile
activity. I have told the absolute truth and have
nothing farther to add concerning this matter.

Read, approved and signed

Closed:

/s/ K. SCHMIDT

/s/ b6

18. Pages 29 through 31 are the interrogation of b6 nee
b6 born b6 in b6 (n.e.a.), residing in b6
b6 by a member of the NSD Kreis Office WURZEN (US 4593) on 20 March
1951. b6 was reminded to tell the truth and gave the following answers
to questions asked by the NSD interrogator: b6 attended the Volksschule
in HONBURG from 1927 to 1935. Afterwards, she was employed for one year as
household helper by VOGELREUTER in NISCHWITZ (n.e.a.). From 1936 to 1939,
b6 was employed as saleslady by b6 owner of a butcher-shop
in WURZEN. After that she worked as a saleslady until 1944 at the butcher-
shop owned by b6 in LEIPZIG (US 1891). On 12 December 1943,
b6 married b6 born b6 in b6 since that time she
has done housework.

Question: Who are your relatives and acquaintances?

Answer : My father is b6 who resides in b6
number b6 with his wife b6 nee b6
I have a sister b6 born b6
in b6 who resides in b6 b6
b6 is not employed because she suffers from epileptic
disease and is slightly unbalanced mentally. My mother-
in-law, Minna, nee HAUMANN, resided in TORGAV and passed
away in 1943. My father-in-law, Wilhelm HEUSE, 73 years
old, resides in TORGAV. He receives a pension and was
formerly employed as a laborer by the city administra-
tion in TORGAV. A sister-in-law, b6 nee
b6 is approximately 30 years old. b6 is not
employed and takes care of her household. She has an
eight year old boy. Approximately 14 days ago, my
father-in-law notified us of her arrest. b6
husband of b6 approximately 35 years old,
was employed by the city administration in TORGAV. His
present whereabouts are not known to me. At the end of
last year, my sister-in-law informed me that he had
been given a two year prison sentence. A brother-in-
law, b6 approximately 45 years old resides
in WERCHEN (n.e.a.) and has a leading position in

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a factory there. I do not know any further details.
Sisters and brothers of my father are: b6
b6 a pensioner, resides b6
b6 b6 a pensioner, resides in
LEUPITZ (n.e.s.) Kreis WURZEN. He was formerly em-
ployed as a quarryman. b6 nee b6
pensioner, resides in b6
b6 nee b6 housewife, resides in
ROHNBURG. b6 nee b6 housewife, re-
sides in ROHNBURG. b6 nee b6 whose
husband owns a farm in KURZEN (n.e.s.), Kreis WURZEN.
Sisters and brothers of my mother are: b6
nee b6 housewife, residing in ROHRLIN, Kreis
OSCHATZ. b6 street construction worker,
residing in EISENBODA, Kreis FORSTAU. b6
post employe, residing in b6
b6. We are acquainted with the families b6 and
b6 b6 is employed as an electrician by
the firm MÖHNER in WURZEN, and resides in ROHNBURG. Herr
b6 is employed on his father's farm. My husband
plays shot with b6 and b6

Question: When did you contact b6 and when did you write
to her the last time?

Answer: I last met Frau b6 on Memorial Day, in November of
last year. I last wrote to her in the beginning of Feb-
ruary; I do not recall the exact date.

Question: When and what did b6 write to you?

Answer: The end of December or beginning of January I received
a letter, wherein she informed me that money would be
mailed to me from BERLIN and that I should forward this
money to her. She further mentioned that she was using
the money to pay the lawyer who had defended her husband
at the trial.

Question: What did you write in your reply?

Answer: I did not answer b6 immediately but waited till the
beginning of February, when the first money in the amount
of 117 RM, arrived. On 8 or 9 March another 107 RM
arrived, which I have retained in my possession because
my father-in-law informed me that b6 had been ar-
rested. The money order listed b6

b6 presently residing b6 on
12 March 1953 my husband and I took the money to FORSTAU,
and, since we knew that the lawyer b6 was to re-
ceive this money, we went to his office. Nobody was
there, however, so we went home again with the money.

Question: What do you know about b6 criminal activity?

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VIII-16540.10; D-329156, CIO Region VIII, Subj: "StS (Staatssekretariat fuer Staatssicherheit - State Secretariat for State Security) Bezirksverwaltung (Administrative District) MOENBACH, IDEN b6 23 January 1954

Answer : Nothing is known to me concerning b6 criminal activity.

Question: What missions did b6 assign to you?

Answer : I did not receive any assignments from b6

Question: Do you know any persons who are engaged in criminal activity?

Answer : b6 told me in August last year during her visit in HONBUND, that she had been to BERLIN and had enjoyed herself very much. She mentioned that she had visited a cousin of hers by the name b6 is not known by me. I stated the absolute truth and have nothing further to add concerning this matter.

Read, approved and signed

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/s/ b6

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19. Pages 32 through 34 are the interrogation of b6 born b6 in b6 residing in b6 with a number of the RAS Kreis Office WURZEN. On 20 March 1951, in HONBUND, b6 stated the following: He attended the Volksschule in TORGAIU from 1926 to 1934. After completion of school he was employed as a butcher apprentice by (fnn) b6 in TORGAIU until 3 April 1937. From 1937 to 1939, he was employed as a butcher by b6 owner of a butcher shop in LEIPZIG. From May 1940 to September 1940 he served in the Reichs Labor Service. After that b6 was employed as a butcher until 3 March 1941 by b6 owner of a butcher shop in LEIPZIG, Pfaffenroderstrasse. He was then drafted into the German army and assigned to a transportation company in CHENWITZ. Shortly afterwards he was transferred to Poland, where he served as a cook in the German army. On 15 May 1945 b6 came from GETTSCHEN-BUCHENBACH GSR, to HONBUND. b6 was not a member of any political party or affiliated organization during the Nazi regime. In February 1946 he joined the KPD and is now a cashier for SED group. b6 is married to b6 nee b6. His parents are Wilhelm HESSE, a laborer, who resides in TORGAIU, Leipziger- b6 and Minna, nee KAUMANN, who died in 1945. b6 has a brother and a sister; his brother, b6 approximately 45 years old, is in charge of a foundry of a VEB (Nationalized Factory) in WETTERZBURG (n.e.). b6 has not seen his brother for two years nor has he corresponded with him during this time. b6 was married two years ago and is now divorced. During the Nazi regime he was a member of the NSDAP (National Socialist German Workers' Party). He was not a soldier during the last war, probably due to the fact that he is an expert in the steel industry. His sister, b6 b6 nee b6 born b6 in b6, resides in b6

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b6 is unemployed. Approximately 14 days ago he received a message from his father stating that his sister had been arrested. Her husband, b6, approximately 35 years old, who was employed by the city administration in TORGAU, was arrested in July or August 1952. He did not know any details concerning the crime committed by b6 other than that he turned over birthdates of persons holding high positions in TORGAU, to some woman, b6. Father had seven brothers and sisters who all have passed away and were not known to him. b6 has three uncles: b6 who resides in TORGAU and receives a pension, formerly employed by the Post Office; b6 who resides in TORGAU and receives a pension; b6 resides in TORGAU and receives a pension. Further details concerning the above mentioned relatives are not known to b6. b6 is associated with the family b6 and b6 with whom he plays skat. b6 is approximately 26 years old, resides in HONBURG and is employed as an electrician by the firm HONNER in WURZEN. He does not belong to any political party. b6 is approximately 52 years old, resides in HONBURG and is employed on his father's farm.

Question: When did you last meet b6 and when did you last write her?

Answer: I last saw my sister on Memorial Day in November 1952. I do not write any letters as my wife does this. I know that my wife had forwarded money to my sister in TORGAU in the middle of February, which had been mailed to us from BERLIN and listed a return address of Fr. b6

Question: When and what did b6 write to you?

Answer: In the beginning of February my wife told me that my sister had written and stated that money would be sent to our address and that we should forward it to her address in TORGAU.

Question: What was your reply to b6?

Answer: I know that my wife did not answer the letter immediately, but in the middle of February, when the first money arrived from BERLIN, she forwarded the money and also wrote a letter to her. I do not recall the exact amount, but it was over 100 DM. The 117 DM which arrived on 11 or 12 March 1953, I have in my possession. In addition, I know that my sister had told my wife in the letter that the money was to be used to pay the fee of the lawyer who had handled her husband's case.

Question: What do you know concerning the criminal activity of b6?

Answer: Nothing is known to me. Neither did I notice anything during my visit in TORGAU.

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VIII-16540.10; D-329156, CIC Region VIII, Subj: "StfS (Staatssekretariat fuer Staatssicherheit - State Secretariat for State Security) Bezirksverwaltung (Administrative District) MAGDEBURG, [b6] Ilse", 25 January 1954

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Question: Did you receive assignments from your sister?
Answer: I did not receive any assignments from her.
Question: Name persons who are engaged in criminal activities.
Answer: I do not know of any such persons. I know that my sister went to BERLIN several times in order to visit a cousin by the name of [b6] who is approximately 37 years old. I never had any contact with this cousin and do not know anything further about him. I have told the absolute truth and can not add anything.

Read, approved and signed

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/s/ [b6]

Signature illegible

20. Pages 35 through 44 are the interrogation of [b6] born [b6] in [b6], residing [b6] on 16 February 1953, from 1000 hours to 1330 hours by a member of the MHS MAGDEBURG. [b6] is married to [b6]. He is a member of the NPD. He was fined 150 DMs for theft. His father, who died in 1913, was Ferdinand [b6], and his mother, [b6] nee [b6] resides in ROCHAU, Kreis Stendal. [b6] comes from a small bourgeois family, attended the Volksschule for eight years in ROCHAU, Kreis Stendal. After completion of his schooling he was employed as an electrician's apprentice until 1930 by the Firm Krich GOLD. Then he was employed by several firms as an electrician. In September 1939, he was drafted into the German army and assigned to the Air Corps in STENDAL. He served in the German Armed Forces until the end of World War II, and was released on 15 June 1945, after a two day stay at the PW camp in INGOLSTADT (n.e.a.). After release from the PW camp, [b6] went to SCHONENHAUSEN by INGOLSTADT and later to MUNICH, where his wife was staying. [b6] resided in MUNICH until 30 August 1946 and in the fall of 1946 returned to his parents in ROCHAU. From ROCHAU he moved to MAGDEBURG, where he found employment at the factory which is now known as the Karl MARX and [b6] factory. From April 1948 until the day of his arrest, he was employed by the Reichsbahn. In 1951 he joined the NPD and carried out the functions of a political leader. He is a member of the FDGB and, since 1950, member of the GDSF (Association of German Soviet Friendship).

Question: With which West BERLIN criminal organization are you in contact?

Answer: Since May 1952, I have been in contact with the agent RUX from the criminal organization "Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit" (Kgu - Fighting Group Against Inhumanity).

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VIII-16540.10; D-329156, CIC Region VIII, Subj: "SFS (Staatssekretariat fuer
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(Administrative District) MAGDEBURG", b6 25 January 1984

Question: When and where did you meet RUX?
Answer : In May 1952, I worked on a freight train going to BERLIN, and a driver, a refugee from the GDR and only slightly known to me, spoke to me at the Bahnhof Zoo and invited me to have a glass of beer. While we were at a restaurant in the vicinity of the Zoo, the driver made a phone call, and shortly afterwards a man joined our table and conversed with me. This man spoke out violently against conditions in the GDR and I agreed with him. Then he told me that he had owned a business in the GDR and had fled to West BERLIN. He inquired mainly about deliveries of goods to small retail stores. He was further interested in knowing how often I came to BERLIN. He mentioned the name of "RUX" and remarked that the next time I came to BERLIN, I should call the telephone number 79-115 and ask for RUX.

Question: How often have you met RUX since that time and what assignments did you receive?
Answer : I met RUX seven times.

Question: Report concerning each meeting.
Answer : The first meeting took place in June 1952. I called the telephone number given me from Bahnhof Grunewald. RUX told me that he would wait for me at the restaurant "Schultheis" located at the railway station BERLIN-Charlottenburg. From there we went to his office, which is also his apartment, at Clauswitzstrasse 6. There he told me that he was working for an office of the West. He asked me if I could bring him information from the GDR. I told him that I could do this as far as it would be possible to do so. I was given the assignment of determining where the goods produced by the VEB factories in MAGDEBURG are being shipped. On this day I submitted information to him concerning employees of the Reichsbahndirektion (German Railroad Administration) in MAGDEBURG, and information concerning functionaries of the SED. I gave him the name of the president and the name of the administrative chief then in charge. I gave him information concerning the large railway offices, that these offices have a full time Party Secretary and gave him the names of the functionaries. I was given the cover name [b6] and signed a receipt for 12 DMs (West) with the cover name [b6]. Before I left he wrote down another telephone number, 84-4346, extension 34. Before I left he gave me another telephone number to call in event that I arrive in BERLIN at night. He

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VIII-16540.10; D-329156, CIO Region VIII, Subj: "SfS (Staatssekretariat fuer Staatsicherheit - State Secretariat for State Security) Bezirksverwaltung (Administrative District) MAGDEBURG, NS: b6, 25 January 1954

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wrote this number on a slip of paper to represent a bill, and handed it to me. The second meeting took place on 8 or 9 July 1952. I called RUX from Bahnhof Zoo at the new number. He told me to come to a small restaurant near the railroad station in BERLIN-Lichterfelde-West. About one hour later RUX arrived, accompanied by a one-armed person. The name of this person is unknown to me. I received from RUX the assignment of identifying movements of the Soviet Army in the vicinity of MAGDEBURG. I was also to report on Soviet vehicles which are transported from MAGDEBURG. He also asked for a public-opinion-survey, which I gave. I also furnished him with characterizations of SED-functionaries as far as I knew them. He asked for addresses of Party functionaries, which I gave him. I again received 12 DMs and I signed a receipt for it in my cover name of b6 RUX gave me instructions not to get drunk in the future nor to act aggressively, so that there would be no possibility of showing any criminal activity. I also was assigned to get a public-opinion-survey about the visit of President Wilhelm PIECK in MAGDEBURG. The third meeting took place in August 1952. From the railroad station ZOO I called RUX, who told me to meet him in the corridor of BOTANISCHER GARTEN. From there we went to RUX's apartment where he invited me to stay for supper. The apartment is located at Clausewitzstrasse 6. That night, a scrap of paper fell out of my wallet from which it appeared that I was employed at the WISMUTH AG., JOHANN-GEORGENSTADT. RUX had seen the scrap of paper and he questioned me about everything there, such as my experience and what I had seen. I told him about the transport of ore, the guard system, of the transport ways, about the approximate gain of a pit, about the living conditions, the possibility of earning money, of the shift schedules and of the miners opinion. I also told him of the personnel strength of the Soviet officers I knew and of the pit-administration. I also told him about the Soviet airport in SENDEL. The same day RUX showed me a plan of the Soviet airport. Then I told him about the agricultural production association in the vicinity of MAGDEBURG. On that day I did not receive an assignment from RUX. He only told me to keep my eyes and ears open so that I could give him a detailed report.

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The fourth meeting took place in late August or Early September 1952. I called RUX from EICHKAMP and we met

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VIII-16548.10; D-329156, CIO Region VIII, Subj: "sfs (Staatssekretariat fuer Staatssicherheit - State Secretariat for State Security) Bezirksverwaltung (Administrative District)MAGDEBURG". RE: b6 25 January 1954

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in the restaurant ZUM SCHULHEISS in BERLIN-Charlottenburg. Here I received the assignment of traveling to DESSAU, to visit a man named b6 residing in DESSAU, Suedstrasse, in the same house as the stone-mason-shop b6 is located. Here I was to deliver my message, that b6 should be careful and for him to come to West BERLIN. This assignment I did not carry out because I went on vacation at that time with my wife. On that day I again received 12 DMs and signed the receipt in my cover name of b6

The fifth meeting took place early in September 1952. I called RUX from the railroad station b6 and he told me to meet him in the corridor of BOTANISCHER GARTEN. We went to a restaurant which is located on the right exit of the corridor. The co-worker of the Kglu accused me of not being in DESSAU. I received the assignment to give 200 DMs to a Frau (fnu) b6 in TORGAU. The name of the street I do not recall, but the house number was 23. I mailed the money to the above mentioned person. Then RUX wanted to give me a letter for a certain person named b6 residing in MAGDEBURG, Hegelstrasse. I was supposed to bring him this letter and tell him to come to West BERLIN again. This assignment was later cancelled by RUX, as he wanted to handle this matter otherwise. I received the assignment of identifying the persons of the operative staff who are stationed in the BEIRSKASERNE. I was also supposed to get a DPA (German Identification Card) and a labor book (Arbeitsbuch) for RUX. I did not carry out this assignment.

The sixth meeting took place in the middle of October 1952. RUX asked for a public-opinion-survey, which I gave him orally. The co-worker made his notes about this. I received the assignment of traveling to DESSAU. Here I was to remove hidden material from a sandhill in the backyard of Frau (fnu) b6. I had not been told what kind of material this was. RUX also told me that b6 has an affair with Frau b6 and that she is informed about his activity. Frau b6 is the owner of a stone-mason-shop and resides in DESSAU-Sued. Two or three days later I traveled to DESSAU to carry out my assignment. I met Frau b6 at the exit of her workshop. She recognized me and called me Herr b6. She made me understand that everything had been removed from the sandhill. For this assignment I received from RUX 25 DMs. I signed the receipt in my cover name b6

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The seventh meeting took place at the end of October or early in November 1952. I called RUX from the railroad station Bahnhof Zoo. I spoke to him personally and he told me that he had no time for me. I was to call him again the next time I arrived in BERLIN.

During the second meeting, I received from RUX a sheet of paper and he kept the other half. He told me that if a person came to me with the opposite part of my half sheet of paper, I was to trust this person completely and that I was even to give reports to this person. I kept that scrap of paper at my home in the living-room. The scrap of paper got lost. No one has reported to me up to the present.

Question: When and in what period of time did you receive mail from RUX?

Answer : I received a post-card from RUX from BERLIN 3 January 1953. On this card he told me that uncle EMIL and my aunt had celebrated New Year and he asked how the new year was treating me. He also wrote that uncle EMIL had a stomach abscess.

Question: What was the meaning of the text that RUX wrote on his card?

Answer : I understood from this card, that I was to get in contact with RUX again. I also understood that there was something wrong and that I was in danger.

Question: After receiving this card, when did you pick up contact with RUX again?

Answer : Since then I have not met RUX again. I did not even have a fixed day to see him again.

Question: Which persons do you know of, that also do a criminal activity against the German Democratic Republic?

Answer : As I mentioned before, I know Frau (fnu) [redacted] b6 EISSAU, Suedstrasse; Herr (fnu) [redacted] b6 MAGDEBURG, Hegelstrasse; and Frau (fnu) [redacted] b6 TORGAV, Street unknown, house number 23. I do not know of any other persons.

Question: Give us a full detailed report on the persons you mentioned, their criminal activity, and through whom you found out about this.

Answer : I do know Frau (fnu) [redacted] b6 from EISSAU personally because I had a conversation with her about the criminal activity. Frau [redacted] b6 is informed of everything through (fnu) [redacted] b6 I do not know (fnu) [redacted] b6 MAGDEBURG, Hegelstrasse. About Frau (fnu) [redacted] b6 I can only report that she received the 200 DM from RUX, which I mailed to her from MAGDEBURG.

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Question: Name all persons of the so-called KGU which you met during your criminal activity.

Answer : RUX, approximately 35 to 37 years of age, 5'6" tall, stocky build, dark blond hair, oval face, blue eyes, hair combed back, often wears dark horn glasses. On his right hand he wears a golden wedding band. He speaks a middle-German dialect. He is married, does not drink much alcohol, but is not too particular about women. RUX is residing in BERLIN-Charlottenburg, Clausewitserstrasse 6, 4th floor. RUX has a secretary, I do not know her name; I have only seen her once casually. She is approximately 30 years of age. RUX is in the possession of a dark yellow leather diplomat briefcase with pockets and leather belts with belt buckles attached.

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At RUX's apartment I met a person who is a full-time employee of the KGU. I do not know his name. His personal description is as follows: Approximately 28 to 30 years of age, 5'9" tall, black hair, hair combed back straight, long face, dark eyes, one gold tooth, speaks a Thuringen-dialect. His left arm is amputated at the elbow. He has a polished and well-groomed appearance.

Question: Do you know that the KGU is a criminal organization and that they do espionage, sabotage and other activities in the territory of the German Democratic Republic?

Answer : Yes, I do know that the KGU is doing espionage, sabotage and other activities in the German Democratic Republic.

Question: Are you sure that you have done espionage in the German Democratic Republic by order of the KGU?

Answer : Yes, I am sure that I have done espionage in the German Democratic Republic by order of the KGU.

Question: Why have you kept silent to the Ministry for State Security about your criminal activity?

Answer : I believed that the Ministry for State Security did not know and would never learn of my criminal activity.

Read, approved and signed

Questioned and closed

/s/ [b6]

21. Pages 45 through 57 are the interrogation of [b6] born [b6] in [b6], residing in [b6] profession, guard, on 16 April 1953 from 1030 hours until 1700 hours.

Question: What criminal activity have you done against the German Democratic Republic? 0887

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VIII-16540.10; D-329156, CIC Region VIII, Subj: "SFS (Staatssekretariat fuer Staatssicherheit - State Secretariat for State Security) Bezirksverwaltung (Administrative District) MAGDEBURG", REF: [b6], 25 January 1954

Answer : Since the month of May 1952 I have been in contact with the criminal organization KGU and until the end of the year 1952 I carried out criminal assignments.

Question: Who recruited you for your criminal activity and how was the recruiting done?

Answer : For my criminal activity I was recruited by [b6] [b6] DESSAU, street and house number I do not recall. Together with [b6] I attended the Land-Party-School of the National Democratic Party in NAUMBURG from the end of March until the beginning of May 1952. At the end of the training course [b6] called on me and told me that he had contact with a West BERLIN organization and that he would like to take me there. On the day the training course was completed we made an appointment for the next day to meet in West BERLIN on the corner of Henschenstrasse and Dahlmannstrasse. I promised to be there and so I went to the agreed upon place in West BERLIN.

Question: Continue with your description.

Answer : At about 1000 hours [b6] appeared with a person unknown to me. He was not introduced. We went to the apartment of an unknown person at Clausewitzerstrasse 6, 4th floor. The unknown person carried on a conversation with me about my private situation. At a later meeting the unknown person told me that his name was RUX. He also told me that RUX was not his right name. The name [b6] which he also used, he told me in the month of June or July when I met him in West BERLIN.

Question: What questions did RUX ask you and what did you answer him?

Answer : The co-worker of the KGU was interested in the private retail trade, in the grease production in the German Democratic Republic and also in public opinion. I answered these questions as far as I was able. RUX gave me the assignment of interesting myself in the private retail trade. The co-worker of the KGU was especially interested to know how they were supplied with goods, if the Trade Organization (HO) and the KONSUM's have first priority, and whether in MAGDEBURG many private retail trades have been changed over to the Trade Organization (HO). At the same time I was to interest myself for the Soviet troop-transports by train. I promised the co-worker of the KGU that I would carry out the assignment. RUX gave me his telephone number so that I could get in contact with him at all times. I then said good-bye to RUX and returned to MAGDEBURG.

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VIII-16540.10; D-329156, CIC Region VIII, Subj: "SfS (Staatssekretariat fuer Staatssicherheit - State Secretariat for State Security) Bezirksverwaltung (Administrative District) MAGDEBURG". RE: [b6] 25 January 1954

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Question: How often have you met the co-worker of the KGU?

Answer : I have met the co-worker of the KGU about seven or eight times, always in West BERLIN. The meetings took place from the month of May until the month of December 1952. I went to West BERLIN about once a month to see the co-worker of the KGU. We met at RUX's apartment in BERLIN-Charlottenburg, Clausowitzerstrasse 6 and in restaurants close to the railroad station Charlottenburg.

Question: Which assignments did you receive from the co-worker of the KGU, RUX or [b6]

Answer : During the meetings with RUX I received the following assignments: I was to find out what the Soviet joint stock company furnished and how large the supply is, who delivered and where it was delivered to. I also received the assignment to find out whether there are large Soviet troop movements taking place in the vicinity of MAGDEBURG. I was also to report about Soviet vehicles transported by rail. RUX also asked about recruiting for the GDR police, and if there is a lack of employment in the businesses. During the time of the potato scarcity, the co-worker of the KGU told me to bring him a public-opinion-survey. He questioned me about Party functionaries and about the administration of the railroad direction. I was also to give a public-opinion-survey on the visit to MAGDEBURG of President Wilhelm PISCK of the German Democratic Republic. The co-worker gave me the order to inform myself of the production associations. He especially wanted to know how far the establishment of production associations in the country has progressed, how the harvesting is done, if there is enough pack-thread at disposal, and conditions of the farm workers. The co-worker of the KGU was especially interested in the state owned farms. The co-worker also ordered me to distribute among the population the package of posters he gave me. RUX gave me a stamp, printing ink and a matrix. With this material I was to write threatening cards to the functionaries of the Party and the Administration. Several of these matrices had been finished already. I also received a bottle of acid. This acid I was to use in the ballbearing of the railroad flat cars which were qualified for the transport of Soviet troops. I was also supposed to look for irregularities in the railroad system. I was to give false directions to the railroad cars. In late August or early September 1952 I received from RUX the assignment of traveling to DESSAU to the contact man of the KGU, (fau) [b6] I was to tell him to come to the

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co-worker of the KGU in West BERLIN. In the month of September 1952 I received from RUX the assignment again of traveling to DESSAU and warning the contact man of the KGU, (fnu) [b6] During another meeting with RUX I again received the order to travel to DESSAU and to find if a Frau (fnu) [b6] residing in DESSAU, street and house number unknown, and three other agents of the KGU, had yet been arrested. At the same time I was to interest myself in the sandhill which is located in the back yard of Frau (fnu) [b6] workshop. The things which I would find in the sandhill, I was to throw into the water or to hide them in the ground. I also was to bring information concerning the BEIMS-KASERNE in MAGDEBURG. I was also to try getting the names of the Soviet officers stationed in the BEIMS-KASERNE. The co-worker of the KGU also told me to get him a German identification card (DPA) and a labor book. Several times I received the assignment of contacting the Party friend [b6] residing in GARDHEGEN and get him to go to West BERLIN in order to see the co-worker of the KGU. I also was to have a [b6] [b6] residing in RATHENOW, come to West BERLIN to see RUX. Then I was to establish a so-called dead letter drop where material for me could be delivered. This was either to be a hollow tree or a bombed out house. I was especially to report to the co-worker of the KGU on irregularity in the railroad system. During early December 1952 I received from RUX the assignment of sending 200 DM from MAGDEBURG, or from any other place in the GDR, to Frau (fnu) [b6] residing in TORGAU. Then I was to write down numbers of Soviet vehicles and bring these numbers to RUX. I was to report on the fulfillment of the orders of the German Democratic Republic for the safety of the demarcation line of the Democratic sector of BERLIN. In the month of August/September 1952 RUX asked me if I was willing to get a package of pistols from the vicinity of HALLE/Saale for him. I have not received any other assignments from the co-worker of the KGU.

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Question: How were you supposed to keep contact with the co-worker of the KGU?

Answer : The contact was to be kept through the telephone number given me by the co-worker of the KGU. At all meetings, with the exception of the first meetings, I telephoned RUX when I arrived in West BERLIN. The place of the meeting was then arranged.

Question: What espionage reports did you transmit to your handling agent?

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VIII-16340.10; D-329156, CIC Region VIII, Subj: "Sfs (Staatssekretariat fuer Staatssicherheit - State Secretariat for State Security) Bezirksverwaltung (Administrative District) MAGDEBURG". ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ b6 25 January 1954

Answer : First I gave him an oral report that the supplies for the Soviet joint stock company were packed in crates. These crates have Russian writing on them, which I can not read. I told him that those crates came from all over the GDR and that they were shipped to the CST-HARFEN in the direction of FRANKFURT/Oder. I told him that I do not know the number or the contents of these crates. About the Soviet troop transports I told RUX that since May 1952 there have been less and that they then stopped completely. I told my handling agent in detail about the extent and the number of those Soviet troop transports which have been by rail. I also gave him a rough estimate of the number per week and per month, departure and destination. I told RUX that a large number of Soviet tanks are transported by rail in certain directions. About the Soviet troop transports I could not see too clearly. I was not able to give RUX the number of the transports. About the recruiting for the GDR police, I told RUX that in every town advertising signs are posted for the recruiting to the GDR police. Some recruiters have appeared in the factories to recruit young people for the GDR police. I also told him that because of the recruiting to the GDR police some large farms do not have enough workers. I brought public-opinion-surveys about the potato rationing in the month of August 1952 and the margarine rationing. I gave RUX a statement of the recent nomination in the railroad offices and the railroad office in MAGDEBURG. I also gave him names of functionaries in the railroad and a personality sketch of them. About the visit to MAGDEBURG of the President of the German Democratic Republic I could not give the co-worker a public-opinion-survey because I had been away on a duty trip during that time. About the agriculture production association I told RUX that in certain districts, for example in ALTMARK, production associations have been established, and that several more will be established in the future. I gave him a statement of the size of the harvest and of the amount of pack thread which is at disposal of the machine tractor station. I also gave him a statement on the lack of employees in the larger agriculture concerns. I told RUX about the state owned farms, that there are still large amounts of corn on the fields. I told the co-worker the towns and the districts where the corn is still on the fields. The posters which I received from RUX I distributed in MAGDEBURG.

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VIII-16549.10; D-329156, OIG Region VIII, Subj: "SFS (Staatssekretariat fuer Staatssicherheit - State Secretariat for State Security) Bezirksverwaltung (Administrative District) MAGDEBURG" RE: [b6] 25 January 1954

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Buckau in Warschauerstrasse, Forsestrasse and Cocci-
strasse when I returned from work. I gave approximately
10 posters to [b6]. The bottle of acid, which
I received from RUX, I did not use as I had been told to.
I knocked the head off the bottle and poured the acid
into the toilet of my apartment. I threw the empty bot-
tle in the trash can. Shortly before Christmas I handed
the stamp, the printing ink and the matrix over to [b6].
[b6] He printed the threatening cards and handed
them back to me, so that I could send them to the func-
tionaries of the Party and the Administration. There
were about 15 to 20 threatening cards. I addressed 2
cards and put them in different mail boxes. I was not
able to send railroad flat cars in the wrong directions
to make irregularities in the railroad system. I did
carry out the assignment of traveling to DESSAU to see
the contact man, (fun) [b6]. In September 1952 I
traveled once more to DESSAU to warn [b6]. I meant
to tell him to be careful in his criminal activity and
to stop because he was in danger, but I could not reach
him because he was in West BERLIN. In October 1952 I
carried out the third assignment. I again traveled to
DESSAU to see Frau [b6]. I fulfilled my mission at
Frau [b6] and then I returned to MAGDEBURG. I
could not give a report about the REINSKASERNE. Also I
could not get a German identification card (BPA) or a
labor book for the co-worker of the KdV. The assign-
ment to get in contact with [b6] in HATHE-
NOW I did not carry out. The order to send 200 DM to
Frau [b6] in TORGAU I carried out. I mailed the
money to the cover address [b6] in TORGAU. I reported
several times to RUX about the Soviet transport of ve-
hicles on railroad flat cars. I told the co-worker the
direction the trains came from and where they went.
There was only one train on which I could give RUX de-
tails, and that was the train that I was on myself. I
told him the train number, the load of the flat cars,
the kind of arms, the destination and the departure
railroad station. At the end of October or beginning
of November 1952 when I was together with [b6]
in the neighborhood of the REINSKASERNE, I marked one
number of a Soviet vehicle. I told [b6] the number
and he marked it down. I told RUX about the irregular-
ity in the railroad system. For instance, the reason
for trains being late and the working morale of the
railroad employees. When RUX asked me about the sup-
plying of fuel material for the population, I answered

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him. I told him about the control upon entering West BERLIN and I assumed that the controls are the same at the demarcation line BERLIN-MARIENBORNE, and also that the circumspccting freight line is soon to be completed.

Question: How did you carry out the espionage assignments?

Answer : During my duty I noticed that some flat cars were loaded with crates. These flat cars were sent in the direction of FRANKFURT/Oder and the direction of the OSTHAUSEN. Sometimes I was able to read of the place of departure and the place of destination of those flat cars. That is how I told the agent RUX in the fall of 1952 about the transportation of exports and their destinations. Through my employment in the railroad I was able to give RUX correct statements on the production of the explosive factory b6 and the shipment of those products. Also I was able to report on the troop transports of the Soviet Army, because of my employment at the railroad and through conversations with my wife. The other completed assignments; for instance, about the GDR police and about the production association--I knew about those things through conversations and newspaper reports. Through my parents and other inhabitants of ROCHAU I found out that especially large farms did not have enough workers. Through my employment at the railroad I was able to tell the co-worker of the KGU about the recent nomination of the railroad direction and the railroad office in MAGDEBURG. And I was able to give him the names. I could give definite reports only because of my employment at the railroad. I gave the co-worker of the KGU an oral statement concerning the Soviet troop transports, which has already been reported. At the end of October or beginning of November 1952, I went with b6 to the neighborhood of the BEINSKASERNE in MAGDEBURG to find out about the personnel, the numbers of the vehicles, what kind of vehicles and what arm of service. At this occasion I noticed a number of Soviet vehicles which came out of the BEINSKASERNE. I could not make any further reports to the co-worker of the KGU because no other Soviet vehicles entered or left the BEINSKASERNE on that day. b6 and I walked up and down in front of the BEINSKASERNE one time. My wife, b6 told me about the irregularities at the railroad. Through my employment at the railroad I often had the opportunity to travel to West BERLIN to see the co-worker of the KGU. Therefore b6 brought me some espionage material which I took with me to West BERLIN for RUX. This happened

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about four or five times. I also wish to report that I was to tell the co-worker of the KGU about how democratic the administration was. Since I had no knowledge of this matter I could not tell RUX anything. The assignment from the co-worker of the KGU to recruit [b6] in GARDELSGEN, I carried out as follows: I wrote him a letter and asked him to cooperate with the KGU. I had told him at the Land Party School that I might be active for the enemy. Through my employment in AUE in the year of 1950/51 I was able to tell RUX about the ore hauling, the guard system, the transport ways, the living conditions, the possibility of earning money, the shift schedule and the workers' opinions. I also told RUX of the personnel strength, the Soviet officers and the pit administration. When RUX showed me a plan of the Soviet airport I told him that I did not know the Soviet airport as it was on the plan.

Question: How did you turn your espionage reports over?

Answer : Those espionage reports I reported orally to the co-worker of the KGU.

Question: Who helped you to carry out your assignments?

Answer : My wife, [b6], helped me to carry out my assignments because she was employed as a locomotive supervisor at the railroad in MAGDEBURG and she had a better opportunity to see the whole railroad system. No other person helped me to carry out my above mentioned assignments. I have carried out all criminal assignments myself.

Question: Which persons did you recruit for your criminal activity?

Answer : For the criminal activity I recruited [b6] and my wife, [b6] as I took both of them to RUX in West BERLIN. I recruited my wife but [b6] was recruited by the co-worker of the KGU, with my help.

Question: What cover name did you receive by the co-worker of the KGU?

Answer : During the second meeting in the month of June 1952 I received from RUX the cover name [b6] and at the fourth or fifth meeting I received the cover name [b6]. When I came to West BERLIN I called RUX under that cover name. During the second meeting in the month of June 1952 I also received from RUX a sheet of paper with a mark on it. RUX tore the paper in half and gave me half of it and kept the other half. He then told me that I was to completely trust the person who would show me the opposite scrap of paper. I would have to give reports to that person. But no person has ever reported to me with

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VIII-16540.10; D-329156, CIC Region VIII, Subj: "SfS (Staatssekretariat fuer Staatssicherheit - State Secretariat for State Security) Bezirksverwaltung (Administrative District) MAGDEBURG". SS: [b6], 25 January 1954

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that scrap of paper. The co-worker of the KGU also told me that when I receive a card with VERLOBUNG written on it, I was to come to him. If I would receive a card with VERLOBUNG AUFGELOEST (engagement cancelled) written on it, then I was in danger. When I would receive a card with KIND ANGEKOMMEN (child arrived) then I was to flee immediately to West BERLIN. On 3 January 1953 I received a post card from RUX in which he told me that uncle EMIL and my aunt had quite a New Year party and asked how the new year was treating me. He also told me that uncle EMIL had a stomach abscess. I did not know what to make of this card but I believed that I was to report to RUX again in West BERLIN. I also thought that something might be wrong and that I was in danger.

Question: What did you receive from the co-worker of the criminal organization for the accomplishment of your assignments?

Answer : I received the total amount of approximately 130 to 140 DM from the co-worker of the KGU. RUX only paid me for my trip and my expenses. Several times he gave me a package of cigarettes or a candy bar and he always paid the bill in the restaurants.

Question: For what reason did you carry out your criminal activity against the German Democratic Republic?

Answer : I carried out my criminal activity because I did not agree with the various measures in the German Democratic Republic. I was also influenced in my negative attitude for the German Democratic Republic by listening to the Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk and the inflammatory talk of the RIAS. The contact man of the KGU, (fau) [b6] understood how to recruit me for the criminal activity. Under all these mentioned circumstances I took up the criminal activity.

Read, approved and signed

Interrogated and closed

/s/ [b6]

22. An examination of Source "B" revealed the following individuals, one of whom might be identical to (fau) [b6] referred to in this SOI:

a. [b6] : Meister, born about 1932, about 5'11" tall, slender build, blond hair, blue eyes, single, Sudeten German, has been with the NSB since December 1949.

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VIII-16540.10; D-329156, CIG Region VIII, Subj: "SFS (Staatssekretariat fuer Staatssicherheit - State Secretariat for State Security) Bezirksverwaltung (Administrative District) MAGDEBURG" RE: [b6] 25 January 1954

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b. [b6] VP Wachtmeister, resides at DESSAU (UT 1046), previously assigned to Police Precinct II DESSAU, joined the MSS Office in early August 1951, born about 1931, five feet seven inches tall, slender build, blond hair.

c. [b6] Resides at DESSAU/HAIDEBERG (n.o.a.) Erika-
weg, recently caused the arrest of eight (8) persons who were sitting at a restaurant in DESSAU talking about Western Germany. His wife is an MSS informant.

23. On 11 January 1953 the files of Region VIII, 66th CIG Group, BERLIN (UU9220), were examined with the following results: [b6]
referred to in this SOI, passed through the Refugee Screening Center in BERLIN on 1 October 1952. At that time his address was given as [b6]

[b6] His former address was DESSAU (UT 1046), Heide Strasse 87. He was born [b6] in [b6] (n.o.a.), married, and unemployed. He carried a Personal Ausweis Nr. 34611/49 issued in LIEBENVERDA (n.o.a.) on 16 March 1949. He claimed that he had worked with the KGU since April or May 1951 and ran a net for them throughout the East Zone. He allegedly fled when explosions on the railroad in DESSAU were attributed to him. He claimed that the KGU was taking care of him and that contact was being maintained with his people in the East Zone. His name appears on the Refugee Screening List dated 1 October 1952, File VIII-12890. (B-2)

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Hamburg, den 27. 2. 1953

b6

Beschluss

zur Eröffnung des Untersuchungsverfahrens

Das Untersuchungsverfahren gegen den b6 geb. b6

geb. a b6 in b6

(Geburtsort)

wegen Spionage

wurde am 27. 2. 1953 eröffnet.

(Datum)

[Signature]

(Unterschrift)

b6

(Nachbearbeiter)

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Das Amtsgericht.

Es wird gebeten, bei allen
Eingaben die nachstehende
Geschäftsnummer anzugeben.

Geschäftsnummer:

Magdeburg, den
Halberstädter Straße 8
Telefon: 43001/97.

19

Gastbefehl.

Gegen d.

in

sind auf Grund des vollstreckbaren — Urteils — Strafbefehls — des

in vom 19

Jahre Monate Wochen Tage — Haft — Gefängnis — zu vollstrecken.

— Es liegt ein Verbrechen im Sinne des StGB. vor. —

Es wird ersucht, zu verhaften und in das Gefängnis
in einzuliefern.

Von der Verhaftung ist abzugehen, wenn die Zahlung oder Abfindung der an
erster Stelle auferlegten Geldstrafe von RM Pf.

(Reichsmark Reichspfennig).

insbesondere durch Vorlegung einer Quittung oder eines Postscheins, nachgewiesen wird.

Wenn d. Verurteilte den Betrag bezahlen will, wird gebeten, die Einzahlung
auf der nächsten Postanstalt zu ermöglichen.

Es sind mitzubringen: 1. Angestellten- oder Invaliden-Versicherungskarte, 2. Arbeits-
buch, 3. Wehrpaß (soweit vorhanden), jedoch ohne Kriegsbeorderung oder Wehrpaßnotiz.

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Nr. 81
§ 157 StGB, § 152 StGB. — Gericht.

Das Bezirksgericht

Stefan Hafrichter

Magdeburg, den

27.2.1953

195

Gesch.: I/ 43/53

Gegenwärtig:

b6

als Richter,

Budnowski

als Schriftführer der Geschäftsstelle

Strafsache

H a f t:

v.

Gegen

b6

geb.

b6

wegen

Spionage

1. Annahme — ~~Entlassung~~ — Ersuchen ist erteilt.

2. ~~XX XX XX XX XX XX~~

Staats-Anwaltschaft

in Magdeburg

Vorgeführt erschien d. ~~1. a~~ Beschuldigte und erklärte:

Zur Person: wie bei ~~XXX~~ — ihrer — Vernehmung
vor der Volkspolizei vom 26.2.1953

Bl. ~~XXX~~ d. A.

Magdeburg, den 27.2.1953 195

Das Bezirksgericht



b6

Es wurde ~~ih~~ eröffnet, welche strafbare Handlung
~~ih~~ zur Last gelegt wird. Sodann wurde d. ~~1. a~~
Beschuldigte eingehend zur Sache vernommen.

Hierbei ergab sich, daß d. ~~1. a~~ Beschuldigte im wesent-
lichen dieselben Angaben machte, wie bei ~~XXX~~ —
ihrer — polizeilichen Vernehmung vom 26.2.53

Bl. ~~XXX~~ d. A.

Der Beschuldigte wurde deshalb das vorbezeich-
nete Protokoll vorgehalten

Sie erklärte darauf:

Meine mir vorgehaltenen Angaben sind richtig.

Ich wiederhole sie und mache sie zum Gegenstand
meiner heutigen richterlichen Vernehmung.

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3a

Ich habe noch folgendes hinzuzufügen:
Ich habe nichts mehr hinzuzufügen.

V.g.U.

b6



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V.g.U.

Der Beschuldigten wurde der anliegende Haftbefehl verkündet.
Über das Beschwerderecht wurde er belehrt.
Haftbefehl wurde nicht erlassen.



Der Haftbefehl wurde mir am 27.2.1955 um 15.45 Uhr verkündet.

b6

b6

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- Es 4/53 -

B e s c h l u s s

In der Strafsache

g e g e n

die Hausfrau [b6] geb. Kesse;
geb. am [b6] in [b6] wohnhaft in [b6]
[b6] verh., ein Kind, seit dem 25.2.1953
in U-Haft,

w e g e n

Verbrechens und Vergehens nach Art. 6 der Verf.
der DDR i. V. mit KD, 38, Abschn. II, Art. III A
III

wird die Haftbeschwerde der Beschuldigten vom 3.3.1953
gegen den Haftbefehl des Haftrichters des MfS vom
27.2.1953 als unbegründet zurückgewiesen.

Die Kosten hat die Beschwerdeführerin zu tragen.

G r ü n d e :

Der Akteninhalt ergibt, dass die Beschuldigte sich mit bezahlten
Agenten westberliner Spionageorganisationen getroffen hat und
diesen Angaben über Personen und sonstige Ereignisse von Bedeu-
tung aus Torgau mitzuteilen gemacht hat und dafür auch entsprechend
honoriert wurde.

Die von der Beschuldigten vorgebrachten Argumente in ihrer Haft-
beschwerde können demgegenüber nicht Platz greifen.

Da das der Angeeschuldigten zur Last gelegte Verbrechen mit einer
höheren als zwei jährigen Freiheitsstrafe bedroht ist, ist der
Erlass des Haftbefehls gem. § 141 StPO gerechtfertigt.

Die Haftbeschwerde war deshalb, wie geschehen, zurückzuweisen.

Magdeburg, den 4. März 1953
I. Strafsenat des Bezirksgerichts

b6

Kunstler

b6

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Ministerium für Staatssicherheit
Verwaltung Sachsen-Anhalt

Halle, den 27.2.1953

3 / 58

Einlieferungsanzeige

074

Engeliefert am: 27.2.1953

Personalien:

Der Nebengenannte ist vorläufig festgenommen /
in Haft genommen, weil:

b6

geb.:

in:

Beruf: ohne

Wohnadresse:

b6

b6

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BY 60420 DM/PA
AKA 60420 DM/PA

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Magdeburg, den 26. 2. 1953

Leibesvisitationsprotokoll

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Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200-1R

der

b6

1. 1 Handtasche braun, Kunstleder
2. 1 Geldbörse, Leder, braun mit DM 1,48 Inhalt, 1 Briefmarke
3. 1 DPA-Nr. 8098/49 a -, 24 DM u. Reparaturkarten
4. 1 Ausweis für Hausvertrauensleute - Nr. 558
5. 1 Ausweishülle mit Kontrollkarte 32 f. Bezug von Fürsorge
6. 10 Fotos
7. 1 Behandlungsausweis
8. 4 Punktkarten voll, 2 Punktkarten mit insgesamt 17 Punkten
9. 2 Lebensmittelkarten für Monat Februar 1953
(1-Gr.Karte mit 780 Gramm Zucker
1 K-Karte mit 200 " Fisch)
10. 1 Konsum-Zettel DM 0,40
11. 1 Zettel mit der Adresse von b6
12. 1 Zettel mit der Aufschrift: Amtsgericht Berlin-Mitte
13. 1 Rep.Karte für hohe Kinderschuhe Staatsanwalt Blaurock
14. 1 Zettel mit der Aufschrift: Bez.-Gericht Leipzig C 1
15. 2 Lebensmittelkarten-Abmeldungen, b6
16. 1 Bescheinigung vom Rat der Stadt Torgau, Abt. Sozialwesen
17. 1 Bescheinigung von VP.-Cb.Rat Straube, Torgau, daß b6
b6 in U.-Haft einsitzt.
18. 1 Brieftasche schwarz.
19. 1 Schlüsselloch mit 3 Schlüsseln
20. 1 Paar dunkelblaue Strickhandschuhe

Am Körper:

1 Brille

schwarzen Mantel

1 bunter Schal

1 karr. Rock

1 braune Pfl.

1 hellbraune Stoffjacke

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- 1 Paar Strumpfe
- 1 Paar braune Lederschuhe
- 1 Trauring, Gold 333
- 1 Freundschaftsring, gelb
- 1 Unterrock
- 1 Schlupfer
- 1 Hemd
- 1 Bustenhalter
- 1 Strumpfhaltergürtel

Die angeführten Gegenstände sind mein Eigentum.

b6

b6

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Regierung der
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik
Ministerium für Staatssicherheit

Verwaltung Land

Abtlg. (Kreisdienstst.) V

Magdeburg, den 26.2. 1953

**Durchsuchungs — Sicherstellungs — Beschlagnahme-
Protokoll**

Auf Anordnung d.
wurde, weil Gefahr im Verzuge war, heute um 10⁰⁰ Uhr eine Durchsuchung in der Wohnung — den
Geschäftsräumen — und sonstigen Räumen — der Person — d. **er** b6
(Name und Vorname)

b6

(Ort, Straße und Nr.)

von d.
Unterzeichneten vorgenommen.

Der Durchsuchung wohnten bei:

Frau

b6

Es wurden die umstehend aufgeführten Gegenstände in

Wohnzimmerschrank

(Hier ist zu vermerken, wo und unter welchen Umständen die Gegenstände aufgefunden wurden.)

aufgefunden und — in Verwahrung genommen — sichergestellt — beschlagnahmt — weil sie — als
Beweismittel von Bedeutung sein können — der Einziehung unterliegen.

Gegen die Beschlagnahme wurde von d. **er** b6
kein — ~~rechtmäßig~~ — Widerspruch erhoben.

Ein Verzeichnis wurde dem / der b6
— nicht — ausgehändigt.

b6

(Stelle)

(Dienststelle)

0907

Beschluß:

Die polizeiliche Durchsuchung-
Beschlagnahme vom 26.2.53
wird gem. § 140 StPO
richterlich bestätigt.

Magdeburg

26.2.53

Kreis...

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(Nichtzitiertendes ist zu durchstreichen)

Ke 9.0.15.152

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Nachweisung der Gegenstände

Lfd. Nr.	Menge	Art	Name, Stand, Wohnung des letzten Inhabers
1.	1	Karte mit dem Absender b6	
2.	2	Abschriften v. Rechtsanwalt Dr. b6 in der Strafsache gegen b6	
3.	4	Einlieferungsscheine für Päckchen an b6	
4.	1	Einlieferungsschein an den Bez. Staatsanwalt Leipzig	
5.	1	Zettel mit der Notiz: Amtsgericht Berlin-Mitte, Staatsanwalt Blaurock	
6.	1	Zettel mit der Adresse: Frau b6 Allendorf	
7.	1	Zettel mit der Adresse: b6 Leipzig	
8.	1	Postanweisung mit 110.- DM Abs. b6	
9.	1	Zettel mit der Aufschrift, wir sind im Kino	
10.	1	Zettel mit Zahlen und dem Namen b6	
11.	1	Briefumschlag mit dem Absender Dipl. Mission der GDR.	
12.	1	Notizbuch 1953	

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b6

(Name des Mitarbeiters)

b6

(Name des Betroffenen oder eines Zeugen)

Verbleib der Gegenstände:

- a) Belassen im Gewahrsam des / der
- b) in der Dienststelle 0908 sichergestellt.
- c) zur Aufbewahrungsstelle gegeben.

u. gehündigt am an

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(Name des Empfängers)

(Name des Übergabenden)

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~~Vermögensaufstellung~~

In den gemieteten Wohnräumen der Frau [b6]
geb. Hesse, wohnhaft [b6] befinden
sich folgende Gegenstände:

1. Wohnzimmer, bestehend aus 1 Kredenz, 1 Ausziehtisch
4 Stühle, 2 Polstersessel, 1 Hocker,
1 kleiner Tisch, 1 Rauchtisch, 1 kleiner
Hausebar mit Stehlampe, 5 Bilder, 1 Linoleum-
teppich 3 x 2,5 Meter, 1 Stoffteppich 2 x 1,20,
2 Übergardienen mit Stors, 1 dreiarmlige Lampe.
2. Schlafzimmer, bestehend aus 2 vollständigen Betten,
1 Ankleideschrank, 2 Stühlen, 1 Hocker
und 1 Holzstuhl, 2 Nachtschränke, 1 Nacht-
tischlampe und 1 Schlafzimmerlampe,
3 Bettvorleger 60 x 1,10 Meter.
3. Küche, bestehend aus 1 Küchenschrank, 1 Tisch, 1 Stuhl,
1 Hocker, 1 Kastenmatratze und 1 Gaskocher.

Torgau, den 19.5.1953

Sachbearbeiter

[b6]

Offiz.

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10
Magdeburg, den 26. 2. 1953

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Verantwortliche Vernehmung

Vorgeführt erscheint die

b6 geb. b6
geb.am b6 in b6
Beruf: Hausfrau, ohne Beschäftigung
Fam.Stand: verh., 1 Kind 8 Jahre
Wohnung: b6

Mit dem Gegenstand der Vernehmung vertraut gemacht und zur Wahrheit ermahnt, gebe ich folgendes zu Protokoll:

Zur Person:

Ich entstamme einer Arbeiterfamilie und besuchte von 1929 bis 1932 die Volksschule in Torgau. Nach meiner Schulentlassung arbeitete ich ein Jahr im Druck- und Verlagshaus in Torgau als Arbeiterin. Von 1938 bis 1948 arbeitete ich als Verkäuferin bei der Witwe b6 Lebensmittelgeschäft in Torgau. Frau b6 ist die Großmutter meines Mannes. Nach 1948 war ich nicht mehr beruflich tätig. Am 28.8.1942 heiratete ich Fritz LEHMANN, geb.am 14.12.1918 in Torgau. Mein Mann war in der Stadtverwaltung Torgau bis Juni 1952 als angestellter Beamter tätig. Er wurde dann festgenommen und wegen Verhörs zu zwei Jahren Zuchthaus verurteilt.

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Zur Sache:

Frage: Wie oft waren Sie, nach der Inhaftierung Ihres Mannes, in Westberlin und zu welchem Zweck waren Sie dort?

Antwort: Nach der Inhaftierung meines Mannes war ich dreimal in Berlin, und zwar war ich im Juli 1952 im demokratischen Sektor Berlins. Ich war beim Amtsgericht Berlin-Mitte, Littenstraße. Ich hatte von der Kriminalpolizei in Torgau erfahren, daß der Haftbefehl gegen meinen Ehemann von Berlin gekommen war. In Berlin wollte ich mich erkundigen, was gegen meinen Ehemann vorlag. Ich war nicht in den Westsektoren.

Frage: Welchen Grund hatte Ihre zweite Fahrt nach Westberlin?

Antwort: Ich hatte die Absicht, im Oktober 1952 meine Verwandten in Westberlin zu besuchen. Es handelt sich um

b6

b6

Frage: Haben Sie bei dieser Fahrt nach Westberlin noch mit anderen Personen gesprochen?

Antwort: Beim Umsteigen am S-Bahnhof Schöneberg, in West-Berlin, traf ich b6 ehemals wohnhaft in Torgau, Bahnhofstraße, der als Angestellter beim Amt für in Torgau beschäftigt war. Er begrüßte mich und fragte, was ich hier mache. Er wußte, daß mein Mann verhaftet wurde. Auf meine Frage, woher er das wisse, sagte er, "das wissen wir alles" und lachte. Wenn er mit "wir" meinte, weiß ich nicht. Darauf strebten wir außerhalb des S-Bahnhofes Schöneberg ein Land ein, wo ein TRONIKER verliesse für eine kurze Zeit unseren Tisch. Er wieder abgenommen hatte, b6

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Frage: Welches Gespräch führten Sie mit b6 ?

Antwort: Wir sprachen über Torgau. Er hatte verschiedene Fragen, die ich ihm beantwortete. Unter anderem wollte er wissen, wie weit der Bau des HO-Geschäftes in Torgau ist, inwieweit die ausgebrannten Häuser aufgebaut sind, ob das Amt für Arbeit noch so besetzt ist, wie es zu der Zeit war, als er noch dort arbeitete. Ob b6 ehemaliger Leiter des Amtes für Arbeit noch dort ist. Als ich diese Fragen beantwortete, kam ein Freund b6 der mit Namen b6 hieß, an unseren Tisch und setzte sich zu uns.

Frage: Welches Gespräch führten Sie mit b6 ?

Antwort: b6 fragte, ob ich von Torgau bin, was ich bejahte. Auf meine Frage, ob er Torgau kenne, sagte er ja, er wäre nach dem Zusammenbruch im Jahre 1945 dort gewesen und zwar an der Elbe-Holzbrücke. Ich sagte ihm, daß jetzt die Elbbrücke wieder hergestellt ist. WEBER erklärte mir, daß ich mich für alles interessieren soll. auch dafür, ob die Volkspolizei in Torgau Übung hat. Er sagte mir, wenn ich von alledem etwas festgestellt habe, soll ich wiederkommen und mich bei FROMM in Westberlin, Lichterfelde, Post, Telefon 56, melden und meine Bericht abgeben. Ich habe mich berichtet, das sein kann was er will.

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Adresse der Familie [b6] wohnhaft [b6]
[b6] und [b6] Hoburg über Kurzen an. Letzterer ist mein
Bruder.

Frage: Wann waren Sie nach dem Empfang des Geldes erneut in Berlin und haben [b6] aufgesucht?

Antwort: Ich bin am 13.1.1953, nach Empfang der 200,—DM nach Westberlin gefahren, habe aber [b6] nicht wieder aufgesucht. Lediglich am 12.1.1953 habe ich [b6] eine Karte geschrieben, in der ich ihm mitteilte, daß ich die 200,—DM erhalten habe und ich vorläufig noch nicht zu ihm kommen kann. Ich habe nur an diesem Tage meinen Vetter, [b6] in [b6] besucht.

Frage: Wußten Sie, daß Sie für eine verbrecherische Organisation in Westberlin arbeiten sollten?

Antwort: Ja, dieses war mir bekannt, ich hatte aber trotzdem zu, weil man mir finanzielle Hilfe versprach, was auch von seiten der Mitglieder der feindlichen Organisation eingehalten wurde.

Ich habe die Aufgabe ohne Zwang getan und die volle Arbeit

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Magdeburg, den 5. März 1953

Zeit: 14.00 - 16.00 Uhr

Bu:

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Ausfertigung

VERNEHMUNGS-PROTOKOLL

b6 geb. b6

geb. am b6 in b6

wohnhaft in b6

Beruf: Hausfrau

Frage: in ihrer Vernehmung vom 26.2.1953 haben Sie zu Protokoll gegeben, dass Sie mit einem Volkspolizei - Meister b6 in Verbindung standen. Was hat Ihnen b6 über seine Tätigkeit bei der Volkspolizei erzählt?

Antwort: Über die dienstlichen Angelegenheit hat b6 zu mir niemals etwas erzählt. Ich stellte auch an ihn niemals Fragen. Von sich aus hat b6 niemals etwas zu mir gesagt. Wir haben uns über Bucher und allgemeine Dinge unterhalten. Auch erkundigte sich Herr b6 nach meinem Manne und stellte die Frage ob ich Post von seinem Manne empfangen habe. Ort haben wir zusammen Schach und Karten gespielt.

Frage: Wieoft besuchte Sie b6 und wie lange hielt er sich bei Ihnen auf?

Antwort: Vom Monat Dezember 1952 bis zu meiner Festnahme hat mich b6 ca. b6 Wohnung in b6, aufsucht. Ich wollte höchstens eine Stunde bei ihm. Von b6 mit seiner Ehefrau Hilara G. (Name) (Name) waren die Kontakte.

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b6

b6

b6

b6

$\hat{h}^{(k)} = 1$ is implicitly defined by $\hat{h}^{(k)} = \min_{i \in \{1, \dots, n\}} \{h_i^{(k)}\}$.

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**Deutsche Demokratische Republik
Ministerium für Staatssicherheit**

Verw. d. Landes

Abtlg. (Kreisdienstst.)

Nr. des Vorganges

Karteikarte angelegt.

Fingerabdruck genommen - nicht erforderlich*)

Person ist - nicht - festgestellt*)

Name:

Dienstgrad:

Dienststelle:

Auf Vorladung*) - Vorgeführt*)

Magdeburg

17.3.

1953

Beginn: 10.30 Uhr

Ende: 14.00 Uhr

erscheint

b6

und erklärt, zur Wahrheit ermahnt:

I. Zur Person:

1. a) Familienname, auch Beinamen

bei Frauen auch Geburtsname, ggf. Name des früheren Ehemannes

b) Vornamen (Rufname ist zu unterstreichen)

a)

b6

geborene

b6

b)

b6

2. a) Beruf: Ober des Berufsverbände ist angegeben - als Inhaber, Handwerkermeister, Geschäftsführer oder Gehilfe, Geselle, Lehrling, Fabrikarbeiter, Handlangergehilfe, Vertriebsmitgl. usw.
- bei Ehefrauen: Beruf des Ehemannes -
- bei sonst. Angehörigen die genaue Anschrift der Dienststelle -
- bei Studierenden die Anschrift der Hochschule und das belegte Fach -
- bei Trägern akademischer Würden (Dipl.-Ing., Dr. D. pp.) wann und bei welcher Hochschule der Titel erworben wurde -

b) Einkommensverhältnisse

c) Erwerbslos?

a)

Hausfrau

b)

Unterstützung in Höhe von 99,50 DM monatlich

c) Ja -

~~NEIN~~ - ~~NEIN~~

3. Geboren

am

b6

in

b6

Verwaltungsbezirk

Leipzig

Landgerichtsbezirk

Land

4. Wohnung oder letzter Aufenthalt

in Torgau

Verwaltungsbezirk

Land

Fernruf

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<p>9. a) Des Vaters (Vormundes) Vor- und Zunamen Beruf, Wohnung</p> <p>b) Der Mutter Vor- und Geburtsnamen Beruf, Wohnung <small>sich wenn Eltern bereits verstorben</small></p>	<p>a) <input type="text"/> b6 <input type="text"/> Arbeiter Torgau, <input type="text"/> b6 <input type="text"/></p> <p>b) <input type="text"/> b6 <input type="text"/> geborene <input type="text"/> b6 <input type="text"/> verstorben im Jahre 1945</p>
<p>10. Vorbestraft?</p> <p><small>Kurze Angabe von - der - Beschuldigten. Diese Angaben sind, soweit möglich, auf Grund der amtlichen Unterlagen zu ergänzen</small></p>	<p>kein</p>
<p>11. Parteizugehörigkeit:</p> <p>vor 1945</p> <p>nach 1945</p>	<p>keine</p> <p>---</p> <p>---</p>
<p>12. Gefangenschaft - Kriegsgefangenschaft</p> <p>wann?</p> <p>wo?</p>	<p>keine</p>

II. Zur ~~Person~~ Person:

Ich entstamme einer Arbeiterfamilie und besuchte vom Jahre 1929 bis 1937 in Torgau die Volksschule. Nach meiner Schulentlassung arbeitete ich ein Jahr lang im Druck- und Verlagshaus in Torgau als Arbeiterin. Darauf arbeitete ich vom Jahre 1938 bis 1948 als Verkäuferin bei der Witwe b6 Lebensmittelgeschäft in Torgau, Kurstrasse 8. Frau b6 ist die Mutter meines Mannes. Nach 1948 war ich bis zur ...

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Antwort: Insgesamt habe ich von
b6 310,- DM erhalten und zwar einmal 200,-DM und
ein anderes Mal 110,- DM. Die 200,-DM habe ich am 9. Januar
und die 110,-DM am 16. Februar 1953 durch die Post erhalten.

Frage: Schildern Sie erneut, wie Sie
b6 in Westberlin getroffen haben und was er zu
Ihnen gesprochen hat !

Antwort: Seit meiner Schulzeit ist
mir b6 bekannt. Sein voller Name ist : b6
b6 zuletzt wohnhaft in Torgau, Bahnhofstrasse. Dieser
nicht mehr bekannt.
Bis zum Jahre 1951 war b6 beim Amt für Arbeit in
Torgau beschäftigt. Darauf hörte ich, dass er mit seiner
Frau unbekannt verzogen sein soll. Auch ging das Gerücht
in Torgau herum, dass b6 wegen Diebstahl einsperrt
wurde. Er sollte eine Briefftasche entwendet haben.

Im Oktober 1952 habe ich die Absicht gehabt, meine Verwandte
in Westberlin zu besuchen. Es handelt sich um b6

b6 wohnhaft. In diesem
Monat fuhr ich auch nach Westberlin und traf beim Warten
am S-Bahnhof Schöneberg in Westberlin, b6

b6 begrüßte mich sofort und stellte an mich die
Frage, was ich in Westberlin mache. Ich erzählte ihm, dass ich
bei mir in der Friedrichsgraben wohnt. Er
sagte mir, dass sein Name wegen Diebstahl einsperrt
worden wurde. Er erzählte mir, dass er in
Westberlin wohnt und dass er in
Westberlin wohnt.

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Als ich alle an mich gestellten Fragen beantwortet habe, kam ein Freund von [b6] an unseren Tisch. Der Freund stellte sich mir mit dem Namen [b6] vor.

Frage: Welches Gespräch führten Sie mit [b6] und [b6] ?

Antwort: [b6] fragte mich sofort, ob ich von Torgau bin, was ich bejahte. Auf meine Frage, ob er Torgau kenne, sagte er ja und erzählte, dass er nach dem Zusammenbruch im Jahre 1945 dort gewesen war und zwar an der Elbe-Holzbrücke. Ich erklärte [b6] dass die Elbebrücke wieder hergestellt wurde. Im Laufe des Gesprächs erklärte mir [b6], dass ich mich für alles interessieren soll, auch dafür, ob die Volkspolizei in Torgau Übung hat. Auch sagte [b6] zu mir, dass, wenn ich von alledem etwas Festgestelltes habe, dann soll ich wiederkommen und mich bei [b6] in Westberlin, Lichterfelde - West, Kadettenweg 66, melden und dort meine Berichte abgeben. [b6] stellte noch an mich die Frage, ob ich arbeite. Als ich ihm erklärte, dass ich eine Unterstützung erhalte, sagte er zu mir dann: "Das reicht doch auch nicht! Wir werden Sie aber unterstützen!"

[b6] fuhrte noch an mir, dass er den Fall weiter untersuchen kann. Auf die Frage, ob er noch etwas wissen möchte, antwortete er, dass er noch etwas wissen möchte, aber er werde sich damit befassen.

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Das Gesicht ~~war~~ ~~hell~~ und die Augen dunkel. THROCKMOR
hat einen braunen Mantel angehabt und war ohne Hut ge-
wesen.

Frage: Geben Sie eine Personalbe-
schreibung des [b6]

Antwort: [b6] war etwas größer als
[b6] und hat gleichfalls dunkles Haar gehabt. [b6]
hat ein volles und rundes Gesicht und hat einen dunkel-
grünen Ledermantel angehabt.
Eine nähere Personalbeschreibung kann ich [b6] nicht
geben.

Frage: Welche Spionageaufträge haben
Sie von [b6] und [b6] erhalten?

Antwort: Einen konkreten Spionage-
auftrag habe ich von den beiden Agenten nicht erhalten.
Ich habe mich lediglich nur über das bereits zu Proto-
koll gegebene unterhalten. Der Auftrag war allgemein ge-
halten. Ich sollte mich für alles interessieren.

Frage: Wann war der nächste Treff
vereinbart und welche Spionageaufträge haben Sie durch-
geführt?

Antwort: Einen bestimmten Treff
habe ich mit den beiden Agenten nicht vereinbart. [b6]
erklärte mir jedoch, am 15. Oktober 1952, dass, wenn ich
wieder nach Westberlin komme, ich ihn aufsuchen soll.
THROCKMOR gab mir seine Adresse: Berlin - Lichterfelde
West, Lindenweg 3, Nr. 13. Am 16. Oktober 1952, 17.
18. 10. 1952 habe ich ihn besucht. Er hat mich in sein
Haus eingeladen und wir haben uns unterhalten.

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Frage: Wer war Ihnen bei der Durchführung Ihrer Ausreise behilflich?

Antwort: Ich habe keine Ausreise durchgeführt und mir hat auch niemand geholfen.

Frage: Wer sind Ihre Bekannten und Verwandten?

Antwort: Ich habe zwei Brüder mit Namen [b6] [b6] Hoburg bei Würzburg

[b6]

Als Bekannter kommt ein Vp.-Meister [b6] in [b6] [b6] in Frage.

Frage: Worin besteht Ihre Verbindung zu [b6]?

Antwort: Seit dem Jahre 1941 ist mir [b6] bekannt. Bereits zuvor habe ich mit seiner Frau Klara Schmidt Bekanntschaft gemacht. [b6] befand sich bis zum Jahre 1940 in sowjetischer Gefangenschaft. Als sein Erbenner, an dessen Stelle, haben wir beide die Familie [b6] in ihrer Wohnung aufgenommen. Nach der Festnahme meines Ehemannes im Herbst 1941 bin ich oft allein zu der Familie [b6] gekommen. Der Herr [b6] hat mich mehrere Male in seiner Wohnung aufgesucht. Wir unterhielten ein freundschaftliches Verhältnis. Ein Liebesverhältnis war es nicht. In meiner Wohnung haben wir Schach gespielt und uns über allseitig Dinge unterhalten. Wir sprachen über Bücher und über meinen Ehemann.

Frage: Welche Spionageaufträge haben Sie [b6] erteilt?

Antwort: Ich habe Schmidt keine Spionageaufträge erteilt. Wir haben über nichts gesprochen.

Frage: Hat Sie Schmidt bei der Durchführung Ihrer Ausreise unterstützt und geholfen?

Antwort: Ich habe Schmidt

keine Aufträge erteilt und habe mich nicht an der Durchführung meiner Ausreise beteiligt.

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- 6 -
Antwort: Ich habe [b6] nichts
gegeben noch versprochen. Ich betone erneut, dass
keine Spionageaufträge durchgeführt und dass ich ihm
keine gegeben habe.

Frage: Was wissen Sie über die feind-
liche Tätigkeit des [b6] ?

Antwort: Darüber ist mir nichts bekannt.
[b6] hat mir niemals über seine feindliche Tätigkeit
erzählt.

Frage: Nennen Sie Personen, die eine
feindliche Tätigkeit gegen die Deutsche Demokratische
Republik durchführen?

Antwort: Personen, die eine feindliche
Tätigkeit gegen die Deutsche Demokratische Republik
durchführen, sind mir nicht bekannt. Ich kenne nur
[b6] und Weber. Andere Personen habe ich nicht
kennengelernt.

Frage: Warum haben Sie in Ihrer
ersten Vernehmung die Unwahrheit gesagt?

Antwort: Ich habe Angst gehabt, in
eine Sache verwickelt zu werden, mit der ich nicht
zutun habe. Aus diesem Grunde versuchte ich die Gift-
überweisungen des [b6] über die beiden Deck-
adressen an mich zu verschweigen.

Frage: Ist es Ihnen bekannt, dass,
wenn Sie wider besseres Wissen die Begehung einer
Straftat vortäuschen, der die Dienststelle des [b6] über
eine Person eines an einer Straftat teilhaben
zu täuschen suchen, sich strafbar machen?

Antwort: Dieses ist mir bekannt.
Ich habe die reine Wahrheit gesagt. Es entspricht allen
den Tatsachen.

Frage: Warum führten Sie diese
feindliche Tätigkeit durch?

Antwort: Ich habe keine andere Möglichkeit
Tätigkeit durchgeführt und habe lediglich [b6] -
von [b6] erhalten.

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[b6]

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Auch wenn dieses sehr unwahrscheinlich ist, entspricht es der Wahrheit. Ich war mir klar darüber, dass sich die Agenten mit diesem Geld für die Durchführung einer verbrecherischen Tätigkeit anwerben wollten.

selbst gelesen und unterschrieben:

b6

vernommen und geschlossen

b6

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Magdeburg, den 9.4.1953

Zeit: 21.00 - 22.30 Uhr

Bu.

2 Exemplare

1 Ausfertigung

VERNEHMUNGS-PROTOKOLL

b6 geb. b6
geb. am b6 in b6
wohnhaft in b6
Beruf: Hausfrau

Frage: In Ihrer Vernehmung vom 17.3.1953 haben Sie zu Protokoll gegeben, dass Sie mit zwei Mitarbeitern der sogenannten " Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit" in Verbindung standen und auf gestellte Fragen, geantwortet haben! Welche Fragen haben Sie außer den bereits schon zu Protokoll gegebenen den beiden Mitarbeitern beantwortet und welche verbrecherische Aufträge haben Sie noch erhalten ?

Antwort: Weitere Antworten habe ich den beiden Mitarbeitern der verbrecherischen Organisation nicht gegeben. Einen weiteren Auftrag habe ich nicht erhalten. Ich sollte mich nur für die Volkspolizei in Torgau interessieren und den Mitarbeitern hiervon das Ergebnis mitteilen. Dazu sollte ich wiederkommen und mich bei b6 b6 melden. Diesen Auftrag habe ich nicht durchgeführt. Ich bin nicht wieder nach Westberlin gefahren. b6 sagte dann noch zu mir, dass ich mich in Torgau für alles interessieren sollte. Einen Decknamen habe ich nicht erhalten.

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b6

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Frage: In Ihrer Vernehmung vom 17.3.1953 haben Sie zu Protokoll gegeben, dass Sie im Oktober 1951 einen [b6] in [b6] [b6] aufgesucht haben! Wie lange waren Sie bei [b6] und was haben Sie dort gemacht?

Antwort: Ich war zwei Tage bei [b6] Um 12.00 Uhr bin ich bei [b6] angekommen und am nächsten Tage um 17.00 Uhr wieder abgefahren. Ich machte eine Geburtstagsfeier des Kindes der Eheleute [b6] mit. Ich bin Taufpate des Kindes [b6] hat am 13. Oktober jeden Jahres Geburtstag. An diesem Tage war ich bei den Eheleuten [b6]

Frage: Welche Tätigkeit übt [b6] aus?

Antwort: [b6] ist Angestellter beim westdeutschen Zoll und verrichtet seinen Dienst in Westberlin.

Frage: Was wissen Sie über einen [b6] und [b6]?

Antwort: Die genannten Personen sind mir namentlich nicht bekannt.

Frage: Warum haben Sie mit den Mitarbeitern der sogenannten "Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit" Verbindungen aufgenommen und auf Fragen geantwortet?

Antwort: Als ich die Fragen beantwortet habe, habe ich mir darüber nichts gedacht. [b6] war ein alter Torgauer gewesen. Bei Beantwortung der Fragen war mir noch nicht bekannt, dass [b6] Mitarbeiter der "Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit" ist.

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Als ich vom Mitarbeiter [b6] den Auftrag erhalten habe, mich für alles, insbesondere für die Volkspolizei in Torgau zu interessieren und [b6] von dem Ergebnis in Kenntnis zu setzen, wußte ich, dass es sich um Menschen handelt, die eine feindliche Tätigkeit gegen die Deutsche Demokratische Republik durchführen. Mit meiner Zusage, dass ich den Auftrag durchführen werde, weiß ich, dass ich verbrecherisch gehandelt und mich somit strafbar gemacht habe.

selbst gelesen und unterschrieben:

vernommen und geschlossen:

[b6]

[b6]

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Zeugenschaftliche Vernehmung

Vorgeladen erscheint der VP.-Mstr.

b6
geb. am b6 in b6
wohnhaft b6

und gibt mit dem Gegenstand der Vernehmung bekannt gemacht und zur Wahrheit erhärtet, folgendes zur Sache an:

Frage:

Mit welchen Personen standen und stehen Sie in Verbindung?

Antwort:

Ich stand seit dem Jahre 1948 mit dem b6 und b6 b6 familiär in Verbindung. Diese Verbindung war jedoch keine engere, da mir der Herr b6 nicht sympatisch war. Er war ein sogenannter Besserwisser.

Frage:

In welchem Verhältnis stehen Sie zu b6

Antwort:

Nachdem der Ehemann der b6 im Frühjahr 1952 verhaftet worden war, kam die b6 des öfteren zu uns in die Wohnung, wobei sie meiner Frau öfter im Haushalt half. Seit Mitte Sommer 1952 bis Dezember 1952 war die b6 fast täglicher Gast in unserer Familie. Wie ich schon sagte, unterstützte sie meine Frau im Haushalt, wir spielten abends zusammen Mensch ärgere dich nicht und später lernte ich ihr auch Schach spielen. Seit Anfang November 1952 besteht zwischen der b6 und mir ein intimes Verhältnis.

Frage:

Wie oft sind Sie mit b6 zusammen gekommen?

Antwort:

Wie ich schon angeht, waren wir bis zum Dezember fast alle Tage, bzw. Abende beisammen. Bis zu dieser Zeit war ich durchschnittlich ein Mal in einer Woche bei ihr in der Wohnung. Anlässlich meines Geburtstages kam es zu einer Aussprache zwischen meiner Frau und der b6. Meine Frau vermutete, daß zwischen der b6 und mir ein intimeres Verhältnis besteht. Sie machte der b6 Vorwürfe und verbot ihr die Wohnung. Seit dem hat die b6 unsere Wohnung nicht mehr betreten. Seit dieser Zeit verkehrte ich auch weiter durchschnittlich ein Mal ein Mal wo ich normalerweise von 17.00 - 19.00 oder 19.00 - 21.00 Uhr war, ausser zwei Mal, wo ich ganze Nacht über bei ihr war.

Frage:

Wie oft haben Sie Ihren Aufenthalt bei mir gehabt?

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Auth Para 2.102 DOD 5200.1R

0927

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22

Frage:

Was wissen Sie über die verbrecherische Tätigkeit der [b6]?

Antwort:

Mir ist nichts über eine verbrecherische Tätigkeit der [b6] bekannt. Ich wußte nur durch die [b6] daß sie seit der Verhaftung ihres Mannes finanzielle Unterstützung durch ihren Bruder aus Zeitz (40,- DM) erhielt, und daß sie, wie sie sagte, von einem Cousin aus Westberlin 200,- DM erhalten hat. Diese 200,- DM waren an meine Frau adressiert. Die [b6] ließ es deshalb an meine Frau adressieren, weil sie, wie ich schon sagte, sich tagtäglich bei uns aufgehalten hat.

Frage:

Nennen Sie Personen, die eine feindliche Tätigkeit durchführen.

Antwort:

Mir sind keine Personen bekannt, die eine feindliche Tätigkeit durchführen.

Weiter kann ich zur Sache keine Aussagen machen, ich habe die volle Wahrheit gesagt, nichts verschwiegen und nichts hinzugefügt.

[b6]

gelesen und unterschrieben

Geschlossen,

[b6]

[b6]

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ON 18 JUN 1998
BY USAINSCOM FOI/PA
Amth Para 4-102 INOD 3200.1R

Zeugenschaftliche Vernehmung

Vorgeladen erscheint die Frau

Schmidt, Klara, geb. Stiehler,
geb. 23.7.1907 in Sitzenroda, Kreis Torgau,
wohnhaft in Torgau, Breite Str. 18

mit der Sache Vertraut gemacht und zur Wahrheit ermahnt, sagt
sie folgendes aus;

Frage:

Mit welchen Personen standen und stehen Sie in Verbindung?

Antwort:

In unserer Wohnung verkehrte des öfteren [b6] ihr
Ehemann, sowie ihr Sohn [b6]

Frage:

Wie oft sind Sie mit [b6] zusammen gekommen und wie
stehen Sie zu ihr?

Antwort:

Familie [b6] verkehrte familiär in unserer Wohnung.
Nach der Verhaftung ihres Ehemannes verkehrte die Genannte
fast täglich in unserer Wohnung, und zwar bis zum 7. Dezember.
Seit dieser Zeit war [b6] nur ein Mal in unserer Wohnung.

Frage:

Welche Aufträge hat Ihnen die [b6] erteilt?

Antwort:

Sie sagte mir lediglich, es kann Oktober oder November 1952
gewesen sein, sie würde Geld erhalten, sie habe meine Adresse
angegeben und ich solle dieses doch in Empfang nehmen.
Sie fügte hinzu, die Berliner wollen mich unterstützen, da der
Rechtsanwalt so viel kostet und sie solle dieses davon bezahlen.
Weitere Aufträge erteilte mir [b6] nicht.

Frage:

Was wissen sie über die verbrecherische Tätigkeit der [b6] ?

Antwort:

Über eine verbrecherische Tätigkeit der [b6] ist mir nichts
bekannt. Mir ist jedoch bekannt, daß [b6] ungefähr im
Oktober 1952 in Berlin gewesen ist. Nach ihrer Rückkehr äußerte
sie; Es war wieder einmal schön, ich habe mich gut amüsiert
gut gegessen und getrunken, habe doch wieder mal schöne Tage
verlebt. Über ihren Aufenthalt in Berlin hat sie sich nie
geäußert. Bemerken möchte ich noch, daß sich die [b6]
nie ausgesprochen hat, trotzdem enge Verbindungen zwischen uns
bestanden.

Frage:

Nennen Sie Personen, die eine feindliche Tätigkeit durchführen.

Antwort:

Personen, welche feindliche Tätigkeit ausüben, sind mir nicht
bekannt.

Weiter habe ich zur Sache nicht, s. [b6] lesen, genannt und
zu sagen, habe die volle Wahrheit [b6] unterschrieben
gesagt, nicht verschwiegen und nichts hinzugefügt.
Geschlossen: [b6] [b6]

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DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

29

Regierung der
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik
Ministerium für Staatssicherheit

Verw. Land: DDR
Abt.: (Kreisdienst)
Nr. des Vorganges:

Karteikarte angelegt.
Fingerabdruck genommen — nicht erforderlich*)
Person ist — nicht — festgestellt*)

Name:
Dienstgrad:
Dienststelle:

Auf Vorladung) — Vorgeführt)

Hohburg, am 20.3.53 195

erscheint: d. 10. Hausfrau

b6

und erklärt, zu Wahrheit ermahnt:

I. Zur Person:

1. a) Familienname, auch Beinamen
bei Frauen auch Geburtsname, ggf. Name des früheren Mannes

a) b6 geb. b6

b) Vornamen (Rufname ist zu unterstreichen)

b) b6

2. a) Beruf: Über das Berufsverhältnis ist anzugeben, ob Inhaber,
Hilfsverwalter, Geschäftsführer oder Geselle, Lehrling,
Fahrtreiber, Hausangestellter, Verkäufer oder
bei Ehefrauen: Beruf des Ehemannes
— bei stand. Angestellten die genaue Anschrift der Dienststelle —
bei Studierenden die Anschrift der Hochschule und das belegte Le-
fach — bei Trägern akademischer Würden (Dipl.-Ing., Dr., D. pp.),
Wissen und bei weichen Hochschule der Titel erworben wurde —

a) Verkäuferin jetzt Hausfrau

b) Einkommensverhältnisse

b) keins

c) Erwerbslos

c) keins

3. Geboren:

am b6 in b6

Verwaltungsbezirk

Landgerichtsbezirk

Land b6

4. Wohnung oder letzter Aufenthalt

in b6

Verwaltungsbezirk

Land b6

Fernruf

Strasse Nr.
Platz

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ON 16 JUN 1998
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Airtel Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

5. Staatsangehörigkeit deutsch

0930

6. Religion (such frühere) ev. luth.

7. a) Familienstand
ledig — verheiratet — verwitwet — geschieden — lebt getrennt

a) verh.

b) Vor- und Familienname des Ehegatten
bei Frauen auch Geburtsname

b) b6

c) Wohnung des Ehegatten, bei verheiratet

c)

8. Kinder

a) Anzahl 1

b) Alter Jahre

unehelich: a) Anzahl

b) Alter keins Jahre

*) Nichtzutreffendes durchstreichen

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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9. a) Des Vaters (Vormundes) Vor- und Zunamen Beruf, Wohnung	a) b6
b) Der Mutter Vor- und Geburtsnamen Beruf, Wohnung <small>sach wenn Eltern bereits verstorben</small>	b) b6 geb. b6 Hausfrau, wie Ehemann
10. Vorbestraft? <small>Kurze Angabe des -- der -- Beschäftigten. Diese Angaben sind soweit möglich, auf Grund der amtlichen Unterlagen zu ergänzen.</small>	nein
11. Parteizugehörigkeit: vor 1945 nach 1945	keine DFD
12. Gefangenschaft — Kriegsgefangenschaft wann? wo?	entfällt

Herrn Sachse

Zur Person:

Ich besuchte die Volksschule in Hohburg von 1927 bis 1935. Anschließend war ich ein Jahr in Nischwitz bei Vogelreuter als Hausgehilfin. 1936 bis 1939 war ich als Verkäuferin bei **b6** Fleischerei in Wurzen, tätig. Anschließend ging ich nach Leipzig zu **b6** Fleischerei, und war dort ebenfalls bis 1944 als Verkäuferin tätig.
In der Zwischenzeit, am 12.12.43, habe ich mich mit Hesse, Helmut, geb. am 23.7.1920 in Torgau, verheiratet.
Jetzt bin ich als Hausfrau tätig.

Frage: Wer sind Ihre Verwandten und Bekannten?

Antwort: Ich habe noch eine Schwester **b6**, geb. am **b6** in Hohburg, wohnh. in **b6**. Sie ist nicht berufstätig, da sie an Epelyptischen Anfällen leidet. Sie ist nicht besonders auf der Höhe.
Meine Schwiegermutter **b6** geb. **b6**, (den Geburtstag kann ich nicht angeben) war in Torgau wohnhaft und ist 1945 verstorben.

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Awt: Para 4-102 EOP 1200.12

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Mein Schwiegervater Wilhelm **b6** 73 Jahre alt, ist in Torgau wohnhaft, er war früher als Arbeiter bei der Stadt Torgau tätig und ist jetzt Rentner.

Eine Schwester meines Mannes (Schwägerin) ist die Frau **b6** geb. **b6** sie ist in Torgau wohnhaft, ca. 30 Jahre alt. Sie war nicht berufstätig und führte den Haushalt. Sie hat einen 8-jährigen Sohn.

Vor ca. 14 Tagen schrieb mein Schwiegervater, daß man sie weggeholt habe.

Der Ehemann der Frau **b6** ist der **b6** ca. 35 Jahre alt, er war bei der Stadtverwaltung in Torgau angestellt. Wo er sich jetzt aufhält ist mir unbekannt. Meine Schwägerin schrieb mir damals, daß er 2 Jahre Zucht haus bekommen hätte, diese Mitteilung erhielt ich Ende vorigen Jahres.

Ein Bruder meines Mannes (Schwager) ist der **b6** etwa 45 Jahre alt, wohnhaft in Wetterzeube (der Ort liegt zwischen Gera und Zeitz), Er ist in einem dortigen Werk in einer leitenden Stellung, genaues darüber kann ich nicht geben.

Geschwister meines Vaters: (Onkels)

b6 wohnh. **b6**
er ist Rentner.
b6 wohnh. Lütitz, Kr. Wurzen, er war stein-
bruchsarbeiter und ist jetzt Rentner.
b6 geb. **b6** wohnh. **b6**
Sie ist Rentnerin.
b6 geb. **b6** wohnh. Hohburg Nr., sie ist
Hausfrau.
b6 geb. **b6** wohnh. Hohburg, Hausfrau.
wohn Kühren Kr. Wurzen, ihr Mann hat eine
Bauernwirtschaft.

Geschwister meiner Mutter:

b6 geb. **b6** wohnh. in Pöhl Kr. Oschatz,
Hausfrau.
b6 wohnh. in Sitzendorf Kr. Torgau, Straßen-
bauermeister.
wohnh. in **b6**
er ist Postangestellter.

Währenden Verkehr pflegen wir mit der Familie **b6**
wohnh. in Hohburg. Herr **b6** ist als Elektriker bei der
Fab. Hombor in Wurzen beschäftigt. Weiterhin mit der Familie
b6 Herr **b6** er hilft bei seinem Vater,
welcher Mitbauer ist.
Mein Mann und die zwei Gebrüder spielen Skat.

Frage:

Waren sind Sie mit **b6** zusammengekommen
in das letzte mal an die Ferien geschickten?

Antwort:

In Werra bei vorigen Jahren (2010) sind Sie
mit **b6** zusammengekommen.
In Werra bei vorigen Jahren (2010) sind Sie
mit **b6** zusammengekommen.

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ON 18 JUN 1986
BY [illegible]
[illegible]

Frage: Wann und was hat Ihnen [b6] mitgeteilt?

Antwort: Anfang Januar, es kann auch schon Ende Dezember gewesen sein, erhielt ich von der [b6] einen Brief, worin sie mir mitteilte, daß ich einmal Geld von Berlin zugeschickt bekäme und dieses ihr (der [b6]) zuschicken soll. Sie teilte mir weiter dazu mit, daß sie dieses Geld für die Bezahlung des Rechtsanwaltes, den sie in der Strafsache gegen ihren Mann verwenden will. Die Straftat des Herrn [b6] ist mir nicht bekannt.

Frage: Was haben Sie der [b6] darauf geantwortet?

Antwort: Ich habe der [b6] nicht sofort darauf geantwortet, sondern erst wie das Geld ankam, es kam Anfang Februar, dieses ihr zugeschickt. Die Höhe des Betrages war 117,- DM. Am 8. oder 9. März kam wiederum Geld und zwar 107,- DM, welches ich noch im Besitz habe, da ich inzwischen von meinem Schwiegervater die Nachricht erhalten habe, daß die [b6] weggeholt worden sei. Der Absender dieses Geldes lautet: [b6] Am 12. 3. 53 waren mein Mann und ich in Torgau und hatten dieses Geld mitgenommen. Da uns bekannt war, daß dieses Geld der Rechtsanwalt [b6] erhalten sollte, wollten wir dieses gleich dort hinschaffen: wir trafen jedoch niemand an und nahmen das Geld wieder mit.

Frage: Was wissen Sie über die verbrecherische Tätigkeit der [b6]?

Antwort: Über eine verbrecherische Tätigkeit der Lehmann ist mir nichts bekannt.

Frage: Welche Aufträge hat Ihnen die [b6] erteilt?

Antwort: Ich habe keinen Auftrag von ihr erhalten.

Frage: Kennen Sie Personen, die eine verbrecherische Tätigkeit ausüben?

Antwort: Die [b6] sollte mir einmal bei einem Besuch in der Wohnung, es war im August vorigen Jahres, daß sie ein altes Foto gewesen wäre und sich dort köstlich amüsiert habe. Ich weiß nichts davon, daß sie bei einem Cousin von ihr einen gewissen Mann, gewesen sei. Dieser Mann ist mir jedoch nicht bekannt.

Ich habe die volle Wahrheit gesagt und kann nichts weiter berichten.

b6

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Regierung der
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik
Ministerium für Staatssicherheit

Verwaltung für Sozialverwaltung Leipzig

Abt. (Kreisstellen)

Nachrichtendienst

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Karteikarte angelegt.

Fingerabdruck genommen — nicht erforderlich*)

Person ist — nicht — festgestellt*)

Name:

Dienstgrad:

Dienststelle:

Auf Vorladung*) — Vorgeführt*)

Mohrham am 20.5. 1953

erscheint

der Führer

b6

und erklärt zur Wahrheit ermahnt:

I. Zur Person:

1. a) Familienname, auch Beinamen

bei Frauen auch Geburtsname; ggf. Name des früheren Ehemannes

a)

b6

b) Vornamen (Rufname) ist zu unterstreichen

b)

2. a) Beruf (über das Berufsverhältnis ist anzugeben, — ob Inhaber, Hauptverdienst, Geschäftsführer oder Obediente, Geselle, Lehrling, Facharbeiter, Handlungsgeschäft, Verkäufer, usw. — bei Ehefrauen: Beruf des Ehemannes — bei staatl. Angestellten die genaue Anschrift der Dienststelle — bei Studierenden die Anschrift der Hochschule und das belegte Fach — bei Trägern akademischer Würden (Dipl.-Ing., Dr., D. pp.), wann und bei welcher Hochschule der Titel erworben wurde —

a)

Fleischer (Hauswirtschaft)

b) Einkommensverhältnisse

b)

160.- DM monatlich

c) Erwerbslos

c)

Ja, nein, etc.

3. Geboren

am

b6

in

b6

Verwaltungsbezirk

Landgerichtsbezirk

Land

b6

4. Wohnung oder letzter Aufenthalt

in

b6

Verwaltungsbezirk

Land

b6

Strasse
Platz

Nr.

Fernruf

5. Staatsangehörigkeit

deutsch

6. Religion (auch frühere)

ev. luth.

7. a) Familienstand

ledig — verheiratet — verwitwet — geschieden — lebt getrennt

a)

verh.

b) Vor- und Familienname des Ehegatten

b)

CHARLOTTE

bei Frauen auch Geburtsname

c) Wohnung des Ehegatten, bei verschiedener Wohnung

c)

8. Kinder

ehelich: a) Anzahl

b) Alter

unehelich: a) Anzahl

b) Alter

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33

Ich habe noch eine Schwester **b6** geb. **b6** geb. am **b6** in **b6** wohnh. **b6**. Sie ist nicht berufstätig. Von meinem Vater bekam ich vor ca. 14 Tagen die Nachricht, daß sie verhaftet worden wäre. Ihr Ehemann **b6**, ca. 35 Jahre alt, er war in der Stadtverwaltung Torgau tätig und wurde im Juli-August 1952 verhaftet. Über die Straftat ist mir im Einzelnen nichts bekannt. Er hat wohl damals einer Frau die Geburtsdaten führender Persönlichkeiten von Torgau gegeben.

Mein Vater hatte 7 Geschwister, die alle verstorben sind. Ich kenne davon niemand.

Die Geschwister meiner Mutter: (Onkel)

b6 wohnh. Torgau, er war bei der Post beschäftigt, jetzt ist er Rentner
b6, wohnh. in Torgau, er ist ebenfalls Rentner.
b6 wohnh. in Torgau, Rentner.

Weiteres ist mir über die Genannten nicht bekannt.

Weiteren Verkehr pflege ich mit der Familie **b6** und **b6**. Wir unterhalten hier einen Skatklub. **b6**, ca. 26 Jahre alt, ist in Hohnburg wohnhaft und als Elektriker bei der Pa. Mombert in Wurzen tätig. Er ist parteilos.

b6, ca. 32 Jahre alt, er ist in Hohnburg wohnhaft und als Wirtschaftsgelhilfe bei seinem Vater, welcher Althauer ist, tätig.

Zur Sache:

Frage:

Wann sind Sie mit **b6** zusammengekommen und wann haben Sie das letzte Mal an die **b6** geschrieben?

Antwort:

Am Totensonntag, im Nov. vorigen Jahres, habe ich meine Schwester das letzte Mal in Torgau gesehen und gesprochen. Ich selbst schreibe nicht, das erledigt alles meine Frau. Ich weiß soviel, daß meine Frau **b6** einmal Geld, welches von Berlin mit dem Absender Fr. **b6** z.Zt. Berlin 0-17, ankam, nach Torgau zu meiner Schwester geschickt hat.

Frage:

Wann und was hat Ihnen **b6** mitgeteilt?

Antwort:

Anfang Februar hat mir meine Frau einmal erzählt, daß meine Schwester geschrieben habe, und mitgeteilt hat, daß hier her nach Hohnburg einmal Geld kommen werde, welches ich dann nach Torgau an die Adresse meiner Schwester, schicken sollen.

Frage:

Was haben Sie der **b6** darauf geantwortet?

Antwort:

Ich weiß, daß meine Frau nicht sofort geantwortet hat, sondern erst **b6** als das erste Geld von Berlin ankam, dieses wegschickte und einen Brief an sie schrieb. Die Höhe des Betrages weiß ich nicht genau, es waren jedoch über 100,- DM. Am 11. oder 12. März 1953 kamen erneut 117,- DM an, die ich noch in meinem Besitz habe. Ich weiß dazu noch soviel, daß meine Schwester an meine Frau noch mitgeschrieben hat, daß dieses Geld zur Bezahlung der Rechtsanwaltskosten, die durch die Strafsache von ihren Ehemann entstanden waren, begeben werden sollten.

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AUS Para 4, 12 DOD 5200.1R

34

Frage: Was wissen Sie über die verbrecherische Tätigkeit der [b6]

Antwort: In keiner Weise ist mir darüber etwas bekannt. Ich habe auch bei meinen Besuchen in Torgau darüber keine Feststellungen gemacht.

Frage: Haben Sie Aufträge von Ihrer Schwester erhalten?

Antwort: Ich habe keine Aufträge von ihr erhalten.

Frage: Nennen Sie Personen, die eine verbrecherische Tätigkeit durchführen?

Antwort: Ich kenne keine derartigen Personen. Ich weiß aber, daß meine Schwester ab und zu mal nach Berlin fuhr und zwar, wie sie äußerte, zu einem Cousin namens [b6] etwa 37 Jahre alt. Ich habe aus diesem Cousin keinerlei Verbindung gehabt und kenne nicht näher.

④ Ich habe die volle Wahrheit gesagt und kann nichts mehr hinzufügen.

Geschlossen:

b6

b6

gelesen, genehmigt und unterschrieben

b6

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35

XXXX Berlin Magdeburg

Magdeburg 16.2. 3
Beginn: 10.00 Uhr,
Ende: 15.30 Uhr,
Bsp.

b6

Berlin

Berufshilfe

370,- netto

XXXX

5.12.1911 Scharstedt
Kreis Stendal

Magdeburg

Magdeburg

Sachsen-Anhalt

Helmholtz- XXXX 31

deutsch

ohne

verheiratet

b6

Magdeburg, Helmholtzstraße 3

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Amh Para 4-102 DOD 5209.10

0938

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1
11
keine

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b6

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36

b6
verstorben im Jahre b6
b6 geborene b6
wohaft in Rochau Kreis
Stendal

wegen Diebstahl zu 150,—RM
Goldstrafe

keine

NDPD

keine

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ON 18 JUN 1998
BY USAINSCOM FOIPA
Amh Para 4-102 DOD 5200.102

XXXX Person

Ich bin Weinbürgerlicher Herkunft und besuchte vom 6. bis zum 14. Lebensjahre in Rochau Kreis Stendal die Volksschule. Nach meiner Schulentlassung trat ich bei der Firma Erich GOLD als Elektrolehrling in die Lehre. Im Jahre 1930 lernte ich aus und arbeitete darauf bei verschiedenen Firmen als Elektromonteur. Anfang September 1939 wurde ich zur ehemaligen faschistischen Wehrmacht einberufen und kam zu den Luftnachrichten nach Stendal. Ich machte den zweiten Weltkrieg bis zum Schluß mit und wurde am 15.6.1945 aus dem Durchschleusungslager Ingolstadt, wo ich ganze zwei Tage war, entlassen. Darauf begab ich mich nach Scheibenhagen Ingolstadt und anschließend zu meiner Frau nach München. In München verblieb ich bis zum 30.8.1946 und kehrte im Herbst 1946 zu meinen Eltern nach Rochau Kreis Stendal zurück. b6 versag ich nach Magdeburg und fand Beschäftigung im jetzigen Karl Marx und Ernst Thälmann Werk. Von April 1948 bis zum Tage meiner Festnahme war ich bei der Reichsbahn im Fahrdienst tätig.

b6

0930

2 -

b6

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37

- 2 -

1951 wurde ich Mitglied der NDFP. Ich hatte die Funktion eines politischen Leiters inne. Ich bin Mitglied des Freien Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes und seit 1950 Mitglied der Gesellschaft für Deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft.

Frage: Mit welcher verbrecherischen Organisation in Westberlin stehen Sie in Verbindung ?

Antwort: Seit Mai 1952 stehe ich mit dem Hauptagenten RUX der Verbrecherorganisation "Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit" in Verbindung.

Frage: Wann, wo und wie haben Sie RUX kennengelernt ?

Antwort: Im Mai 1952, als ich einen Güterzug nach Berlin fuhr, wurde ich am Bahnhof Zoo von einem mir flüchtig bekannten Autofahrer, welcher republikflüchtig ist, angesprochen und zu einem Glas Bier eingeladen. Während des Aufenthaltes in einem Lokal in der Nähe des Zoologischen Gartens, ging er ans Telefon, um anzurufen. Kurze Zeit darauf erschien ein Herr, welcher sich an unseren Tisch setzte und sich mit mir unterhielt. Dieser Herr schimpfte über verschiedene Mißstände in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. Ich stimmte seinen Ausführungen zu. Danach erzählte er mir, daß er aus der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik geflohen sei, wo er Inhaber eines Geschäftes war. Er erkundigte sich vor allen Dingen nach der Belieferung der Kleinhandelsgeschäfte. Desweiteren interessierte er sich, ob ich öfter nach Berlin fahre. Er nannte mir den Namen RUX und gab mir mit dem Bemerkens die Telefonnummer 79443, daß, wenn ich wieder in Berlin bin, sollte ich diese Nummer anrufen und "RUX" verlangen.

b6

- 3 -

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ON 18 JUN 1998
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Auth Para 4-102 DOD 5200.1R

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Frage: Wie oft haben Sie sich in der Folgezeit mit RUX getroffen und welche Aufträge haben Sie erhalten ?

Antwort: Ich habe mich mit RUX insgesamt siebenmal getroffen.

Frage: Berichten Sie über die einzelnen Treffe !

Antwort: Der erste Treff fand im Juni 1952 statt. Ich rief vom Bahnhof Grunowald die mir von "RUX" gegebene Telefonnummer an. Von ihm erhielt ich den Bescheid, daß er mich im Lokal "Schultheis" am Bahnhof Charlottenburg erwartete. Von hier aus gingen wir in sein Büro bzw. in seine Wohnung, Glauerstraße 6. Hier erzählte er mir, daß er für eine westliche Zentrale arbeitet. Er fragte mich, ob ich ihm Informationen aus der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik bringen könnte. Ich sagte zu, ihm dieselben, soweit es mir möglich ist, zu bringen. Ich erhielt den Auftrag, festzustellen, wo die in den VEB-Betrieben Magdeburgs hergestellten Gegenstände hingeliefert werden.

An diesem Tage berichtete ich ihm über Angestellte der Reichsbahndirektion Magdeburg und über Funktionäre der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands. Insbesondere nannte ich die Namen des Präsidenten und des damaligen Antwortstundes.

Weiterhin berichtete ich ihm über die größeren Dienststellen der Eisenbahn, daß diese einen hauptamtlichen Parteisekretär haben und nannte ihm die Namen dieser Funktionäre.

Ich erhielt den Decknamen [b6] An diesem Tage erhielt ich [b6] und unterschrieb eine Quittung mit dem Decknamen

[b6] Zuletzt gab er mir eine neue Telefonnummer, welche er mir für den Fall aufschrieb, wenn ich einmal Nachts nach Berlin kommen sollte, daß ich ihn erreichen kann. Die Nummer ist 844345, Apparat 34. Diese Nummer erhielt ich getarnt auf einen Zettel, welcher eine Rechnung darstellen sollte.

Der zweite Treff fand am 8. oder 9.7.1952 statt. Ich rief RUX vom Bahnhof Zoo mit der neuen Nummer an, welcher mich nach

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Berlin-Lichterfelde. Dort habe ich mich in der Nähe des Bahnhofs bestellt. Ich habe mich dann mit RUX in Begleitung eines Führers in eine Wohnung begeben, die mir unbekannt war. Ich erfuhr von RUX, ob ich in der Nähe von Berlin, in der Nähe der sowjetischen Armee eintrifft. Dementsprechend sollte ich ihm über sowjetische Fahrzeuge und deren Art berichten, welche in Magdeburg verladen werden. Ferner verlangte er auch die Bevölkerung, Stimmungsberichte, welche ich ihm auch gab. Weiterhin lieferte ich ihm Charakteristiken von Funktionären der SED, soweit sie mir bekannt waren. Er fragte auch Angaben von Parteifunktionären, welche ich ihm auch machte. Ich erhielt wiederum 12,- Mark und unterschrieb eine Quittung mit meinem Decknamen [REDACTED] b6

RUX gab mir die Anweisung, daß ich mich in Zukunft nicht betrinken soll. Nach außen hin soll ich mich fortgeschritten begeben, um nach Möglichkeit durch meine verbrecherische Tätigkeit nicht aufzufallen.

Weiterhin erhielt ich noch den Auftrag, über den Besuch des Präsidenten Wilhelm Pieck in Magdeburg Stimmungsberichte zu sammeln.

Der dritte Treff war im August 1952. Vom Bahnhof Zoo rief ich RUX an, der mich zum "Botanischen Garten" in die Wandelhalle bestellte. Von hier aus gingen wir in die Wohnung des RUX, wo mir Abendbrot angeboten wurde. Die Wohnung befindet sich in der Clauswitzstraße 6. An diesem Abend ist mir aus meiner Brieftasche ein Zettel herangefallen, auf dem ersichtlich war, daß ich bei der Wismuth-AG, Johannsberganstadt, beschäftigt war. RUX sah diesen Zettel und befragte mich über alles, was ich dort erlebt und gesehen habe. Ich berichtete ihm über die Erfordernisse, über die Bewachung, über den Transportweg, über die ungefähre Ausbeute eines Schachtes, über die Wohnverhältnisse, die Verdienstmöglichkeiten, über den Schichtwechsel sowie über die Stimmung der Knappen. Desweiteren nannte ich ihm die Belegschaftsstärke, die mir bekannten sowjetischen Offiziere sowie die Schachtleitung. 0942

Weiterhin berichtete ich über den sowjetischen Flugplatz in Stendal. RUX zeigte mir an diesem Tage einen Plan von demselben. Ferner berichtete ich ihm noch über die landwirtschaftliche

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Produktionsgenossenschaften im Gebiet von Magdeburg.

An diesem Tage erhielt ich vom RUX keinen Auftrag. Er sagte nur, daß ich Ohren und Augen offen halten sollte, um ihm wieder ausführlich berichten zu können.

Ich bekam zirka 10 000 Mark, die ich während der Fahrt zwischen Potsdam und Genthin aus dem Zug warf.

Bei diesem Treff erhielt ich wieder 12. — Mark West und unterschrieb eine Quittung mit meinem Decknamen. b6

Der vierte Treff wurde Ende August/Anfang September 1952 durchgeführt. Ich rief RUX vom Bahnhof Rikamp an und wir trafen uns in Berlin-Charlottenburg und zwar in dem Lokal "Zum Schulheiss". Hier erhielt ich den Auftrag, zu einem gewissen b6 nach Dessau, Südstraße, zu fahren. b6 wohne in dem Hause, in welchem sich das Steinmetzgeschäft STRITZ befindet. Hier sollte ich bestellen, daß sich b6 vorsehen und nach Berlin kommen soll. Diesen Auftrag habe ich nicht durchgeführt, da ich zu dieser Zeit mit meiner Frau in Urlaub gefahren bin.

An diesem Tage erhielt ich wieder 21. — Mark West. Ich unterschrieb eine Quittung mit meinem Decknamen. b6

Der fünfte Treff wurde Anfang September 1952 durchgeführt. Ich rief RUX vom Bahnhof Rikamp an und wurde von ihm zum "Botanischen Garten" in die Wandelhalle bestellt. Wir gingen in ein Lokal, welches am rechten Ausgang der Wandelhalle lag. Der Mitarbeiter der Kampfgruppe machte mir Vorwürfe, daß ich nicht in Dessau war. Ich erhielt den Auftrag, in Magdeburg Zoo, — DM an eine Frau b6 Torgau, aufzugeben. Die Straße ist mir entfallen. Die Hausnummer war 23. Ich glaube, es war Breitestraße. Dieses Geld habe ich an die Genannte abgeschickt. Dann wollte mir RUX noch einen Brief geben, welchen ich zu einem gewissen b6 Regelstraße, bringen sollte. b6 sollte ich ausrichten, daß er sich in Westberlin wieder einmal sehen lassen sollte. Diesen Auftrag nahm RUX später zurück, da er die Angelegenheit anderweitig regeln wollte. Ich erhielt den Auftrag, festzustellen, welche Leute vom Operativ-Stab in der Bekanntheits liegen. Weiterhin sollte ich RUX einen EPA, sowie ein Arbeitsbuch besorgen. Diesen Auftrag führte ich nicht durch. b6

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Antwort: Ich erhielt am 3.1.1953 von RUI aus Berlin eine Ansichtskarte. Auf dieser Karte teilte er mir mit, daß Onkel Emil und Tante tüchtig Sylvester gefeiert haben und wie ich ins neue Jahr gekommen bin. Weiterhin teilte er mir mit, daß Onkel Emil ein Hagengeschwür habe.

Frage: Was sollte dieser Text, den Ihnen RUI auf seiner Karte mitteilte, bedeuten ?

Antwort: Ich entnahm aus dieser Karte, daß ich mich wieder bei RUI melden soll und nahm gleichzeitig an, daß irgend etwas nicht in Ordnung sei, daß ich mich in Gefahr befinde.

Frage: Wann haben Sie die Verbindung mit RUI, nachdem Sie diese Karte erhielten, wieder aufgenommen ?

Antwort: Seit diesem Tage war ich nicht wieder bei RUI. Ich hatte auch keinen festen Termin, wann ich wieder zu RUI fahren sollte.

Frage: Welche Personen sind Ihnen bekannt, die ebenfalls eine verbrecherische Tätigkeit gegen die DDR ausführen ?

Antwort: Wie schon erwähnt, sind mir bekannt:

Frau [b6] Dessau, Südstraße
[b6] Hegelstraße
Frau [b6] Torgau, Straße unbekannt,
Hausnummer 23.

Weitere Personen sind mir nicht bekannt.

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Frage: Berichten Sie ausführlich, wie die von Ihnen genannten Personen ihre feindliche Tätigkeit durchführen und durch wem Ihnen das bekannt wurde ?

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Antwort: Die Frau WATZ aus Dessau ist mir persönlich bekannt.

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da ich mich mit ihr schon über die feindliche Tätigkeit unterhalten habe. Frau [b6] ist durch [b6] von allem informiert.

Der [b6] Magdeburg, Hegelstraße wohnhaft, ist mir nicht bekannt.

Über Frau [b6] wohnhaft in Torgau, kann ich nur berichten, daß sie von RUX DM 200,--, welche ich von Magdeburg an sie abgeschickt habe, erhalten hat.

Fragen: Nennen Sie alle Personen, die Sie im Laufe Ihrer verbrecherischen Tätigkeit von der Zentrale der sogenannten "Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit" kennengelernt haben.

Antworten:

1.) RUX, circa 33 bis 37 Jahre alt, circa 1,68 groß, Figur untersetzt, Haar dunkelblond, Gesicht oval, Augen blau. Seine Haare hat er streng nach hinten gekämmt. Er trägt desöfteren eine dunkle Hornbrille. An der rechten Hand trägt er einen goldenen Trauring.

Dialekt: Mitteldeutsch.

Er ist verheiratet, trinkt mehr wenig Alkohol und nimmt es mit den Frauen nicht so genau.

R. ist wohnhaft in [b6]

RUX hat eine Sekretärin, die ich mit Namen nicht kenne. Ich habe diese nur einmal flüchtig gesehen. Sie ist circa 30 Jahre alt.

RUX ist im Besitze einer Diplomatenaktentasche aus dunkelgelbem Leder, mit aufgesetzten Taschen mit Riemen, die einen Schellenverschluß haben.

2.) Der Mitarbeiter von RUX:

Bei RUX lernte ich eine Person kennen, welche ebenfalls hauptamtlich bei der "KGu" eingestellt ist. Der Name ist mir unbekannt.

[b6]

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Personenbeschreibung

etwa 25 bis 30 Jahre, 1,75 m groß, dunkelblondes, fast schwarzes Haar, sehr glatt nach hinten gekämmt, Gesicht länglich, Augen dunkel, 1 Goldzahn, Dialekt thüringisch.

Der linke Arm bis ungefähr zum Ellenbogen ist amputiert. Er hat ein sehr gepflegtes Aussehen.

Frage: Ist Ihnen bekannt, daß die sogenannte "KGu" eine verbrecherische Organisation ist und Spionage, Sabotage und Diversionstätigkeit im Gebiet der DDR betreibt?

Antwort: Ja wohl. Mir ist bekannt, daß die "KGu" im Gebiet der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik Spionage, Sabotage und Diversionen durchführt.

Frage: Sind Sie sich darüber im klaren, daß Sie im Auftrage der "KGu" Spionage in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik getrieben haben?

Antwort: Ich bin mir darüber im klaren, daß ich eine Spionagetätigkeit gegen die Deutsche Demokratische Republik betrieben habe.

Frage: Warum und weshalb haben Sie bisher Ihre verbrecherische Tätigkeit dem Ministerium für Staatssicherheit verschwiegen?

Antwort: Ich habe geglaubt, daß meine verbrecherische Tätigkeit dem Ministerium für Staatssicherheit nicht bekannt sei und auch nicht bekannt wird.

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Magdeburg, den 16.4.1953

Beginn: 10.30 Uhr

Ende: 17.00 Uhr

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Vernahmungsprotokoll

des Häftlings

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geb. am b6 in b6

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wohnhaft in b6

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Beruf: Zugführer.

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Frage: Welche verbrecherische Tätigkeit führten Sie gegen die Deutsche demokratische Republik durch?

Antwort: Seit dem Monat Mai 1952 stehe ich mit der Verbrecherorganisation, der "Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit" in Verbindung und habe bis Ende des Jahres 1952 laufend verbrecherische Aufträge durchgeführt.

Frage: Von wem wurden Sie für eine verbrecherische Tätigkeit angeworben und wie erfolgte die Anwerbung?

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Antwort: Für die verbrecherische Tätigkeit wurde ich von b6 Pögnau, Straße mit Hausnummer nicht mehr erinnerlich, angeworben. Ich begegnete zusammen mit b6 vor Ende März bis Anfang Mai 1952 die Landespartoleitende der Nationaldemokratischen Partei in Neuburg. b6 sprach mich zum Schluss des Lehrganges an. Er erzählte mir, daß er mit einer Organisation in Westberlin Verbindung aufrecht erhält und daß er sich einmal nach Westberlin mitnehmen möchte. In der Folge Beendigung des Lehrganges verabschieden wir uns und verabredeten für den nächsten Tag, um 10 Uhr in der Kasse - Bahnhofsstr. 10 zu treffen. Ich kam zu dem zum verabredeten Zeit nach Westberlin.

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Frage: Schildern Sie weiter!

Antwort: Gegen 10.00 Uhr erschien
b6 mit einer mir unbekannten Person, die sich mir nicht
vorstellte. Wir begaben uns in die Wohnung der unbekannten
Person und zwar in die b6 dritter
Stock. Die unbekannte Person unterhielt sich zunächst mit
mir über meine privaten Verhältnisse. Bei einem späteren
Treff mit der unbekannten Person sagte diese zu mir, daß
die HUX heiße. Er betonte, daß HUX nicht sein richtiger Name
sei. In Wirklichkeit heiße er anders. Den Namen b6 wie
er sich auch nannte, sagte mir HUX im Monat Juni oder Juli,
als ich bei ihm in Westberlin war.

Frage: Welche Fragen stellte ich an
Sie und was haben Sie darauf geantwortet?

Antwort: Der Mitarbeiter der "Kampf-
Gruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit" interessierte sich für private
Einzelhandelsgeschäfte, für die Pottversorgung in der Deutschen
Demokratischen Republik und wie die Stimmung der Bevölkerung
ist. Ich beantwortete alle an mich gestellten Fragen soweit
ich dazu in der Lage war. Darauf gab HUX mir den Auftrag,
mich für private Einzelhandelsgeschäfte zu interessieren.
Insbesondere wollte der Mitarbeiter der "Kampfgruppe
gegen Unmenschlichkeit" wissen, wie diese mit Waren
versorgt werden, ob die Handelsorganisationen und die
Konsums beliefert werden und ob in letzter Zeit
in Magdeburg viel private Einzelhandelsgeschäfte in die
Handelsorganisation oder in die Konsums überführt wurden.
Gleichzeitig sollte ich mich für sowjetische Transpor-
tate, die von der Eisenbahn transportiert werden,
interessieren. Ich versprach dem Mitarbeiter der
"Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit", die Aufträge durch-
zuführen. Darauf gab mir HUX seine Telefonnummer an und
sagte mir, daß ich ihn unter dieser Telefonnummer zu Hause
erreichen kann. Ich verabschiedete mich von ihm und
Magdeburg zurück.

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Frage: Wie oft haben Sie mich in der Folgezeit mit dem Mitarbeiter der "Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit" getroffen?

Antwort: Ich habe mich mit dem Mitarbeiter der "Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit" sieben Mal nach Berlin getroffen und zwar jedesmal in Westberlin. Die Treffen fanden in der Zeit vom Monat Mai bis zum Dezember 1953 statt. Ich bin durchschnittlich einmal monatlich zu dem Mitarbeiter der "Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit" nach Westberlin gefahren. Wir trafen uns in der Wohnung des RUX, Berlin-Charlottenburg, b6 und in Berlin in der Nähe des Charlottenburger Bahnhofes.

Frage: Welche Aufträge erhielten Sie von dem Mitarbeiter der "KKG" RUX oder b6

Antwort: Ich habe bei den Treffs mit RUX folgende Aufträge erhalten: Ich sollte feststellen, was die sowjetischen Aktiengesellschaften liefern, wie groß die Lieferung ist, wer liefert und wohin die Lieferungen gehen. Ferner erhielt ich den Auftrag, festzustellen, ob in Halle von Magdeburg große Verschiebungen von sowjetischen Gruppen stattfinden. Desweiteren sollte ich ihn über Feuerungen von sowjetischen Fahrzeugen und deren Art berichten, welche bei der Reichsbahn verladen werden. RUX stellte an mich noch die Frage, wie und mit welchem Erfolg die Werbung zur Volkspolizei stattfindet und ob dadurch in den Betrieben Mangel an Arbeitskräften entsteht. Zur Zeit der Kartoffelkampagne forderte mich der Mitarbeiter der "Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit" auf, ihm Stimmungsberichte aus der Bevölkerung zu liefern. Er befragte mich nach Funktionen der Parteien und Verwaltung der Reichstahndirektion. Auch sollte ich Stimmungsberichte über den Aufenthalt des Präsidenten der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik in Magdeburg liefern. Der Mitarbeiter gab mir den Auftrag, mich über die Produktionsgenossenschaften zu informieren.

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Er wollte insbesondere wissen, wie weit die Bildung der Produktionsgenossenschaften auf dem Lande vorangekommen ist, wie die Einführung der Ernte vorstatten geht, ob genügend Bindlegern zur Verfügung steht und wie es mit den Arbeitskräften in der Landwirtschaft aussieht. Besonders interessierte sich der Mitarbeiter der "Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit" für die Volkseigenen Güter. Der Mitarbeiter gab mir ferner den Auftrag, das mir gegebene Paket mit Klebeszetteln, die einen hetzerischen Inhalt hatten, unter der Bevölkerung zu verbreiten. Auch gab mir RUX einen Stempel, sowie Druckfarbe und Matrizen mit. Mit diesem Material sollte ich an Funktionäre der Parteien und Verwaltungen Drohkarten schreiben. Einige Matrizen waren schon fertig geschrieben. Auch erhielt ich eine Flasche Säure. Diese Säure sollte ich in die Kugellager von Wägen gießen, die für sowjetische Militärtransporte geeignet waren. Ferner sollte ich versuchen, im Eisenbahnverkehr Unregelmäßigkeiten hervorzurufen. Ich sollte gegen falsch leiten. Ende August - Anfang September 1952 bekam ich von RUX den Auftrag, zu den Verbindungsmann der "Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit", EHRHARDT zu fahren und ihm auszurichten, nach Berlin zu dem Mitarbeiter der "Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit" zu kommen. Im Monat September 1952 erhielt ich von RUX den Auftrag, erneut nach Dessau zu fahren und den Verbindungsmann der "Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit" zu sehen. Bei einem anderen Treff mit RUX erhielt ich den Auftrag, wiederum nach Dessau zu fahren und festzustellen, ob eine Frau [b6] Dessau, Straße und Hausnummer nicht bekannt, und drei weitere Agenten der "Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit", sich noch auf freiem Fuß befinden. Gleichzeitig sollte ich mich für einen Sandhaufen im Hofe der Werkstatt der [b6] STRATZ interessieren. Die Gegenstände, die ich in Sandhaufen finden würde, sollte ich in's Wasser werfen, bzw. vergraben. Ferner sollte ich Informationen über die Kaserne in Magdeburg bringen, weiterhin versuchen, die von sowjetischen Offizieren, die sich in der Kaserne in Magdeburg befinden, in Erfahrung zu bringen.

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Der Mitarbeiter der "Kampfgruppe" forderte mich auf, ihm einen DPA und ein Arbeitsbuch zu beschaffen. Mehrmals habe ich den Auftrag erhalten, den Parteifreund [b6] Gardelegen, anzuwerben, bzw. ihn zu bewegen, nach dem Mitarbeiter der "Kampfgruppe" nach Ostberlin zu fahren. Auch sollte ich einen [b6] in Rathenow, dazu bewegen, nach Westberlin zu RUX zu kommen. Desweiteren sollte ich einen sogenannten toten Briefkasten einrichten, wo Material für mich abgelegt werden könnte. Dafür sollte ein hohler Baum, oder eine Ruine infrage kommen. Besonders sollte ich noch dem Mitarbeiter der "Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit" Mitteilungen von Unregelmäßigkeiten, die bei der Reichsbahn vorkommen, machen. Anfang Dezember 1952 erhielt ich von RUX den Auftrag, 200,-DM von Magdeburg, oder von einem anderen Ort in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik nach Torgau an eine Frau [b6] zu übersenden. Auch sollte ich mir Nummern von sowjetischen Kraftfahrzeugen aufschreiben und diese RUX überbringen, desweiteren Angaben über die Durchführung der Verordnung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik zum Schutze der Demarkationslinie vom Demokratischen Sektor Berlins machen. Im Monat August/September 1952 stellte RUX an mich die Frage, ob ich nicht für ihn aus dem Raum Halle ein Paket mit Pistolen abholen kann. Weitere Aufträge habe ich von dem Mitarbeiter der "Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit" nicht erhalten.

Frage: Wie sollte die Verbindung zu dem Mitarbeiter der "Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit" aufrecht erhalten werden?

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Antwort: Die Verbindung sollte durch die Telefonnummer, die mir der Mitarbeiter der "Kampfgruppe" gegeben hat, aufrecht erhalten werden. Bei allen Treffs, mit Ausnahme des ersten Treffs, habe ich RUX von meiner Ankunft in Westberlin telefonisch in Kenntnis gesetzt, der Treffpunkt wurde dann telefonisch verabredet.

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Frage:

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übermitteln. Wie Ihrem Auftraggeber?

Antwort: Zunächst ist mir
dem Mitarbeiter davon mündlich Mitteilung, daß die Kisten
rungen der sowjetischen Aktiengesellschaften in Kisten ver-
packt worden. Die Kisten werden mit russischer Beschriftung
sehen, die ich nicht lesen kann. Ich berichtete, daß die
Kisten aus allen Enden der Deutschen Demokratischen
Republik kamen und dass die Kisten in Richtung Ostpreußen
hier und nach den Ostseehäfen transportiert werden.
Zahl und Inhalt der Kisten konnte ich keine Angaben machen.
Beszüglich der sowjetischen Truppenvermehrungen in 1952
ich nur mit, daß diese seit Mai 1952 nachgelassen und
dann ganz aufgehört haben. Ich berichtete meinem Auf-
geber eingehend über Umfang und Zahl der sowjetischen
Militärtransporte, die durch die Reichsbahn durchgeführt
worden, gab geschätzte Zahlen pro Woche und Monat an,
sowie über Abgangs- und Bestimmungsbahnhöfe.
Ich gab an, daß in bestimmte Richtungen eine große
Anzahl sowjetischer Panzer auf Güterwagen transportiert
werden. Über die anderen sowjetischen Truppenvermehrungen
konnte ich mir kein klares Bild machen. Transportieren sich
habe ich nur nicht mitteilen können.
Zur Werbung der Volkspolizei sagte ich an, daß in
allen Orten Plakate zur Werbung für die Volkspolizei
angeklebt werden und einzelne Werbung in den Zeitungen
erschienen sind, um junge Menschen für die Volkspolizei
zu werben.
Ich gab an, daß in der Landwirtschaft durch die
nur Volkspolizei bei einzelnen Großbauern Angestellte
Arbeitskräften eingesetzt ist. Ich machte dem Mitarbeiter
mein Stimmungsberichte aus der Bevölkerung über die
Selbstversorgung im Monat August 1952, ferner über die
Nahrungsmittelversorgung. Ich machte auch Angaben über die
Zugung der Reichsbahndirektion, sowie den
Eingebung. Ich nannte ihm Namen von
bahnen und gab eine Charakteristik
über den Aufenthalt des
sowjetischen Republik in

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Mitarbeiter keinen Stimmungsbericht liefern, in ich an diesem Tage dienstlich unterwegs war.

Über die landwirtschaftlichen Produktionsgenossenschaften konnte ich RUX mitteilen, daß in bestimmten Gebieten, zum Beispiel in der Altmark, Produktionsgenossenschaften ins Leben gerufen wurden und weitere kurz vor der Gründung stehen. Ich machte ihm Angaben über die Einbringung der Ernte, über die Mengen Rindergarn, die den Maschinen-traktorenstationen zur Verfügung stehen. Auch machte ich RUX Angaben über den Mangel an Arbeitskräften in größeren landwirtschaftlichen Betrieben. Von den Volkseigenen Höfen sagte ich RUX, daß auf deren Feldern noch große Getreidebestände von Getreide stehen. Ich gab dem Mitarbeiter Orte und Gegenden an, wo sich Getreide auf den Feldern befindet. Die Klebezettel, die ich von RUX erhalten habe, verbreitete ich in Magdeburg-Buchau in der

Warschauerstraße, Porzellanstraße und Cocolistraße, als ich vom Dienst nach Hause ging. Circa 10 Zettel habe ich

b6 ausgehändigt. Die von RUX erhaltene Flasche mit Säure habe ich nicht auftragsgemäß verworfen. Ich habe den Kopf der Flasche in Klosett meiner Wohnung oberschlagen und den Inhalt in das Klosett gegossen. Die leere Flasche habe ich in den Aschesimer geworfen. Den Stempel, die Druckfarbe und die Satzritzen habe ich kurz vor Verhaftung

b6 ausgehändigt, der damit Druckkarten druckte und diese mir zur Versendung an Funktionäre der Partei und Verwaltungen übergab. Es waren circa 15 bis 20 Druckkarten. Ich lieferte für zwei Druckkarten die Nachschriften und brachte diese in Magdeburg in verschiedenen Briefkästen ein. Güterwagen konnte ich nicht falsch leiten. Durchschleusen bei der Reichsbahn konnte ich auch nicht hervorbringen. Den Auftrag nach Dessau, zu dem Verbindungsname der "Gruppe", b6 zu fahren, habe ich durchgeführt. Im September 1952 bin ich noch einmal nach Dessau gefahren, um b6 mitzuteilen, daß er in seiner verbotenen Tätigkeit vorsichtig sein und diese einstellen soll, in Gefahr ist.

b6

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Ich habe jedoch [b6] nicht in Dessau antreffen können, da er selbst in Westberlin war. Im Oktober 1952 führte ich auch den dritten Auftrag durch. Ich fuhr wiederum nach Dessau und suchte die Frau [b6] in Dessau auf. Die Frau [b6] erledigte ich meinen Auftrag, und ich fuhr wieder nach Magdeburg zurück. Über die Einkäuferin in Magdeburg konnte ich keine Berichte liefern.

Meinen deutschen Personalausweis und ein Arbeitsbuch konnte ich dem Mitarbeiter der "Kampfgruppe" nicht beschaffen. [b6] in Athenay aufzusuchen und von meinem Auftrag in Kenntnis zu setzen, habe ich nicht durchgeführt. Den Auftrag, die 200,— DM noch zu zahlen, an eine Frau [b6] zu übermitteln, führte ich durch. Ich übergab das Geld an die Rückadresse "Schiff" in Berlin. Über Transporte von sowjetischen Fahrzeugen auf der Berlin-Halle habe ich RUX mehrere Male Mitteilung gemacht. Ich rief den Mitarbeiter die Richtung, aus der die Züge kamen und in welche die Züge fuhren. Nur über einen Zug, auf dem ich selber gefahren bin, konnte ich RUX näheres mitteilen. Ich nannte ihm die Zugnummer, die Beladung der Güterwagen, die Waggengattung, sowie den Ziel- und Abgangsbahnhof. Die sowjetischen Kraftfahrzeuge merkte ich mir eine Nummer, als ich mit [b6] zusammen Ende Oktober Anfang November in der Nähe der Reichsbahn in Magdeburg war. Ich nannte [b6] die Automaten, die er sich anschaffte. Auch machte ich RUX über Unregelmäßigkeiten in der Fahrt bei der Reichsbahn Vorkommen.

Zur Beispiel Ursachen von Zugverspätungen und Arbeitsstörungen der Eisenbahner.

Auf Befragen des RUX machte ich ihm über die Versorgung der Bevölkerung mit Heizmaterial Mitteilung. Ich machte Angaben über die Kontrolle bei der Einfuhr nach Berlin, dabei war ich auf Maßnahmen angewiesen und sagte, dass ähnlich die Kontrolle an der Demarkationslinie durchgeführt wird.

Der Osterauftrag wäre kurz vor der Vollerfüllung.

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Frage: Wie führten Sie die Spionageaufträge durch?

Antwort: Während des Dienstes habe ich festgestellt, daß einzelne Güterwagen mit Eisen beladen in Richtung Frankfurt/Oder und in Richtung zu den Ostseehäfen fahren. Ich konnte auch vereinzelt den Abgang und Zielbahnhof von den Güterwagen ablesen. So machte ich auch dem Agenten RUX im Herbst 1952 über Transporte mit Exportwaren und ihre Bestimmungsländer Mitteilung. Durch meine Tätigkeit bei der Reichsbahn habe ich RUX konkrete Angaben über die Produktion des Sprengstoffwerkes Schönebeck und den Versand der Produkte machen können. Auch die gemachten Angaben über Truppenverchiebungen der sowjetischen Armee habe ich durch meine Tätigkeit bei der Reichsbahn und durch Unterhaltungen mit meiner Frau feststellen können. Die anderen durchgeführten Aufträge, zum Beispiel über die Volkspolizei und über die Produktionsgenossenschaften habe ich durch Gespräche und Zeitungsberichte zur Kenntnis genommen. Durch meine Eltern und andere Vorbesitzer von Gochau hörte ich, daß besonders Großbauern wenig Arbeitskräfte haben. Auch meine Tätigkeit bei der Reichsbahn konnte ich dem Mitarbeiter der "Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit" die Neubestimmungen der Reichsbahndirektion Magdeburg und den Reichsbahnmeistern mündlich mitteilen. Konkrete Berichte konnte ich nur aus meiner Tätigkeit bei der Reichsbahn liefern. So machte ich dem Mitarbeiter der "Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit" Mitteilung, die immer auf mündliche Weise erfolgte, von den bereits zu Protokoll gegebenen sowjetischen Militärtransporten. Ende Oktober - Anfang November ging ich mit [b6] zur Poliseinspektion in Magdeburg, um über die Belegung, Anzahl der Polizisten, Art der Fahrzeuge und Truppengattung Feststellungen zu treffen. Bei dieser Gelegenheit merkte ich mir eine Autonummer eines sowjetischen Fahrzeuges, das aus der Poliseinspektion herausfuhr. Angaben über die Poliseinspektion konnte ich dem Mitarbeiter der "Kampfgruppe" nicht geben.

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da an dieser Lage keine sonstigen Fahrzeuge aus, noch
in die Kaserne führen. Ich bin mit [b6]
an der Kaserne ab und abgegangen.
Meine Ehefrau [b6] berichtete mir über die
Kameradschaften, die bei der Wehrmacht vorkamen.
Durch die Tätigkeit bei der Wehrmacht habe ich Gelegen-
heit gehabt, oft nach Berlin, zu den Mitarbeitern der
"Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit" zu fahren.
Bei dieser Gelegenheit brachte mir Walter K. [b6]
Spionage-Material, das ich mit zu Ruz nach Westberlin
nahm. Ich nahm circa 4 bis 5 Male, daß ich dortiges
Spionage-Material mit nach Westberlin zu der "Kampfgruppe
gegen Unmenschlichkeit" nahm. Ferner möchte ich noch zu
Protokoll geben, daß ich über die Demokratisierung
der Versammlungen dem Mitarbeiter der "Kampfgruppe"
Mitteilung machen sollte. Da ich an dieser Demokrati-
sierung keine nähere Kenntnis gehabt habe, konnte ich
Ruz darüber keine Angaben machen. Den Auftrag des
Mitarbeiters der "Kampfgruppe", [b6] in West-
berlin für die Mitarbeit anzuwerben, führte ich aus,
daß ich an ihn einen Brief schrieb, indem ich ihn zur
Mitarbeit aufforderte. Ich hatte diesem auf der
Landes-Wehrschule erzählt, daß ich eine feindliche
Tätigkeit aufnehmen wollte. Durch meine Tätigkeit in
den Jahren 1950/51 konnte ich über die
Verhältnisse von Ruz, über die Bewachung, über den Transport-
weg, über die Wohnverhältnisse, die Verhältnisse der
Mitarbeiter, über den Schichtwechsel, sowie über die Stimmung der
Arbeiter berichten. Desweiteren nannte ich Ruz die
Geheimschriftart und machte ihm Angaben über
sowjetische Offiziere und über die Wehrleitung.
Anhand einer Skizze, die mir Ruz zeigte, best. sich ich dem
Mitarbeiter, daß mir ein Flugplatz der sowjetischen
Armee, so wie er aufgezeichnet ist, nicht bekannt sei.

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Spionageberichte ?

Frage: Wie überbrachten Sie die

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Antwort: Diese Spionageberichte überbrachte ich dem Mitarbeiter der "Kampfgruppe" mündlich. Ich machte mir oft Notizen auf Zetteln und berichtete diesen dann dem Mitarbeiter.

Frage: War war Ihnen bei der Durchführung Ihrer Aufträge behilflich?

Antwort: Bei der Durchführung meiner Aufträge war mir meine Ehefrau b6 MR behilflich, da sie auch bei der Reichsbahn in Magdeburg als Loküberwacherin tätig war und einen größeren Einblick in den gesamten Eisenbahnbetrieb hatte. Eine weitere Person war mir bei der Durchführung vorgenannter Aufträge nicht behilflich. Ich habe die verbrecherischen Aufträge alle selbst durchgeführt.

Frage: Welche Personen haben Sie für Ihre verbrecherische Tätigkeit angeworben?

Antwort: Für die verbrecherische Tätigkeit habe ich einen b6 MR b6 MR angeworben, indem ich beide dem RUX in Westberlin aufführte. Direkt angeworben habe ich nur meine Ehefrau. b6 wurde durch den Mitarbeiter der "Kampfgruppe" angeworben. Durch meine Hilfe wurde b6 ebenfalls von RUX angeworben.

Frage: Welche Decknamen haben Sie vom Mitarbeiter der "Kampfgruppe" gegen Unzuständigkeit erhalten?

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Antwort: Beim zweiten Treff im Monat Juni erhielt ich von RUX den Decknamen " " und beim vierten oder fünften Treff den Decknamen " ". Mit diesen Decknamen meldete ich mich immer telefonisch, wenn ich RUX in Westberlin anrief. Beim zweiten Treff im Monat Juni erhielt ich ferner von RUX ein Blatt Papier mit einem Zeichen, welches er in der Mitte durchgehends hat. Die eine Hälfte gab mir b6, die andere Hälfte behielt er jedoch. Hiermit erklärte er mir, daß ich, wenn sich eine Person bei mir meldet

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und mir das Gegenstück, welches er zurückbehielt, vorzeigt, zu dieser Person vollstes Vertrauen haben kann.

Dieser Person kann ich Berichte aushändigen. Eine Person hat sich bei mir jedoch nicht gemeldet. Auch belehrte mich der Mitarbeiter der "Kampfgruppe" darüber, daß, wenn ich eine Karte mit dem Text: "Verlobung" erhalte, ich zu ihm kommen solle. Erhalte ich aber eine Karte mit dem Text: "Verlobung aufgelöst" befinde ich mich in Gefahr. Erhalte ich eine Karte mit dem Text: "Kind angekommen", so sollte ich mich schnellstens nach Westberlin absetzen.

So habe ich am 3.1.1953 eine Ansichtskarte von RUX erhalten, auf dieser Karte teilte er mir mit, daß Onkel Emil und Tante tüchtig Sylvester gefeiert haben und wie ich ins neue Jahr gekommen bin. Ferner teilte er mir mit, daß Onkel Emil ein Magengeschwür hat. Aus dieser Karte bin ich nicht klug geworden und glaubte, mich wieder bei RUX in Westberlin melden zu müssen. Ich nahm auch an, daß irgend etwas nicht in Ordnung sei und dass ich mich in Gefahr befinde.

Frage: Was haben Sie für die durchgeführten Aufträge vom Mitarbeiter der Verbrecherorganisation erhalten?

Antwort: Insgesamt habe ich vom Mitarbeiter der "Kampfgruppe" zirka 120,— bis 140,— Westmark erhalten. RUX vergütete mir immer nur die Reise und meine Anlagen. Ferner gab er mir mehrere Male eine Schachtel Zigaretten, sowie eine Tafel Schokolade und bezahlte die Kosten in den Gastwirtschaften.

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Frage: Aus welchem Grunde führten Sie diese verbrecherische Tätigkeit gegen die Deutsche Demokratische Republik durch?

Antwort: Ich habe diese verbrecherische Tätigkeit durchgeführt, weil ich mit verschiedenen Maßnahmen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik nicht einver-

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standen war. Beeinflusst durch das Abhören des Nordwest-
deutschen Rundfunks und des Hetzsenders "RIAS" wurde ich
in meiner negativen Einstellung zur Deutschen Demokratischen
Republik bestärkt. Der Verbindungsmann der "Kampfgruppe gegen
Unmenschlichkeit" [b6] hat es verstanden, mich für die
feindliche Tätigkeit anzuwerben. Alle die genannten Umstände
trugen dazu bei, diese verräterische Tätigkeit durchzuführen.

selbst gelesen und unterschrieben:

[b6]

verlesen und geschlossen:

[b6]

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RESTRICTED SECURITY

to CR

TRANSLATION

Refugee Screening Berlin
Report Nr 2911/53

b1

Berlin 12.11.1953

BfV

File D-395-979

SfS Technical Training

(Source)

b1

DOB

b1

German

Laborer, SfS Faldwabel (Sgt)

Previous Address:

b1

Parents:

b1

Identity Document:

b1

Federal Refugee Emergency Acceptance Commission

TOC.R: FUEIN D 395979

Previously questioned by the Police, the three
Allies, KGU, Uff, Ostbures of the CDU, FDP and SPD.

From 27 May 52 to 31 July 53, he was in BERLIN,
WITTEBERG, WISSENFRIS, NARBURG

Information in report obtained by source through
activity (employment) with various offices of the
SfS.

Source is a simple person of hardly average intel-
ligence. Information and personal data is considered
believable.

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Now located in BERLIN-Charlottenburg, Salmerstr 14,
Refugee Camp, wants to go to mining area in North
Rhein-Westphalia.

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SFS Technical Training

All operational co-workers must subject themselves to a continual technical training. The technical training courses are given in each Kreis Administration (Office) principally by the Kreis Office Chief.

The guiding principle number 21 of the MFS of February 1953 serves as the main basis for study. In addition all co-workers are instructed continually through pertinent circular orders insofar as they are of a general nature.

These courses do not replace the training at special SFS schools as, for example, in POTSDAM-Buche.

From the guiding principle number 21, the source could make only the following detailed statements:

What is a GI?

A GI is a person who because of his position in social life is in the situation to be able to give the SFS important information. The GI has no direct contact with the opponent. The GI actually works for idealistic reasons. He receives payment only in individual cases when he delivers especially valuable reports.

What is a GM?

A GM should have basically direct contact with the opponent. GM's are frequently "turned back", that is, members of Western agencies among others.

The GM is more important to the SFS than a GI and is considerably better and usually always paid.

Because of the importance, GM's are handled in most instances by the office chief of the Kreis.

Who can occupy a conspirative residence (cover house)?

The occupant of a conspirative residence should be a reliable and good SED brother; he can be an otherwise progressive person who through his previous conduct, which has been checked, has proved that he is positively in favor of Socialism and is prepared at any time to help the Soviet Zone Government.

The conspirative residence itself should be located if possible in a large house in which there is much traffic; for example, it is practical when in such a house there is a doctor's office, a lawyer's office, a shop, or similar businesses. The residence (apartment or room) itself should if possible be on the ground floor, or first floor above, so that the

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GM's or GI's, through repeated visits to such a residence are not noticed by the permanent residents.

If the occupant of the residence gave the room as a rented teaching room, it will then be furnished very good by the SFS itself.

Where are GM's and GI's to be looked for?

GM's and GI's are looked for among those persons who through their occupation have the possibility of coming together without difficulty with a larger circle of persons continually, for example, bartenders, innkeepers, insurance agents, street car operators, barbers, newspaper vendors, doctors, etc.

Insofar as possible GM's or GI's should not be selected from members of the SED since they are already obligated within the realm of the so-called "alertness" to report all appropriate observations to the SED leadership. The SED leadership must at all times forward appropriate reports to the responsible SFS office. It is desired to have SED members visit the SFS office directly only in exceptional cases.

Recruiting

There are three types of recruitment:

1. Recruitment through inner conviction:

A progressive person in the interest of the Soviet Union will permit himself to be recruited because of inner conviction. If it concerns a religious person, it must be made clear that the Government of the GDR also promotes and supports the churches.

2. Recruitment through pressure:

If a person who is acceptable to the SFS is charged criminally or politically, he can be recruited by pressure. However, possibly freedom from prosecution may be offered if such a person is prepared to work for the SFS.

3. Turning back of sources:

If the SFS has learned that a resident of the Soviet Zone or a citizen of West BERLIN or the Federal Republic who is repeatedly seen in the Soviet Zone, works for the opponent, he must be "turned back"; that is, he is recruited under pressure and is provided significantly more financial advantages than he receives from the opponent. The latter concerns only, however, persons who are to be doubleed as GI's.

It has been repeatedly ordered that the main workers of the SFS offices use the greatest part of their time for the recruiting of GM's and GI's, and occupants of conspirative residences.

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Carrying out of Meetings

Meetings in open places, parks, streets, and locales are basically to be prevented. A direct prohibition of this has not been given to date.

If a meeting takes place in a conspirative residence, the operational co-worker must prepare himself thoroughly before going to the meeting; that is, he must have a detailed knowledge of the previous reports submitted by the GM or GI.

The case worker must have at each meeting his pistol worn in the prescribed manner. He must enter the conspirative residence at least ten minutes prior to the meeting and orient himself on the possible alterations which may have been made in the residence. The report of the meeting must be prepared during the meeting by the GM or GI, and with ink or indelible pencil.

If the GM comes from West BERLIN he must be generously supplied with cigarettes and drinks as well as food.

The occupant of the residence must not open the door for the GM or GI; this must be done by the operational co-worker himself. After the ending of the meeting, he must observe the exit of the GM to see if he possibly meets with some other person or is under observation by another person. Before the case worker himself leaves, he must check the condition of the residence and look for carbon paper which may have been left lying, etc.

The reliability of a GM or GI or the occupant of a conspirative residence is checked on through other GM's or GI's. Occupants of conspirative residences are obligated to report immediately possible changes in the house and also new tenants. In this respect a meeting in the open when it cannot be avoided is held similarly and similarly. Preparations for it must be carried out.

Courier System

In the district of the SFS HALLE, courier days are Monday and Thursday of each week. Between 1100 and 1200 hours the courier of the District Office HALLE arrives at the Kreis Office GRAEFENHAINICHEN. Here he is awaited by the couriers from BERNAU, ROSSLAN, WITTENBERG, and BITTERFELD for the exchange of courier mail.

The armed couriers (2) can go only by automobile.

Special courier pouches have not been observed by the source. The operational co-worker designated as courier generally uses his own briefcase.

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Special Measures

On special occasions, as for example the celebration of the October Revolution, STALIN's birthday, celebration of the founding of the GDR, b6 birthday, and others, the operational co-workers and other personnel are all held almost constantly at the office. Three days before and approximately three days after such occasions, the operational co-workers must perform patrol duty. In this the

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HEADQUARTERS

66TH COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS DETACHMENT
EUROPEAN COMMAND

D-306006

APC 154
3 March 1952

SUBJECT: Ministry for State Security, Operation at Kreis Level

TO: See Distribution

1. Inclosed herewith are portions of a recent report from CIO Region VIII, BERLIN (N53/275), concerning organizations, methods of operation, training, communications and certain administrative matters of the MSS in a Kreis office.

2. The source of the information contained in this report is a former MSS officer who served in a Kreis office of that organization for approximately one (1) year.

3. Most of the information in the attached report dates no later than December 1950. There is no reason to suppose it is not generally still valid, however, with the possible exception of the information concerning the relationship between the MGB and the MSS. With the apparent slow phasing out of many MGB offices, particularly those in rural Kreise, close control by the MGB has reportedly been replaced by close supervision. Information in the inclosed report is evaluated F-6.

4. This report presents the most complete picture of MSS operations and structure at Kreis level which has to date come to the attention of this headquarters. Parts of its contents will be incorporated into an MSS workbook now being prepared. It is believed that study of its contents at this time by all persons concerned with this target will prove highly profitable.

BY ORDER OF COLONEL b6

1 Incl

SOI Reg VIII, file VIII-
12650-3, subj: MSS Land Admini-
stration of Land Saxony-Anhalt,
dat 6 Feb 52.

b6
Maj. TC
Chief, Operations Section

Cap b6 /ms/Stgt 944-344
OP5

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6 February 1952

66th CIC Detachment, Region VIII, CE Team, File No. VIII-12650.3

Ministry for State Security, Land Administration of Land
Saxony-Anhalt.

1. The following information was obtained from source concerning the activities of the MSS in a Kreis office:

a. The MSS Kreis office in which source was stationed was not divided into departments. The authorized strength as of December 1950 was as follows: Eight (8) MSS agents and case officers (Operativerbeiter), including the chief of the office, four (4) guards, one (1) secretary, and one (1) driver.

b. All targets and cases were assigned to this Kreis MSS office either from MSS Headquarters in HALLE (M52/D92) or directly from the MGB office responsible for the Kreis. If the MSS at Kreis level wanted to initiate an investigation, a request was forwarded to Land headquarters for approval. All important cases were investigated personally by the case officers. Any cases to be investigated outside of the Kreis area had to be first approved by Land headquarters or the local MGB.

c. The MSS Kreis office had no direct relationship or liaison with the local government and administrative units. All local agencies, including all political parties, were targets of the MSS at Kreis level.

d. No direct liaison existed between the local MSS offices and the SED at Kreis level. Penetration of the SED at Kreis level was ordered by MSS headquarters in HALLE. The local MSS office had at least one (1) informant in the SED Control Commission at Kreis level and this informant reported directly to the local MSS office. It is possible that this informant, whose name was known to Land headquarters, also reported information directly to Land headquarters. No SED functionaries were informed about the identity of MSS informants. It was also possible that Land headquarters also placed an informant in the local SED Leitung without the knowledge of the local MSS office.

e. MSS Kreis offices were ordered to penetrate all police agencies at Kreis level. With the exception of the regular criminal and uniformed police (HVDVP), no other police units are located in Kreis offices.

f. (1) Up to June 1950, all local MSS offices were directly controlled and supervised by the MGB office located in the Kreis. Source reported almost daily for instructions to the local MGB liaison officer.

(2) Source was not informed as to the operational demarcation between the MGB and MSS; however, she believed that the MSS at Land level was responsible for not

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transferring into matters or cases with which the MGB was concerned.

(3) As of December 1950, the MGB gave missions directly to the MSS at Kreis level. As of October/November 1951, the MGB at a nearby office was continuing to come to the source's office twice weekly to meet their informants and to assign cases to the local MSS. Usually, one MGB officer would meet and talk to informants and another MGB officer would give instructions and missions to the MSS chief at Kreis level. Most of the MGB cases or missions which were assigned to the local MSS concerned themselves with a particular person or an illegal organization that the MGB was interested in.

(4) The various MGB operations were gradually being turned over to the MSS from the MGB. The Kartoi (Card files) in one town was turned over to the local MSS office by the MGB in January 1951. [b6] Chief of MSS in Land Saxony-Anhalt, commented at an operations meeting at HALLE that the MSS would be assigned all work concerning GDR which is presently performed by the MGB as soon as the MSS indicated that it was competent to it. [b6] further stated that the MGB would then only concern itself with supervisory work and control of high MSS officials.

(5) As of December 1950, no MGB informants had been turned over to the MSS at Kreis level. However, the MSS headquarters in HALLE had intimated that the MSS would, in the near future, be given some of the MGB's informants. No informants were recruited by the MSS for the local MGB.

(6) Source had no knowledge whether or not the MGB recruited MSS agents as informants, but he was of the opinion that one MSS agent in every MSS Kreis office is an informant of the local MGB.

g. The MSS recruits prospective agents mostly from the SED local police, and governmental units. A selected candidate was obliged to fill out a questionnaire given to him by his immediate supervisor or at his place of employment. Selected persons are not aware at the time that they are being recruited for the MSS, but are of the opinion that they will be given a position with the Landesbehoerde Der Volkspolizei (People's Police at Land level) in HALLE or a position with the GDR. Before being questioned or interviewed by the MSS chief or one of the case officers, information concerning the candidate has already been received from the SED informants or from informants at the candidate's place of employment. This information mostly concerns the person's political beliefs, relatives, and close friends and associates. The candidate is then interviewed by the Kreis MSS chief or by one of the case officers concerning the information the candidate had entered on his questionnaire. From the information received through this interview and information received from the MSS informants, a letter of recommendation is written by the interviewing officer.

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This letter of recommendation along with the candidate's questionnaire and other personal papers are sent to MSS headquarters in HALLE. The prospective agent's papers are re-examined at Land headquarters and if the candidate has relatives residing at other cities in the GDR, a lead sheet is sent to the respective MSS office in order that this office can investigate the relatives. The results of these investigations are forwarded directly back to MSS headquarters in HALLE. After thoroughly investigating the applicant's background, MSS headquarters in HALLE, after receiving an approval from the MGB headquarters in HALLE, approves the assignment to the MSS and assigns the candidate to whatever office is desired. Usually a person is assigned to a Kreis which is not known to him. As of December 1950, no special training was given new MSS agents and the prime qualifications were of a political nature. It was preferred that a person be a pre-1933 KPD or a young anti-fascist ex-Soviet POW. According to source, MSS headquarters depended on the Criminal Police to do most of the technical work, such as interrogations, fingerprinting, and etc. An operative was usually given the rank of VP Korrisar; the younger ones usually started at the rank of VP Meister.

h. As of December 1950, all training was in the hands of the Kreis MSS chief and his case officers. This training was supplemented by the local MGB officer. Usually the Kreis chief called a meeting once a month for all MSS personnel under his supervision, and at this time, he and his case officers gave instructions and advice on methods of operation. The local MGB officer came about twice a month and gave special instructions to MSS agents on operational matters. The MSS chief also received orientations at Land headquarters once a month which he was to pass on to the MSS personnel under his command.

i. Informants:

(1) Informants were usually selected from the ranks of trusted SED members. Persons with a criminal record of convictions for a moral crime were also recruited as informants; persons arrested for a minor crime are forced to work as informants for MSS.

(2) A selected informant was obliged to fill out a personal questionnaire (Lebenslauf) and furnish a recent picture of himself. The MSS chief reviewed the questionnaire and made a characterization of the person after interviewing him. The informant was forced to sign a statement to the effect that he would never work for the GDR and never reveal his work to any person. All papers were then sent to MSS Land headquarters. Every name of a prospective informant was checked in the MGB Register at Land level.

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(3) As of December 1950, the local MGB approved the naming of informants after the MGB files had been checked. The MGB could disapprove a prospective informant although MSS Land headquarters had approved.

(4) Up to February 1950, informants were given numbers.

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After that date a cover name was assigned to each informant. This cover name appeared on each informant's signed statement which is maintained at MSS Land headquarters. The MSS Kreis chief maintained a roster of all informants by cover name and correct name. Each informant chose his own cover name and it was changed only when the MSS chief learned that two (2) informants had the same cover name. All records pertaining to informants were maintained at Land headquarters.

(5) Informants were not paid regular salaries. When an informant reported something which was outstanding and reflected favorably on the MSS, he would receive a bonus from Land headquarters through the local MSS office. Informants were reimbursed for bus and train fares if the expense was incurred in the line of duty for the MSS.

(6) The MGB used their informant network to check on MSS informants. Each case officer or MSS chief filled out an informant control sheet monthly; a copy of this control sheet was forwarded directly to the local MGB office for examination. Control sheets contained meeting places, time of meetings, information reported on by informants, and missions assigned to informants by the handling agent.

j. Source, as chief of MSS in a Kreis office, received 250 marks per month in addition to his regular salary. Each operative (Sachbearbeiter) received 30 marks and the driver received 50 marks per month in addition to his regular salary. Each operative or chief was repaid for any official trips made during the month. This was paid at the end of each month and the money was received from the Interior Dept. In September 1950, Source was told at an operations meeting at FALLE that sources and informants would be paid for important information submitted in written form signed by the source. The sources or informant would be paid by Land headquarters through the local MSS office.

k. Modus Operandi in investigations:

(1) Subject of investigation was not to know that he was under investigation by the MSS or that he was even under suspicion.

(2) The following points were usually covered during the investigation:

a. Subject's background from birth up to the present date; to include any military service, and any criminal or moral record.

b. Places of employment. 0969

c. Relatives; including background data on each relative. Emphasis was placed on determining whether suspect had relatives residing outside the GDR and the political proclivities of those relatives residing in

the GDR.

d. Associates: particularly those associates who did not belong to the SED or belong to an organization not in sympathy with the GDR.

e. Travels: special stress was placed on travels to West Berlin or West Germany.

f. Salary: ascertain whether or not the suspect was living above his means.

g. Determination of Suspect's weak points and strong points.

h. Determination of ~~what~~ restaurants, cafes, and night clubs were frequented by Subject.

i. Attempt to identify all of Subject's visitors, particularly those visitors from out of town.

j. During the investigation, the investigating agent was to recruit one of Subject's enemies in order that this enemy of Subject would report all information known to him concerning Subject.

(3) The following places were sources of information for an investigation:

a. All local governmental and administrative units; including all police units, trade unions, etc.

b. MSS informants and SED functionaries.

c. Neighborhood checks. Non-sensitive neighborhood checks were performed by the local criminal police. Important cases were worked by an MSS operative.

d. Technical coverage was used in complaint type cases. Technical coverage was authorized by the local Amtsgericht until 1950; since then the MSS at Kreis level was given authority to place technical coverage on anyone whom the local MSS office deemed necessary.

e. Informants of the MSS occasionally discreetly had the Subject fill out a questionnaire under the pretense of receiving a more important job. This gave the MSS informant cause to question Subject on things which could not be verified during the investigation.

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1. Technical coverage: No technical facilities were available for technical coverage in the MSS office in which source served.

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(1) Mail was either brought to the MSS office by the local postmaster, or the interested case officer went to the post office for the intercepted mail. All mail was usually opened in the presence of the postmaster and one MSS agent. As of December 1950, the Kreis office depended on private photo shops or a nearby MSS office to have any photostats made.

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(2) Technical coverage on telephone or telegraph communication was performed by the local telephone and telegraph office. Results of this coverage were brought directly to the MSS chief by the chief of the local telephone office.

m. Interrogations: Interrogations were usually performed by former criminal policemen who had a great deal of experience in this type of work. Each Kreis office was authorized one experienced interrogator. In Source's office, each MSS agent interrogated persons pertaining to their respective cases. A preliminary interrogation was made at Kreis level and if the case was extremely important, the suspect was sent to HALLE where he was interrogated in detail by experienced interrogators. No special methods were employed at Source's office in the interrogation of suspects. Each MSS agent was responsible for the results of his interrogations and he was responsible for extracting the necessary information as best he could.

n. Arrests and treatment of prisoners: Most suspects were arrested by the local criminal police and turned over to the MSS. Persons involved in sensitive cases were arrested by MSS agents without the knowledge of any local government officials. The prisoners were interrogated in the local MSS offices or sent to HALLE. No prisoner could receive visitors or write to anyone. No one was to know that he was being held in the local MSS prison. Arrest warrants were approved by the local courts. Usually the local judge was a MSS informant. Instructions to arrest a suspect usually came from MSS headquarters in HALLE. House searches could be made without a search warrant; however, all searches were conducted in the presence of one witness.

o. MSS Courts: The MSS had a special court with special judges for the trying of MSS cases. The judges numbered from one (1) to five (5) and no sentences were given out under one (1) year.

p. (1) Due to Source's long absence from the MSS office, he could no longer remember in detail the exact cases which were run by his office. Source stated that at the beginning of the MSS, about 80% of all cases originated from the local MGB and the remainder from MSS Land headquarters. In December 1950, the percentage of cases from the local MGB and from Land headquarters were about equal. He is of the opinion that presently 70% of the cases are directed by MSS headquarters in HALLE. Reports were typed in four (4) copies: original and one (1) copy was held by the local office until court proceedings were ready, then the original was sent to HALLE which in turn forwarded it to the responsible court. One (1) copy was forwarded direct to the local MGB office and one (1) copy to MSS headquarters in HALLE. All papers pertaining to a certain case were forwarded to HALLE;

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even the copy, which was held by the local MSS office, was later forwarded to MSS Land headquarters. The local office could recall a dossier from HALLE if further investigation was desired on a case which was previously considered closed. The dossier of every case is registered under a cover name and not the name of the person under investigation. In Source's former office, each case officer was assigned part of the alphabet and all cases falling under his letters were his responsibility. Investigations were conducted as outlined in sub-paragraph 1-k above.

(2) a. In addition to the regular cases assigned to the MSS office, the office was given the mission of reporting on and controlling the following organizations and persons:

- (1) Police units at all levels.
- (2) All political parties existing in the Kreis
- (3) All churches or religious organizations whether organized or not.
- (4) Any organization or person which was believed to have support from the Western Countries or West Germany.
- (5) All local governmental agencies and administrations.
- (6) People's Owned Factories.
- (7) Jehovah Witnesses (Priority I).
- (8) Former German Army officers residing in the Kreis.
- (9) Farm Implement Loan Station (MAS).
- (10) Western intelligence agencies. Source named CIC and SVI.

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q. Reports: (1) Each MSS Kreis Office was required to make a monthly report to HALLE on all cases being conducted and all cases which were completed during the previous month. The cases had to be sub-divided as to the nature of the case or the crime against the GDR.

(2) Incident reports had to be first reported by telephone and afterwards a written report had to be forwarded directly to HALLE.

(3) Cases were written up in report form and distributed as outlined in sub-paragraph 1-p.

r. As of December 1950, no files were maintained in the Kreis office. All files and dossiers were being maintained at HALLE.

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s. Couriers: (1) All MSS couriers are MSS officers who are accompanied by an MSS chauffeur and an MSS guard. Each person participating in a courier run is armed with either a Belgian FN 7.65 pistol or a Walther PP. The courier always traveled in an MSS vehicle. Whenever an MSS office becomes under strength, only an MSS officer and a chauffeur go on the courier run. The MSS agents usually took turns as courier. The courier schedule is always irregular and the exact date set in advance.

(2) Every piece of correspondence or reports carried by a courier is given a number and logged in the courier book. The courier log is maintained by the MSS chief. All documents are put in a courier pouch which is locked with a special lock to which no one except the MSS Kreis chief has a key. Additional keys are available at points where the courier gives up the pouch. The courier cannot open the pouch unless he does it surreptitiously.

(3) MAGDEBURG is the meeting place for all couriers in Land Saxony-Anhalt. At MAGDEBURG, all courier pouches are combined and a courier is dispatched from MAGDEBURG to MSS headquarters in HALLE. This system is used for all information coming from MSS headquarters in HALLE to all MSS offices in Land Saxony-Anhalt. Each MSS office which is a meeting point for couriers has a key for all pouches delivered to that particular office. Source believes that the courier guard is strengthened between MAGDEBURG and HALLE and it is a possibility that a dummy courier is often dispatched on the trip to confuse any persons who are interested in intercepting the courier.

t. Communications: The MSS office, in addition to its own telephone communication, utilized the telephone for the police which is a direct line. The MSS also uses teletype. The Kreis MSS office can contact any MSS office in the GDR by this means. All messages going out by teletype are coded. All messages are coded and decoded by the MSS chief who keeps and maintains the code book.

u. Vehicles: All MSS vehicles for Land Saxony-Anhalt are delivered to and controlled by MSS headquarters in HALLE. All MSS cars have a license number which begins with SE-10 followed by four (4) additional numbers. All vehicles from the HALLE area begin with SN10, SN11, and SN12. It is possible to mistake an MSS car for a privately owned car from the HALLE area.

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v. Wearing of uniform: In source's former office, MSS agents usually wore a uniform. On special cases, the MSS agents always wore civilian clothes. There was no set rule as to whether the agents had to wear a uniform or civilian clothes; the agent wore a uniform or civilian clothes on his own discretion.

w. Salaries of MSS officers: As of December 1950:

~~SECURITY INFO~~ ~~TOP SECRET~~

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Gross Monthly Salary</u>	<u>Expense Money</u>
Chokinspökteur	3000 East Marks	1000 East Marks
Inspökteur	2200 East Marks	500 East Marks
Kommandeur	1500-1600 East Marks	500 East Marks
Oberrat	1000 East Marks	250 East Marks
Rat	800 East Marks	250 East Marks if chief of office
Oberrat	700 East Marks	30 East Marks
Kommissar	650 East Marks	30 East Marks

x. Hours and time of work:

- (1) Prior to August 1950: 0800 hours to 1700 with 30 minutes for lunch.
- (2) Since August 1950: 0900 hours to 1400 hours -
1600 hours to 2000 hours.
- (3) Present: 1000 hours to 1600 hours - 2000 to 2400.

All MSS agents were on call 24 hours a day. MSS informants were usually met sometime between 2000 and 2400 hours.

y. All functionaries of the SED and FDJ, as well as the PK officers, are pledged to report all information which is detrimental to the GDR or the Soviet Union to the local MSS office immediately. Inasmuch as most of these personalities were already coded MCS informants, control of those persons presented no problem. Occasionally a functionary would report an incident to SED headquarters in HALLE and cause the local MSS office considerable amount of embarrassment.

z. Checks on foreigners: The appearance of a foreigner in the area had to be reported immediately to the local MGB with the circumstances of why this person was in the Kreis. The MSS had been instructed by the local MGB that the MSS was in no case to attempt to control or arrest a foreigner without the prior approval of the local MGB officer.

Eval: (F-6)

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~~SECURITY INFO~~

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It is not reasonable to segregate meaningful portions of the record for release.

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Information pertains solely to another individual with no reference to you and/or the subject of your request.

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Information originated with another government agency. It has been referred to them for review and direct response to you.

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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

DATE

6 February 1952

PREPARING OFFICE

66th CIC Detachment, Region VIII, CE Team, File No. VIII-12650.3

b6 /fhp

SUBJECT

Ministry for State Security, Land
Administration of Land Saxony-Anhalt

CODE FOR USE IN INDIVIDUAL PARAGRAPH EVALUATION

OF SOURCE:

COMPLETELY RELIABLE A
USUALLY RELIABLE B
FAIRLY RELIABLE C
NOT USUALLY RELIABLE D
UNRELIABLE E
RELIABILITY UNKNOWN F

OF INFORMATION:

CONFIRMED BY OTHER SOURCES . . . 1
PROBABLY TRUE 2
POSSIBLY TRUE 3
DOUBTFULLY TRUE 4
IMPROBABLE 5
TRUTH CANNOT BE JUDGED 6

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

1. OSTERBURG (M53/Y77): The following information was obtained from source concerning the activities of the MSS in Kreis Osterburg, Land Saxony-Anhalt.

a. During the time source was with the MSS in Kreis Osterburg, the MSS office was not divided into departments. The authorized strength as of December 1950 was as follows: Eight (8) MSS agents and case officers (Operativarbeiter), including the chief of the office, four (4) guards, one secretary, and one driver.

b. All targets and cases were assigned to the MSS office in OSTERBURG either from MSS Headquarters in HALLE (M52/D92) or directly from the MGB office responsible for the Kreis. If the MSS at Kreis level wanted to initiate an investigation, a request was forwarded to Land Hq for approval. All important cases were investigated personally by the case officers. Any cases to be investigated outside of the Kreis area had to be first approved by Land Hq or the local MGB.

c. The MSS Kreis Office had no direct relationship or liaison with the local government and administrative units. All local agencies, including all political parties, were targets of the MSS at Kreis level.

d. No direct liaison existed between the local MSS offices and the SED at Kreis level. Penetration of the SED at Kreis level was ordered by MSS Hq in HALLE. The local MSS office had at least one informant in the SED Control Commission at Kreis level and this informant reported directly to the local MSS office. It is possible that this informant, whose name was known to Land Hq, also reported information directly to Land Hq. No SED functionaries were informed about the identity of MSS informants. It was also possible that Land Hq. also placed an informant in the local SED Leitung without the knowledge of the local MSS office.

e. MSS Kreis offices were ordered to penetrate all police agencies at Kreis level. With the exception of the regular criminal and uniformed police (HVDVP), no other police units are located in Kreis Osterburg.

f. (1) Up to June 1950, all local ~~MSS~~ offices were directly controlled and supervised by the MGB office located in the Kreis. Source reported almost daily for instructions to Lt. (fnu) [b6] at OSTERBURG, Bahnhofstrasse 17. Lt. [b6] is described as being approximately 36 years old, about 5'8" tall, weighing about 145 lbs., slender build, and having black wavy hair and dark eyes. [b6] who helped organize the MSS in Kreis Osterburg, left OSTERBURG in June 1950 and went to HALLE. Bahnhofstr. 17 was turned over to the PDJ. After June 1950, instructions were re-

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dated 6 February 1952

received from the MGB in STENDAL (M53/Y85) whose office was also responsible for Kreis Osterburg. Source then worked with Captain (fnu) [b6] about 41 years old, about 5'10" tall, blond hair, had a mole on left cheek.

- (2) Source was not informed as to the operational demarcation between the MGB and MSS; however, he believed that the MSS at Land level was responsible for not transgressing into matters or cases with which the MGB was concerned.
- (3) As of December 1950, the MGB gave missions directly to the MSS at Kreis level. As of October/November 1951, the MGB at STENDAL was continuing to come to the OSTERBURG MSS office on Tuesdays and Thursdays to meet their informants and to assign cases to the local MSS. Usually, one MGB officer would meet and talk to informants and another MGB officer would give instructions and missions to the MSS chief at Kreis level. Most of the MGB cases or missions, which were assigned to the local MSS, concerned themselves with a particular person or an illegal organization that the MGB was interested in.
- (4) The various MGB operations were gradually being turned over to the MSS from the MGB. The Kartei (Card files) in AUE (N51/K53) was turned over to the local MSS office by the MGB in January 1951. [b6] Chief of MSS in Land Saxony-Anhalt, commented at an operations meeting at HALLE that the MSS would be assigned all work concerning GDR which is presently performed by the MGB as soon as the MSS indicated that it was competent to successfully fulfill all missions and assignments given to it. [b6] further stated that the MGB would then only concern itself with supervisory work and control of high MSS Officials.
- (5) As of December 1950, no MGB informants had been turned over to the MSS at Kreis level. However, the MSS Headquarters in HALLE had intimated that the MSS would, in the near future, be given some of the MGB's informants. No informants were recruited by the MSS for the local MGB.
- (6) Source had no knowledge whether or not the MGB recruited MSS agents as informants, but he was of the opinion that one MSS agent in every MSS Kreis office is an informant of the local MGB.

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g. The MSS recruits prospective agents mostly from the SED, local police, and governmental units. A selected candidate was obliged to fill out a questionnaire given to him by his immediate supervisor or at his or her place of employment. Selected persons are not aware at the time that they are being recruited for the MSS,

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but are of the opinion that they will be given a position with the Landesbehoerde Der Volkspolizei (People's Police At Land Level) in HALLE or a position with the GDR. Before being questioned or interviewed by the MSS chief or one of the case officers, information concerning the candidate has already been received from the SED informants or from informants at the candidate's place of employment. This information mostly concerns the person's political beliefs, relatives, and close friends and associates. The Candidate is then interviewed by the Kreis MSS chief or by one of the case officers concerning the information the candidate had entered on his questionnaire. From the information received through this interview and information received from the MSS informants, a letter of recommendation is written by the interviewing officer. This letter of recommendation along with the candidate's questionnaire and other personnel papers are sent to MSS Headquarters in HALLE. The prospective agent's papers are re-examined at Land Headquarters and if the candidate has relatives residing at other cities in the GDR, a lead sheet is sent to the respective MSS office in order this office could investigate the relatives. The results of these investigations are forwarded directly back to MSS Headquarters in HALLE. After thoroughly investigating the applicant's background, MSS Headquarters in HALLE, after receiving an approval from the MGB Headquarters in HALLE, approves the assignment to the MSS and assigns him or her to wherever they see fit. Usually a person is assigned to a Kreis which is not known to him or her. As of December 1950, no special training was given new MSS agents and the prime qualifications were of a political nature. It was preferred that a person be a pre-1933 KPD or a young anti-fascist ex-Soviet POW. According to source, MSS Headquarters were depended on the Criminal Police to do most of the technical work, such as interrogations, fingerprinting, and etc. An operative was usually given the rank of VP Kommissar; the younger ones usually started at the rank of VP Meister.

h. As December 1950, all training was in the hands of the Kreis MSS chief and his case officers. This training was supplemented by the local MGB officer. Usually the Kreis chief called a meeting once a month for all MSS personnel under his supervision, and at this time, he and his case officers gave instructions and advice on methods of operations. The local MGB came about twice a month and gave special instructions to MSS agents on operational matters. The MSS chief also received orientations at Land Headquarters once a month which he was to pass on to the MSS personnel under his command.

i. Informants:

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- (1) Informants were usually selected from the ranks of trusted SED members. Persons with a criminal record or convictions for a moral crime were also recruited as informants; persons arrested for a minor crime are forced to work as informants for MSS.
- (2) A selected informant was obliged to fill out a personal questionnaire (Lebenslauf) and furnish a recent picture of himself. The MSS chief reviewed the questionnaire and made a characterization of the person after interviewing the person. The informant was forced to sign a statement to the effect that he would loyally

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work for the GDR and never reveal his work to any person. All papers were then sent to MSS Land Headquarters. Every name of a prospective informant was checked in the MGB Registry at Land level.

- (3) As December 1950, the local MGB approved the hiring of informants after the MGB files had been checked. The MGB could disapprove a prospective informant although MSS Land Headquarters had approved.
- (4) Up to February 1950, informants were given numbers. After February 1950, cover names were assigned to each informant. This cover name appeared on each informant's signed statement which is maintained at MSS Land Headquarters. The MSS Kreis chief maintained a roster of all informants by cover name and correct name. Each informant chose his own cover name and it was changed only when the MSS chief learned that two (2) informants had the same cover name. All records pertaining to informants were maintained at Land Headquarters.
- (5) Informants were not paid regular salaries. When an informant reported something which was outstanding and reflected favorably on the MSS, the informant would receive a bonus from Land Headquarters through the local MSS Office. Informants were reimbursed for bus and train fares if the expense was incurred in the line of duty for the MSS.
- (6) The MGB used their informant network to check on MSS informants. Each case officer or MSS chief filled out an informant control sheet monthly; a copy of this control sheet was forwarded directly to the local MGB office for examination. Control sheet contained meeting places, time of meetings, information reported on by informant, and missions assigned to the informant by the handling agent.

j. Source, as chief of MSS in Kreis Osterburg, received 250 marks per month in addition to his regular salary. Each operative (Sachbearbeiter) received 30 marks and the driver received 50 marks per month in addition to his regular salary. Each operative or chief was repaid for any official trips made during the month. This was paid at the end of each month and the money was received from the Intendentur Dept..

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dated 6 February 1952

In September 1950, Source was told at an operations meeting at HALLE that sources and informants would be paid for important information submitted in written form signed by the source. The sources or informant would be paid by Land Headquarters through the local MSS office.

k. Modus Operandi in investigations:

- (1) Subject of investigation was not to know that he was under investigation by the MSS or that he was even under suspicion.
- (2) The following points were usually covered during the investigation:
 - (a) Subject's background from birth up to the present date; to include any military service, and any criminal or moral record.
 - (b) Places of employment.
 - (c) Relatives; including background data on each relative. Emphasis was placed on determining if suspect had relatives residing outside the GDR and the political proclivities of those relatives residing in the GDR.
 - (d) Associates; particularly those associates who did not belong to the SED or belong to an organization not in sympathy with the GDR.
 - (e) Travels; special stress was placed on travels to West Berlin or West Germany.
 - (f) Salary; ascertain whether or not the suspect was living above his means.
 - (g) Determination of Suspect's weak points and strong points.
 - (h) Determination of what restaurants, cafes, and night clubs were frequented by Subject.
 - (i) Attempt to identify all of Subject's visitors, particularly those visitors from out of town.
 - (j) During the investigation, the investigating agent was to recruit one of Subject's enemies in order that this enemy of Subject would report all information known to him concerning Subject.

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dated 6 February 1952

(3) The following places were sources of information for an investigation:

- (a) All local governmental and administrative units; including all police units, trade unions, etc.
- (b) MSS informants and SED functionaries.
- (c) Neighborhood checks. Non-sensitive neighborhood checks were performed by the local criminal police. Important cases were worked by a MSS operative.
- (d) Technical coverage was used in complaint type cases. Technical coverage was authorized by the local Amtsgericht until 1950; since then the MSS at Kreis level was given authority to place technical coverage on anyone whom the local MSS office deemed necessary.
- (e) Informants of the MSS occasionally discreetly had the Subject fill out a questionnaire under the pretense of receiving a more important job. This gave the MSS informant cause to question SUBJECT on things which could not be verified during the investigation.

1. Technical coverage: While Source was chief of the Osterburg MSS office, no technical facilities were available for technical coverage.

- (1) Mail was either brought to the MSS office by the local postmaster, or the interested case officer went to the post office for the intercepted mail. All mail was usually opened in the presence of the postmaster and one MSS agent. As of December 1950, the Osterburg office depended on private photo shops or the MSS office in STENDAL to have any photostats made.
- (2) Technical coverage on telephone or telegraph communication was performed by the local telephone and telegraph office. Results of this coverage was brought directly to the MSS chief by the chief of the local telephone office.

m. Interrogations: Interrogations were usually done by former criminal policemen who had a great deal of experience in this type of work. Each office, such as the Osterburg office, was authorized one experienced interrogator. In OSTERBURG, each MSS agent interrogated persons pertaining to their respective cases. A preliminary interrogation was made at Kreis level and if the case was extremely important, the suspect was sent to HALLE where he was interrogated in detail by experienced interrogators. No special methods were employed at the Osterburg Office in the interrogation of suspects. Each MSS agent was responsible for the results of his interrogations and he was responsible for extracting the necessary information the best he could.

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66th CIC Detachment, Region VIII, CE Team, File No. VIII-12650.3

SUBJECT: Ministry for State Security, Land Administration of Land Saxony-Anhalt
dated 6 February 1952

n. Arrests and treatment of prisoners: Most suspects were arrested by the local criminal police and turned over to the MSS. Persons involved in sensitive cases were arrested by MSS agents without the knowledge of any local government officials. The prisoners were interrogated in the local MSS offices or sent to HALLE. No prisoner could receive visitors or write to anyone. No one was to know that he was being held in the local MSS prison. Arrest warrants were approved by the local courts. Usually the local judge was a MSS informant. Instructions to arrest a suspect usually came from MSS Headquarters in HALLE. House searches could be made without a search warrant; however, all searches were conducted in the presence of one witness.

o. MSS Courts: The MSS had a special court with special judges for the trying of MSS cases. The judges numbered from one to five (5) and no sentences were given out under one year.

p. (1) Due to Source's long absence from the MSS office, he could no longer remember in detail the exact cases which were run by his office. Source stated that at the beginning of the MSS, about 80% of all cases originated from the local MGB and the remainder from MSS Land Headquarters. In December 1950, the percentage of cases from the local MGB and from Land Headquarters were about equal. He is of the opinion that presently 70% of the cases are directed by MSS Headquarters in HALLE. Reports were typed in four (4) copies; original and one copy was held by the local office until court proceedings were ready, then the original was sent to HALLE who in turn forwarded it to the responsible court. One copy was forwarded direct to the local MGB office and one copy to MSS Headquarters in HALLE. All papers pertaining to a certain case were forwarded to HALLE; even the copy, which was held by the local MSS office, was later forwarded to MSS Land Headquarters. The local office could recall a dossier from HALLE if further investigation was desired on a case which was previously considered closed. The dossier of every case is registered under a cover name and not the name of the person under investigation. In OSTERBURG, each case officer was assigned part of the alphabet and all cases falling under his letters were his responsibility. Investigations were conducted as outlined in sub-paragraph 1-K above.

(2) a. In addition to the regular cases (see below) assigned to the MSS office, the Osterburg MSS office was given the mission of reporting on and controlling the following organizations and persons.

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SUBJECT: Ministry for State Security, Land Administration of Land Saxony-Anhalt
dated 6 February 1952

- (1) Police units at all levels.
 - (2) All political parties existing in Kreis Osterburg.
 - (3) All churches or religious organizations whether organized or not.
 - (4) Any organization or person which was believed to have support from the Western Countries or West Germany.
 - (5) All local governmental agencies and administrations.
 - (6) People's Owned Factories.
 - (7) Jehovah Witnesses (Priority I).
 - (8) Former German Army officers residing in Kreis Osterburg.
 - (9) Farm Implement Loan Station (MAS).
 - (10) Western intelligence agencies. Source named CIC and SVL.
- (b) Source furnished the following names of persons who were suspected of working for some western intelligence agency:
- (1) ^{NAK} [b6] (US Sector); an alleged courier from AUE to BERLIN-Schoeneberg.
 - (2) [b6] (fnu) [b6] a resident of Kreis Osterburg; known to frequent or work for the Lysoform firm in BERLIN-Schoeneberg.
 - (3) ^{Can't identify} [b6] (fnu) [b6] a member of the Border police and resides at HALLE; known to be in contact with Polizeirat [b6] [b6] in EBERSWALDE (N53/V08). [b6] is believed to be working for the West.
 - (4) ^{NAK} [b6] (US Sector); he has connections in WISMAR (M54/T49)
 - (5) ^{NAK} [b6] born [b6] in [b6] a resident of ARENDSEE, Kreis Osterburg; he is believed to be an American agent.

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(21) Herr (fnu) ^{3, 1, 100} [redacted], a school teacher residing at GALLENDORF, Kreis Osterburg, a double agent for MGB and West.

(22) ^{NR} [redacted] b6 clock maker, resides at OSTERBURG, Grosser Markt, a double agent for MGB and West.

RD - 306006 Conf 503 17 Jan 52 File VIII-12650.3 ? RD-211318 ?

(23) Frau (fnu) [redacted] b6 employee of the Stadtverwaltung at ARENDSEE, member of the LDP Kreisvorstand. Her husband resides somewhere in Western Germany and she was arrested by MSS and forced to work for the MGB.

(24) ^{NR} Herr (fnu) [redacted] b6 Oberregierungsrat, resides at MAGDEBURG.

(25) ^{can't identify} fnu [redacted] b6 resides at BENDER, Kreis Osterburg, a double agent.

(26) [redacted] b6 born [redacted] b6 in [redacted] b6 returned from internment in Yugoslavia and is believed to be working for a western power.

(27) ^{NR} [redacted] b6 born [redacted] b6 in [redacted] b6 returned from internment in Yugoslavia and is believed to be working for a western power.

(28) [redacted] b6 born [redacted] b6 at [redacted] b6 returned from internment in Yugoslavia and is believed to be working for a western power.

(29) ^{NR} Erich SATTLER: born 25 January 1904 in BRESLAU (P52/C41), resides at ARENDSEE, Hohe Warte 25, a tavern owner and believed to be west agent.

(30) [redacted] b6 born [redacted] b6 a merchant, resides at [redacted] b6

(31) ^{NR} Emil BORKOWSKI: born 21 July 1901.

(32) [redacted] b6 born [redacted] b6 at [redacted] b6 (L54/S55), resides at ARENDSEE, Hohe Warte 5.

(33) ^{NR} Erich HUNDE: born 14 August 1892, postmaster at ARENDSEE, resides at ARENDSEE, Bahnhofstr. 12, believed to be contact man for [redacted] b6 of HANNOVER (L53/X32).

(34) ^{RD 270243-VIII-10-50} [redacted] b6 age [redacted] b6 born [redacted] b6 resides at [redacted] b6 a double agent for MGB and west. 0985

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^{RD-288(28-AR-II-22-2-512)}
(35) ^{NR} Paul TREBSTEIN; born 24 July 1903, resides at ARENDSEE,
Bahnhof str. 10.

(36) ^{NR} b6; about 37 years old, resides at ARENDSEE %
a Frau b6 and also has an apartment at BERLIN-Char-
lottenburg, Kurfuerstendamm, has contact with BERLIN-
Lankwitz (US Sector), Bellingstr. 13. b6 works to-
gether with Frau b6 and Herr b6 named above.

(37) ^{NR} Herr (fmu) b6 member of LDP or NDP, resides at
OSTERBURG, Stendalerstr., has connections with PLUEKTHUN
and MASSE, two (2) former German Army Officers suspected
of organizing an underground movement.

(38) ^{NR} Hans b6 chief of the Finance Office at OSTERBURG.
His name was carried under MGB case number 958.

(39) b6 resides at b6
connections to West Germany and Ostbuero.

(40) b6 resides at b6 has
contacts in Ostbuero.

(41) b6 resides at b6, has
connections with Ostbuero.

(42) b6 resides at b6, has con-
nections with Ostbuero.

^{RD-230419AR, 167m 50, file VIII-11634, b6-9847}
(43) Frl (fmu) b6 employee of the Osterburg Post Office,
member of CDU-Ost.

^{NR} (44) b6 resides at b6 is
carried under MGB case number 957.

(45) ^{NR} b6 resides at b6 is carried
under MGB case number 963.

(46) ^{NR} b6 resides at b6 is carried
under MGB case number 961.

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- q. Reports: (1) Each MSS Kreis Office had to make a monthly report to HALLE on all cases being conducted and all cases which were completed during the previous month. The cases had to be sub-divided as to the nature of the case or the crime against the GDR.
- (2) Incident reports had to be first reported by telephone and afterwards a written report had to be forwarded directly to HALLE.
- (3) Cases were written up in report form and distributed as outlined in sub-paragraph 1-p (1) above.
- r. As of December 1950, no files were maintained in the Osterburg Office. All files and dossiers were being maintained at HALLE.
- s. Couriers: (1) All MSS Couriers are MSS officers who are accompanied by a MSS Chauffeur and a MSS guard. Each person participating in a courier run is armed with either a Belgian FN 7.65 pistol or a Walther PP. The courier always traveled in a MSS vehicle. Whenever a MSS office becomes under strength, only a MSS officer and a chauffeur goes on a courier run. The MSS agents usually took turns as courier. The courier schedule is always irregular and the exact date set in advance.
- (2) Every piece of correspondence or reports carried by a courier is given a number and logged in the courier book. The courier log is maintained by the MSS chief. All documents are put in a courier pouch which is locked with a special lock to which no one except the MSS Kreis chief has a key. Additional keys are available at points where the courier gives up the pouch. The courier cannot open the pouch unless he does it surreptitiously.
- 0987
- (3) The courier travels by automobile from OSTERBURG to STENDAL where he gives up the pouch to the STENDAL MSS office. STENDAL is the meeting point for couriers from OSTERBURG, SALZEDDEL (M53/Y27), GARDELEGEN (M53/Y44), and GENTAIN (M53/Z03). A courier is dispatched from STENDAL to MAGDEBURG with all material from the above named MSS offices. MAGDEBURG is the meeting place for all couriers in Land Saxony-Anhalt. At MAGDEBURG, all courier pouches are combined and a courier is dispatched from MAGDEBURG to MSS headquarters in HALLE. This system is used for all information coming from MSS Headquarters in HALLE to all MSS Offices in Land Saxony-Anhalt. Each MSS office which is a meeting point for couriers has a key for all pouches delivered to that particularly office. Source believes that the courier guard is strengthened between MAGDEBURG and HALLE and it is a possibility that a

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dummy courier is often dispatched on the trip to confuse any persons who are interested in intercepting the MSS courier.

t. Communications: The MSS office in OSTERBURG has the telephone number 583 which is a regular Post Office telephone number. In addition, the MSS office utilized the telephone for the police which is a direct line. Since June 1951, the MSS office in OSTERBURG has been using a teletype machine. Kreis MSS office can contact any MSS office in the GDR by teletype. All messages going out by teletype are coded. All messages are coded and decoded by the MSS chief who keeps and maintains the code book. No teletype was utilized in OSTERBURG at the time Source was chief of this office.

(NOTE: Source learned about the installation of a teletype machine at the OSTERBURG MSS office from a friend after his (source) release from prison).

u. Vehicles: All MSS vehicles for Land Saxony-Anhalt are delivered and controlled by MSS Headquarters in HALLE. All MSS cars have a license number which begins with SN-10 followed by four (4) additional numbers. All vehicles from the HALLE area begin with SN10, SN 11, and SN 12. It is possible to mistake a MSS car for a privately owned car from the HALLE area. As of December 1950, the OSTERBURG MSS office was using a grey-green Opel Olympia and a 98 cc Duerkopp motorcycle. No undercover cars were being utilized by the Osterburg office as of December 1950, however, police cars were often utilized.

v. Wearing of uniform: In OSTERBURG, MSS agents usually wore a uniform. On special cases, the MSS agents always wore civilian clothes. There was no set rule as to whether the agents had to wear a uniform or civilian clothes; the agent wore a uniform or civilian clothes on his own discretion.

w. Salaries of MSS officers: As of December 1950.

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Gross Monthly salary</u>	<u>Expense money</u>
Chekinspekteur	3000 East Marks	1000 East Marks
Inspekteur	2200 East Marks	500 East Marks
Kommandeur	1500-1600 East Marks	500 East Marks
Oberrat	1000 East Marks	250 East Marks
Rat	800 East Marks	250 East Marks if chief of office
Oberkommissar	700 East Marks	30 East Marks
Kommissar	650 East Marks	30 East Marks

x. Hours and time of work:

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(1) Prior to August 1950: 0800 hours to 1700 with 30 minutes for lunch.

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(2) Since August 1950; 0900 hours to 1400 hour -
1600 hours to 2000 hours.

(3) Present: 1000 hours to 1600 hours - 2000 to 2400.

All MSS agents were on call 24 hours a day. MSS Informants were usually met some-
time between 2000 and 2400 hours.

y. All functionaries of the SED and FDJ, as well as the PK officers, are pledged to report all information which is detrimental to the GDR or the Soviet Union to the local MSS office immediately. Inasmuch as most of these personalities were already coded MSS informants, control of these persons presented no problem. Occasionally a functionary would report an incident to SED Headquarters in HALLE and cause the local MSS office considerable amount of embarrassment.

z. Checks on foreigners: The appearance of a foreigner in Kreis Osterburg had to be reported immediately to the local MGB with the circumstances of why this person was in Kreis Osterburg. The MSS had been instructed by the local MGB that the MSS was, in no case, to attempt to control or arrest a foreigner without the prior approval of the local MGB officer.

Source: See IRS

Eval: (F-6)

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990-998

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INTERNAL ROUTE SLIP

HEADQUARTERS, EUROPEAN COMMAND

FILE NO: VIII-12650

SUBJECT: Ministry for State Security Office Procedure

DATE: 25 May 1950

(Number each memo or minute consecutively. Fill in each column, signed legibly draw a line across the sheet. Use entire width of sheet for long memoranda.)

No.	From	Pass to	Date	HAS THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH ALL CONCERNED?
1	CIC Reg VIII	Hq 66th CIC Det (Attn: Messrs. b6 b6)	25 May 50	<p>1. Forwarded for your information and any action deemed necessary.</p> <p>2. Source, [b1] Volkspolizei East Sector, BERLIN, obtained the information during May 1950 and gave it to [b1] on 20 May who reported it to handling agent on 21 May 1950.</p> <p>3. [b1]</p> <p>[b1]</p> <p>[b6]</p>

1 Incl: AR, Subj. & file as above (3)
w/Exhibit "A" (photostat & microfilm)
Berlin 42323/[b6]/hll/OPS

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(over)

~~RESTRICTED SECURITY~~

People's Police offices, the People's Police patrols, the offices of the SED and its mass organizations are to be checked (observed) continually.

At the same time the civil population is to be watched (gatherings, distribution of pamphlets, etc.).

1000